Hitler's Worst Mistake

[Lord Baal]

Anschluss, Munich, remilitarization, occupation of Bohemia, etc, etc...
Besides they had little interest in Poland, it was just an arbitrary line to begin with and the English and French saw no need to actually defend it (as seen during the Phony War). There was no real reason to declare war over Poland, other than the idea that Germany had pushed one step too far.

The fact that Britain and France both gave him ultimatums over Poland, which didn't happen over Austria and the Sudetenland, should probably have given the crazy old bastard a little pause.

Also remember that throughout the 1930s funds confiscated from Jews and Communists and others were a significant part of the German economy and these sources were quickly drying up. Poland would prove quite lucrative.

Those funds had dried up years earlier, with a few exceptions, such as the confiscation of the few remaining Jewish businesses - mostly department stores - in 1938. There was an influx caused by the Anschluss and the occupations of the Sudetenland and Bohemia and Moravia, but that also ran out quickly. It was obvious that any economic gains through confiscations in Poland would be quickly eaten up by the war effort.

As for Russia, the Nazis seriously underestimated the Russians. The idea that they were Slavs running a Jewish system made, based on Nazi ideology, the Soviet Union an easy target (and they had taken quite a beating in Finland). Not to mention their huge unbeaten army sitting in France. If they could have broken the Soviets they probably could have stood against the West for significantly longer.

If they'd broken the Soviets they may actually have won. The USSR was one of the most resource-rich areas on the planet, providing everything that Germany needed to keep up its war effort. Nazi Germany would eventually have collapsed of course, due to the fact that its political and economic systems simply weren't sustainable, but a victory over the USSR would have rendered Germany virtually impregnable to Britain and the US. The best the West could have hoped for was for Britain to race troops into the Caucasus to keep the Germans from taking the oil-fields, and that wasn't bloody likely.

Following the invasion of Poland, I would put his biggest strategic mistakes as not pushing Dunkirk (enormous morale victory for the British) and declaring war on the US, which might have forced FDR into a Japan First policy and prevented significant action against Germany for years.

Not crushing the British and French troops at Dunkirk was a huge mistake indeed. I'm ambivalent about the declaration of war on America, as I am unsure if FDR wouldn't have been able to force through a declaration of war against Germany and Italy anyway.

Well, this will be a little bit offtopic, but anyways. I heard that Hitler really wanted the war. Unifying with Austria, getting back the Sudetenland... those were all approaches to provocate the war. I suppose he wanted the Allies to start the war, so that it looks justified to the Germans. Don't know. But I'm pretty sure that I heard that someone from his delagation that should negotiate over these provocations, reported that he teturned pretty happy to Hitler and told him that they were able to keep peace while getting what they wanted. Hitlers reaction was anger. So I'd say that 'Hitler believed at the time England would not declare war when invading Poland' is pretty wrong - that's exactly what he wanted.

Unification with Austria and the Sudetenland was simple territorial revanchism, combined with economics - both were good sources of iron ore and other resources which Germany did not possess.

You are however correct about Hitler wanting a war with the West; the incident you are referring to is the signing of the Munish Pact. Hitler wanted the Sudetenland for Germany, but he also wanted a war. He intended to use the issue of the Sudetenland to start a war, which he believed Germany would win. The fact that his own generals planned a coup in the event of a war over Czechoslovakia gives you a good idea of how they thought such a war would turn out. Hitler's second-in-command, Hermann Goering, also realised that a war would be bad for Germany at that time - as Minister for Re-armament he knew more about Germany's military readiness than pretty much everyone else - and so negotiated the Munich Pact behind Hitler's back. Hitler was livid and reduced Goering's authority after the event, but the deal was so sweet that he took it; he never could have justified turning it down to the army or the party.

Regarding Hitler's desire for war; it was a war with France he wanted, not a war with Britain. Read Mein Kampff sometime, if you can stomach it. He actually thought that Britain and Germany were natural allies, and after Germany defeated and humbled France, Germany and Britain could destroy first the USSR, then the US. He openly stated that Britain wouldn't declare war over Poland, and was shocked when they did.

I have seen both arguments.
I don't think he really know what he wanted. I believe that he wanted war, but I think he also wanted territory as easily as possible. It also is likely that he wanted war with France far more than Britain. France was a huge threat on the border and there was a wish for revenge. Britain on the other hand wasn't that great of a threat on its own, the only real benefit of war with them likely would have been breaking the Empire.

Hitler didn't actually want to destroy the British Empire. He admired it and wanted to ally with it. It was only when Britain refused to capitulate that he began to target the Empire, and even then it was mostly through Mussolini's bumbling.

The racism. I think he could have pulled off a successful invasion of the USSR (not conquering it, but causing it to collapse) if he had treated the Ukrainians and other Slavic minorities better. Also, if they weren't so concerned about using "Jewish science" they could have advanced many of their research programs more quickly.

The fact that Ukrainians and other subject populations in the USSR initially welcomed the Germans with open arms - including, shockingly, many Jews - supports this theory. "Aryan physics" is an interesting and hilarious chapter in science, as it's basically a group of otherwise decent scientists refusing to use such obviously useful concepts as Einstein's Theories of Relativity because they were Jewish concepts, and therefore wrong. "Aryan biology" and "Aryan chemistry" are equally interesting, but considerably less humourous, due to their results.

Then again, if Hitler wasn't racist, there was essentially very little point in starting the war at all.

Reclaiming West Prussia (then Poland) for the Reich seems like a good enough reason to me, and also to avenge their defeat against France. Ludendorff is the one who began die Dolchstoßlegende; he blamed defeat in World War I on industrial Jews and communists. Theoretically he'd just have to fixate on the latter and you have a significantly less antisemitic Germany in the 1930s, though I'm no magician that can say thus for certain.

This. There was plenty of reason to start a war, even without racism.

He put unneccessary emphasis on capturing Stalingrad because of a personal duel with Stalin. If he ignored the city and went for the jugular at Moscow he could of well captured Stalin and the whole Bolshevik leadership! iirc Panzers got very near Moscow, 20 miles or so!

Legend has it that some advanced recon units actually got close enough to see the Kremlin's towers. These weren't Panzers though, merely motorised reconnaisance forces. The actual armoured columns were some distance back. Not to mention that Stalingrad took place after the failure to capture Moscow anyway.

Also, most of the Soviet government had been evacuated. Stalin and a few hangers-on remained, but could have been evacuated easily if the city was actually about to fall. There is an outside chance that German troops could have captured Stalin if they made a lightning quick advance that caught the Soviets off-guard and got really, really lucky, but it isn't very likely.

Not listening to generals advice.

That one is pretty damn huge.

It certainly doesn't require a holocaust scale genocide, but the idea that "We deserve that land more than them" is certainly racist and doesn't leave much room for what will end up happening to the displaced people.

No it's not. Deserving the land merely comes down to an ability to defend it. Just because there wa a racial element to lebensraum doesn't mean there has to be.

I agree that there is no way of knowing if revengism in Germany was so high that there would be another war without the Nazis' racist ideologies, but I do know that their economy was certainly starting to boom and had the average quality of life been as good as it was but with no one screaming about the evils of the Jews, Jehovah Witnesses and Slavs, I don't think it's beyond comprehension that it could have been avoided.

"Revengism?" Do you mean 'revanchism' or are you inventing a word to mean 'a desire for revenge?'

Germany's economy was pretty much in the toilet by 1939. It was completely geared towards re-armament at the expense of everything else. Now, granted, this caused massive initial booms in 1933-34, especially in associated industries such as road construction, automobile manufacture, metallurgy, and research into things like artificial rubber (buna) and alternative fuels, but this boom was very short-lived. The military quickly began to monopolise resources desired by industries for non-military reasons. Hitler often decried industrialists unwillingness to put the good of the nation - re-armament - ahead of their capilist ideals - profit. In fact, the primary reason why Austria was annexed in 1938 - Hitler had backed away from annexing Austria after a 1934 coup attempt by Austrian Nazis failed miserably, nearly resulting in war with Italy - was that Goering desperately needed Austrian resources to continue weapons producton.

Quality of life was also pretty poor in Germany under the Third Reich. It was an improvement over the Depression, but quality of living under the Thrid Reich never surpassed that of the Wiemar Republic at it's best.

I disagree. He actually had a reasonable chance of defeating the Soviet Union. (He had to capture Moscow and Leningrad instead of getting distracted by Stalingrad.) He had no chance at all at defeating the United States, since he couldn't reach us in the first place. The US was already at war with Japan, and if Hitler hadn't declared war on the US, we wouldn't have rushed into a two-front war.

Hitler didn't have much chance of defeating the USSR. That Germany very nearly pulled it off is a testament to how piss-poor Soviet preparations for war were, not how good Hitler's chance's were. If he had a 1/100 chance of defeating the USSR, he appears to have been the 98th or so alternate reality Hitler to have a crack at it.

Leningrad was completely unnecessary to the war effort. With Moscow toaken, Leningrad would have been forced to capitulate, starved out, or taken by a wing of the German Army sweeping West after conquering Moscow. It was entirely useless in the overall strategic situation.

I've already mentioned my ambivalence over the US situation. I don't know if FDR could have pushed through a declaration of war against Germany or not, but I think he'd have tried. Even not declaring war on Germany likely wouldn't have slowed down Lend-lease and other aid to Britain and Russia.

Now here's the silly question. What would capturing Moscow have done?

Moscow was a major railway hub; without it, units to the west (in Novgorod, St. Petersburg, etc.) would have been cut off from the east. It also could have had political ramifications for the Russian leadership, but one needn't engage in speculation to see that its capture would have, at the very least, been a major strategic benefit for the Germans.

This. There's also the massive morale boost the capture of Moscow would give the Germans, combined with the morale hit to Russians, the ability to set up a puppet government in the city which many old White sympathisers might flock to - including in the military - and the ability taking the city would give the Germans to flank Russian forces in the West, East and South. Not to mention that Russian supply routes would effectively be cut completely by this, since the USSR was pretty much devoid of an alternative to Moscow for transportation and supply at this time; with Moscow taken, where do supplies from Murmansk go through to end up in military hands? The only alternative supply routes I can think of - the Persian Gulf and Vladivostok - aren't nearly as good as Murmansk.

Mixing some things up, here... Reconaissance elements did get within sight of Moscow, but that was 1941. The drive on Stalingrad was in the 1942 campaign, after the Russian counteroffensive had driven German troops back far from Moscow.
The drive on Moscow in 1941 was not stalled because of Stalingrad, but because forces were diverted to close the cauldron at Kiev, which destroyed most of the remaining Soviet Western army and netted the Wehrmacht hundreds of thousands of prisoners. Perhaps a mistake, but it would have been hard to miss such an opportunity ... and could they have taken and held Moscow if that Army Group at Kiev had remained intact?

All correct. As to your question; yes, they could have. A concentrated push on Moscow would have taken the city, enabling German troops to cut the Kiev Army Groups supply lines by encircling their rear, simply at a greater distance than occurred in the Kievan cauldron. All that was needed by the Germans was to keep enough troops in the area to slow the Army Group down; it wasn't moving very quickly, nor did it really possess the capability to feed, clothe and supply its 600,000+ troops, even without having its supply lines cut. Hitler's decision to divert from Moscow to destroy the Army Group at Kiev is ofter cited as a textbook case of a commander ignoring the overall strategic situation for a short-term tactical benefit.

As to the Kessel at Stalingrad - he did attempt to relieve it. Manstein and Hoth came within 30 km IIRC, but couldn't manage the rest. The mistake was in not allowing Paulus to break out to the west to meet Hoth.

A breakout at that time was a desperation move. Paulus could have broken out on his own earlier, or Guderian and Hoth could have been given greater supplies and latitude earlier. Either would have been effective. Better yet, Paulus could have just bloody avoided Stalingrad completely. Like Leningrad, it was unimportant in the overall strategic situation, with the added detriment of being a blastedly obvious trap.

To the OP: somewhat whimsically, I submit Hitler's greatest single military mistake was allying with the Italians... . Mussolini pulled Hitler into first North Africa and then the Balkans, diverting resources and delaying Barbarossa, while never being of much help otherwise, except in tying down British naval units in the Med.

To be fair, it wasn't allying with the Italians that was bad. It was allying with Mussolini, who had a tendency to embark on ill-prepared and thought-out ventures without even consulting his allies, that was the trouble.

He should have went straight for the Caucasian oil fields instead of sending armies north to capture Moscow and St. Petersburg as well.

Going after either Moscow or the oil-fields would be an effective plan. Going after both unnecessarily split his forces. Moving on Moscow was probably the better plan of the two, as the oil-fields were simply better-defended, though they were more valuable.

It would have been the nightmare that Stalingrad was, but several orders of magnitude stronger.

No, no it wouldn't. I don't doubt the Russians would have fought for the city tooth-and-nail, but what made Stalingrad a nightmare was the encirclement of the 6th Army. Zhukov was in absolutely no position to encircle the forces attacking Moscow. He'd have had no choice but to withdraw if the city fell. The situations are entirely different.

His acquisition of the Sudetenland was one of his best moves. He got hugely beneficial land for virtually no cost, invading Bohemia was worse because it cost him any acceptance of his policies by the French and British.

Funnily enough, the Munich Pact was something Hitler didn't want. Shows how nuts he really was sometimes.

In a very brief summary: money, industry, manpower, and geography.

Not to mention simply being better at strategy, tactics and logistics than the Third Reich.

He made a few mistakes, but invaded Russia cant be consider has one.. he had no choice! Plus, he nearly conquer it. But IMO a little top 3.

He could always have waited until his military was actually ready for the gargantuan task of tackling the USSR, or put away Britain first so that he wasn't fighting a two-front war.

3) Keeping a Hardline provocative tone with the British. It has been studied a lot that after the flash defeat of France, most political leaders in Britain were seriously considering allying themself with Hitler. They actually couldnt, mostly because the public opinion wasnt on their side. Hitler, instead of offering good term that would show respect AND a good share, choosed to use threats and later in september gave the order to bomb them into submission, Which is the stupidiest thing you can ever think to acheive. The worst part is that a lot of sources says that he never really intended to attack Britain who he considered has brothers (and also.. pityful pirates of a nation). More over, he knew he had NOTHING to gain by invading the british isle... at best he would have dismantle the empire without havin any mean of claiming it for himself.

Actually, Hitler did offer the British very good terms; they refused them. Very few favoured capitulation, regardless of public opinion. Some of those who did were possibly British agents attempting to deceive the Germans as to public opinion in Britain.

Hitler only then began preparing for an invasion; this made perfect sense strategically, as a conquered Britain may well have capitulated and a puppet-regime, likely under the decidely pro-Hitler Edward VIII and Oswald Mosley, giving him the Empire without having to fight for it, much as happened in France. Tactically, however, it was a terrible idea, as Germany was incapable of invading Britain.

Even if Hitler had merely conquered Britain and not gained the Empire, doing so was obviously beneficial for him. After all, what were the remaining British forces overseas and their American allies supposed to do to get Britain back? They needed the British Isles to use as a springboard to invade Continental Europe - an invasion through North Africa was not as effective, nor as easy to supply, even granting that a Germany which had conquered Britain couldn't easily hold onto North Africa anyway. No Britain, no Normandy landings; no defeated Germany in 1945, no a lot of things.

During the preliminaries to an invasion of Britain, the Luftwaffe attacked important targets suchas radar stations, ports, airfields, etc.. This was the correct decision. When a group of bombers were forced to release prematurely armed bombs over London, Hitler was furious. He had in fact specifically ordered that British civilian targets not be bombed. Immediately after the accidentaly attack on London, however, Winston Churchill ordered a retaliatory raid on Berlin. Hitler, even more furious, then ordered the Blitz.

 

[LightSpectra]

The fact that Britain and France both gave him ultimatums over Poland, which didn't happen over Austria and the Sudetenland, should probably have given the crazy old bastard a little pause.

Hitler actually wanted to go to war over the Sudetenland. He wanted a cause that most Germans would see as just and rally towards. Prior to the invasion of Poland, he said this:

"Now Poland is in the position I wanted. [...] I am only afraid that some bastard will present me with a mediation plan at the last moment."

Edit: Oh, I read the rest of your post and discovered that you already knew this. I think I'll keep this post up just because I find the quote to be amusing.

 

[say1988]

He could always have waited until his military was actually ready for the gargantuan task of tackling the USSR

I really don't see Hitler's situation, military or political, improving with any delay to Barbarossa. It isn't like the Soviets were sitting idly, and by the end of the year the US was in the war, and even if they weren't in a declared war against Germany, they would be supporting the British as their ally in the East. I don't think you would see anything like a repeat of the Munich delay here.

or put away Britain first so that he wasn't fighting a two-front war.

And how might he have done that?

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

No, no it wouldn't. I don't doubt the Russians would have fought for the city tooth-and-nail, but what made Stalingrad a nightmare was the encirclement of the 6th Army. Zhukov was in absolutely no position to encircle the forces attacking Moscow. He'd have had no choice but to withdraw if the city fell. The situations are entirely different.

But the city wouldn't magically "fall" like in Civilization, you have to fight through it. It took a month to clear out Berlin, which was a much smaller city than Moscow. The Germans entered parts of Leningrad several times, but found themselves unable to push further, and retreated with heavy loss. Stalingrad was a huge mess long before Operation Uranus. It was an enormous, sprawling city, and the Russians just kept pouring men and materiel into it, fighting for every inch, which necessitated huge numbers of German troops inside the city proper. The disaster that befell Paulus was that once Uranus began, he had absolutely no way to get out of the city in time, even though he saw the imminent danger. Its not easy to just pack up a whole army during battle in a city and get it out; certainly not while the noose is being tightened outside. Moscow would have been all of these things and more. Harder fighting for the city, more Russians in the city (not only reinforcements from elsewhere including Siberia, but also armed citizenry like those Zhukov formed in November), which means more Germans in the city, which means a much, much bigger threat of Uranus-esque encirclement. And you can bet Hitler would not have allowed the Wehrmacht to retreat from inside Moscow, even if it would have saved it from greater disaster; we saw that in Bagration in the summer of 1944.

So yes, I think that Moscow was effectively impossible to take, short of total encirclement. But to pretend the Germans could have done that is to venture into the realm of pure fantasy.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

Now that I've got you in hysterics, maybe you can actually read what I wrote. I didn't say he wanted to save Poland from the Nazis, I said he wanted to preserve the existence of the Polish state, because it acted as a buffer between the USSR and Germany.

I was certain you wrote "Saving" but now couldn't find it either. Very weird. My bad.
Anyway, if the USSR was so afraid of Germany that it even invaded a country - territory Russia holds until today - for that reason, how come it was so baffled when actually attacked?
Also how come that most historic interpretation don't seem to share this view. Are there some important sources and evidences which have been purposefully or accidentally been neglected?

When the Polish government removed this possibility by fleeing the country instead of negotiating with the Germans, they [the Soviets] had no choice but to occupy Poland up to the line where Germany was supposed to stop, since there was no longer a reason for them to stop, there being no one to negotiate with to end the war, and no government to exercise control over the territory. In short, Poland had no government, and thus no longer existed as a legal political entity.

Negotiations were never a possibility. I don't see how Stalin or any other high-ranking and informed Soviet politician could have been naive enough to believe otherwise.
That the USSR hesitated had little to do with the hope for peace.

No one is talking about refuting the Pact. I'm simply pointing out what it says and does not say. People are taking that document and adding all sorts of hidden meanings to things which amount to nothing more than suspicion and circumstantial evidence.
They have no proof that the Pact was a secret agreement to jointly invade Poland, as that is not what it talks about. The Pact says that if either party goes to war with Poland at any point, they will only advance to a certain, predetermined line, which would serve to properly "punish" the Poles, but preserve the Polish buffer state, which both parties wanted. It says nothing about joint invasion, it says nothing about joint anything.

Then why was Hitler so angry about Stalin waiting with his attack? Did Hitler just totally misunderstand the whole agreement?
Also you should consider that Russia and Germany divided Poland ones before, that Russia/USSR did not give up Poland happily after WWI and that Stalin himself had specific plans for the invasion of Europe.

Hitler actually wanted to go to war over the Sudetenland. He wanted a cause that most Germans would see as just and rally towards. Prior to the invasion of Poland, he said this:

"Now Poland is in the position I wanted. [...] I am only afraid that some bastard will present me with a mediation plan at the last moment."

Edit: Oh, I read the rest of your post and discovered that you already knew this. I think I'll keep this post up just because I find the quote to be amusing.

It really is amusing. IMO Hitler neither knew how to wage war nor how to call foreign policy. All he knew was how to create one big mess.
Strikingly similar to Wilhelm II. Well Wilhelm II at least pushed some enduring internal policies.

 

[Lord Baal]

Hitler actually wanted to go to war over the Sudetenland. He wanted a cause that most Germans would see as just and rally towards. Prior to the invasion of Poland, he said this:

"Now Poland is in the position I wanted. [...] I am only afraid that some bastard will present me with a mediation plan at the last moment."

Edit: Oh, I read the rest of your post and discovered that you already knew this. I think I'll keep this post up just because I find the quote to be amusing.

I love that quote. It's probably my favourite Hitler quote ever.

I really don't see Hitler's situation, military or political, improving with any delay to Barbarossa. It isn't like the Soviets were sitting idly, and by the end of the year the US was in the war, and even if they weren't in a declared war against Germany, they would be supporting the British as their ally in the East. I don't think you would see anything like a repeat of the Munich delay here.

A relative improvement probably wouldn't happen, as Russia was arming and industrialising at a faster pace than Germany. But an absolute improvement would have happened given two more years or so, and that absolute improvement would have given Germany greater stockpiles of the raw materials - such as oil - that they ran out of towards the end of the war. Of course, I don't think Germany could have defeated Russia in 1944 any more than in 1941, but the logical move was to at least wait until your military is ready to fight a two-front war, or to eliminate one of the fronts.

And how might he have done that?

As I stated earlier in this thread, he couldn't. His best bet was the Mediterranean, but the British were never in danger of losing Egypt, no matter how good Rommel was.

But the city wouldn't magically "fall" like in Civilization, you have to fight through it.

I am not completely stupid, you know.

It took a month to clear out Berlin, which was a much smaller city than Moscow. The Germans entered parts of Leningrad several times, but found themselves unable to push further, and retreated with heavy loss.

Thus proving that they never should have entered the city to begin with. Starve it out, or simply ignore it. Leningrad was useful only as a potential source of supplies for the USSR, and Germany's conquest of Denmark and Norway, combined with Sweden's forced neutrality, already neutralised that use.

Stalingrad was a huge mess long before Operation Uranus. It was an enormous, sprawling city, and the Russians just kept pouring men and materiel into it, fighting for every inch, which necessitated huge numbers of German troops inside the city proper. The disaster that befell Paulus was that once Uranus began, he had absolutely no way to get out of the city in time, even though he saw the imminent danger.

And that danger was..? Oh yes, the Russians Army Groups launching an encirclement manoeuvre that a blind man could see coming, cutting off a massively over-extended salient into their lines. This would not have been the case in Moscow, as there were no forces in the area able to encircle the German invaders in such a way. Granted, if the Germans took too long in securing the city such troops could get there, but from where? I don't know how far east of Moscow the bulk of Russia's military in the region was, so this isn't a rhetorical question. Kuibyshev? I'm not talking small forces here, I'm talking a good-sized military force - at least an Army Group, not a smaller task force, though those could reinforce the city if they arrived quick enough - actually capable of smacking the Germans about.

Also, the Russian supply lines to Stalingrad were clearer and shorter than those to Moscow, enabling them to flood it with men and materiel far more effectively than they could have done with the capital. The two are not analogous situations, though they obviously bear some similarities. You also don't seem to realise that the Germans hardly needed to clear out the whole city to secure it. They needed only to make the city unusable for the Russians to negate its use as a supply corridor. Once that's done, cut the city off to the east, destroy the airfields through bombing raids, then leave a garrison to slowly force the Russians out while turning south to deal with the Kiev Army Group. I don't know how much ammunition the Russian soldiers in Moscow had, but I guarantee that they'd run out of it quicker than the Germans if they didn't have re-supply.

Its not easy to just pack up a whole army during battle in a city and get it out; certainly not while the noose is being tightened outside. Moscow would have been all of these things and more. Harder fighting for the city, more Russians in the city (not only reinforcements from elsewhere including Siberia, but also armed citizenry like those Zhukov formed in November), which means more Germans in the city, which means a much, much bigger threat of Uranus-esque encirclement.

But unlike Operation: Uranus, the push on Moscow was never as overextended. German supply lines were better defended and easier to maintain there. That means that even when reinforcements arrive from the east they'll have a much harder time cutting the troops in Moscow off from the bulk of German forces. So I dispute your claim that the threat of encirclement would be even equal to that in Stalingrad, let alone greater.

With this threat of encirclement weaker, even if the Germans were forced to withdraw from Moscow they'd have more time to do it. They could fight a rearguard action more effectively than in Stalingrad. Honestly, the Germans could have done the same in Stalingrad if Hitler hadn't ordered them to keep pushing, as Paulus must have seen how dangerous his position was early enough to get out. Withdrawing from a position, while not easy, is much easier than attacking one.

And you can bet Hitler would not have allowed the Wehrmacht to retreat from inside Moscow, even if it would have saved it from greater disaster; we saw that in Bagration in the summer of 1944.

No arguments there. Of course, if Hitler were the type of person to actually listen to the advice of his generals rather than his own delusions of strategic wisdom, we likely wouldn't even be having this discussion; he'd have backed down over the Sudetenland before Goering got desperate enough to negotiate the Munich Pact, or probably even earlier, during the re-militarisation of the Rhineland, and there'd have been no war that Germany could neve win.

So yes, I think that Moscow was effectively impossible to take, short of total encirclement. But to pretend the Germans could have done that is to venture into the realm of pure fantasy.

Total encirclement is hardly necessary when there really aren't many routes the supplies can arrive from. Destroy the rail lines with bombing raids to keep supplies from routing to the north or west, then park your forces at a position east of Moscow to keep the bulk from arriving. I'd have to have a long hard look at some contemporary Russian maps to figure out a good spot, and it may not be feasible, but it's not as impossible as you make it seem, Cheezy.

 

[say1988]

But an absolute improvement would have happened given two more years or so, and that absolute improvement would have given Germany greater stockpiles of the raw materials - such as oil - that they ran out of towards the end of the war.

Unfortunately, as you undoubtedly know, absolute terms do not matter, only relative does. As far as I know, raw materials were not critical before the tide of the war turned, it was only after their defeat became inevitable that resources became critical, strategically.

Of course, I don't think Germany could have defeated Russia in 1944 any more than in 1941, but the logical move was to at least wait until your military is ready to fight a two-front war, or to eliminate one of the fronts.

I take it you are a fan of the Munich Pact then?
Really, the German Army was as ready as it was ever going to be for what was anticipated and 1941 was their best opportunity to attack the Soviets, before their expanding industry gets online bringing new equipment into the equation etc.
Eliminating the other front simply wasn't possible, as you yourself noted, and we agree that Germany would be weaker, relative to the Soviets, if they had delayed Barbarossa further. I personally subscribe to the idea that a Nazi-Soviet War was coming in the next few years whether Hitler started it or not, leaving a two front war.
Yes, I am using hindsight, and maybe with the knowledge available to the Nazis the logical decision was to delay, but it seems pretty clear to me that any delay would have hurt the Nazis.

This is also ignoring the political aspects. Anti-communism being a basis of Nazism, really pushes for action against the Soviets rather than working with them, as Germany, at least, appeared to be doing. The whole lebensraum idea requiring defeat of the Soviets, etc. We cannot ignore politics as an aspect of war (or the other way around).

 

[Lord Baal]

Unfortunately, as you undoubtedly know, absolute terms do not matter, only relative does. As far as I know, raw materials were not critical before the tide of the war turned, it was only after their defeat became inevitable that resources became critical, strategically.

Absolute terms can matter, though not as much as relative ones. Fuel became a problem during the push to Moscow, though that was more a matte of supply than stockpiles. The Germans still didn't actually have the men or materiel they needed to occupy the territores they were invading, though. Given a little more time, they might have - probably not - which is a situation in which an absolute sum would have mattered.

I take it you are a fan of the Munich Pact then?

How do you figure that? The Munich Pact made Germany stronger and enabled it to vastly increase the speed of its industrialisation and re-armament. It was both morally and strategically the wrong decision, unlike knocking off Britain before taking on Russia. The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is more analogous, as it removed the threat of a two-front war.

Really, the German Army was as ready as it was ever going to be for what was anticipated and 1941 was their best opportunity to attack the Soviets, before their expanding industry gets online bringing new equipment into the equation etc.

The German Army was far from ready, but I certainly understand why they thought they were. They vastly underestimated the Soviets, and considering the USSR's piss-poor efforts in Finland, they kind of had the right to. They should have focused more on the result of Soviet skirmishes with Japan though, which were a more accurate gauge of Soviet strength. The Germans also had morale on their side after a string of victories, but they still shouldn't have attacked when they did. Certainly not with such a weak strategy.

Eliminating the other front simply wasn't possible, as you yourself noted, and we agree that Germany would be weaker, relative to the Soviets, if they had delayed Barbarossa further. I personally subscribe to the idea that a Nazi-Soviet War was coming in the next few years whether Hitler started it or not, leaving a two front war.

I also think Russia would have eventually attacked Germany. Germany's best bet though would have been to give Rommel everything he asked for and tried to push the British out of Egypt. With the Suez Canal in German hands Britain would be effectively cut off from its Empire. They could then attack British possessions in the Middle East and seize the oil there. If they pulled this off they'd be in a much better position to strike at the Russians, and this would conceivably only take another year, during which Japan would have attacked the British in the Far East. Of course, Germany couldn't conquer Egypt, but that was what they bloody well should have been trying to do.

Yes, I am using hindsight, and maybe with the knowledge available to the Nazis the logical decision was to delay, but it seems pretty clear to me that any delay would have hurt the Nazis.

With hindsight, yes. But at the time, delay was the smart option. Even with hindsight, they still made the wrong choice, as it was, as I've said several times in this thread, the Mediterranean theatre that would decide the outcome of the war. That's where Germany needed to concentrate its efforts.

This is also ignoring the political aspects. Anti-communism being a basis of Nazism, really pushes for action against the Soviets rather than working with them, as Germany, at least, appeared to be doing. The whole lebensraum idea requiring defeat of the Soviets, etc. We cannot ignore politics as an aspect of war (or the other way around).

Nazi theory also posited that Britain would join Germany in attacking Communist Russia, which clearly wasn't going to happen. Nazi ideology actually favoured attacking Britain and forcing a capitulation before turning the combined might of Germany and the British Empire against Russia. The push for quick action against the USSR was a result of Hitler's poor strategic thinking - he thought he could defeat Russia quickly, which would then result in a British capitulation :crazyeyes: - not ideology. So the political situation was actually in favour of a Mediterranean strategy as well, strangely enough, even without Stalin's offer to join the Axis.

 

[say1988]

Absolute terms can matter, though not as much as relative ones. Fuel became a problem during the push to Moscow, though that was more a matte of supply than stockpiles. The Germans still didn't actually have the men or materiel they needed to occupy the territores they were invading, though. Given a little more time, they might have - probably not - which is a situation in which an absolute sum would have mattered.

Except for gettting driven off hundreds of miles from where they actually advanced to due to the relatively stronger Soviets. Absolute strength only really matters if you can be successful.

How do you figure that? The Munich Pact made Germany stronger and enabled it to vastly increase the speed of its industrialisation and re-armament. It was both morally and strategically the wrong decision, unlike knocking off Britain before taking on Russia.

It kept Britain and France out of a war they weren't ready for leading to a significant increase in their absolute capabilities and decrease in hteir relative capabilities. The same as delaying Barbarossa would have for the Germans.

I also think Russia would have eventually attacked Germany. Germany's best bet though would have been to give Rommel everything he asked for and tried to push the British out of Egypt. With the Suez Canal in German hands Britain would be effectively cut off from its Empire. They could then attack British possessions in the Middle East and seize the oil there. If they pulled this off they'd be in a much better position to strike at the Russians, and this would conceivably only take another year, during which Japan would have attacked the British in the Far East. Of course, Germany couldn't conquer Egypt, but that was what they bloody well should have been trying to do.

Russia would provide you with plenty of oil and other resources which the Middle East would not. As such a victory in Russia would make the result of North Africa unimportant.
It also had shorter (at least early on) and more manageable (no need to rely on Italians and worry about ships) supply lines.
You seem to also believe that a victory in Russia was far more likely than a victory in Egypt. Which would make Barbarossa the better choice, if not the logical one at the time.

 

[Rik Meleet]

Perhaps stopping the development of the [wiki]Messerschmitt 262[/wiki] in 1941.

 

[Heraclius49]

Perhaps stopping the development of the [wiki]Messerschmitt 262[/wiki] in 1941.

What about interfering with the development of the Sturmgewher 43 and delaying its mass production?

 

[say1988]

Neither of which would have made a difference in the long run. Earlier and/or better jet fighters might have cost the allies more aircraft and crews, perhaps causing some minor delay or allowing the Germans to have a bit more equipment survive, but the Allies could put up enough planes and men to win.

The MP 44 would improve the effectiveness of trained infantry, but it may have faced teh same problem as the Russians did with semi-automatic rifles for untrained conscripts. Even if not, it would no have proven anything near decisive, even if developed pre-war, but I don't believe the MP44 was more than a vague idea before, at least, 1942.

No weapon the Germans could realistically develop and deploy would have made a decisive difference.

 

[LightSpectra]

No weapon the Germans could realistically develop and deploy would have made a decisive difference.

Not even the Landkreuzer P. 1500 Monster?

 

[Lord Baal]

Except for gettting driven off hundreds of miles from where they actually advanced to due to the relatively stronger Soviets. Absolute strength only really matters if you can be successful.

True enough, but I look t Operation: Barbarossa the same way I look at Operation: Sealion. Neither were ever going to be successful, but both were impossible at the times they were attempted - or, in the case of Sealion, planned to be attempted. While waiting longer would have enabled the enemy to increase its relative strength compared to Germany, it was only by waiting longer that Germany ever could have actually accumulated the necessary materiel to actually execute the plan to begin with.

It's like if Germany and Russia were plying basketball, but Germany only had three players and no ball while Russia had five and a ball. A ball is needed to win the game. Germany invades with its three players because it knows that if it waits a year, it will have five players but Russia will have twelve. Seems logical, but waiting that year will also give Germany its ball, which it needs to even stand a chance of winning in the first place. Piss-poor analogy I know, but that's the best I can do. In 1941, Germany was in better position relatively than it would be in 1942, but it had no ball. In 1942, it would have (maybe).

It kept Britain and France out of a war they weren't ready for leading to a significant increase in their absolute capabilities and decrease in hteir relative capabilities. The same as delaying Barbarossa would have for the Germans.

Except that the Munich Pact kept Britain and France out of a war that they would have won in a matter of months if they hadn't signed it, whereas delaying Barbarossa would have kept Germany out of war it was always going to lose if started then. The Munich Pact wasn't just refusing to shoot an aggressor while he was on the ground, but helping him up, handing him a gun, then helping him beat someone (Czechoslovakia) up.

Russia would provide you with plenty of oil and other resources which the Middle East would not. As such a victory in Russia would make the result of North Africa unimportant.

North Africa and the Middle East were far more strategically important than Russia. It was an obvious starting point for both an invasion of mainland Europe by the Allies and an invasion of Russia by Germany. It would also likely force Britain's capitulation for the same reason that Germany surrendered in WWI, lack of supplies, as a huge amount of British shipping came through the Suez Canal, even with the Italians there. The Middle East also gve Germany comparable resources to Russia, without the trouble of having to pacify the region. The Germans were on far better terms with Arab nations and Iran than with the Slavic nations that comprised the European USSR, and had no racial hang-ups with them, except for the Palestinian Jews. They would be welcomed as liberators from the British and French, and it is doubtful they'd piss away such good will as they did in Russia.

Conquest of the Middle East enabled Germany to strike directly at Russian oil fields in the Caucasus, making war with Russia about a thousand times easier, and Turkey, Greece, etc., would also have needed to capitulate without a fight. Germany needed to control the Middle East to defeat both Britain and Russia. Without it, she could defeat neither.

It also had shorter (at least early on) and more manageable (no need to rely on Italians and worry about ships) supply lines.

Supply by ship is easier than supply on frozen Russian roads, and the supply lines of the British in the Middle East were even longer than the German ones. It would also cut both British and Russian supply lines, whereas an invasion of Russia forces the Soviets back on their supplies and denies the British nothing.

You seem to also believe that a victory in Russia was far more likely than a victory in Egypt. Which would make Barbarossa the better choice, if not the logical one at the time.

Only because the Russians were caught woefully flat-footed, and even the dumbest British commander - and the Desert War had plenty of them - could defend El Alamein from Rommel. It was a choke-point the Germans simply could not take. No comparable defence existed in Russia, but otherwise the Middle East was much easier to break. If the Germans miraculously got through El Alamein, there was absolutely nothing to stop them from marching all the way to India short of fuel.

Neither of which would have made a difference in the long run. Earlier and/or better jet fighters might have cost the allies more aircraft and crews, perhaps causing some minor delay or allowing the Germans to have a bit more equipment survive, but the Allies could put up enough planes and men to win.

The MP 44 would improve the effectiveness of trained infantry, but it may have faced teh same problem as the Russians did with semi-automatic rifles for untrained conscripts. Even if not, it would no have proven anything near decisive, even if developed pre-war, but I don't believe the MP44 was more than a vague idea before, at least, 1942.

No weapon the Germans could realistically develop and deploy would have made a decisive difference.

Thanks for saying it, so I wouldn't have to.

Not even the Landkreuzer P. 1500 Monster?

Is that the totally awesome submarine that walked on the land?

 

[Renner]

Reminds me of a Sandcrawler from Star Wars, that thing would have been massive.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:P1500_Monster.gif

 

[say1988]

Supply by ship is easier than supply on frozen Russian roads, and the supply lines of the British in the Middle East were even longer than the German ones. It would also cut both British and Russian supply lines, whereas an invasion of Russia forces the Soviets back on their supplies and denies the British nothing.

True, when you have sufficient shipping capacity and control of the seas. The Allies had the ships (merchant and combat) to support their forces despite losses. Every ship lost was significant to the Germans, and when forces were operating out of Malta those losses were pretty big.

Only because the Russians were caught woefully flat-footed, and even the dumbest British commander - and the Desert War had plenty of them - could defend El Alamein from Rommel. It was a choke-point the Germans simply could not take. No comparable defence existed in Russia, but otherwise the Middle East was much easier to break. If the Germans miraculously got through El Alamein, there was absolutely nothing to stop them from marching all the way to India short of fuel.

And if they had waited a year, the Soviets may not have been caught off guard. then both fronts become unwinnable.

I understand what you are saying, and logically, at the time, I would agree with you. But hindsight shows that their best shot at success was Barbarossa in 1941, where they had a slim shot at victory, while anything else would require, as you said, a mirable.

Is that the totally awesome submarine that walked on the land?

1500 ton tank with 800mm guns (Schwerer Gustav) and a crew of over 100. I believe frontal armour was to be 250mm or something like that.

 

[Rik Meleet]

What about interfering with the development of the Sturmgewher 43 and delaying its mass production?

I think that had a minor influence compared to (theoretically) having a ME 262 in 1941.

Neither of which would have made a difference in the long run. Earlier and/or better jet fighters might have cost the allies more aircraft and crews, perhaps causing some minor delay or allowing the Germans to have a bit more equipment survive, but the Allies could put up enough planes and men to win.

The MP 44 would improve the effectiveness of trained infantry, but it may have faced teh same problem as the Russians did with semi-automatic rifles for untrained conscripts. Even if not, it would no have proven anything near decisive, even if developed pre-war, but I don't believe the MP44 was more than a vague idea before, at least, 1942.

No weapon the Germans could realistically develop and deploy would have made a decisive difference.

I don't think "in the long run" is what mattered. If the effects of the "sort run" could be a bit more decisive there wouldn't have been a "long run".
I know this plane had its testflights in 1941 and the battle of Britain was in 1940, but... Just imagine ME 262's in sufficient numbers (and with reliable engines) actively present during the battle of Britain and what consequences that could have had.

Not even the Landkreuzer P. 1500 Monster?

This weapon strikes me as utterly unusable and impractical in offensive combat. Especially on the bad roads of Russia. And just think about the logistic and maintenance nightmares ...

 

[say1988]

Just imagine ME 262's in sufficient numbers (and with reliable engines) actively present during the battle of Britain and what consequences that could have had.

What if Hitler had a thousand F-22s and B-52s? Or some Los Angeles class subs, and Leopard II tanks?
There was no way that there would be significant numbers of reliable Me-262s for the Battle of Britain. The first jet engine was tested in 1937, the first jet aircraft flew in 1939. Even if they had been present in a noticeable number, they would not have been decisive, and even if they were and invasions would still be impractical at best.

 

[Rik Meleet]

What if Hitler had a thousand F-22s and B-52s? Or some Los Angeles class subs, and Leopard II tanks?
There was no way that there would be significant numbers of reliable Me-262s for the Battle of Britain. The first jet engine was tested in 1937, the first jet aircraft flew in 1939. Even if they had been present in a noticeable number, they would not have been decisive, and even if they were and invasions would still be impractical at best.

I agree that an invasion would still be unlikely. But I do think, since Britain's skys would be in the hands of the Luftwaffe, that reinforcing Britain and gathering sufficient US and Canadian forces on English soil would be virtually impossible (not to mention countering the Nazi submarine threat on the North Atlantic) so preparing an invasion in France might be out of the question, freeing many Nazi troops for other war theaters.
And don't forget without the UK's reinforcements-by-sea of for instance Malta and Egypt would only increase this effect.

 

[say1988]

Even with 262s they could only seriously threaten a small portion of British soil. And I doubt it would take too long to develop tactics to put them down. Sheer numbers of fighters and AA guns would do the same thing to the 262s as they did to the 109s. Germany did not have the capability of establishing and maintaining air superiority over Britain.

There were significant port outside of any areas threatened by the Luftwaffe for landing men and materiel. Look at how well the Germans maintained their forces when the Allies had air superiority, the British could do that and more.

Reinforcements to Egypt went via the Cape and as such could not be threatened by 262s. Malta is the only place that could be cut off by better air power, and the Germans for a while did pretty well. True some 262s would decrease the ability of Spitfires to defend Malta, but I doubt a few better fighters could hold it down once the British really started trying to defend it and they would not be able to break the island.

The aerial portion of the Battle of the Atlantic was fought by bombers out of reasonable range for 262s to be effective combatants.

And once again, I seriously doubt it would take too long to develop tactics to counter them and their advantage would deteriorate over time.

Lastly, how could the Germans possibly conjure up a significant number of reliable 262s in 1940?