Stanford rapist only gets 3 months

I would say one is drunk enough to be incapable of a criminal state of mind at the same point one is drunk enough to be incapable of a criminal act.
 
yeah - though while getting drunk there is still a time at which one can decide to stop getting too drunk - that is the gist of the reasoning there - the criminal act then is not the actual crime commited but the decision to not stop drinking (or consuming other drugs) and thus continuing to act in a manner leading to getting so intoxicated that a crime is commited without criminal responsibility.
 
yeah - though while getting drunk there is still a time at which one can decide to stop getting too drunk - that is the gist of the reasoning there - the criminal act then is not the actual crime commited but the decision to not stop drinking (or consuming other drugs) and thus continuing to act in a manner leading to getting so intoxicated that a crime is commited without criminal responsibility.

I'm still not buying it. It's not like you stop being capable of making choices while drunk, even very drunk. Tetley's statement is fair, and far too many people I've seen have tried to blame poor choices on the alcohol.

Do we have evidence people really lose the capability to form a criminal state of mind while intoxicated, despite still being fit to move and make apparent choices? From my own experience, I've only been intoxicated to the point of being unable to walk properly twice. I have decent but imperfect recollection of both times, including recollection of making choices (and saying inane crap before judgment prevented blurting it out :D). I don't think I could have gone much further without alcohol poisoning on those occasions, yet I can still remember making choices and anticipating consequences of choices, many years later. I am open to accepting that different people are affected differently...IE some people really do forget or completely lose control/awareness instead of just looser inhibitions. Do we have evidence that happens?

However, from observation that does not seem to be the case. People who can move about and do stuff still have some line of reasoning and choice, even if their inhibitions and judgments are not as strong as usual. I am reasonably certain at least some of those claims of not remembering the night before are cover-up lies, even on far more innocuous "poor decisions" than criminal activity.

Fundamentally, based on my own experience with drinking I can't grasp why someone should expect a weaker penalty for doing something while intoxicated. Is it really so different for other people?
 
How one functions when intoxicated depends on a large amount of variables. You really cant expect to make conclusions based on just two personal experiences.

However, FWIW, in our court practice, being intoxicated was traditionally considered aggravating, rather than ameliorating circumstance when deciding upon a punishment.
 
How one functions when intoxicated depends on a large amount of variables. You really cant expect to make conclusions based on just two personal experiences.

However, FWIW, in our court practice, being intoxicated was traditionally considered aggravating, rather than ameliorating circumstance when deciding upon a punishment.

Oh, I've been intoxicated many times. The two I mentioned were the two where I could not walk properly. They are the only times where, on reflection, I'd have struggled to do most criminal acts if I were so inclined simply because it was a struggle to move decently.

If we're talking "just" being intoxicated, I have at least dozens of personal experiences with that. However, if it affects people differently outright and there is evidence of that it wouldn't matter if I had thousands. If there isn't any, I see no reason to believe a person who can walk, act, and answer questions intelligibly should be given any leeway because they've consumed alcohol.

I also don't see why it should be an aggravating consideration for punishment. If someone is acting of apparent volition we need a good reason to believe it isn't so, otherwise why should punishment vary?
 
Ok, this is a super necro but Turner was in the news somewhat recently for trying to get off the registered sex offender list (and failing, obviously).

Someone told me the judge in the case was in the exact same fraternity at Stanford Turner was in, and thus it's a potential conflict of interest.

I couldn't find any proof that this is true, but it sounds so plausible that I can't dismiss it entirely. Where could I know for sure?
 
Someone told me the judge in the case was in the exact same fraternity at Stanford Turner was in, and thus it's a potential conflict of interest.

I couldn't find any proof that this is true, but it sounds so plausible that I can't dismiss it entirely. Where could I know for sure?

Not a "conflict of interest" but arguably an appearance of bias. (Personally, I wouldn't buy it.)

A legal newspaper in the area might have archived judges' bios. If we're talking Stanford, California, you'd probably have to look in the SF area for such a paper.

I'd guess that, if this were a problem, it would have to be brought up when the judge was first assigned to the case, or else the objection would be waived.
 
Maybe they didn’t know ?
 
Someone told me the judge in the case was in the exact same fraternity at Stanford Turner was in, and thus it's a potential conflict of interest.
Turner was not in a frat, he was a freshman. He wasn't even at the party that the frat was holding, he just noticed her behind the building and decided to take advantage of the fact that she's unconscious.

So I see no conflict of interest here, if anything, Turner made the frat look bad even though they didn't do anything wrong (as evidenced by the false conclusion that he was a member there). Couldn't find any source for that claim (but many people asking if it's true, so I'd guess that's how that rumor spread), and the commission that investigated the case found no evidence of wrongdoing (but California later introduced minimum sentences to avoid such cases in the future). Imho, it's just a rich white kid getting the treatment of a rich white kid.

Not that it would really change anything anyway, as the judge has already been voted out of office.
 
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According to the girls testimony he was definitely at the party.
 
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Yes, my bad. He WAS at the party, but he was not in the frat. Should have checked that, instead of going by memory.
 
Alright, thanks.
 
Here's the CCP statute on judicial qualification.

Spoiler Judicial Disqualification :

CHAPTER 3. Disqualifications of Judges [170 - 170.9]
( Chapter 3 added by Code Amendments 1880, Ch. 35. )

170.1.
(a) A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following are true:

(1) (A) The judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.

(B) A judge shall be deemed to have personal knowledge within the meaning of this paragraph if the judge, or the spouse of the judge, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.

(2) (A) The judge served as a lawyer in the proceeding, or in any other proceeding involving the same issues he or she served as a lawyer for a party in the present proceeding or gave advice to a party in the present proceeding upon a matter involved in the action or proceeding.

(B) A judge shall be deemed to have served as a lawyer in the proceeding if within the past two years:

(i) A party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party, was a client of the judge when the judge was in the private practice of law or a client of a lawyer with whom the judge was associated in the private practice of law.

(ii) A lawyer in the proceeding was associated in the private practice of law with the judge.

(C) A judge who served as a lawyer for, or officer of, a public agency that is a party to the proceeding shall be deemed to have served as a lawyer in the proceeding if he or she personally advised or in any way represented the public agency concerning the factual or legal issues in the proceeding.

(3) (A) The judge has a financial interest in the subject matter in a proceeding or in a party to the proceeding.

(B) A judge shall be deemed to have a financial interest within the meaning of this paragraph if:

(i) A spouse or minor child living in the household has a financial interest.

(ii) The judge or the spouse of the judge is a fiduciary who has a financial interest.

(C) A judge has a duty to make reasonable efforts to inform himself or herself about his or her personal and fiduciary interests and those of his or her spouse and the personal financial interests of children living in the household.

(4) The judge, or the spouse of the judge, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person is a party to the proceeding or an officer, director, or trustee of a party.

(5) A lawyer or a spouse of a lawyer in the proceeding is the spouse, former spouse, child, sibling, or parent of the judge or the judge’s spouse or if such a person is associated in the private practice of law with a lawyer in the proceeding.

(6) (A) For any reason:

(i) The judge believes his or her recusal would further the interests of justice.

(ii) The judge believes there is a substantial doubt as to his or her capacity to be impartial.

(iii) A person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.

(B) Bias or prejudice toward a lawyer in the proceeding may be grounds for disqualification.

(7) By reason of permanent or temporary physical impairment, the judge is unable to properly perceive the evidence or is unable to properly conduct the proceeding.

(8) (A) The judge has a current arrangement concerning prospective employment or other compensated service as a dispute resolution neutral or is participating in, or, within the last two years has participated in, discussions regarding prospective employment or service as a dispute resolution neutral, or has been engaged in that employment or service, and any of the following applies:

(i) The arrangement is, or the prior employment or discussion was, with a party to the proceeding.

(ii) The matter before the judge includes issues relating to the enforcement of either an agreement to submit a dispute to an alternative dispute resolution process or an award or other final decision by a dispute resolution neutral.

(iii) The judge directs the parties to participate in an alternative dispute resolution process in which the dispute resolution neutral will be an individual or entity with whom the judge has the arrangement, has previously been employed or served, or is discussing or has discussed the employment or service.

(iv) The judge will select a dispute resolution neutral or entity to conduct an alternative dispute resolution process in the matter before the judge, and among those available for selection is an individual or entity with whom the judge has the arrangement, with whom the judge has previously been employed or served, or with whom the judge is discussing or has discussed the employment or service.

(B) For the purposes of this paragraph, all of the following apply:

(i) “Participating in discussions” or “has participated in discussion” means that the judge solicited or otherwise indicated an interest in accepting or negotiating possible employment or service as an alternative dispute resolution neutral, or responded to an unsolicited statement regarding, or an offer of, that employment or service by expressing an interest in that employment or service, making an inquiry regarding the employment or service, or encouraging the person making the statement or offer to provide additional information about that possible employment or service. If a judge’s response to an unsolicited statement regarding, a question about, or offer of, prospective employment or other compensated service as a dispute resolution neutral is limited to responding negatively, declining the offer, or declining to discuss that employment or service, that response does not constitute participating in discussions.

(ii) “Party” includes the parent, subsidiary, or other legal affiliate of any entity that is a party and is involved in the transaction, contract, or facts that gave rise to the issues subject to the proceeding.

(iii) “Dispute resolution neutral” means an arbitrator, mediator, temporary judge appointed under Section 21 of Article VI of the California Constitution, referee appointed under Section 638 or 639, special master, neutral evaluator, settlement officer, or settlement facilitator.

(9) (A) The judge has received a contribution in excess of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1500) from a party or lawyer in the proceeding, and either of the following applies:

(i) The contribution was received in support of the judge’s last election, if the last election was within the last six years.

(ii) The contribution was received in anticipation of an upcoming election.

(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the judge shall be disqualified based on a contribution of a lesser amount if subparagraph (A) of paragraph (6) applies.

(C) The judge shall disclose any contribution from a party or lawyer in a matter that is before the court that is required to be reported under subdivision (f) of Section 84211 of the Government Code, even if the amount would not require disqualification under this paragraph. The manner of disclosure shall be the same as that provided in Canon 3E of the Code of Judicial Ethics.

(D) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 170.3, the disqualification required under this paragraph may be waived by the party that did not make the contribution unless there are other circumstances that would prohibit a waiver pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of Section 170.3.

(b) A judge before whom a proceeding was tried or heard shall be disqualified from participating in any appellate review of that proceeding.

(c) At the request of a party or on its own motion an appellate court shall consider whether in the interests of justice it should direct that further proceedings be heard before a trial judge other than the judge whose judgment or order was reviewed by the appellate court.

 
Here's the CCP statute on judicial qualification.

Spoiler Judicial Disqualification :

CHAPTER 3. Disqualifications of Judges [170 - 170.9]
( Chapter 3 added by Code Amendments 1880, Ch. 35. )

170.1.
(a) A judge shall be disqualified if any one or more of the following are true:

(1) (A) The judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding.

(B) A judge shall be deemed to have personal knowledge within the meaning of this paragraph if the judge, or the spouse of the judge, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.

(2) (A) The judge served as a lawyer in the proceeding, or in any other proceeding involving the same issues he or she served as a lawyer for a party in the present proceeding or gave advice to a party in the present proceeding upon a matter involved in the action or proceeding.

(B) A judge shall be deemed to have served as a lawyer in the proceeding if within the past two years:

(i) A party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party, was a client of the judge when the judge was in the private practice of law or a client of a lawyer with whom the judge was associated in the private practice of law.

(ii) A lawyer in the proceeding was associated in the private practice of law with the judge.

(C) A judge who served as a lawyer for, or officer of, a public agency that is a party to the proceeding shall be deemed to have served as a lawyer in the proceeding if he or she personally advised or in any way represented the public agency concerning the factual or legal issues in the proceeding.

(3) (A) The judge has a financial interest in the subject matter in a proceeding or in a party to the proceeding.

(B) A judge shall be deemed to have a financial interest within the meaning of this paragraph if:

(i) A spouse or minor child living in the household has a financial interest.

(ii) The judge or the spouse of the judge is a fiduciary who has a financial interest.

(C) A judge has a duty to make reasonable efforts to inform himself or herself about his or her personal and fiduciary interests and those of his or her spouse and the personal financial interests of children living in the household.

(4) The judge, or the spouse of the judge, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person is a party to the proceeding or an officer, director, or trustee of a party.

(5) A lawyer or a spouse of a lawyer in the proceeding is the spouse, former spouse, child, sibling, or parent of the judge or the judge’s spouse or if such a person is associated in the private practice of law with a lawyer in the proceeding.

(6) (A) For any reason:

(i) The judge believes his or her recusal would further the interests of justice.

(ii) The judge believes there is a substantial doubt as to his or her capacity to be impartial.

(iii) A person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.

(B) Bias or prejudice toward a lawyer in the proceeding may be grounds for disqualification.

(7) By reason of permanent or temporary physical impairment, the judge is unable to properly perceive the evidence or is unable to properly conduct the proceeding.

(8) (A) The judge has a current arrangement concerning prospective employment or other compensated service as a dispute resolution neutral or is participating in, or, within the last two years has participated in, discussions regarding prospective employment or service as a dispute resolution neutral, or has been engaged in that employment or service, and any of the following applies:

(i) The arrangement is, or the prior employment or discussion was, with a party to the proceeding.

(ii) The matter before the judge includes issues relating to the enforcement of either an agreement to submit a dispute to an alternative dispute resolution process or an award or other final decision by a dispute resolution neutral.

(iii) The judge directs the parties to participate in an alternative dispute resolution process in which the dispute resolution neutral will be an individual or entity with whom the judge has the arrangement, has previously been employed or served, or is discussing or has discussed the employment or service.

(iv) The judge will select a dispute resolution neutral or entity to conduct an alternative dispute resolution process in the matter before the judge, and among those available for selection is an individual or entity with whom the judge has the arrangement, with whom the judge has previously been employed or served, or with whom the judge is discussing or has discussed the employment or service.

(B) For the purposes of this paragraph, all of the following apply:

(i) “Participating in discussions” or “has participated in discussion” means that the judge solicited or otherwise indicated an interest in accepting or negotiating possible employment or service as an alternative dispute resolution neutral, or responded to an unsolicited statement regarding, or an offer of, that employment or service by expressing an interest in that employment or service, making an inquiry regarding the employment or service, or encouraging the person making the statement or offer to provide additional information about that possible employment or service. If a judge’s response to an unsolicited statement regarding, a question about, or offer of, prospective employment or other compensated service as a dispute resolution neutral is limited to responding negatively, declining the offer, or declining to discuss that employment or service, that response does not constitute participating in discussions.

(ii) “Party” includes the parent, subsidiary, or other legal affiliate of any entity that is a party and is involved in the transaction, contract, or facts that gave rise to the issues subject to the proceeding.

(iii) “Dispute resolution neutral” means an arbitrator, mediator, temporary judge appointed under Section 21 of Article VI of the California Constitution, referee appointed under Section 638 or 639, special master, neutral evaluator, settlement officer, or settlement facilitator.

(9) (A) The judge has received a contribution in excess of one thousand five hundred dollars ($1500) from a party or lawyer in the proceeding, and either of the following applies:

(i) The contribution was received in support of the judge’s last election, if the last election was within the last six years.

(ii) The contribution was received in anticipation of an upcoming election.

(B) Notwithstanding subparagraph (A), the judge shall be disqualified based on a contribution of a lesser amount if subparagraph (A) of paragraph (6) applies.

(C) The judge shall disclose any contribution from a party or lawyer in a matter that is before the court that is required to be reported under subdivision (f) of Section 84211 of the Government Code, even if the amount would not require disqualification under this paragraph. The manner of disclosure shall be the same as that provided in Canon 3E of the Code of Judicial Ethics.

(D) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of Section 170.3, the disqualification required under this paragraph may be waived by the party that did not make the contribution unless there are other circumstances that would prohibit a waiver pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of Section 170.3.

(b) A judge before whom a proceeding was tried or heard shall be disqualified from participating in any appellate review of that proceeding.

(c) At the request of a party or on its own motion an appellate court shall consider whether in the interests of justice it should direct that further proceedings be heard before a trial judge other than the judge whose judgment or order was reviewed by the appellate court.


tl;dr

(6)(A)(iii) A person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.

I think that if the judge is a proud alumnus of the fraternity and the alleged crime took place at a fraternity party a person might reasonably entertain such a doubt. I also think that if the prosecution raised such a question there would be very few judges who would refuse to recuse themselves. So I'm pretty confident that no such connection exists.
 
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