How did Poland hold out longer than France.

[Traitorfish]

They were essentially an ugly deformation of the old Connollyite position (with Marxist-Leninist influences), which had been maintained by elements of the IRA and, after the '69 split, the Official IRA. By the time they wound down after the Good Friday Agreement, their "socialism" was little more than a vague pretence entertained to justify the killing and maiming of working class people who happened to be of the "wrong" (and occasionally "right") nationality.

 

[ParkCungHee]

They're political wing seems to take socialism rather seriously, and I have to ask, if their military wing didn't I can't imagine why they'd maintain their own military seperate from the PIRA.
http://www.irsp.ie/Background/policytheory.html

 

[Traitorfish]

They're political wing seems to take socialism rather seriously, and I have to ask, if their military wing didn't I can't imagine why they'd maintain their own military seperate from the PIRA.
http://www.irsp.ie/Background/policytheory.html

There was certainly a socialist ideology there, but they did bugger all to implement it, even by the embarrassing standards of the British/Irish far-left. Sectarianism was the greatest barrier to working class solidarity that Northern Ireland ever faced, and the IRSP and their ilk never did anything but perpetuate it. They tried to justify with some quasi-Maoist ramblings about colonialism and national liberation, but most of it basically came down to sectarianism for sectarianism's sake.
As to the separation from the PIRA, that had an ideological element, but a lot of it was to do with religion; the PIRA had a strong "Catholic Nationalist" sentiment- they were nicknamed the "Rosary Brigade" by the OIRA- while the INLA were secular Irish nationalists who drew members from Catholic and Protestant backgrounds. Besides, by the time of the GFA, it was partly just down to power politics, much of the armed conflict having degenerated into nominally-ideological gang warfare, the organisations as much akin to ethnic gangs as paramilitaries. In "protecting" their communities from drugs and prostitution, the paramilitaries had learned how effective a revenue stream such things can produce and embraced them far more quickly than they would like you to believe.

 

[cubsfan6506]

Woooooooooooooooooo I did it, 500 posts.

 

[Lord Baal]

I'm still thinking what I want to open with.

Pfft, open. Spoken like an amateur.

I've already read her every single Timothy Zahn Star Wars story, including the short stories, with the sole exception of Allegiance, which I started today. She's getting a great education. I'm going to make sure she learns about art, like any good military commander.

 

[Racsoviale]

Are we preparing for the inevitable machine takeover "Mr. Baal", or should I say Sarah Connor!!!!

 

[Lord Baal]

Are we preparing for the inevitable machine takeover "Mr. Baal", or should I say Sarah Connor!!!!

I thought I was preparing her lead the Galactic Empire to victory over the Rebel Alliance, but whatever, it's all good.

 

[Domen]

about who was really the barbarian

Well, actually Terry Jones doesn't say that Romans were barbarians.

================================

What about changing the name of this thread - why did France hold out longer than Poland?

 

[lionn77]

I found this thread very interesting to read. I'd like to address two facts some people seem not to know about:

1. Between August 30th and 31st all Polish Air Force battle squadrons rebased to field wartime airbases. That was a brilliant and well timed move completely missed by the German intelligence. As a result when Luftwaffe launched major attack againts all major peacetime airfields they found nothing but empty runways and hangars. Of course they managed to destroy a few training planes but even most of school planes
had managed to escape the danger! So unlike the French and the Soviets who lost hundreds the Polish squadrons didn't lose a single combat aircraft on ground on the first day of German offensive. Even later as the German offensive moved on and the squadrons had to rebase again and again the only aircraft lost on the ground were those ones that were seriously damaged and unable to evacuate and torched as a result. Both battle quality and morale of Polish personnel were top class and they continued to harass invaders as long as they had aircraft to fly and fuel supplies.

2. The infamous lances-to-tank stuff. The Polish prewar cavalry units consisted of about 40 regiments that were later reorganized into 11 brigades of regular mounted cavalry and one brigade of armored cavalry(10th Motorized Brigade). All mounted units were expected to be upgraded to the status of motorized brigades within 5-10 years. All mounted units were drilled to fight as infantry as their primary task
and equiped with carbines, grenades,AT guns(excellent 37mm Polish made Bofors guns and AT rifles) and machine guns. Each cavalry brigade was supported by a 75mm field artillery battallion and engineers. So they were ordered to move as a mounted unit and fight like infantry. A mounted charge was to be only an emergency means of fighting and as a matter of fact there were indeed several charges during the campaign but none with lances and none directly againts tanks! One of those charges took place near Krojanty and it was that one that created the myth. Open wikipedia and search for "Skirmish of Krojanty" to get a clear explanation what happened then.

 

[Civ'ed]

Spoiler :

"They're German/Italian/Austrian/Spanish/Italian/Polish/Prussian/Russian/Dutch! what did you expect."

rrrright. and these nazis came from... mars?

That map is, like, from Napoleon Bonapartes time?
(In WWII there was no such thing as a french netherlands or a prussia. It was Netherlands and das dritte Reich.

 

[Dachs]

I doubt Guangxi will be coming around again to respond, dude. His - entirely valid - point is that "national character" stereotypes about, well, anything are pretty stupid.

 

[Domen]

Note that Polish mobilization (excluding improvised units, which were not planned) ended on 14.09.1939. But of course in fact it never ended as planned, because it was interrupted by German air and ground military actions.

Here a very interesting table taken from the article by Rafał Białkowski (pages 10 - 27):

http://www.martola.com.pl/biuletyn-dws-2010-07_HQ.pdf

It shows planned strength of the Polish army* after mobilization and its real strength on 01.09.1939. As can be seen the Polish army had roughly 70% of the planned post-mobilization strength mobilized on 01.09.1939:

Two of the 3 planned reserve groups ("Kutno" and "Tarnow") were in fact non-existant when war started:
(apart from that Army "Prusy" was a reserve army, while all other armies were along the frontier)

Note that the number of AFVs includes all armoured vehicles - both tanks and armoured cars.

One cavalry regiment = 5 squadrons. Apart from regiments also non-regimental squadrons are included. Of course one cavalry squadron was more or less of 1/2 infantry company size and one regiment - of infantry battalion size.

*This table includes everything on the anti-German and anti-Slovakian front except for forces in the Coastline (which included among other units further 12 infantry battalions). It also doesn't include forces which yet on 01.09.1939 (and according to the mobilization plan) weren't on the western front, but along the Polish-Soviet border (this includes apart from other units 24 infantry battalions of KOP, Border Protection Corps - 22 rifle battalions and 2 fortress battalions) and in eastern Poland (apart from other units 10 infantry battalions - all of them National Defence).

And here planned dislocation of Polish forces along main directions of German attack:

A - from East Prussia towards Warsaw and Brest (A "Modlin", odwód "Wyszków" and SGO "Narew")
B - from West Pomerania and East Prussia towards Torun and Poznan (A "Pomorze" and A "Poznań")
C - from Silesia towards Warsaw (odwód "Kutno", A "Łódź", A "Prusy" and A "Kraków" in Czestochowa gap)
D - from Upper Silesia and Czechoslovakia (rest of A "Kraków", A "Karpaty" and odwód "Tarnów")
dispositional units of the CiC (still being formed Warsaw Armored-Motorized Brigade and other units)

battalions / squadrons / HMGs / light arty / heavy arty / AA arty / AT arty / AVFs (as in the previous table):

Those 455 planned infantry battalions (of which 316 actually mobilized on 01.09.1939) included:

39 infantry divisions with 353 battalions (including 24 KOP and 12 ON)
56 ON (National Defence) usually weak battalions (including 14 in 3 mountain brigades and 42 attached to individual armies and operational groups)
14 KOP (Border Protection Corps) battalions - 5 regiments (12) and 2 independent battalions
10 rifle battalions
7 HMG and support weapons battalions
9 fortress battalions (including one company of in fact battalion strength)
3 battalions of 1st Podhale Rifle Regiment (2nd Mountain Brigade)
3 improvised battalions in Army "Pomorze" (battalion ON "Grudziadz", improvised IV./67 Inf.Rgt. and improvised "assault battalion" of 16th Infantry Division)

1. Between August 30th and 31st all Polish Air Force battle squadrons

Which on 01.09.1939 numbered in total 404 aircrafts in combat units, including:

158 fighters (108 x PZL P-11c; 20 x PZL P-11a; 30 x PZL P-7)
114 light bombers - reconnaissance (114 x PZL P-23 "Karas")
36 medium bombers (36 x PZL P-37 "Los")
84 observation - communication (49 x Lublin R-XIII; 35 x RWD-14 "Czapla")
12 seaplanes

Here you can find more info on this:

http://www.samoloty.ow.pl/str080.htm

.

 

[vogtmurr]

Do you have that same level of detail for the German forces ?
If you did you could model a pretty realistic scenario, and see if it's possible for Poland to hold out longer.

 

[Domen]

I have almost the same level of detail for German forces (this comes from another source, Polish historian Tadeusz Jurga, who also compares there German and Polish forces - but his numbers for Polish forces are slightly different than above ones - in most cases they are bigger).

However, I know that:

1) This data for German forces includes only those which crossed the border on 01.09.1939 (and many divisions invaded with smaller or bigger delay).

2) This is probably because it also includes only Polish forces mobilized on 01.09.1939 (and some more became ready during the next days).

3) Even though, there are still some mistakes there. But I am too lazy at the moment and don't have time to correct them.

4) The main advantage is that this alternative data (Tadeusz Jurga) compares forces along the whole frontline and along main directions of German attack. So it shows a more realistic comparison of forces in decisive for the outcome of the "Battle for the Border" parts of the initial frontline.

Anyway - I will scan it also (I've got it on paper, not online) and post here.

But, as I already wrote, there are some mistakes there (the main one is that real numbers for German forces were bigger).

========================================================

OK - here it is, enjoy:

* Infantry (battalions) - this includes also cavalry (each cavalry regiment counted as one infantry battalion).

** Note that if all AFVs were counted, German superiority would be much bigger (since they deployed ca. 900 - 1000 armoured cars compared to ca. 100 Polish).

This calculation includes - when it comes to German forces:

Only 35 (out 42) regular infantry divsions, only 6 (out of 7 - 10th Pz.Div. is not included because it crossed the border on 03.09.1939) Panzer divisions, only 1 (out of 3) mountain divisions that crossed the Polish border yet on 01.09.1939 (out of those which invaded Poland in total) and all of other divisions.

The same rule applies to units smaller than divisions, starting with brigades (many of which despite being rather of brigade strength, were often called in German sources as divisions - for example Division "Eberhardt", 301. Inf.Div.) - many of them are not included in this table too.

For example certainly Brigades "Lotzen" and "Goldap" from the so called Division "Brand" aren't included. As well as Group "Konigsberg", etc.

When it comes to German infantry battalions, out of this total number given in the above posted schedule, as many as 83 were fully motorized (including 76 transported by trucks & cars and 7 transported by motorcycles) in 15 armored-motorized divisions and 2 Waffen SS regiments only, without non-divisional ones (if any of them were motorized - probably yes, which would increase the total number, but I don't know anything more specific about it).

For comparison, out of all Polish infantry & cavalry units, only 3 cavalry regiments and 1 infantry battalion were motorized.

.

 

[Domen]

Now a similar comparison for the Battle of France would be nice.

and see if it's possible for Poland to hold out longer.

The Polish side unfortunately commited a number of serious mistakes in planning and command. The first and one of most significant being linearly and almost evenly scattering all of relatively small Polish forces along the entire 2,000 km long border.

Another thing is that the Soviet Invasion accelerated the Polish final collapse (but also hard situation of Poland encouraged Stalin for so early invasion, so partly the Polish leadership was responsible for this "stab in the back" - at least for such an early one).

It was possible for Poland to hold out longer and better, despite all the German superiority.

Another factor was that Poland started mobilization and in general preparation to war too late.

But Polish forces were astonished by the first ever implementation of the Blitzkrieg - nobody knew its efficiency before. Polish mobilization and concentration, communications, cooperation, system of command - were interrupted by Luftwaffe, armoured spearheads and sabotage (Abwehr and "V Column").

On the other hand, France one year later should have been already aware of what Blitzkrieg is capable of.

France didn't have so many hostile or at least "negatively neutral" minorities on its territory and in its army as Poland.

France also had almost 1 year of "phoney" wartime to improve training of its reservists, complete mobilization, strengthen fortifications, etc.

So France was in a much more comfortable position. As well as in a much better geopolitical situation.

Also the German superiority over France and her allies was much smaller than that over Poland.

 

[jagdtigerciv]

Poland didn't. France held out for the entirety of the phony war.

 

[Steph]

That's not really relevant since there was no real fighting during this time.
What it relevant is that the actual fighting during the invasion of Poland spanned a shorter time than the real fighting during the battle of France.

 

[Lord Baal]

Not to mention the fact that France could actually have beaten Germany had Petain not decided to roll over and die rather than fight back with everything he had. Poland could potentially have held out longer than it did, but it never stood half the chance that France did.

 

[Steph]

What are you talking about with Petain

 

[LightSpectra]

Not to mention the fact that France could actually have beaten Germany had Petain not decided to roll over and die rather than fight back with everything he had.

As far as I know, Pétain was retired at this point and was only recalled so that Reynaud would not become the fall-guy for France's defeat.

What exactly could France have done after Arras (May 21) anyway? The most critical error of the French High Command was not forcefully counter-attacking enough after the breakthrough at Sedan on May 13. They were already evacuating Paris by May 16, which was when Churchill and Gamelin had their infamous conversation ("Où est la masse de manoeuvre?", "Aucune"). By June 1, the Allies had nothing substantial north of Amiens, but had to counter every armored division (which was, what, 2,000+ tanks?) in the Wermacht. The battle was well-lost by the time Pétain called the ceasefire on June 22.