How did Poland hold out longer than France.

[Steph]

I think the critical error was not to attack in September 39. We may have not been fully mobilized yet, but with the German army occupied in Poland, we may have prevailed, or at least keep the Germans busy long enough to finish mobilization and continue the war on their soil.

 

[LightSpectra]

I think the critical error was not to attack in September 39. We may have not been fully mobilized yet, but with the German army occupied in Poland, we may have prevailed, or at least keep the Germans busy long enough to finish mobilization and continue the war on their soil.

Even better than that would be invading the Rhineland in 1938 while the Germans are bogged down in the Sudetenland. But we could talk about Allied errors all day; all I meant was that the French had basically no hope after May 21 (short of something bizarre like Hitler being struck by lightning followed by a Soviet invasion of Silesia). I remind you that this was the Allied position starting on that day:

Spoiler :

 

[Pokurcz]

Poland didn't. France held out for the entirety of the phony war.

Poland never officialy surrenderd, the government moved to London, and Polish armed forces fought all over Europe and in northern Africa. NOt to mention the biggest resistance organization of the war.

 

[rilnator]

Poland never officialy surrenderd, the government moved to London, and Polish armed forces fought all over Europe and in northern Africa. NOt to mention the biggest resistance organization of the war.

Even bigger than the Soviet partisans?

 

[Pokurcz]

the AK in Poland numbered about 400000 in '44.

 

[Domen]

Jugoslavia had bigger partisan forces.

Soviet Union also but maybe not as well organized as Polish.

 

[Pokurcz]

I had no idea the Yugoslavian was that big! Helps to explain howcome they where so succesfull though.

But wasn't the sSoviet one comprized of the Belurussian and Ukrainian one as well, not under one command so to speak?

 

[Theige]

As far as I know, Pétain was retired at this point and was only recalled so that Reynaud would not become the fall-guy for France's defeat.

What exactly could France have done after Arras (May 21) anyway? The most critical error of the French High Command was not forcefully counter-attacking enough after the breakthrough at Sedan on May 13. They were already evacuating Paris by May 16, which was when Churchill and Gamelin had their infamous conversation ("Où est la masse de manoeuvre?", "Aucune"). By June 1, the Allies had nothing substantial north of Amiens, but had to counter every armored division (which was, what, 2,000+ tanks?) in the Wermacht. The battle was well-lost by the time Pétain called the ceasefire on June 22.

Petain's involvement is far more complicated than that; he was still politically active and Reynaud officially brought Petain into his war cabinet June 5th. Petain seems to have been in favor of an armistice with Germany almost immediately.

They, Petain and his supporters, basically traded hundreds of thousands, if not millions of french lives, for their independence as a nation.

 

[Domen]

Coming back to comparison of French (+ their allies) and Polish capabilities of defence against Germany (and their allies):

Comparison of German, French and Polish financial military capabilities:

German / French / Polish relative annual military budgets:
(assuming that German military budged of 1934 = 100)

1934 - 100 / 80 / ---
1935 - 176 / 93 / 5
1936 - 255 / 107 / 5
1937 - 361 / 94 / 4
1938 - 811 / 111 / 3
1939 - 1674 / --- / 2

Where "---" means that I have no data for this country for this year.

So, for example, if German military budget of 1936 = 255, then French in the same year = 107 and Polish = 5.

Comparison of Polish and German military aviation budgets:
(in brackets percentage of total annual military budgets)

1935 - 100 (30,0%) / 1,5 (9,0%)
1936 - 111 (33,0%) / 1,6 (10,0%)
1937 - 133 (34,6%) / 1,7 (9,8%)
1938 - 166 (33%) / 1,9 (11,5%)
1939 - 283 (24%) / 2,5 (12,6%)

Polish 1935/1936 total military budget constituted 35% of entire state budget (but if adding also further 196 million zlotys allocated to Ministry of Internal Affairs this share is going to raise to 44% of overall Poland's 1935/36 state budget).

By comparison German 1937 military budget was 23% of entire German state budget, while French 1937 military budget was 9% of entire French state budget.

French military spendings ranged from 9% to 14% in pre-war period.

Majority of Polish military budget of 1935/1936 was spent on maintenance costs, infantry and cavalry. Here is the breakdown:

- infantry (30 divisions) - 240 million zl
- cavalry (11 brigades) - 59 million zl
- heavy artillery (10 regiments) - 16 million zl
- air forces - 63 million zl
- armor, engineers, communication etc. - 29 million zl
- navy - 46 million zl
- mobilization reserves - 140 million zl
- military building - 40 million zl
- military education, exercises etc. - 30 million zl
- staffs, magazines etc. - 100 million zl
- others - 5 million zl

Comparison of Polish and German aviation industry capabilities in 1939:

- Germany: monthly aircraft production - 700
- Poland: monthly aircraft production - 20

======================================

Please note that in 1939: 1 USD = 5.31 zl and 1 RM = 2.12 zl.

 

[Domen]

To show you how huge was the difference between pre-war German and Polish military budgets, let's mention that modern US military budget (e.g. in 2008 - 460 bn USD) is approximately 50 times bigger than modern Polish military budget (e.g. in 2010 - 9 bn USD).

There was similar difference between Polish and German pre-war military budgets.

But today Polish military budget is only 1,95% of Polish total GDP.

While difference between French and German military budgets was smaller than between US and Russian today (Russian in 2009 was 50 bn USD).

So the Germany vs Poland confrontation in 1939 was like USA vs Poland today.
While Germany vs France confrontation in 1940 was like USA vs 1,5 or 2 x Russia today.

 

[Verbose]

As far as I know, Pétain was retired at this point and was only recalled so that Reynaud would not become the fall-guy for France's defeat.

Theige kind of hinted at this, but Pétains inclusion seems to have been one of broadening the base of the government. Reynaud also brought in de Gaulle to give it some young military oomph. What then transpired was that Reynad and de Gaulle fx were in favour of fighting on from the colonies - or even go along with the rather outrageous scheme of a Anglo-French union (de Gaulle brought the proposal from London to Reynaud, who seemed game). At the same time Pétain was for seeking terms from the Germans, and he was in contact with the CiC Weygand - and it was Weygand who ended up darkly hinting at every damn cabinet meeting, that if Reynaud didn't seek terms from the Germans, then quite possibley Weygand could take the army and remove the government in a coup d'état. The point of this being that the French army shouldn't be forced to surrender to the Germans, but the politicians. After a while of this rubbish, Reynaud threw in the towel and stepped down, Pétain stepped up, requested terms from the Germans as per Weygand's wishes, and de Gaulle went off to London to fight on.

 

[LightSpectra]

Well, I learned something new today.

 

[Theige]

That Anglo-French Union would have been really nifty.

 

[Verbose]

That Anglo-French Union would have been really nifty.

Afaik Jean Monnet — better known for his European Union schemes — was in the thick of it.

 

[Domen]

By June 1, the Allies had nothing substantial north of Amiens, but had to counter every armored division (which was, what, 2,000+ tanks?) in the Wermacht.

Germans certainly didn't have even near as many as 2,000 of their tanks operational on June 1. Note that vast majority of German tank losses in Westfeldzug (between 77% and 81% according to different sources) were suffered in May, the same applies to German aircraft losses (80% - 81% suffered in Fall Gelb). On the other hand, only up to 40% of total German human casualties were suffered in May / Fall Gelb, while even over 60% - in Fall Rot / June.

Moreover - 46% of the total German aircraft losses in Westfeldzug, were suffered between May 10 and May 16.

Regarding tank losses, for example German 7. Panzer-Division had just 86 tanks operational on May 25, while starting the campaign with 225 tanks on May 10, this is slightly more than 38% of the initial combat strength. By similar count, German 4. Panzer-Division started the campaign with 354 tanks, while on June 8 (out of initial 354 + 9 reinforcements = 363) it had only 187 operational tanks - 53% of the starting strength.

Of course French armoured forces suffered even more staggering losses - for example French 1 DLM had just 20 tanks out of the initial 257 left at the start of Fall Rot (which is around 8%); 2 DCR had 6 operational tanks at the start of Fall Rot, out of the initial number of 160 - 4% of the initial fighting strength.

 

[LightSpectra]

What they actually had operational OTL is not the point, since the question is if the Allies would be able to counter-attack with any sufficiency after losing everything in the Low Countries. The German supply lines, in this scenario, would be much shorter, and they'd also have a much more convenient time frame to repair and refuel than in OTL, where the Panzerwaffe rotated south and then advanced rapidly.

But anyhow, that's hardly the tantamount question, given that the French would have barely anything to go on the offensive with, regardless of what the Germans had.

 

[Lord Baal]

Theige kind of hinted at this, but Pétains inclusion seems to have been one of broadening the base of the government. Reynaud also brought in de Gaulle to give it some young military oomph. What then transpired was that Reynad and de Gaulle fx were in favour of fighting on from the colonies - or even go along with the rather outrageous scheme of a Anglo-French union (de Gaulle brought the proposal from London to Reynaud, who seemed game). At the same time Pétain was for seeking terms from the Germans, and he was in contact with the CiC Weygand - and it was Weygand who ended up darkly hinting at every damn cabinet meeting, that if Reynaud didn't seek terms from the Germans, then quite possibley Weygand could take the army and remove the government in a coup d'état. The point of this being that the French army shouldn't be forced to surrender to the Germans, but the politicians. After a while of this rubbish, Reynaud threw in the towel and stepped down, Pétain stepped up, requested terms from the Germans as per Weygand's wishes, and de Gaulle went off to London to fight on.

I made a huge post last night that the forum ate which basically amounted to what you've said in one paragraph.

Also, it must not be forgotten that De Gaulle and Reynaud actually planned to fight on not just from the colonies but in France itself. De Gaulle outlined a plan for the government and what was left of the military to withdraw to a redoubt in Brittany, but Weygand basically forced Reynaud to remove the government to Lyons - and then to Bordeaux - rather than Quimper. That's the moment that France officially lost all chance at fighting back. Lyons and Bordeaux were indefensible, unlike a nearly impregnable Quimper.

 

[W|M]

I heard that France didn't continue the Maginot line past Benelux because Belgium wouldn't let France make it, as Belgium thought France didn't trust Belgium's defences.

 

[Steph]

Belgium wouldn't have been able to do much about it.
It was more a French decision to show Belgium that they can remain a French ally (ie as we don't make the line on your border, you don't have to worry that if the Germans attack, we'll wait behind our line and watch you get slaughtered, and we'd actually come to help you).
That and the more practical reason of the cost...

 

[ParkCungHee]

I heard that France didn't continue the Maginot line past Benelux because Belgium wouldn't let France make it, as Belgium thought France didn't trust Belgium's defences.

Belgium threatened that IF the French built it, this time they would just let the Germans through, because France would then be unlikely to work towards relieving them of German occupation.