thanks for the insight . It was the most detailed book ı had ever read on those days . Asking around for the second , reviews of it suggest Moltke was always for war and not the guy to look for an alternative . Would that be correct ?
The picture of Moltke that's emerged is decidedly more nuanced; Mombauer's work was been modified somewhat since it came out. It's important to recognize the extent to which Moltke pushed for war, but also to recognize the context in which he did it.
For instance, during the key part of the crisis, Moltke was convinced - correctly - that the Russians were mobilizing in secret before the Germans had even declared their "Imminent Danger of War". If Russia were doing this, the Russian military would have a decisive advantage over the Germans. For Germany to preserve any chance at resisting the Russian army, the Germans would have to
at least mobilize themselves -
should have already mobilized.
Mombauer's work was published when historians still took the claims of French and Russian diplomats and historians at face value: that Russia was
not secretly mobilizing for war before everybody else. German intelligence to the contrary was dismissed as a falsification, or as jumping at shadows. Now, of course, we
do know that a secret Russian pre-mobilization existed, and that German intelligence had a vague understanding of it. German diplomats and soldiers that would be read as unreasonably aggressive beforehand seem significantly more level-headed now. (Emphasis on
more level-headed; many Germans generally and Moltke specifically were kinda...loony about some things.)