Dachs:
But the fundamental point is this: Austria under Leopold and Kaunitz wanted to keep Poland alive, less for its own sake than as a valuable intermediary body in eastern Europe, but still alive. And the French Revolution meant that they could not back up this policy with anything meaningful, leaving the door open for the Russians to win a few closer-than-they-otherwise-seemed victories and extinguish Polish independence for good.
You say, that Austria wanted to keep Poland alive as a "valuable intermediary body"... Hmmm...
But this means nothing more and nothing less, but only that Austria wanted to keep Poland not really alive, but rather
vegetating...
A very weak PLC - this is something that also Russia wanted to keep alive, or vegetating (as its Protectorate, which Poland-Lithuania de facto was since at least 1768 - and according to some opinions, it was heavily dependent on Russia even earlier). Russia didn't want partitions, as long as it was able to control entire PLC.
Why giving away half of Poland to Austria and Prussia, when they could control all of PLC by bribing deputies, sending Russian soldiers to the Polish Parliament in order to "protect the deputies during the debates", and preventing any reforms... And for some time they clearly could.
The problem is, that the price for controlling entire Poland turned out to be too high for Russia - as Poles somehow didn't want to be controlled...
Keeping Poland as a vegetable-protectorate, was not something the reformatory camp of Polish patriots wanted. Or perhaps all Polish patriots in general, even the conservative ones, did not want such a miserable existence for Poland. They wanted to overthrow Russia's indirect rules over PLC.
This is why we had the Bar Confederacy of 1768-1772 (which resulted in defeat of the confederates - among them such figures like Casimir Pulaski and Tadeusz Kosciuszko - who escaped to North America after this failed uprising) and then further attempts of reforms from the 1760s onward.
Poland had only two ways to go at that time.
1) Reform itself and fight (then either win and become strong again or lose its independence).
2) Continue to exist as a vegetable-protectorate of one or more of neighbouring powers.
The first partition occured before the French Revolution - and it was the result of Polish attempts to dissolve Russian unofficial-protectorate over their country (which was a fact at least since 1768 - when Russia and her Empress Catherine "the Great" confirmed and guaranteed the anachronistic, ridiculous rights for Polish nobility and called them "the Cardinal Rights" - but already before 1768 Russia attempted to intrude into Poland's internal matters).
So the reason of the first partition was the fact that Poles were unwilling to exist as a Russian Protectorate.
Exactly the same was the reason for the Second Partition (reforms undertaken in Poland since the 1760s and especially the accelerated reforms of the period of the Great Sejm 1788 - 1792 - those reforms as well as their extraordinary speed, including the 3rd May Constitution, had more to do with the Russian-Turkish war, rather than with events in France - PLC, exploiting the Russian involvement in the Turkish war, wanted to strengthen its army and carry out radical reforms as fast as possible, before Turkey is defeated in the war - unfortunetly the plan failed, because Turkey lost as soon as 1791).
The French Revolution - which drawn Austria's and Prussia's attention away to the French border (as you even wrote) - gave Poland the opportunity to do the 1st option (reforms and struggle for full independence), and maybe this is why it accelerated the final two partitions (but only because Poland lost that struggle). Another opportunity was the Turkish-Russian war - but it ended in 1791 and Suvorov moved his forces immediately from the Turkish front to the Polish eastern border. Unfortunately for PLC, Turkey fell too early and PLC had no time to complete the reforms.
Perhaps the main (?) reason of the final, Third Partition, was once again resistance against decisions of the Partitioners. The Kosciuszko Uprising of 1794.
But you are right that PLC after the Second Partition was already a "carcass state" and could not hope for overcoming the crisis, while such a chance still existed after the First Partition and before the Second Partition.
However, it should be underlined that the very first origins of Poland-Lithuania's weakness and decline in the 18th century, date back to the 17th century - precisely to the devastating wars the country experienced between 1648 (beginning of the Civil War in the Commonwealth, which is more often known as Khmelnytsky Uprising) and 1672 (Turkish invasion after which the Ottoman Empire annexed Podolia region and temporarily turned Poland-Lithuania into its vassal-state obliged to pay 22,000 ducats annually to the Sultan's Treasury).
Although PLC took the upper hand in all of those conflicts (i.e. Cossacks were fought to a stalemate, Sweden was in the end repulsed, Russia was repulsed, Turkey was repulsed) - those were clearly Pyrrhic victories, since the state the state was devastated and pillaged back and forth...
Those victories (final, after long struggle) of the years 1648 - 1673 (1673 was the great victory of hetman John Sobieski at Khotyn against the Ottoman Empire - achieved one year after the humilating treaty enforced on PLC in 1672) only strengthened the "Catholic-Sarmatian" ideology popular among some members of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility (the number of its followers clearly increased after those wars).
Paradoxically - all the victories - no matter at what cost achieved - only strengthened the confidence of Polish-Lithuanian nobility, that there was nothing wrong with the state's political system, that the tax level was OK, and that PLC was strong enough to repulse every external danger (as - according to large part of nobility - the 25 years of wars experienced between 1648 and 1673 proved).
That misinterpretation of the historical lesson given to PLC by almost all of its neighbours in that short period of time, had far-reaching negative consequences for the continued stubborn reluctance of the decision-making political factions within the state to reform its political and taxation system (about the taxation system I will write something more below - but in general I can reveal right know, that Poland-Lithuania in the 17th century was simply a tax heaven like Cyprus is nowadays - with very low tax level for every group of the society, and some influential groups enjoying de facto an almost entirely tax-exempt status).
But of course it would be an exaggeration to say that the heavy blow received by PLC in period 1648 - 1672 (and the subsequent epidemic diseases, which usually followed wars - just like in the famous proverb "misery loves company") was something that definitely ended the position of a regional power of the Commonwealth in this part of Europe. It greatly undermined the economic situation of the country, but economy was slowly, but gradually, recovering from that crisis (like in the German states after the Thirty Years War, which was also devastating for local economy and population).
What finally contributed to the decline, was the inability to conduct radical reforms of the state's political system and of the state's finances after those lessons. This resulted - as I already wrote - from misinterpretation of the course of those wars and thus drawing wrong conclusions from the results of those wars.
Apart from nobles who considered those wars as confirmation of the fighting spirit of "Sarmatians" (who somehow missed the word "Pyrrhic" and wanted to see only "victories"), another group saw the "Pyrrhic" aspect and thus became pacifists.
However, this group was also negatively influencing the course of changes.
They were against any wars and instead of strengthening the army of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, they saw the way to avoid wars in the future in further weaking the army - they believed that by becoming totally weak, Poland-Lithuania could avoid being involved in any wars (according to this kind of logic: "We are weak, so we are no threat to anyone, so nobody will want to attack us, because they have no reason to do this"). Like Switzerland. But such a huge Switzerland with precious natural resources and other precious things in the middle of Europe, simply could not work.
And then came the Great Northern War, in which Poland - at least initially - wanted to remain neutral (but somehow ignored the fact that most of war operations were nevertheless taking place on her neutral territory...) while later various factions within the Polish-Lithuanian state supporter either Russia or Sweden, while the official stance of PLC as a state depended on who was the actual king - was that the pro-Swedish Leszczynski (then PLC was at war with Russia), or the pro-Saxon / Russian August II (then PLC was at war with Sweden)...
But let's come back to the origins of the problem - i.e. prior to year 1648...
I will not talk here about the erroneus Polish-Lithuanian policy towards Ukrainian Cossacks (which finally provoked them to start a major uprising in 1648). But rather about the reasons why Poland-Lithuania had so hard time with repulsing those numerous enemies in period 1648 - 1672, even though prior to 1648 on many occasions it proved that its armed forces were superior or at least equal to all possible enemies.
And here we come back to recent even on Cyprus.
What has modern Cyprus with 17th century PLC in common?
The answer is simple - being a tax heaven.
In the 17th century both the richest institution in Poland - the Catholic Church - and the richest group of society - the nobility - de facto enjoyed tax-exempt status. During the Prussian War of 1626 - 1629, experiencing great problems with financing the army perhaps for the first time in its history (mainly due to prolonged time this war lasted) - the Polish-Lithuanian Parliament nearly enacted a radical reform of the taxation system. But then, when the project of the reform was already prepared and just had to be enacted in Sejm, fresh news from the frontline arrived and they were not so bad (the Swedish advance halted, everything fine, etc.). As the result, the project of the reforms was consigned to the dustbin of history...
The nobility happily enjoyed tax-exempt status, while they were floating by rafts thousands of tons of grain via Vistula towards Gdansk each year. That grain could feed 1,000,000 people in the Netherlands. Any - even very small - tax rate put on that grain trade carried out so extensively by Polish nobility, could bring enormous annual incomes for the State Treasury... Other economic activities of the nobility were also tax-free.
Of course grain floated by rafts via Vistula was taxed... but only if a non-noble person was floating it.
And in practice, over 90% of the Vistula grain trade was dominated by nobility... and thus tax-free. When in period 1629 (Truce of Altmark) - 1635 Sweden had the right of collecting small (few %) shipping tolls at Gdansk, this generated enough income to cover large part of all Swedish expenses in the Thirty Years War. This gives us an idea, how much money could Polish Treasury have from this trade, if only it was taxed.
Swedish war waged in Germany in period 1630 - 1635 was financed by Polish grain...
The Catholic Church was also tax-exempt. And it had enormous wealth - too bad that Polish kings did not follow the good example shown by Henry VIII of England and did not confiscate entire landed property of the Church... Or at least charge it with taxes...
The only form of taxes payed by Church in the 1st half of the 17th century, was a kind of voluntary gift - it is hard to even call it a tax. The Parliament could ask the Church to pay some money - and the Church could accept or refuse, or pay less or more (usually they paid less).
It is often underlined how the defence of Jasna Gora Monastery, under command of prior Kordecki, helped to repulse the Swedish invasion in 1655 - and generally how the Catholic Church morally supported the society during that hard time - but not so often it is mentioned, that the lack of Church's participation in financing the army contributed to the military weakness in period immediately preceding the Swedish invasion.
So all the Church did was redeeming itself, at best. At that time it was not such a charitable institution like today...
Basically, Poland in the 1st half of the 17th century was a tax heaven - like Cyprus nowadays, in 2013.
Even taxes for peasants and townsmen were small - both were rich enough to be able to afford paying even much higher taxes.
That situation was good for the people, but bad for the state - just like very recently at Cyprus...
That situation was not negatively influencing Poland's military strength as long as Poland was able to conclude every war swiftly. For example the massive Turkish invasion from 1621 was repulsed in just +/- 3 months since the army was mobilized - a swift end of the campaign...
Because the campaign ended in 3 months, the army received soldier's pay only for 3 months... And the war was cheap.
But when Gustavus Adolphus invaded Prussia in 1626, he captured many castles at the very beginning thanks to surprise effect, and fortified his forces there. Later, it was not possible to repulse them from Prussia, especially that the Polish army had more cavalry than infantry (and cavalry is not good for capturing castles, as we know). As the result - the war was prolonged and the fiscal system of our "Tax Heaven" started to be deficient...
Too bad, that Gustavus did not manage inflict any crushing, really devastating defeat on Polish forces at that time. Such a defeat would finally open the eyes of the nobility and disillusion their unrealistic dreams of having a tax heaven and a vast but well-defended state at the same time...
And when such a defeat (or rather Pyrrhic victory - as the invaders were finally repulsed) took place in years 1648 - 1672, when PLC was being invaded from each side all the time during 25 years without a break - it was too late. The state was devastated and pillaged back and forth...
Plus, even those events of 1648 - 1672 unfortunately produced wrong judgements regarding the necessity of reforms.
