Here in murica we speak English! Anything else is offensive!

Hmm. Taken to its logical conclusion that would seem to prevent everyone making any statements about anything at all.

Which is, you know, fine... and all that.

My only basic assumption is that people are, and remain over time, very similar to each other. Unless, there's any evidence to the contrary.

This is Humanism 101.
 
If your humanism requires people to act and think in ways basically identical to late modern Europeans, it doesn't seem like much of a humanism.
 
Not at all. Though that's certainly one way of looking at it.

But another is that Europeans basically act and think in the ways that humanity always has done.

It's a two way street, if you like. Not only is it reasonable, in my view, to think that people of the ancient world were as capable of rational, and let's say compassionate, acts as modern people, but that modern people are as capable of the same sorts of acts as cruelty. (Should anyone have the idea that cruelty is a real thing, of course.)

The human condition is what it is. I don't really see why you think this is an outrageous notion.

This isn't, of course, to suggest that there aren't, or can't, be any differences whatsoever. No doubt there are. And if there's any evidence of differences, then that's fine and dandy. It's just that the default position is of similarity.

It's very nice to cite empiricism, but that's not how most scientific (I really wouldn't know how historians actually go about it, but it seems probable that they don't differ all that much in practice) investigation goes on. Usually a scientist* will start with a hypothesis that he's dreamt up, while sitting under an apple tree, perhaps. And only then go out into the real world and test his hypothesis against observation. A later scientist** - two or three hundred years later - might decide that apples and trees don't really pass muster, and dream up an alternative hypothesis that other scientists, 50 years later, decide fits their observations. And we're all set till the next dreamy scientist has another think.

*For the sake of argument, lets call him Newton.

** And this one, Einstein.
 
Not at all. Though that's certainly one way of looking at it.

But another is that Europeans basically act and think in the ways that humanity always has done.
You can make that case. But it's not a case you're making. That would mean starting with the thought and behaviour of "primitive man", and locating it in the thought and behaviour of "civilised man". (This was the great project of Lévi-Strauss, for example.) But what you're proposing is that we start with "civilised man" and assume his behaviour, not even locate it but really just assume it, in the thought and behaviour of "primitive man". That we can express this as a reversible equation does not change the fundamental narrow-sightedness of its content.

It's a two way street, if you like. Not only is it reasonable, in my view, to think that people of the ancient world were as capable of rational, and let's say compassionate, acts as modern people, but that modern people are as capable of the same sorts of acts as cruelty. (Should anyone have the idea that cruelty is a real thing, of course.)
I don't disagree. But those aren't substantial categories. Saying that people "could be cruel" or "could be rational" tells us nothing about the content of their thoughts and behaviour, nothing about their value systems or social existence, nothing about them as humans. It rings true but, but it's not history.

This isn't, of course, to suggest that there aren't, or can't, be any differences whatsoever. No doubt there are. And if there's any evidence of differences, then that's fine and dandy. It's just that the default position is of similarity.
But, why? There is no obvious reason to assume similarity, to assume anything that is not empirically supported (however tenuously), and plenty of reasons not to.
 
Hmm.

If you don't assume similarity, or indeed don't make any assumptions, then what can you possibly say about anything? All you're left with in the end, is saying you just don't know.

For example, when Caesar decided to divide Gaul into three parts, unless you make some assumptions about the workings of his mind, it's impossible to impute any motives to him at all: you'll just be left with the bare facts (if facts they are - which raises the whole question of what actually constitutes evidence) and your conclusion is you simply don't know.

I really don't think that anyone works in a vacuum: that they start with a blank slate, examine the world around them, and come to conclusions. Without any simplifying assumptions, all you have is a mass of undifferentiated input, and absolutely no clue to make any sense of it.

Rather, I think history says more about the people who write it than it does about the people of history. Indeed, what other purpose does it have?

I think making assumptions is fine, provided you know what your assumptions are. The danger comes when you don't know what they are; and even go so far as to think you don't have any. If you know, and clearly state, what your assumptions are, it's perfectly possible to re-examine them in the light of new information.
 
But, as I said, there are no reasons for us to make the assumptions you want to make, and numerous reasons not to. That it can be valid to be make assumptions about the past does not mean that it is valid in regards to any particular set of assumptions.

Simply being aware of the fact of our assumptions does not in itself improve the quality of our history, any more than being aware that we're building a house on sand means it won't sink.
 
Simply being aware of the fact of our assumptions does not in itself improve the quality of our history, any more than being aware that we're building a house on sand means it won't sink.

However, being aware that we can't tell sand from rock might make us more circumspect about where we build.
 
That's a fair point. But what's being proposed is we just sink the foundation wherever we happen to be standing, which is the worst of both worlds.
 
You're reading WAY too much into the comparison to the past, which was more illustrative than anything. Perhaps the illustrations were bad, I still think some were relevant (Napoleon), but I don't have enough evidence to support them so consider them withdrawn.

Bottom line is, Hitler, right now, is the "Big Bad" of the narrative we call popular history (and popular history being a narrative IS a historically averred fact; it has always been). I doubt he will be that to future generations, for the simple reason that WW II and the Holocaust won't be as relatable to them - as much a founding event of the world as they understand it - as it is to us now.

(Note that "big bad" describes here a role in a story; not the presence or absence of honor or other redeeming qualities)

He will still be seen as a villain, of course, but he just won't occupy the place he does now in our perception. And for that reason alone, it's dubious that he will ever be as reviled as he is now.
 
You're reading WAY too much into the comparison to the past, which was more illustrative than anything. Perhaps the illustrations were bad, I still think some were relevant (Napoleon), but I don't have enough evidence to support them so consider them withdrawn.

Bottom line is, Hitler, right now, is the "Big Bad" of the narrative we call popular history (and popular history being a narrative IS a historically averred fact; it has always been). I doubt he will be that to future generations, for the simple reason that WW II and the Holocaust won't be as relatable to them - as much a founding event of the world as they understand it - as it is to us now.

(Note that "big bad" describes here a role in a story; not the presence or absence of honor or other redeeming qualities)

He will still be seen as a villain, of course, but he just won't occupy the place he does now in our perception. And for that reason alone, it's dubious that he will ever be as reviled as he is now.
Even "Now" needs to be qualified by "Now, in these peculiar locations."
 
There's the traditional Loyalist view, for example, that Hitler was only a baddy to the extent that he was a high-ranking member of the International Papist Conspiracy, and thus subservient to the Roman Anti-Christ.
 
Fringe conspiracy theories and popular history are kind of known as not quite the same thing. Some conspiracy theories (JFK, perhaps moon landing) have managed to be integrated into popular history, but that's a far cry from considering every last loonie and quackie fringe theory part of popular history.

As for "now", I will ammend to "Now, in the western world". I had already mentioned that earlier, but forgot to mention it in that post. It's very true that the perception of Hitler is very different in Asia; not that the difference works in favor of Traitorfish's expectations of future generations.

(Popular history is, of course, only history in the most superficial sort of way).
 
Good thing the scope I mentioned is "Western World" and not "Ireland". Within which such loyalists, if they indeed exist, are quite decidedly a fringe minority :-p
 
Great thing I didn't say civilised world then :-p
 
I have enough respect for your intelligence to ASSUME you understood perfectly well what I meant.

The point I was making is still valid (as in: it's a theory held by a tiny minority in the western world and one that's quite different from the mainstream, orthodox view of Hitler in the western world), so how about you debate that instead of quibbling about terminology?

(Which is three-quarters of what you've been doing this debate, come to think of it...)
 
One of the "foreign" languages the song is sung in is Keres, an unwritten Native American language. I mean, can you GET more American?
 
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