History questions not worth their own thread

[vogtmurr]

The latter. Anybody that can claim that what McClellan did in the Seven Days and at Antietam is anything but the most outrageous incompetence either doesn't know what he or she is talking about, or is lying.

I am neither sympathetic nor especially critical of Maclellan. I just wasn't sure I understood the initial comment - historians get irate when they read other historians they consider inaccurate too. But yeah I'm aware Maclellan didn't exactly move things forward - for 7 days he consistently inflicted heavier losses on the Confederates yet consistently retreated against a smaller army. I guess that counts as a good one for Lee though, eh ?

 

[say1988]

Fortune favors the bold, remember.

Tell that to Monty
Carefulness and caution can be used very effectively (look at the slow British build-up prior to breaking the Germans at El-Alamein, when they had the numbers to almost guarantee victory), and aggressive actions can lead to horrible failures (Market Garden).
But yes, it is situation dependent and I know little about the US Civil War (most of what I see is boastful patriotic garbage, so I quickly quit trying to research it. Though from my position it appears that the Union had the men, money, and materiel to play aggressively and take losses while devastating the Confederates.

 

[LightSpectra]

Tell that to Monty

Rommel had already expended too much of his resources (whether by carelessness or because he was undersupported, depending on who you ask) in order to win the African front of the war. Monty was just the right guy at the right time.

 

[Cutlass]

Tell that to Monty
Carefulness and caution can be used very effectively (look at the slow British build-up prior to breaking the Germans at El-Alamein, when they had the numbers to almost guarantee victory), and aggressive actions can lead to horrible failures (Market Garden).
But yes, it is situation dependent and I know little about the US Civil War (most of what I see is boastful patriotic garbage, so I quickly quit trying to research it. Though from my position it appears that the Union had the men, money, and materiel to play aggressively and take losses while devastating the Confederates.

While true, you also need to consider that for at least the first 2 years the North suffered from useless leadership and the South had some very capable leaders. No matter how good your equipment is and how much you may outnumber your enemy, you have to have leaders that can take advantage of that. The North didn't until Grant and Sherman rose to the top. They were too junior and unproven earlier. But once seasoned and appointed as the top leaders, the South was doomed. The earlier Northern leaders just weren't good enough to take advantage of any opportunities.

 

[say1988]

Rommel had already expended too much of his resources (whether by carelessness or because he was undersupported, depending on who you ask) in order to win the African front of the war. Monty was just the right guy at the right time.

Just pointing out how some times fortune doesn't favour the bold, with a person who showed it from both sides.

Cutlass: Like I said, I know few details about the US Civil War, it just appears to me that a battle of attrition would very much play into the North's favour and if they made a daring attack and failed miserably they had the ability to recover from their losses, while any defeat for the South would have far more consequences.

 

[Cutlass]

Just pointing out how some times fortune doesn't favour the bold, with a person who showed it from both sides.

Cutlass: Like I said, I know few details about the US Civil War, it just appears to me that a battle of attrition would very much play into the North's favour and if they made a daring attack and failed miserably they had the ability to recover from their losses, while any defeat for the South would have far more consequences.

That may be true. But you need leaders willing to do that. McClellan spent his whole time in command claiming that the South had a larger army than the North, and so refused to attack. Even though the North usually outnumbered the South. That kind of "leadership" resists taking any chances.

 

[Dachs]

Was Napoleon Bonaparte an atheist?

He actually toyed with Islam. I'm unaware of any strongly held religious beliefs or lack thereof, though.

Incompetence, or carefulness? Remember, McClellan was a foreign observer during the Crimean War, he knew what catastrophes could result in committing large numbers of infantry against entrenched positions, and was also very fond of his men. If that meant he was too timid, so be it, but we can look elsewhere in the war to see the meat grinder that such an even can create, and we can only speculate about the ultimate effect of removing McClellan's timidity.

What about timidity after his subordinates have basically ripped the enemy army to shreds. "Oh look I won a battle, time to retreat." What the hell? "Oh look, here I am at Antietam, time to keep a full third of my army nowhere near the battlefield for no appreciable reason whatsoever." What the hell? There were good generals in the ACW who were leery of attacking entrenched positions, like George Thomas or Old Rosey, or Hancock. Yet they managed offensive successes... I'm firmly convinced that the sobriquet "Little Napoleon" is either a monstrous joke or a reference to his gigantic ego. Hell, in the days after First Bull Run he wrote to his wife contemplating becoming a "Dictator" (his words)...

Now, like you said, some are sympathetic to McClellan because he loved his troops and didn't want to cause them harm. But that ultimately resulted in more deaths; the war could've ended in '62 had he decided to throw his reserve corps at Lee's retreating force. Simply, the Confederates were fairly satisfied with turning the war into a meat grinder since it was for the most part working. It only stopped working when generals like Grant and Sherman were willing to counter it with superior numbers and not back down at the prospect of violence.

Seven Days is just as good a place to have the war won; I agree with you everywhere.

While true, you also need to consider that for at least the first 2 years the North suffered from useless leadership and the South had some very capable leaders. No matter how good your equipment is and how much you may outnumber your enemy, you have to have leaders that can take advantage of that. The North didn't until Grant and Sherman rose to the top. They were too junior and unproven earlier. But once seasoned and appointed as the top leaders, the South was doomed. The earlier Northern leaders just weren't good enough to take advantage of any opportunities.

Have you read any books on the Civil War written since the 1960s? That "Northern bad leadership Southern good leadership" stereotype is so bad, so wrong, and so pervasive it boggles the mind. Hell, in 1861 Lee lost at Cheat Mountain, First Bull Run was won by a hair because of a relatively chance event, the Federal Captain Lyon managed some impressive victories and then was killed in battle, and the South's "brilliant" Leonidas Polk, the bishop-general, and his comrade in suck Joe Johnston made a total hash out of defending Kentucky against Grant and Don Carlos Buell. The crap and skill was split in equal measure on both sides, except for the navy where the Federals totally outclassed the Confederacy (the Port Royal landing was rather skillfully managed). This is the first year of the war, remember.

 

[LightSpectra]

Have you read any books on the Civil War written since the 1960s? That "Northern bad leadership Southern good leadership" stereotype is so bad, so wrong, and so pervasive it boggles the mind.

Is it true 100% of the case? Obviously not. But it is certainly true for the very top cases, i.e., Lee, Beauregard and Jackson versus McClellan, Burnside and Buell.

And while we're speaking of it, let me say that I think Lee is quite overrated. All of his battles were defeats, even his "perfect battle" of Chancellorsville. Even if he held the field, he usually depleted the same amount of resources as the Union commander; which was problematic being that the Confederacy had less than half as many resources as the Union did. So generally speaking, Davis and Lee were hoping that the Union would simply withdraw from the war at some point or France/Britain would intervene; but that's risking so much on the idea that they would never lose a battle, which was shattered at Gettysburg.

 

[Dachs]

Is it true 100% of the case? Obviously not. But it is certainly true for the very top cases, i.e., Lee, Beauregard and Jackson versus McClellan, Burnside and Buell.

Problem is, those aren't the top echelons in 1861, or even 1862. Lee is just some dude who failed in West Virginia and got sent off to North Carolina to fail at stopping the US Navy from capturing Forts Walker and Beauregard. Burnside is even more of a nonentity. Buell is about as important as some actually competent people like Rosecrans and Grant. I think my opinions on Jackson's erratic generalship are quite well known, and Beauregard was hardly better.

And while we're speaking of it, let me say that I think Lee is quite overrated. All of his battles were defeats, even his "perfect battle" of Chancellorsville. Even if he held the field, he usually depleted the same amount of resources as the Union commander; which was problematic being that the Confederacy had less than half as many resources as the Union did. So generally speaking, Davis and Lee were hoping that the Union would simply withdraw from the war at some point or France/Britain would intervene; but that's risking so much on the idea that they would never lose a battle, which was shattered at Gettysburg.

I agree but I don't go as far as you do.

 

[LightSpectra]

Problem is, those aren't the top echelons in 1861, or even 1862. Lee is just some dude who failed in West Virginia and got sent off to North Carolina to fail at stopping the US Navy from capturing Forts Walker and Beauregard. Burnside is even more of a nonentity. Buell is about as important as some actually competent people like Rosecrans and Grant. I think my opinions on Jackson's erratic generalship are quite well known, and Beauregard was hardly better.

Ah, my mistake; we were only talking about '61 and '62? So Lee didn't have a chance to shine until Bull Run II; Grant, before the Vicksburg campaign in mid-'63, actually seemed like a fairly poor general; McClellan had a case of "the slows" and "dumbass"; Jackson, though erratic, shone quite brilliantly in the North Virginia campaign.

Still, the point remains. The disasters for the North from '61 to mid-'63 were almost entirely because of poor generals versus excellent ones, and to a lesser degree, because the Confederacy hadn't run low of resources yet and the incompetent Simon Cameron was in charge of the Union's war department.

 

[Dachs]

Ah, my mistake; we were only talking about '61 and '62? So Lee didn't have a chance to shine until Bull Run II; Grant, before the Vicksburg campaign in mid-'63, actually seemed like a fairly poor general; McClellan had a case of "the slows" and "dumbass"; Jackson, though erratic, shone quite brilliantly in the North Virginia campaign.

Still, the point remains. The disasters for the North from '61 to mid-'63 were almost entirely because of poor generals versus excellent ones, and to a lesser degree, because the Confederacy hadn't run low of resources yet and the incompetent Simon Cameron was in charge of the Union's war department.

You've got an odd opinion of the Grant whose penetration of the Kentucky cordon to capture Henry and Donelson is one of the great examples of rapid concentration of force in space and time. And you're still forgetting competent higher leaders like Rosecrans and Thomas and the very solid group of corps commanders the Federals had, especially in the Army of the Potomac. And we are talking about the same Jackson who started the Second Manassas campaign by getting his entire corps totally mauled by a single brigade, and whose total lack of anything approaching speed ruined the Seven Days' campaign even more than it was ruined already...aren't we? And of course, the Confederacy's logistical system was a joke, and not just because of the remfs either, the generals themselves from Lee to bloody Pemberton didn't really ever plan for it...

 

[LightSpectra]

Tell me if I have the history of Germany generally correct up until the wars of unification.

The Germanic tribes of central Europe were subjugated by Charlemagne and latter Otto I and other Holy Roman Emperors. They were a leading power in Europe until the Investiture Controversy severely depowered the Emperor due to a high degree of federalism. Frederick I and the II were both able to regain political dominance, but the latter's poor decisions caused decentralization again. This was greatly exacerbated by the Thirty Years' War which depopulated German territories and turned the Emperor into a pure figurehead.

Habsburg Austria manages to become a continental power, particularly because of the politics of Charles V, Maximilian I and Leopold I. Prussia also gains prestige because of the modernization and conquests of Frederick the Great. After the Napoleonic Wars, a sense of nationalism grew among Germans who were united against France; causing the birth of the German Confederation, a loose political-economic union with Prussia and Austria as leading members.

Is this correct, or do I err on anything significant?

 

[Mirc]

I can never be sure about English, but in my language "to subjugate" has a very clearly negative meaning. Therefore, I find it really strange to say that "Germanic tribes of Central Europe were subjugated by [...] other Holy Roman Emperors". After all, it was "The Holy Roman Empire of German Nation", what would make one think it was "subjugating" Germanic peoples? (if "subjugating" has the meaning I think it does)

 

[LightSpectra]

I can never be sure about English, but in my language "to subjugate" has a very clearly negative meaning. Therefore, I find it really strange to say that "Germanic tribes of Central Europe were subjugated by [...] other Holy Roman Emperors". After all, it was "The Holy Roman Empire of German Nation", what would make one think it was "subjugating" Germanic peoples? (if "subjugating" has the meaning I think it does)

The Franks conquered the Saxons, and other Germanic territories followed under the reigns of Otto I and the like.

 

[Dachs]

More or less okay, except Charlemagne wasn't a Holy Roman Emperor (and the creation of the "German" Holy Roman Empire has relatively little to do with him, though there is significant overlap between the 'East Francia' polity that arose after Charlemagne's death and the Ottonian HRE), the post-Hohenstaufen decentralization was more due to the extinction of the Hohenstaufen line than to Friedrich II's "poor decisions", and the ensuing interregnum which could only be ended by a decrease in imperial power via the mechanism of the Golden Bull that Karl IV (Karel I of Bohemia) issued. (Well, maybe not only, but it certainly helped.) Woo federalism.

Austria's ascension was already in the cards before Karl V; Friedrich III had already seized the Imperial crown when ruler of just Austria, and his predecessor Albrecht II had nearly got it but was never actually made Emperor. Anyhow, the Habsburgs already had the imperium before the remarkable coincidence of marriage that brought the remnant of Burgundy together with Castile, Aragon, and Austria, none of which was Karl V's doing. It's true that he further increased Habsburg power and allowed them to lay claim to even larger areas, but he did ultimately fail. Maximilian and Leopold were also of course successful leaders.

Compressing the reasons behind Prussian success into "modernization and conquests of Friedrich II" is mmmh. The Hohenzollerns' success rested firstly on their army, which the Great Elector began to build up first, and their excellent diplomatic maneuvering. Modernization came in the 19th century (Friedrich II did do his best to stimulate private enterprise via state investments and did improve the quality of the Silesian industry somewhat, but many of his programs were abandoned on his death and didn't show any particular success in the first place). It was the army, first and foremost, that allowed success. That army in turn allowed Prussia to gain diplomatic leverage and new territory, which in turn further aided its rise to the top.

The "sense of nationalism", by the way, was there after the Volkskrieg against Napoleon, but it certainly had nothing to do with the formation of the Confederation. After the defeat of Bonaparte, the Allies needed something to replace the HRE as a stability guarantor in Central Europe that was sufficiently decentralized to keep it from being too powerful. The institution of the Empire already being moribund, the Confederation was created.

 

[privatehudson]

And while we're speaking of it, let me say that I think Lee is quite overrated. All of his battles were defeats, even his "perfect battle" of Chancellorsville. Even if he held the field, he usually depleted the same amount of resources as the Union commander; which was problematic being that the Confederacy had less than half as many resources as the Union did. So generally speaking, Davis and Lee were hoping that the Union would simply withdraw from the war at some point or France/Britain would intervene; but that's risking so much on the idea that they would never lose a battle, which was shattered at Gettysburg.

On what basis are you claiming that he suffered defeat at say Fredericksburg or 2nd Bull Run? Especially since you later say that the idea that he would never loose a battle was broken only in 1863.

Whether he depleted a similar level of resources or not he was just about the only southern army commander to enjoy anything like regular success in battle against Northern generals. He was also one of the few army commanders who Davis trusted (helped by the fact that he bothered to tell Davis what he was doing unlike say Johnson) and had the man management skills to deal a group of men like Jackson, Stuart and Longstreet without the kind of bickering that would have torn an army apart.

Lee certainly wasn't perfect but he was a damn sight better than most of the rest of the CSA army commanders or his subordinates would have been in that position. The only ways he's overrated as far as I can tell is because of the "northern generals bad, southern good" myth and the "lost cause" idiots who made him into some sort of perfect genius that surpassed even Washington.

 

[LightSpectra]

On what basis are you claiming that he suffered defeat at say Fredericksburg or 2nd Bull Run? Especially since you later say that the idea that he would never loose a battle was broken only in 1863.

At 2nd Bull Run, he only inflicted 2,000 more casualties on the Union than he received. Again, it was a brilliant strategic victory, but on the grand scale, the CSA were depleting their resources proportionately much faster than the Union were.

You're right about the Battle of Fredericksburg, however. The mark of a good general is the ability to exploit the enemy's critical errors, which is exactly what Lee did against Burnside.

Whether he depleted a similar level of resources or not he was just about the only southern army commander to enjoy anything like regular success in battle against Northern generals.

But again, most of his battles were defeats on a tactical scale due to the fact that he was expending his resources too fast. He was betting everything on the idea that the CSA would be recognized by the British and French, which came very close to working but was a too ambitious plan overall.

He was also one of the few army commanders who Davis trusted (helped by the fact that he bothered to tell Davis what he was doing unlike say Johnson) and had the man management skills to deal a group of men like Jackson, Stuart and Longstreet without the kind of bickering that would have torn an army apart.

I'm not saying Lee is a bad general. He was quite brilliant, but I wouldn't say moreso than Winfield Scott or William T. Sherman. I honestly think Longstreet and Jackson deserve about as much credit as Lee does.

 

[Naskra]

LSpectra, your Boethius quote is really badly translated.

On Gen Lee: A much over-worshipped man.
The seven Days' battles were a very bloody and unnecessary exercise in assisting a retreat in progress.
2nd Manassas was a victory seized by Jackson and Longstreet before Lee had influence on it.
The Maryland campaign was an ill-conceived disaster.
Antietam should have resulted in Lee's discharge. Had a stray shell killed McClellan, the whole rebel army would likely have surrendered, pinned against the river.
Fredericksburg was hard to lose.
At Chancellorsville, Lee was badly surprised, and only saved by Union command failure again.
At Gettysburg, there was much to lose and little to gain by attacking at all.
1864 was a series of retreats. "Brilliant" if you like, but still retreats.
1865 was a capitulation delayed months too long. Few generals have spent blood so freely and been so honored for it.

 

[say1988]

Recently I have seen sources claiming that the AK-47 (or perhaps a Chinese copy) was used during the Korean war. I had always believed that the Russians had not yet began exporting it (the AK only being adopted by the Russians in '49 [I assume this when when mass production was also implemented, or began to be], just four years before the war needed). Was the AK used in the Korean War? If yes, was it used in numbers, by regular infantry, or just be elites; were they used by the Chinese, North Koreans, or both?

Was there any really standard weapons for the Communists during the Korean war (I mean one that was predominant, much more common then any others?
I have also just assumed that they used whatever random weapons they had available (Japanese weapons left behind after the war, those imported Soviet and Communist China (the former I would assume to be mainly Mosin-Nagants, the latter mixture of copied German weapons as well as leftover Japanese, American, and possibly British weapons used during WWII), and Western weapons captured in the advance.

 

[privatehudson]

At 2nd Bull Run, he only inflicted 2,000 more casualties on the Union than he received. Again, it was a brilliant strategic victory, but on the grand scale, the CSA were depleting their resources proportionately much faster than the Union were.

I don't see resources use/depletion as a tactical issue but a strategic one and a rather moot point overall since offensive campaigning in that period was likely to result in high casualty levels due to recent advances. Alternatives such as Johnson may have a better casualty ratio (or maybe not, haven't looked into it to be frank) but you then have to put up with a general who refuses to tell you what he's doing and gives up important defensive lines and cities, seemingly without rhyme or reason.

You pays your money and you takes your chances...

But again, most of his battles were defeats on a tactical scale due to the fact that he was expending his resources too fast. He was betting everything on the idea that the CSA would be recognized by the British and French, which came very close to working but was a too ambitious plan overall.

I don't think he bet everything on the Europeans at all. His invasions seem to aim more at influencing Northern opinion to the war along with giving the south breathing space than they do European support. Wiki's article on Antietam cites Sears as saying that:

Some Confederate politicians, including President Jefferson Davis, believed the prospect of foreign recognition would increase if they won a military victory on Northern soil; such a victory might gain recognition and financial support from Great Britain and France, although there is no evidence that Lee thought the South should base its military plans on this possibility

(emphasis added by me)

Later on you can also see some attempt at prolonging the conflict by fighting defensively in order to influence the presidential elections. Besides, just what else other than trying to influence northern opinion and bringing the Europeans into the war was going to win the war for the south? They could hardly invade, occupy and conquer the North after all. If you have some ideas as to what would have worked better feel free to air them.

I'm not saying Lee is a bad general. He was quite brilliant, but I wouldn't say moreso than Winfield Scott or William T. Sherman. I honestly think Longstreet and Jackson deserve about as much credit as Lee does.

Credit yes, but neither of them had the ability to command an army. Jackson would have had half his divisional commanders on a charge and whilst I'm very fond of Longstreet didn't seem very capable of independent command.

2nd Manassas was a victory seized by Jackson and Longstreet before Lee had influence on it.

Interesting statement given that AFAIK Lee was on the field and with Longstreet when the latter launched his assault.

The Maryland campaign was an ill-conceived disaster.

Given the situation a disaster would have been the ANV or a significant section of it being wiped out or captured, what happened was more of a setback.

Antietam should have resulted in Lee's discharge. Had a stray shell killed McClellan, the whole rebel army would likely have surrendered, pinned against the river.

Highly unlikely given that McCellan spent most of the battle quite some distance from the action. Besides of those corps commanders present only Franklin might have been interested in pressing an assault had this injury occurred midway through the day. Sumner and Porter were nearly as cautious as their chief, Burnside was busy blundering about on the left, Mansfield was dead and Hooker had been carried off the field injured.

At Chancellorsville, Lee was badly surprised, and only saved by Union command failure again.

So presumably the bold separation of his army in the face of superior numbers had nothing to do with this? Is it not possible that the confidence this implied helped persuade Hooker against further action?

At Gettysburg, there was much to lose and little to gain by attacking at all.

This is a rather vague statement, are you referring to the entire battle or just one part of it?

1865 was a capitulation delayed months too long. Few generals have spent blood so freely and been so honored for it.

I can think of quite a few actually, Napoleon comes to mind and it could be argued that he gets even more honour out of his "body count". Lee seemed to care a bit more for those under his command though, its hard to imagine him walking down bloody lane and commenting that one night in Richmond will replace the dead found there.