Japanese surrender and the end of the Pacific War

Are there concrete numbers of German atrocities on the western front compared to allied ones (uh, ignoring the rounding up and murdering of Jews, etc, of course)? Obviously, German action in the Eastern Front was worse than their action in the west, but I'm not entirely sure it was necessarily better than the allies.

I'd also take exception to the idea that it was rampant on the US side, although it was clearly a greater problem than it should be.
There are concrete numbers of atrocities against civilians in the West - I don't have them to hand, but I've read them in the past - but I have no idea of any such numbers with regards to military activities. It's no secret that the Germans behaved far better when fighting their "fellow Aryans" in the West than the Slavic untermenschen in the East, however.
 
Unless you count the Jews they rounded up in the west.
 
It was a POW thing, not excusing the holocaust or other atrocities commited against civilians by the Germnans. Killing PoWs was also commen enough in the pacific theatre that they had to offer 3 days leave and icecream for GIs to yake Japanese prisoners.

In one instance almost half of the Germans taken prisoner made to to the beaches in Normandy. The shooting of PoWs as depited in Band of Brothers are based on fact.
 
Actually, as shown through the rest of the series, Speirs never confirmed nor denied the incident before he died and there is no ard evidence it occurred, but there is no question that there were numerous occasions of Allied troops refusing surrender, to paraphrase a statement from a later episode ("Replacements", I believe) "sometimes it pays to be seen as the toughest SOB in the army". This is also a man who is supposed to have, and I believe generally accepted to have, shot one of his sargents. AKA not your average soldier.
 
Actually, as shown through the rest of the series, Speirs never confirmed nor denied the incident before he died and there is no ard evidence it occurred, but there is no question that there were numerous occasions of Allied troops refusing surrender, to paraphrase a statement from a later episode ("Replacements", I believe) "sometimes it pays to be seen as the toughest SOB in the army". This is also a man who is supposed to have, and I believe generally accepted to have, shot one of his sargents. AKA not your average soldier.
Speirs most definitely shot his own sergeant. He reported to his C.O. that he'd shot his own sergeant. He never confirmed killing POWs but was widely believed to have done so. He was reported to kill for "shock value," especially when breaking in new recruits.

@Louis XXIV: I quite clearly mentioned "military activities." That obviously doesn't include crimes committed by the Germans during the occupation, except when they were military in nature. Crimes against humanity aren't the same thing as war crimes (though there's obviously plenty of crossover).
 
Speirs most definitely shot his own sergeant. He reported to his C.O. that he'd shot his own sergeant.
I seemed to recall that it was pretty certain, but didn't know enough to actually say anything definitive.

He never confirmed killing POWs but was widely believed to have done so. He was reported to kill for "shock value," especially when breaking in new recruits.
But, as I said the only evidence is:
a) lack of denial (which can be pretty easily explained for in that he was cultivating the reputation
b) people who had a "friend of a friend" hear or see something
I am not saying he didn't do it, and he appears quite capable of it based what I have seen/read about him, but there is no hard evidence that this one episode was true, as implied by Zardnaar.
 
I seemed to recall that it was pretty certain, but didn't know enough to actually say anything definitive.


But, as I said the only evidence is:
a) lack of denial (which can be pretty easily explained for in that he was cultivating the reputation
b) people who had a "friend of a friend" hear or see something
I am not saying he didn't do it, and he appears quite capable of it based what I have seen/read about him, but there is no hard evidence that this one episode was true, as implied by Zardnaar.
I'm pretty sure Malarkey mentioned actually seeing him commit atrocities of that sort, though he didn't actually see the POW-shooting episode in question. I'd have to steal my father's copy of the book to check that though. Unless Wiki mentions it.

As for shooting his own sergeant, he definitely did it. The record states he shot him for disobeying an order twice. The other soldiers under his command at the time swore the guy was suffering from shell-shock and was incapable of doing pretty much anything other than laying in a ditch rocking back and forth, but Speirs never struck me as the type to really care about a soldier's mental health. He reported the incident to his C.O., but it was never investigated. I believe the C.O. was wounded or killed in action before he had a chance to investigate.
 
I never claimed that Band of Brothers was true in the specific incident but later in the series they had French soldiers who apparently were even worse than the Americans for shooting PoWs.
 
I never claimed that Band of Brothers was true in the specific incident but later in the series they had French soldiers who apparently were even worse than the Americans for shooting PoWs.
Considering the French used German troops as slave labour I wouldn't be surprised.
 
On the western front it seems the Allies were worse than the Axis

That's actually perfectly logical... the more opportunity to kill pows you have, the more kills you'll have. And as a veteran said once on TV "it's really, really hard not to shoot when you heard the screams of your wounded all night long"

In regards to Japanese peace feelers they were half hearted and vague at best. You won't find a single document, or offer from anyone who actually had the authority to surrender. Why not just ask the Americans for terms directly rather than convoluted and messy go arounds?


What? The ONE thing the Japanese hardliners wanted was the confirmation that they could still maintain the Emperor's line (the "unconditional surrender" scared them to death).
Crap 1 : let's kill more civilians because we can't publicly tell our public opinion we won't try their leader
Crap 2: let's keep their leader in position!

And as a final touch... pretty much every japanese expected that Shôwa (including himself) would have had to step down in favor of one of his brothers, but Mac Arthur insisted to keep him on the throne.
 
What? The ONE thing the Japanese hardliners wanted was the confirmation that they could still maintain the Emperor's line (the "unconditional surrender" scared them to death).
Crap 1 : let's kill more civilians because we can't publicly tell our public opinion we won't try their leader
Crap 2: let's keep their leader in position!

Untrue. Historically, there were no terms by anyone with the authority to offer them until after not just Hiroshima, but also August Storm and Nagasaki, at which point the Imperial Council was still tied between the faction demanding the Imperial House be preserved in addition to the Potsdam terms and that also demanding no occupation, and Japanese control over war trials and disarmament, with the latter group notably including the Minister of the Army and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs, any one of whom under the screwed up Japanese Constitution had veto over any final decision. It took direct Imperial intervention to swing it in favor of the former. (whose offer was rejected by the Allies, and Japan finally accepted full unconditional surrender several days later after a failed military coup)
 
Untrue. Historically, there were no terms by anyone with the authority to offer them until after not just Hiroshima, but also August Storm and Nagasaki, at which point the Imperial Council was still tied between the faction demanding the Imperial House be preserved in addition to the Potsdam terms and that also demanding no occupation, and Japanese control over war trials and disarmament, with the latter group notably including the Minister of the Army and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs, any one of whom under the screwed up Japanese Constitution had veto over any final decision. It took direct Imperial intervention to swing it in favor of the former. (whose offer was rejected by the Allies, and Japan finally accepted full unconditional surrender several days later after a failed military coup


I indeed sounded as if the Japanese had directly asked terms to the US, which, as you pointed out is false. Sorry about that. However, the imperial intervention took place after Byrne's answer to the statement of August 10th which clearly said that the Japanese were ready to accept the Potsdam ultimatum "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler". Potsdam is kind of silent about the subject (shame, former Ambassador Grew urged adding the retention of the Emperor's line as an article, but was ignored for obvious reasons).

And we will never know if Shôwa said this to placate one of his most hawkish family member but when asked if the war were to continue if the "Imperial system" could not be preserved, he answered "of course".
 
I indeed sounded as if the Japanese had directly asked terms to the US, which, as you pointed out is false. Sorry about that. However, the imperial intervention took place after Byrne's answer to the statement of August 10th which clearly said that the Japanese were ready to accept the Potsdam ultimatum "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler".

There were 2 separate imperial interventions. The meeting of the cabinet on the night of August 9 ended with no consensus, at which point the Emperor gave his "I swallow my tears and give my sanction to the proposal to accept the Allied proclamation on the basis outlined by the Foreign Minister" speech, with the Foreign Minister being Togo who had swung to accepting Postdam but insist on retaining the Emperor after Nagasaki. This allowed Togo's faction to gain ascendency, allowing it to transmit the offer to surrender with that one condition to the Swiss government for relay on to the U.S. on the morning of August 10.

The offer was then rejected by the U.S. on August 11, which broke the previously achieved consensus, with the Minister of the Army among others returning to demanding additional conditions. The deadlock continued until August 14, when the large number of propaganda leaflets outlining American terms dropped on the 13th led the Emperor to intervene again and ordered the writing of the Imperial rescript declaring surrender (the famously muddleworded one). At which point the military coup that had been building since the first offer to surrender broke out but failed to either prevent the transmission of Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam terms with no conditions or the Emperor's transmitting of the surrender rescript.

And we will never know if Shôwa said this to placate one of his most hawkish family member but when asked if the war were to continue if the "Imperial system" could not be preserved, he answered "of course".

That occurred on August 12th. Clearly we know that Hirohito was just placating the man, since he did in fact order the surrender with no conditions on the 14th.
 
The offer was then rejected by the U.S. on August 11, which broke the previously achieved consensus, with the Minister of the Army among others returning to demanding additional conditions. The deadlock continued until August 14, when the large number of propaganda leaflets outlining American terms dropped on the 13th led the Emperor to intervene again and ordered the writing of the Imperial rescript declaring surrender (the famously muddleworded one). At which point the military coup that had been building since the first offer to surrender broke out but failed to either prevent the transmission of Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam terms with no conditions or the Emperor's transmitting of the surrender rescript.

I am not sure of which "rejection" you are talking about here... Byrne's reply was ambiguous, at best, and it took the leaflets to urge the emperor for a more decisive action, but already Shôwa's intervention of the 10th which broke the deadlock was basically him agreeing with the fact that the kokutai would be preserved. "Anami, it's going to be all right". You'll have noticed that the last paragraph of the rescript starts with "Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure [Kokutai] of the Imperial State...". His resolve on this subject never got tested.
 
I am not sure of which "rejection" you are talking about here... Byrne's reply was ambiguous, at best, and it took the leaflets to urge the emperor for a more decisive action,

It couldn't have been that ambiguous to the Japanese who debated whether or not to accept true unconditional surrender for the next 3 days. It couldn't have been ambiguous to the U.S. either for it continued offensive operations. Clearly, there was no question by anyone that it was a rejection of the Japanese offer of surrender. I don't find it ambiguous either. It brings up the Japanese condition, then directly states the Allies will make no such guarantee, then proceeds to reiterate the demand that the Japanese surrender will be under the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration.

but already Shôwa's intervention of the 10th which broke the deadlock was basically him agreeing with the fact that the kokutai would be preserved. "Anami, it's going to be all right". You'll have noticed that the last paragraph of the rescript starts with "Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure [Kokutai] of the Imperial State...". His resolve on this subject never got tested.

And his intervention on the 14th made no mention of preserving the Kokutai, nor did his Imperial rescript for surrender broadcast on the 15th. Truman was very clear in his statement on the acceptance of Japanese surrender on the 14th that the surrender was entirely unconditional. (that is 14th in DC, 15th in Japan) Obviously, his resolve was in fact tested.
 
And his intervention on the 14th made no mention of preserving the Kokutai, nor did his Imperial rescript for surrender broadcast on the 15th. Truman was very clear in his statement on the acceptance of Japanese surrender on the 14th that the surrender was entirely unconditional. (that is 14th in DC, 15th in Japan) Obviously, his resolve was in fact tested.

Actually it is mentioned in the rescript of imperial court japanese that was broadcast on the 15th... though the official translation went with "structure of the Imperial state".

"朕ハ茲ニ国体ヲ護持シ得テ忠良ナル爾臣民ノ赤誠ニ信倚シ常ニ爾臣民ト共ニ在リ" (l.14)

I think you are quite disingenuous about Byrne's reply though... "the freely expressed will of Japanese people" means absolutely nothing. There's no guarantee the imperial system will be maintained, but there's no assurance the allies will require the complete dismantlement of the imperial system (something which was considered by a lot of people), which is my definition of "ambiguous". Though "Obsfucatory" might work quite well. In effect, it did not change a thing amongst the japanese leaders.
 
I think you are quite disingenuous about Byrne's reply though... "the freely expressed will of Japanese people" means absolutely nothing. There's no guarantee the imperial system will be maintained, but there's no assurance the allies will require the complete dismantlement of the imperial system (something which was considered by a lot of people), which is my definition of "ambiguous". Though "Obsfucatory" might work quite well. In effect, it did not change a thing amongst the japanese leaders.

Umm, what? Byrne's reply was very clear, if phrased in diplomatic language. It brings up the condition the Japanese insisted on in their offer to surrender of August 10. It rejects said condition. It then reiterates that the surrender must occur under the Potsdam declaration. Why do you think it has to state the dismantlement of the imperial system as a goal? It demanded unconditional surrender. That means the Allies do whatever the hell they want. They might dismantle the Imperial system, they might not, either way it's their choice if the surrender is unconditional, as they demanded.

And if it changed nothing among the Japanese leaders, how do you explain the Japanese offering to surrender on the 10th, but needing to offer to surrender again on the 14th for the surrender to actually take place?
 
I can't see where you see the rejection.
"From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.

The Emperor will be required to authorize and ensure the signature by the Government of Japan and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration[...]"

This does nothing to clarify the position of the allies towards the Emperor's system.

As you mentioned yourself earlier, the leaflets exposing the secret negociations scrambled Shôwa in ordering another Imperial conference before military hotheads acted. (Indeed, Hatanaka had been enlisting support for a few days before the 14th).
 
I can't see where you see the rejection.
"From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms.

The Emperor will be required to authorize and ensure the signature by the Government of Japan and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration[...]"

This does nothing to clarify the position of the allies towards the Emperor's system.

As you mentioned yourself earlier, the leaflets exposing the secret negociations scrambled Shôwa in ordering another Imperial conference before military hotheads acted. (Indeed, Hatanaka had been enlisting support for a few days before the 14th).

You still don't see it? The Japanese surrender offer of August 10 accepted the Potsdam declaration with the following caveat: "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler." The bolded part is quite clear. The emperor will have no prerogatives as a sovereign ruler and any authority he may or may not have will be subject to the Allied Supreme Commander. This is followed by: "The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people." In other words, the ultimate form of government will be determined by the Allies in accordance with the Potsdam declaration, with the same meaningless nod to self-determination the U.S. always includes. Notice the Allies will not include any Japanese additions to the Potsdam declaration.

And beyond that, you still can't get beyond the fact that both sides clearly viewed Byrnes reply as a refusal, since the U.S. contined offensive operations and Japan continued fighting back until the 14th.
 
It looks beyond my ability to convince you otherwise and I suspect it might come from a misunderstanding about the vocabulary being used, but you might want to re-read Butow's "Japan's decision to surrender", he might be able to show you that Byrne's reply was actually an acceptation of the proviso (though poorly worded... obviously, if I may say so!). The US was quite divided on the subject (not even speaking of the allies), it makes for a good reading. And there's more about the leaflets than meets the eye.

And yes, it was a war, I could also argue that the US got frustrated towards the lack of progress and resumed operations out of habit. But quite honestly, as much as there was a point in stopping after the Japanese looked ready for surrender, there was no way the US would just let them think about their options for an indefinite time.

And well, on Japan's side, the military being the ones who opposed the surrender, I can't picture them ordering an halt during the negociations.
 
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