I don't really have the time to answer these questions tonight, but I must...
Sidhe said:
I'm afraid the Big Bang is far from universally accepted as such, and there are plenty of theories in physics that dispense with the need for a God although some of them are a tad tenuous scientifically speaking. The big bang being in fact one of them, in an oddly odd sort of way. The universe spontaneously came into existence much like quasi particles do in the void of space in a sea of particle creation and anhiallation. Sounds far fetched but? Might be true?
Of course, but this violates the logical ideas that noting can create something, and effects don't need causes - and while I've heard alot claimed that those ideas have been destroyed by modern physics... that's a pretty tricky development.
Have a look at M theory it explains the big bang as a never ending series of big bangs within a membrane of interdimensionality. Doesn't need a God at all as such.
Sounds like a wild re-interpretation of an infinite chain of causes - but an infinite chain of causes nonetheless.
I have never felt comfortable with the idea that we are all predetermined by our DNA like mindless automatons, it doesn fit with what I experience conciously and intuitively it just feels wrong, especially when I consider how my actions affect others. I can't prove either way that we have or don't have free will but, at a fundemental level I do believe we do.
As do I, which is why I'm looking for a way to explain it.
I have no problem with a God figure either. I do have a problem with what is comitted in that Gods name. It seems to often be used as an excuse to act apaulingly towards humanity. And to justify irational and outmoded moralities.
'Tis nothing against God himself, though.
What ever gave you the impression that human societies progress agrees with that idea.
History if nothing else is evidence to me of free will. For if predetermanism ruled it would be very easy to find out how everyone ticked and to pull their strings I see little evidence of this happening now or ever.
Even if I could take one look at someone and break down his personality profile using his DNA and then use psychology techniques to refine my analysis when face to face. I still would have no hope of predicting with any certainty what anyone will do.
Try experimenting with people you know, you will find that even in the most rigidly defined situations people behave and act unexpectedly to what you predict, with my friends I'd say I could predict what they were going to say in a rigid social situation first about 1 in 300 times.
Psychology is an art not a science,always has been always will be. No matter how much we can know about the way conciousness works, it would continue to defy the predictable.
That we cannot predict something now is no proof that we cannot in the future.
I've heard the idea too that in order to understand the conscious mind you would have to be removed from it(thus the hard problem is an impossible one) This I agree with to some extent, because the way we percieve things clouds our understanding of what we percieve. Not that I think that destroys the idea of free will, but that I think that that destroys the idea of predeterminism, because conciousness is not explicable to those who percieve it and cannot be reduced to materialism, it is more than just the sum of its parts. We might build a machine to observe us and look for signs outside of ourselves but since it would be programmed from our point of view, we would have no idea what to design into it to look for and it would not recognise it because we cannot.
I don't think this is necessarily true. We can already examine small, isolated parts of the brain and understand what they do - why is that necessarily impossible on the large scale, with sufficient knowledge?
Gothmog said:
So the basic idea becomes: where in this lineage does free will originate? where consciousness? Can we really be the only life that has these, assuming for a moment that they are really more than subjective experiences.
On a more philosophical path, why can't we just be a collection of cells that respond to their environment the way they are programed to do? What need is there for a biological organism, such as we are, to be more than that? What roll is there for free will in this context? If it does exist, where does it originate? Are you really 'free' to make decisions that are outside the context of your genetic material and the materialistic process that led to your specific phenotype?
Before anyone attacks these ideas or this presentation as 'patchwork' or 'incomplete' or '1/10' or calls me 'senile' or 'uncreative' or whatever - let me say that this is just a start. I am in no way claiming that this is the truth, or even part of the truth. Heck, I don't even believe in the truth.
Please respond with well formulated questions about it, or not at all.
This was a very good post. I don't have any well-formulated questions, but no attacks either: I'd just like to point out that you've explained what the "hard problem" is well - and we're still no closer to the answer. Which leads us to the question, Can these ever be answered scientifically?
Ayatollah So said:
Sloppy phrasing on my part. It's not feeling that sensation upon looking at the brain scan, which matters, but being reminded of it. Being reminded of it would be required to have a satisfying grasp of why neural activity leads to the sensation. Also, being reminded of a sensation, pain for example, shares something with actually experiencing it. In both cases the concept of pain is usually activated: "Ow, that hurts!" if you're in pain, or "Ow, that's gotta hurt!" if you're a neurologist seeing that an MRI of a patient shows that the patient is in pain.
Because both the actual experience and the second-hand experience of it typically share this feature, you would expect some (not all as I accidentally implied) of the same brain activities to be involved in both. But, you wouldn't expect that just looking at an MRI on its own terms, without correlating to subjective experience, would activate those brain areas.
I still don't understand why you're making this leap. How, exactly, would a link between the visual depiction of brain activity and a reminder of that activity prove anything? You seem to want this to happen to any viewer - but that's just absurd. I'm sure a sufficiently trained MRI operator can do what you ask of them: look at brain activity in a particular area and say, "Ah, this is pain," and if he is an emotional person, he might be reminded of an example of his own pain - but what does this prove, except that he knows how to read a diagram and connect it to his own mind? You could trick a person into reading anything any way: think of the rigorous, scientific way in which Romans read the motions of birds, which meant absolutely nothing. People project emotions on many things that are unrelated, and have no connection: a gullible person might
feel sad that you feel sad when they see your mood ring is a certain color, and what does that mean? Nothing.
I think your line of argument is going down the wrong path. It is, to me at least, inconceivable that we could explain, with science as it is now, why the sensation of consciousness is caused by neural activity - because this question is trying to explain something so mysterious, so elusive, and so viscerally
non-scientific, that it defies a scientific explanation. Explaining consciousness, so far, cannot go higher than neurons - there are no sensation particles, or consciousness levels, which can be pointed at - and at this explanation, which appears to be the highest, it is still mysterious.
Because I don't think you've justified the claim (which I can't remember exactly but here's a rough paraphrase) that on a materialist picture we're controlled by the laws of nature. Using the sense of "controlled" in which genes can be said to control morphology.
I think the analogy fits well. Genes have properties and work according to rules; their interaction produces a certain individual, so can be said to 'control' the nature of that individual.
Particles in the universe have certain properties and act according to certain rules, and their interaction produces more complex things, so can be said to 'control' the nature of that individual. In fact, I'd say the analogy between particles and molecules, and genes and beings, fits well. in fact, it's a neat ascending scale: Particles to molecules to DNA to beings. Each one 'controls' the next level.
Rational criminals are responsible. It's the highly irrational ones, like John Hinckley (the guy who shot Reagan) who have diminished responsibility.
Indeed, and my point is this: Irrational criminals, in our society, are not put in normal jails because they are felt to have no control over their actions - but, according to materialism, rational people and irrational people have equally little control over themselves. It's just that one group acts the same way we do, and one group doesn't.
I don't accept the premise that material beings "have no control over" their actions. If you can rationally evaluate multiple actions and implement the "best" (by your lights) one, you are in control of that action.
Why? You're stubbornly sticking to the old conception of free will without a basis for it. Can I control what I consider rational? Can I choose to implement a lesser option when I know it is lesser?
Intent, as in the difference between Murder 1 and Murder 2, is at best a placeholder for the rationality of the criminal. In premeditated crime the criminal is presumed to be acting according to his stable values, whereas in Murder 2 the perpetrator is "acting in the heat of the moment" and presumed to be blinded by passion. There might be some truth to that in general, but I think this way of sorting out the murderers could stand improvement.
Why is acting murderously on stable values any worse than acting muderously on fleeting, passionate values? Both are in accordance with your desire - only one is for a moment (but how strongly it is!) and one is for many moments.
Is "responsibility," then, nothing more than the
duration of our desires? This is a very odd definition, especially since according to materialism we have no control over our desires...