Teleportation

[Kyriakos]

Afaik man-caused quantum tunneling is at its infancy, with only particles moved/tunnelled. Assuming that at some future time it becomes possible to teleport a human (a vast collection of linked particles) would the entity teleported really be the human or just a copy which to others will be impossible to differentiate from the original human?
Iirc the teleportation of a particle destroys the original (? Or at least makes it disappear) so wouldnt the original human die?
Which wont matter to others, but if you die when teleported it means you wont be in the copy at all.

 

[Estebonrober]

Afaik quantum tunneling is at its infancy, with only particles moved/tunnelled. Assuming that at some future time it becomes possible to teleport a human (a vast collection of linked particles) would the entity telleported really be the human or just a copy which to others will be impossible to differentiate from the original human?
Iirc the teleportation of a particle destroys the original (? Or at least makes it disappear) so wouldnt the original human die?
Which wont matter to others, but if you die when teleported it means you wont be in the copy at all.

Makes watching Star Trek more interesting realizing that every time they teleport they are killing themselves. Anyways this all depends on what "you" are and how you feel about that.

 

[Kyriakos]

Well, if you stop existing i think it is safe to say that the teleported person is not you; you will just die (or relocate to a better multiverse at best). Others might not notice, but you will

 

[hobbsyoyo]

Someone torn apart to read the state of every atom and then having those states imposed on another set of atoms at a distance kills the person it is done to.

Similarly, I don't think a consciousness that is uploaded to a computer is the same person, it is a copy. However, if a person were to be interfaced with computers with their own brain and they transfer more and more brain functions to the computer over time, then that would be the same person even if the living brain eventually died and was disconnected from the computer. It's all about the continuity of consciousness in my opinion though I have nothing to back that up but my own gut feeling.

 

[GoodSarmatian]

That's the kind of question that makes me "dislike" "philosophy".

Someone torn apart to read the state of every atom and then having those states imposed on another set of atoms at a distance kills the person it is done to.

Does it ?
We're constantly losing and taking carbon. You don't even need magic teleporters for Ship of Theseus style existential horror. Are you the same person that you were yesterday, before you fell asleep and lost conciousness ? Did you wake up as some other person with somebody else's memories ?
Does "matter" matter more than the pattern ?

Does all of this even matter ?

 

[hobbsyoyo]

I don't know (x4) ?

 

[GoodSarmatian]

Similarly, I don't think a consciousness that is uploaded to a computer is the same person, it is a copy. However, if a person were to be interfaced with computers with their own brain and they transfer more and more brain functions to the computer over time, then that would be the same person even if the living brain eventually died and was disconnected from the computer. It's all about the continuity of consciousness in my opinion though I have nothing to back that up but my own gut feeling.

Why the distinction ?
Why is the conciuousness you copy over time more "you" than the copy you make immediately ? The only difference is the memory of the transition phase.

 

[El_Machinae]

There are two types. One is a copy. Even if it's a destructive copy, it's a copy. When that technology becomes available, society will become dominated by people who don't mind killing themselves to create a copy. Simple selection process, since everyone huddling in their cave will get completely out-competed.*

Also remember that information cannot be created or destroyed. You cannot move information without destroying it in its original location. If I pick up a book and move it, our heuristic is that it's the 'same book'. Same as if I walk across a room, it's still 'me'. And that's because we've used the quantum laws of nature to individually move the information of each atom of 'me' from one part of the room to the other. While probably [air-quotes] impossible to do, increasing the velocity of this movement of individual pieces of information should get to light-speed. There's a fundamental limit to how much you can 'copy' information without actually just moving the information. When I move across the room, the 3D entity that was in my old chair is completely gone. The 4D entity retains cohesion.

*If you thought El_Mac's 'we should cure aging' was going to create social problems, you are completely unready for the idea of copying people. The competitive edge of someone unwilling to be copied (or better yet, copied and destroyed) will go to zero. They'll live completely on charity while the world burns.

 

[Kyriakos]

Why the distinction ?
Why is the conciuousness you copy over time more "you" than the copy you make immediately ? The only difference is the memory of the transition phase.

Assuming you get destroyed/dissappear like the actual particles already tunnelled in experiments, you do not go to any copy. The copy exists; you do not. The copy may feel it is you, yet if you die you dont magically sense not dieing- let alone having a copy
Tldr, in this case you end up like you would if there was no teleporter but you got a shot to the back of the head.

 

[timtofly]

Does it not rely heavily on the concept of reincarnation working simultaneously with technology? The theory is that you can inhabit many different physical bodies. Why not a copy of the same physical looking you? The only onus would be the ability of the new body to actually function correctly in it's new state. Obviously it is instantaneous evolution and not one that takes years, which also introduces a less favorable body each time it evolves although the changes are less noticeable than a totally new copy would in a couple of seconds or minutes.

The question would be is it possible to mechanically make a copy that works, not necessarily would you be free to jump ship during the process. Most would say you do not have a choice in reincarnation. Those who claim there is only the physical you are stuck with the point it would not work period. There is not a function that would cause it to work, even if a perfectly working body was the result. You cannot transfer memories can you?

We point to stored states of "data" and say, "Sure, we can exchange the vary same state of data from one physical host and exactly replicate it in another physical host." What we do not know yet, would be is that still the same you, or another person entirely strapped with your memories. Reincarnation stresses the same you, but different memories. Teleportation may not be the same you, just a set of memories, that used to belong to you, but you ceased to exist.

If you are just your memories then reincarnation would not work because the biological means to make an exact copy of the physical storage space would not work, nor would it be logical possible for you to fit in a physically different physical host without changing some aspect of who you are. Not that you cannot evolve, but there is no guarantee that evolution would be for the better or for the worse.

Replicating states of brain matter is more complicated than simple states of a computer chip obviously. Even if we could force human memories or states into an animal's physical makup, what benifit would it be other than the collection of useless data that would have no relevance to the body of said animal. The same could be said about a new copy of a similar or even different humanoid body. As just data, it could present useless data, that the new physical body is forced to endure, and you still may not be you. If you are just senseless data, even in the same body, you could change from being you to something or someone else that is no longer you as well.

 

[Kyriakos]

Does it not rely heavily on the concept of reincarnation working simultaneously with technology? The theory is that you can inhabit many different physical bodies. Why not a copy of the same physical looking you? The only onus would be the ability of the new body to actually function correctly in it's new state. Obviously it is instantaneous evolution and not one that takes years, which also introduces a less favorable body each time it evolves although the changes are less noticeable than a totally new copy would in a couple of seconds or minutes.

The question would be is it possible to mechanically make a copy that works, not necessarily would you be free to jump ship during the process. Most would say you do not have a choice in reincarnation. Those who claim there is only the physical you are stuck with the point it would not work period. There is not a function that would cause it to work, even if a perfectly working body was the result. You cannot transfer memories can you?

We point to stored states of "data" and say, "Sure, we can exchange the vary same state of data from one physical host and exactly replicate it in another physical host." What we do not know yet, would be is that still the same you, or another person entirely strapped with your memories. Reincarnation stresses the same you, but different memories. Teleportation may not be the same you, just a set of memories, that used to belong to you, but you ceased to exist.

If you are just your memories then reincarnation would not work because the biological means to make an exact copy of the physical storage space would not work, nor would it be logical possible for you to fit in a physically different physical host without changing some aspect of who you are. Not that you cannot evolve, but there is no guarantee that evolution would be for the better or for the worse.

Replicating states of brain matter is more complicated than simple states of a computer chip obviously. Even if we could force human memories or states into an animal's physical makup, what benifit would it be other than the collection of useless data that would have no relevance to the body of said animal. The same could be said about a new copy of a similar or even different humanoid body. As just data, it could present useless data, that the new physical body is forced to endure, and you still may not be you. If you are just senseless data, even in the same body, you could change from being you to something or someone else that is no longer you as well.

But why assume that teleporting causes reincarnation? If it would, yes, it would be you. Not seing why it would though.

 

[hobbsyoyo]

Why the distinction ?
Why is the conciuousness you copy over time more "you" than the copy you make immediately ? The only difference is the memory of the transition phase.

Because there is not a continuity break. An immediate copy is separate thing, a copy. But merging into a computer means the subjective experience of you never breaks, it just shifts medium. If you do it immediately and discard the body, there are two distinct things, one of which ends instantly. There is no transition, just and abrupt transfer from one to the other.

It's the difference between from and into.

If you copy over, your consciousness is transferred from your body to a machine.
If you are plugged in, your consciousness turns into the machine.

 

[Broken_Erika]

All i can think of is
Which one is the real Riker?

 

[El_Machinae]

It's not an experiment we've run yet. You can migrate your consciousness around your brain. We've not yet created artificial neuronal structures and then migrated our consciousness into and out of those structures. My suspicion is that it's possible, but I don't know for sure. I'd also like the technologies to be done by people who think it's possible.

 

[hobbsyoyo]

We're constantly losing and taking carbon.

Yes but there is quite a bit of difference between breathing and pooping and wholesale replacement. We consider a seed which grows into a plant a copy of that plant even if it took some carbon from its parent plant in the form of the seed.

Are you the same person that you were yesterday, before you fell asleep and lost conciousness ?

Yes because I inhabit the same medium. My brain is still functioning even if I am not aware of it temporarily. That's very different from vaporizing the brain and reinstalling the thouht patterns on something else.

 

[El_Machinae]

Oh, and as an aside, while we are constantly exchanging atoms in our biology, there are some atoms that are not replaced. Or, more clearly, are not guaranteed to be replaced. Some of the atoms you were born with you still have. And those are from cells that undergo less turnover (even though they still have a very active metabolism).

 

[Estebonrober]

Oh, and as an aside, while we are constantly exchanging atoms in our biology, there are some atoms that are not replaced. Or, more clearly, are not guaranteed to be replaced. Some of the atoms you were born with you still have. And those are from cells that undergo less turnover (even though they still have a very active metabolism).

Roughly your body completely replaces itself some very seven years. However when it comes to neurons this is not the case, the extent to which you replace or grow new neurons is still a matter of debate but its not near as fast as the rest of the body. I think this lends credit to Hobb's idea that continuity is important in this discussion and there would be a difference between someone slowly melded into a computer and someone instantly copied into a computer. But this is just intuition talking.

https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/does-the-adult-brain-really-grow-new-neurons/

 

[El_Machinae]

Roughly your body completely replaces itself some very seven years

This is the idea that I am confronting. Parts of your body have atomic turnover. Parts of the body don't. Well, at least it's much slower. It's not that 'roughly every seven years the body completely replaces itself', not at all. Some parts have, many times over. Other parts have, less frequently. And other parts haven't.

I'm not even talking about cellular turnover. I am talking about atomic turnover.

 

[Kyriakos]

To build on hobb's post, imo under some circumstances it might be possible to gradually transfer your consciousness. In which case it is conceivable to transfer consciousness into a clone of yourself.
That likely wont have that much to do with quantum tunneling (let alone teleportation) though.
That said, at least afaik quantum tunneling creates a full copy of the particle. Forming artificially a new neural environment without automatic copying of this kind will imo be impossible (cause non automatic accuracy has a finite degree). And your consciousness likely wont survive being moved to something not virtually identical.

 

[hobbsyoyo]

On the ship of theseus, I come down on the side of it being the same ship if the planks are replaced completely over time.

If instead you took apart the ship, measured every plank and then built an identical copy of it with new blanks, I consider that a different ship, a copy.

Moreover, while I may be wrong on this, I don't think anyone can convince me I'm wrong enough so as to eliminate all doubt. And so long as I have doubt that the teleported copy of me is really me, then I would not do it except on my deathbed, at which point I have nothing to lose.