Occam's Razor and Your Ontology!

Before you say that, do realize that in the ontology thread, I asked whether chairs EXIST not whether a word exists for a bunch of particles arranged chair-wise.
But if you define a chair as particles in the shape and manner of a chair, then chairs to exist. It's kind of circular because you need to change the normal meaning of the word "chair" - most people don't walk into furniture stores and ask for "a collection of particles in a shape that is convenient for the supporting of my posterior" - but it works.

A chair is a collection of particles in the shape of a chair.
Collections of particles in the shape of chairs do exist.
Therefore, chairs exist.

Premise 1 does rely upon itself in order to stand - we're defining the nature of something by referencing its shape, and we know the shape of it because we know what its nature is - so it's circular. But the overall argument is at least consistent, and I don't see how it necessarily violates Occam's Razor.
 
A chair is a collection of particles in the shape of a chair.
That definition is messed up!
1. You can't define something in terms of itself. Defining a chair in terms of a chair, is messed up.

2. There's a collection of (air) particles in front of you in the shape of a chair, but there is no chair!

Now those are just petty quibbles that you could probably fix, but my bigger issue is the general defining a chair in terms of particles and stuff. I just don't think it can be reasonably defined as such. It gets even worse for other things we say exist like words, laws, JPEGs, etc.

The solution, is to not worry about exact material composition to use the term "existence" as some folks here do.
 
But look, you're saying that the particles exist, and this further thing exists: a chair. It is composed of the same stuff as the particles, but they are distinct objects.

Ok, I get it.

Ok, given option to explain what I'm sitting on:

1) Chairs
2) A bunch of particles exist in a chairwise arrangement

I'd say that both the require the same number of entities. The former requires the existance of "chairs" and the latter requires the existance of "chairwise arrangements".
 
So, whats the deal? Is Occam's Razor wrong? Is your ontology wrong? Or do you magically cause actual things to come into existence by acts of dubbing? Or something else?

Hmm, well, according to the Old and New Testament, the latter is true.

I would say that, until something is named, it cannot be discussed or referenced in a meaningful fashion. As a matter of fact, the act of naming is also the act of "granting meaning" to something.

I would also like to point out that, according to Occam's Razor, "chair" is a better name for something than "a bunch of particles in a chairwise arrangement."
 
Ok, I get it.

Ok, given option to explain what I'm sitting on:

1) Chairs
2) A bunch of particles exist in a chairwise arrangement

I'd say that both the require the same number of entities. The former requires the existance of "chairs" and the latter requires the existance of "chairwise arrangements".
No.

A "chair" is a single entity.

A "bunch of particles existing in a chairwise arrangement" is actually trillions upon trillions of individual entities.

So when it comes to my personal interaction with the world, Occam's Razor favors the "chair."

However, when it comes to defining a mathematical formula for predicting the behavior of all matter in the universe, using a single definition of "particle" is simpler than devising separate formulas for "chairs," "tables," and "love."

So, use the right tool for the right job. Use the right name for the right situation.
 
I'm not sure where the contradiction is. Particles exist, and chairs exist (not just in a linguistically convenient sense), and this doesn't violate Occam's Razor, as holding particles and chairs as distinct explains more than just looking at particles, since many things are caused by chairs as a whole, not the particles that make up them.

What do chairs explain that collections of particles arranged chairwise (which we may call "chairs" out of linguistic convenience) do not explain?
 
Ok, I get it.

Ok, given option to explain what I'm sitting on:

1) Chairs
2) A bunch of particles exist in a chairwise arrangement

I'd say that both the require the same number of entities. The former requires the existance of "chairs" and the latter requires the existance of "chairwise arrangements".

A "chairwise arrangement" is not an entity, it is a state of affairs.
 
What do chairs explain that collections of particles arranged chairwise (which we may call "chairs" out of linguistic convenience) do not explain?
You're holding a double standard. You're using the phrase "linguistic convenience" to dismiss the word "chair" while simultaneously using the word "chair" for your own definition.

Go ahead and try to express the concept of "chair" using ONLY a mathematical formula, and try to communicate that concept to anyone who isn't a mathematician. Hell, you can even try to communicate it to a mathematician! I doubt you will find much success with this approach.

Ontology cannot be separated from the act of naming. The two go hand in hand. Just because you are able to replace the word "chair" with a much longer name (that still contains the word "chair") does not mean you have simplified anything at all. You have, in fact, complicated it. So, in accordance with Occam's razor, I propose rejecting the name "bunch of particles in a chairwise arrangement" and stick to the simpler and more elegant "chair."
 
You're holding a double standard. You're using the phrase "linguistic convenience" to dismiss the word "chair" while simultaneously using the word "chair" for your own definition.

I'm not dismissing it, I'm saying that that is not what I mean when I use the word "chair".

Go ahead and try to express the concept of "chair" using ONLY a mathematical formula, and try to communicate that concept to anyone who isn't a mathematician. Hell, you can even try to communicate it to a mathematician! I doubt you will find much success with this approach.

Who said anything about math? What the flying crap are you talking about?

Ontology cannot be separated from the act of naming. The two go hand in hand. Just because you are able to replace the word "chair" with a much longer name (that still contains the word "chair") does not mean you have simplified anything at all. You have, in fact, complicated it. So, in accordance with Occam's razor, I propose rejecting the name "bunch of particles in a chairwise arrangement" and stick to the simpler and more elegant "chair."

So our words determines what exists? That's a fantastically insane theory. Watch, I'm gonna define a bunch of crazy contradictions and other insane, obviously non-existent crap into existence!

qweojta = A round, square, five-sided triangle.
trtttttttall = non-sexy person who looks like Perfection
qooolxpy = an object consisting of the mona lisa, my butt, and Pluto.

Of course, you're going to deny that I've accurately captured your view, but the problem is you are doing an extremely poor job of explaining what on earth it is you're talking about.
 
That definition is messed up!
1. You can't define something in terms of itself. Defining a chair in terms of a chair, is messed up.
As I said, it's circular in that it depends on itself. Which does make it kind of arbitrary. But it makes more sense than saying chairs don't exist.

2. There's a collection of (air) particles in front of you in the shape of a chair, but there is no chair!
No, there's a collection of air particles in front of me that fills my room, it's not in the shape of a chair. Shape implies lines and boundaries - there are no "air boundaries" in the shape of a chair in my room, so that's wrong.

Now those are just petty quibbles that you could probably fix, but my bigger issue is the general defining a chair in terms of particles and stuff. I just don't think it can be reasonably defined as such. It gets even worse for other things we say exist like words, laws, JPEGs, etc.

The solution, is to not worry about exact material composition to use the term "existence" as some folks here do.
I agree that "existence" shouldn't simply be defined as "measurable in physical units", or "existing in physical space" or something similar.
 
No, there's a collection of air particles in front of me that fills my room, it's not in the shape of a chair. Shape implies lines and boundaries - there are no "air boundaries" in the shape of a chair in my room, so that's wrong.
Well, you didn't define boundaries and I wouldn't say they're implied by your defition (I'd say by your definition you could simply define a chair shaped area of particles and call a chair). Since we agree on the outcome and the debate would get into heavy semantics I don't care about, I'm not gonna press the issue.
 
Well, you didn't define boundaries and I wouldn't say they're implied by your defition (I'd say by your definition you could simply define a chair shaped area of particles and call a chair). Since we agree on the outcome and the debate would get into heavy semantics I don't care about, I'm not gonna press the issue.
Shape necessarily implies boundaries, though. There's no such thing as a square shaped object with no sides or boundaries. How could there be a chair shaped object without them, either?

OK, well good talking with you.
 
But look, you're saying that the particles exist, and this further thing exists: a chair. It is composed of the same stuff as the particles, but they are distinct objects.

Where this arguement falls down is that it asserts that the chair is more than a collection of particles. If we do not assume the existance of any platonic ideal of a chair, then the "chair" only exists beyond it's particles as a linguistic and intellectual construct.

If we apply occam's razor to (reject) the existance of the platonic ideal of a chair then the "ontological parsimony" continues just fine.
 
I'm not dismissing it, I'm saying that that is not what I mean when I use the word "chair".
So, what you do mean is a "bunch of particles in a chairwise arrangement"?

That's a circular definition (see the word "chairwise").

Who said anything about math? What the flying crap are you talking about?

I'm talking about the "flying crap" that a chair isn't really a chair, but rather a bunch of particles placed in a "chairwise" arrangement.

If you really care to reduce all entities in the universe to arrangements of "particles," you will quickly find yourself in a bind where you can't describe anything at all without using the very symbols that you're trying to eliminate, such as "chair," "butt," or whatnot.

So our words determines what exists? That's a fantastically insane theory. Watch, I'm gonna define a bunch of crazy contradictions and other insane, obviously non-existent crap into existence!

qweojta = A round, square, five-sided triangle.
trtttttttall = non-sexy person who looks like Perfection
qooolxpy = an object consisting of the mona lisa, my butt, and Pluto.

Of course, you're going to deny that I've accurately captured your view, but the problem is you are doing an extremely poor job of explaining what on earth it is you're talking about.
It's not insane at all. The fact is, we can't talk about it until we've agreed upon a word to describe it. Notice that the word "existence" is, in fact, a word. Without language or words, this discussion -- this line of thinking, even --- would be impossible.

In a world without language, I simply interact with the universe. I don't ask questions about whether or not it exists or what kind of "meaning" it may have, because I don't have the linguistic faculty to ask those questions in the first place.

So, if you care to have a discussion about the existence of "qweojta", "trtttttttall", or "qooolxpy", I'd be happy to indulge you. And you may even discover that these things didn't exist as part of your experience, in the way that you defined them, until you created those very definitions.

How's that for the power of words?
 
BUT A CHAIR JUST IS A BUNCH OF PARTICLES ARRANGED CHAIR-WISE, WE JUST CALL THAT THING A CHAIR BECAUSE ITS LINGUISTICALLY EASIER.
A chair is far more than just the bunch of particles arranged chair-wise, it's the electrical forces that are a result of 'em and the picture of the chair resulting from light deflecting from it! So the particles themselves arn't the whole chair, but the forces and visual output, combined with the particles, are. :p


So here, I manage to avoid the problem altogether by not equating the particles arranged chair-wise to be equal to a chair, while saying that a chair exist because electrical forces and interactions with light exist as well. And I need to account for it because otherwise I just have a bunch of invisible particles that I can go right through because there's there would be no forces to interact with!
 
Where this arguement falls down is that it asserts that the chair is more than a collection of particles. If we do not assume the existance of any platonic ideal of a chair, then the "chair" only exists beyond it's particles as a linguistic and intellectual construct.

If we apply occam's razor to (reject) the existance of the platonic ideal of a chair then the "ontological parsimony" continues just fine.

I'm not sure what you mean here. The Platonic ideal of the chair (which involves the form of a chair existing in an invisible but whollly real and intelligible realm) is a much different thing than positing the existence of a chair. I guess what I'm saying is: could you elaborate your view absent the talk of Platonic ideals, because I don't think they are relevant to the issue (if I'm wrong, then elaborate on that) :p
 
I only wish to point something out about Ockham's Razor.

Ockham's Razor is not used to determine what is true; rather it is used to determine what is most likely to be true from current observations.
 
Where this arguement falls down is that it asserts that the chair is more than a collection of particles. If we do not assume the existance of any platonic ideal of a chair, then the "chair" only exists beyond it's particles as a linguistic and intellectual construct.

If we apply occam's razor to (reject) the existance of the platonic ideal of a chair then the "ontological parsimony" continues just fine.

I agree with this. Well put.

I'm not sure what you mean here. The Platonic ideal of the chair (which involves the form of a chair existing in an invisible but whollly real and intelligible realm) is a much different thing than positing the existence of a chair. I guess what I'm saying is: could you elaborate your view absent the talk of Platonic ideals, because I don't think they are relevant to the issue (if I'm wrong, then elaborate on that) :p

I can't speak for GinandTonic but I think you should think of the platonic ideal as the 'chair quality' that appearantly 80% of your participants believe in, something inherant in all but not defined by any chairs in existance. A quality that is only a "linguistic and intellectual construct".
 
I'm not sure what you mean here. The Platonic ideal of the chair (which involves the form of a chair existing in an invisible but whollly real and intelligible realm) is a much different thing than positing the existence of a chair. I guess what I'm saying is: could you elaborate your view absent the talk of Platonic ideals, because I don't think they are relevant to the issue (if I'm wrong, then elaborate on that) :p

In which case there is no other "quality" that the chair has apart from the particles and the lable "chair". If we preclude any concept of "charishness" here is nothing to even debate the existance of. A heap of particles assigned the signifier "chair".

EDIT -

I can't speak for GinandTonic but I think you should think of the platonic ideal as the 'chair quality' that appearantly 80% of your participants believe in, something inherant in all but not defined by any chairs in existance. A quality that is only a "linguistic and intellectual construct".

Bout the size of it.
 
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