Japanese surrender and the end of the Pacific War

[7ronin]

Yesterday, August 15, Japan observed Shūsen kinen bi (which roughly translates as "remembrance day for the end of the war") with a short ceremony in Tokyo attended by the Emperor and the Empress, and the Prime Minister.

I tried searching the forums for anything dealing with the Japanese surrender and the atomic bombings but could not find anything. That seems unusual for this group.

If there is a thread I would appreciate it if some kind soul would point me in the right direction. If there isn't, I would be interested in reading your thoughts on the topic of what induced Japan to surrender and by implication the necessity or lack thereof for the atomic bombings.

 

[GoodGame]

IIRC it was done aboard a US naval vessel (edit: It was on the USS Missouri). I think the only lasting question is if one atomic bomb or two were really needed to get the Hirohito to surrender. But I'm not read on it.

Google Books has the 1st chapter of this book In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Postwar Asia by Ronald H. Spector (Paperback - Jul 8, 2008)
on the America interpretation of events about the time of the surrender and under what terms to consider the surrender.

Sounds like one concern was that being too lenient on Japan would upset the German peace, but pushing for execution of the Emperor might make it impossible to achieve a convenient capitulation of Japan. And further complicating it was that a significant proportion of the American population wanted to have Hirohito executed.

 

[madviking]

Bombing Japan alone would probably not have induced Japan to surrender. As long as Japan had access to the raw materials in Manchuria and China, they could theoretically hold out and have caused the Americans to fulfill Operation Downfall. However, an offensive consisting of 1.6 million troops by the USSR in August 1945 sealed the deal, as the Japanese that the Americans would treat them better than the Soviets would have, in addition to the Soviets running over coal mines in Manchuria, effectively leaving Japan with no choice but to surrender, as their life blood had been drained.

 

[Racsoviale]

I believe some of our more well versed historians will be arriving soon for a recap of the surrender, but some of the interesting tidbits I know about is the emperors willingness to surrender fairly early, it was the generals who wanted to push the war to suicidal extremes. There was something about a 5-2 in favour of continuing the war in the japanese war cabinet. And at the same time the emperor was mostly being a puppet for the generals.

Please correct me if I am wrong Masada, Dachs, Lord Baal or Lightfang

 

[Zardnaar]

Note that access to resources was already critiacal before the Soviet offensive as the USN had sunk around 90% of Japans merchant marine and the remnants were short of fuel. When the USA bombed the Japanese refineries they had already run out of oil for the most part.

Revisionists and Japanese apologists try and claim the nukes were used to intimidate the Soviets, however the USA was reading the Japanese military codes. It was clear the Japanese were defeated but they were dragging their feet about surrendering. They could also read geography as well as the Americans and were building up large reserves of men in the likely landing zones as intercepted signals revealed. The resources of Manchuria and China had already been lost for the most part and most of what was left came from Korea.

In effect the nukes was used by the Emperor to overide his own hardliners who wanted to fight to the bitter end. There was even an attempted coup at the end in an attempt to continue the war.

 

[Lord Baal]

I believe some of our more well versed historians will be arriving soon for a recap of the surrender, but some of the interesting tidbits I know about is the emperors willingness to surrender fairly early, it was the generals who wanted to push the war to suicidal extremes. There was something about a 5-2 in favour of continuing the war in the japanese war cabinet. And at the same time the emperor was mostly being a puppet for the generals.

Please correct me if I am wrong Masada, Dachs, Lord Baal or Lightfang

I'd take you up on your offer to correct you, but you're pretty much spot on. I don't know the exact split in the cabinet, but the majority was most definitely for continuing the war. Despite this, however, the government fully recognised they were defeated and wanted to surrender; they just didn't want to surrender unconditionally. If anything they wanted a similar deal to the one Italy got in 1943.

The atomic bombs were not necessary to get Japan to surrender; Japan had already offered to surrender twice. They simply wanted certain conditions, the most important of which was a guarantee of the Emperor's safety. The US basically rebuffed these offers and continued the war. So Japan turned to the USSR for assistance. The Japanese Ambassador in Tokyo went to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and requested that he act as an intermediary with the US and UK. In a classic case of duplicity, Molotov agreed (under Stalin's orders) even though he was involved in the planning for the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and made no effort to actually broker a peace. The Japanese Ambassador (I'm terrible with names) actually went to see Molotov on the morning of the Manchurian invasion to ask how peace discussions with the US were going; Molotov made him wait several hours, then handed him an official declaration of war.

The atomic bombs were dropped on Japan for several reasons. The first was to force an unconditional surrender. Japan may have been willing to surrender, but their terms were unacceptable to the US. Not that there were many terms; basically they just wanted the Emperor's safety guaranteed, though many of the militants wanted to retain some territory, particularly Manchuria. Ironically, even after the bombings the Japanese still insisted on the Emperor's safety. The US agreed, meaning they basically gained nothing from the bombings.

A second reason was to intimidate the USSR, which Truman had already decided would be an enemy in the post-war period. This plan backfired completely, as Stalin was not in the least bit afraid of nuclear weapons. Through his spies he knew their capabilities and recognised that they were not a threat. If anything, the Hiroshima bombing showed that nuclear weapons were not a serious threat to industry at the time.

There were other reasons to use nukes on Japan, but they were minor compared to these two reasons.

Still, as Zardnaar said, the bombings did convince Hirohito to override the few hardliners who still held on to the hope of a negotiated settlement (though it is still debated how much of this was due to the bombings and how much the Soviet advance). Those hardliners attempted to assassinate the Japanese Prime Minister on August 16, the day after the Japanese surrender. So they did accomplish their primary goal, although they were probably unnecessary in the long-run.

7ronin, if you're interested in the surrender you could probably watch the ceremony on youtube. I've seen it several times; it's interesting, mostly for the fear on the faces of the Japanese delegation when one of the Allied signatories - I think the Dutch one - signed in the wrong place, thus technically making the surrender null and void. They were crapping themselves.

 

[Zardnaar]

In regards to Japanese peace feelers they were half hearted and vague at best. You won't find a single document, or offer from anyone who actually had the authority to surrender. Why not just ask the Americans for terms directly rather than convoluted and messy go arounds?

 

[Lord Baal]

In regards to Japanese peace feelers they were half hearted and vague at best. You won't find a single document, or offer from anyone who actually had the authority to surrender. Why not just ask the Americans for terms directly rather than convoluted and messy go arounds?

Because of the need to avoid pissing off the military hardliners. It's no secret that the civilian government in Japan was virtually powerless to stop military adventurism. Masada went into great detail on this in a recent thread by amadeus.

While most of the Japanese leaders were aware of the need for peace it was necessary to present the hardliners with a fait accompli or they may have ignored calls for surrender. As it was, even with the Emperor himself publicly calling for surrender there were still harrdliners who refused to surrender. One guy continued a guerrilla war in the Philippines for thirty years, and there was an attempted assassination of the Prime Minister after the surrender. In a situation like that it is only natural that the leaders would tread very carefully so as to avoid offending militants.

 

[Zardnaar]

That explains it, but it doesn't help out the American perspective. The Americans weren't aware that much of internal Japanese politics. They were reading the signals for the military, inner government workings not so much.

 

[xchen08]

Bombing Japan alone would probably not have induced Japan to surrender. As long as Japan had access to the raw materials in Manchuria and China, they could theoretically hold out and have caused the Americans to fulfill Operation Downfall. However, an offensive consisting of 1.6 million troops by the USSR in August 1945 sealed the deal, as the Japanese that the Americans would treat them better than the Soviets would have, in addition to the Soviets running over coal mines in Manchuria, effectively leaving Japan with no choice but to surrender, as their life blood had been drained.

No, Japan did not have access to the raw materials of Manchuria and China. Japan didn't even have access to the raw materials of the other 3 of the Japanese Home Islands, or by the end of the war, access to the raw materials of Honshu itself. This is thanks to Operation Starvation cutting off all coastal and sea traffic, and American tactical air completely destroying all land transportation. Mass starvation was already setting in by the surrender, not so much because there wasn't enough food, but more that it was impossible to transport rice from the fields to the cities, and one of Douglas MacArthur's few truly positive legacies is the speed with which he was able to get food aid deployed averting catastrophic famine.

August Storm proper had no real effect on the war, being a hasty campaign with insufficient supply knowing that they were up against a stripped and demoralized foe already cut off from any real contribution to Japan's war effort. What was important was the Soviet declaration of war shook elements of the Japanese leadership out of their delusional hope that the Soviets could broker a conditional peace with the U.S. And a doozy of a peace that was going to be too, no occupation, no trials of war criminals except by Japanese authorities, Japan to retain Taiwan and Korea and discuss Manchuria and China. The main question is how long that delusion would have lasted had the Soviets not declared war.

 

[vogtmurr]

The atomic bombs were dropped on Japan for several reasons. The first was to force an unconditional surrender. Japan may have been willing to surrender, but their terms were unacceptable to the US. Not that there were many terms; basically they just wanted the Emperor's safety guaranteed, though many of the militants wanted to retain some territory, particularly Manchuria. Ironically, even after the bombings the Japanese still insisted on the Emperor's safety. The US agreed, meaning they basically gained nothing from the bombings.

couldn't they have demonstrated the weapon on a small island offshore, as a simple warning ? The fire raid on Tokyo killed more people anyway.

A second reason was to intimidate the USSR, which Truman had already decided would be an enemy in the post-war period. This plan backfired completely, as Stalin was not in the least bit afraid of nuclear weapons. Through his spies he knew their capabilities and recognised that they were not a threat. If anything, the Hiroshima bombing showed that nuclear weapons were not a serious threat to industry at the time.

how so ? I doubt if Stalin or the rest of the general staff would have assessed them as 'no threat'. What intelligence would give them that idea ?

There were other reasons to use nukes on Japan, but they were minor compared to these two reasons.

Still, as Zardnaar said, the bombings did convince Hirohito to override the few hardliners who still held on to the hope of a negotiated settlement (though it is still debated how much of this was due to the bombings and how much the Soviet advance).

testing the effect on mass population areas I suppose. Surely the bombs were a compelling reason, the Soviet invasion was just the evaporation of their last hope, and the prospect of a Soviet occupation could not have been more attractive.

 

[xchen08]

The atomic bombs were not necessary to get Japan to surrender; Japan had already offered to surrender twice. They simply wanted certain conditions, the most important of which was a guarantee of the Emperor's safety. The US basically rebuffed these offers and continued the war. So Japan turned to the USSR for assistance. The Japanese Ambassador in Tokyo went to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and requested that he act as an intermediary with the US and UK. In a classic case of duplicity, Molotov agreed (under Stalin's orders) even though he was involved in the planning for the Soviet invasion of Manchuria and made no effort to actually broker a peace. The Japanese Ambassador (I'm terrible with names) actually went to see Molotov on the morning of the Manchurian invasion to ask how peace discussions with the US were going; Molotov made him wait several hours, then handed him an official declaration of war.

The atomic bombs were dropped on Japan for several reasons. The first was to force an unconditional surrender. Japan may have been willing to surrender, but their terms were unacceptable to the US. Not that there were many terms; basically they just wanted the Emperor's safety guaranteed, though many of the militants wanted to retain some territory, particularly Manchuria. Ironically, even after the bombings the Japanese still insisted on the Emperor's safety. The US agreed, meaning they basically gained nothing from the bombings.

First of all, that's just not true. No offers to surrender were ever made by anyone with the authority to do so. Second, all the unofficial offers that were floated out by assorted Japanese officials as private citizens insisted on a hell of a lot more than just the Emperor's safety, including no occupation and no war trials. And finally, the Japanese surrender was unconditional and the U.S. did not agree to any conditions regarding the Emperor's safety. The occupation authority simply chose after surrender not to remove the Emperor as they decided the Imperial House would be an useful too of stabilization.

A second reason was to intimidate the USSR, which Truman had already decided would be an enemy in the post-war period. This plan backfired completely, as Stalin was not in the least bit afraid of nuclear weapons. Through his spies he knew their capabilities and recognised that they were not a threat. If anything, the Hiroshima bombing showed that nuclear weapons were not a serious threat to industry at the time.

This gets floated out a lot by revisionists, despite there being not one iota of evidence for it. There's no documentation, no testimony, nothing from anyone in the U.S. leadership at the time indicating that intimidating the Soviet Union played any part in their deliberations. This thesis is a creation from whole cloth based primarily on failing to comprehend the differences in mindset towards nuclear weapons between the mid 40s and the Cold War/post Cold War period. The U.S. leadership just considered nukes a bigger bomb that would allow them to finish the demolition of Japan faster, and used it appropriately.

And I have no clue where you got the idea that nukes weren't effective against industry or that Stalin thought anything of the sort. Curious that he would think so and still devote so much resources from a wartorn and broken Soviet Union to getting his own soonest.

 

[Ataxerxes]

couldn't they have demonstrated the weapon on a small island offshore, as a simple warning ? The fire raid on Tokyo killed more people anyway.

how so ? I doubt if Stalin or the rest of the general staff would have assessed them as 'no threat'. What intelligence would give them that idea ?

testing the effect on mass population areas I suppose. Surely the bombs were a compelling reason, the Soviet invasion was just the evaporation of their last hope, and the prospect of a Soviet occupation could not have been more attractive.

Problem with demonstration on a small island as a warning. We only had 2 bombs. Truman made it sound like we had more, but that was it. They were of different types and only one type had been tested - once. There's a legitmate concern that one of them wouldn't work, for whatever reason. Also, as the second bomb demonstrated, the effect could be lessened by geographic considerations or being a little off target. The Nagasaki bomb (Fat Man) was actually quite a bit more powerful, but did less damage. Hiroshima was as bad as it was because "Little Boy" landed right where it was aimed.

I don't think Stalin would have assessed them as "no threat" but it wouldn't terrify him either. As far as intelligence is concerned, the Soviet spy system at that time was one of the best in the world. Stalin probably didn't know that much less than Truman.

I agree with the last. They were a compelling reason. Considering the attempts to kidnap the Emperor to continue the war and the deadlock in council, I think it was probably necessary or prepare to invade the home islands at a horrible cost.

 

[xchen08]

Problem with demonstration on a small island as a warning. We only had 2 bombs. Truman made it sound like we had more, but that was it. They were of different types and only one type had been tested - once. There's a legitmate concern that one of them wouldn't work, for whatever reason.

Also not true, though this belief has disturbingly become a part of popular myth. At the time of the Japanese surrender, there was a 4th bomb at Tinian, and 1-2 unassembled weapons in the United States. The Manhattan project at the time was producing at the rate of 1 weapon every 10 days, and the U.S. leadership was well aware of this, planning to save up their stockpile after Nagasaki to support the Downfall invasions. (though much of the leadership had already turned or was turning against the very idea of invasion as the lessons of Okinawa sank in, and the invasion would most likely not have occurred even without Japanese surrender, freeing up the bombs for alternate use)

Truman was exaggerating about the rain of fire the U.S. could achieve, but he was neither lying nor bluffing. The low historical stockpile that I figure is the main reason for the growth of this myth was due to the nuke project being frozen with the end of the war and the transfer of all materials to the Atomic Energy Commission.

And regarding whether the weapons would work, while there may have been some doubt in the high command, the scientists of the Manhattan project and anyone who listened to them had no doubt. The implosion type bomb had been tested at Trinity, and the guntype bomb was regarded as so simple as to not needing a test. Indeed, the guntype was dangerously simple in that it could go off simply by accident or from impact, something the scientists were well aware of.

The reason for not doing a demonstration was simple. Most people regarded the nuke as a big bomb. Why would you bother to demonstrate a big bomb on something worthless when you are already at war, and continuously burning down enemy cities? Demonstrating on a city is doing nothing special and saves work.

 

[Zardnaar]

couldn't they have demonstrated the weapon on a small island offshore, as a simple warning ? The fire raid on Tokyo killed more people anyway.


how so ? I doubt if Stalin or the rest of the general staff would have assessed them as 'no threat'. What intelligence would give them that idea ?


testing the effect on mass population areas I suppose. Surely the bombs were a compelling reason, the Soviet invasion was just the evaporation of their last hope, and the prospect of a Soviet occupation could not have been more attractive.

The problem was thatbombing an island used up 1 of 2 bombs. The Manhatten project cost 2 billion dollars which is around 25 billion $$$ today. ALot of resources to throw away nuking an islnd. I once worked out the average amount of people dying per day in WW2 and if the bombs shortened the war by 2-3 weeks they actually saved lives.

 

[7ronin]

Mass starvation was already setting in by the surrender, not so much because there wasn't enough food, but more that it was impossible to transport rice from the fields to the cities.

Japan was a net importer of food stuffs. The food produced in country was not sufficient to sustain the population. You are correct though in stating that the strategic bombing campaign had severely disrupted the food distribution network.

 

[xchen08]

Japan was a net importer of food stuffs. The food produced in country was not sufficient to sustain the population. You are correct though in stating that the strategic bombing campaign had severely disrupted the food distribution network.

Like I said, "not so much" rather than Japan had no food shortage. In practice the absolute food shortfall was irrelevant. Rice was rotting in the fields, and the mass dieoff from lack of transportation would have eliminated the absolute shortfall by Spring 46.

 

[Camikaze]

Bombing Japan alone would probably not have induced Japan to surrender. As long as Japan had access to the raw materials in Manchuria and China, they could theoretically hold out and have caused the Americans to fulfill Operation Downfall. However, an offensive consisting of 1.6 million troops by the USSR in August 1945 sealed the deal, as the Japanese that the Americans would treat them better than the Soviets would have, in addition to the Soviets running over coal mines in Manchuria, effectively leaving Japan with no choice but to surrender, as their life blood had been drained.

Everything on the mainland of Asia was completely isolated, and thus useless, to the defence of Japan.

As for the rest; what Lord Baal said. It's obviously not correct to say that the atomic bombings did not induce Japan to surrender; they evidently did. The real question is whether or not surrender would've occurred under different and more legal (I can't be bothered to back up this claim, BTW, I just can't think of a less controversial but still fitting synonym) circumstances. Would the Japanese have surrendered anyway? Almost certainly. Perhaps not unconditionally, but given the Emperor's position was safeguarded under the occupation and continues to this day (although to an obviously lessened degree), there was no need for the Allies to demand this particular condition. Of course, they hadn't decided by this stage whether or not the Emperor's position was going to be safeguarded, but their indecision on the matter is hardly an excuse for dropping two atomic bombs.

 

[CELTICEMPIRE]

the bomb saved millions of American AND Japanese lives the japanese were being taught that if you die for your country you will go straight to heaven, it was a similar situation to al quaeda, so they would not surrender as the emperor told them it was a sin

Sadly the bomb was necessary and any WWII veteran will tell you that

 

[xchen08]

Would the Japanese have surrendered anyway? Almost certainly. Perhaps not unconditionally, but given the Emperor's position was safeguarded under the occupation and continues to this day (although to an obviously lessened degree), there was no need for the Allies to demand this particular condition.

The Allies didn't demand that particular condition. That's kind of the definition of demanding an unconditional surrender, which the Allied powers had agreed upon at every conference of the war. And the Japanese would have surrendered eventually...unconditionally, as they did historically. The only question is whether they would have done so before Downfall, whose civilian casualty estimates are well published, or if Downfall is called off as the Navy and USAAF wanted, just how much more choking they can take.

Either case, every week of delay in the surrender makes it less likely that emergency food aid could be deployed fast enough to avert the mass dieoff that was inevitable in a chronically underfed population as winter sets in. It was damn close historically as it was. And that's just the Japanese, completely ignoring all the Chinese, Koreans, other occupied peoples that were dying as well. And of course, ignoring the American deaths that Truman actually has to be accountable for.

The real question is whether or not surrender would've occurred under different and more legal (I can't be bothered to back up this claim, BTW, I just can't think of a less controversial but still fitting synonym) circumstances.

How about "less offensive to my personal sensibilities, which have been shaped by the culture and taboos of the Cold War and after, and completely irrelevant to a conflict where all sides engaged in indiscriminate bombardment of civilian targets"?