The Causes of the First World War

[Agent327]

I believe it had. Say what you want of it now (and it seems to be unpopular with current historians?) , but for diplomats living and acting during that time, during the whole century of (near-constant) peace between the Great Powers in the period 1815 - 1914, the notion of "balance of power" between the Great Powers of Europe was present and weighted heavily in their actions. It want new to their era, of course, but the division of Europe between great powers and others, where the great powers could and should "intervene" to "keep order", presupposed the maintenance of a balance of power when these interventions were carried out, and diplomatic consultations to that purpose.

A-H overstepped the bounds of this system when it issued the ultimatum to Serbia. Previous crisis impacting on areas that affected several great powers were resolved through conferences. They could have convened a conference to deal with the issue. Among the other monarchs (and even republican France had a problem with assassination) the issue of the assassination of the heir could be addressed. But the austrians feared that such a convention would actually tackle the problems in the Balkans that were being caused in part by A-H expansionism, so they instead opted for seizing the opportunity to act unilaterally, and were backed by the germans. The rest is history.

What really made the war a world affair was the German backing to Austria. A-H swallowed Bosnia when it was already unstable, thus becoming an impossible empire. The best action by an international congress to deal with the Balkans issue would have been to strip Bosnia out of Hungary. Hand it over to the serbs and let them deal with that mess! Austria would gain stability, while its uppity challenger in the Balkans would probably wreck itself trying to swallow Bosnia.

It was german paranoia over being isolated that ended up chaining the germans to an alliance with a hopeless empire, in a hopeless position. And making a world war seem attractive to them. Germany started the World War because its rulers believed they had backed themselves into a situation where they had no alternatives. They hadn't, France and Russia were in no position to actually start a war against Germany if the germans kept themselves on the defensive, giving no cause to start one.

You seem to miss some rather obvious facts. First, after the last Morocco crisis, virtually every great power was willing to risk war. Second, the balance of power idea had effectively been dropped with the resignation of Bismarck in 1890. After that, the great powers started jostling for advantages upsetting that very balance.

Last, your whole final paragraph is illogical. 'German paranoia over being isolated' resulted from dropping the adherence to a balance of power, and was confirmed by the non-continuation of the Rücksicherungsvertrag with Russia. Germany, in fact, did not start the war; Austria did. Russia was in a perfect position to start a war against Austria, and indeed mobilized first. After this they performed well against Austria, and reasonably well, initially, against Germany. Germany's position was not considered 'hopeless' at all - at least by Germany's leaders. And if there was no war, there's obviously also no need 'to be on the defensive'. The fact of the matter is, that by 1914 all great powers expected to gain something from a 'short, happy war'. War was, in fact, expected. Unfortunately, none of these expectations quite materialized as envisioned. Such things happen, in history.

In short, it would seem that your views on the matter are somewhat... outdated.

 

[r16]

ah , wouldn't the only like "legal" thing Bosnia would have been returning it to the Ottomans ?

apart from the thing that it would be like adding more "loyal" numbers to the pouplation mix , right ?

 

[Flying Pig]

I believe it had. Say what you want of it now (and it seems to be unpopular with current historians?) , but for diplomats living and acting during that time, during the whole century of (near-constant) peace between the Great Powers in the period 1815 - 1914, the notion of "balance of power" between the Great Powers of Europe was present and weighted heavily in their actions. It want new to their era, of course, but the division of Europe between great powers and others, where the great powers could and should "intervene" to "keep order", presupposed the maintenance of a balance of power when these interventions were carried out, and diplomatic consultations to that purpose.

A-H overstepped the bounds of this system when it issued the ultimatum to Serbia. Previous crisis impacting on areas that affected several great powers were resolved through conferences. They could have convened a conference to deal with the issue. Among the other monarchs (and even republican France had a problem with assassination) the issue of the assassination of the heir could be addressed. But the austrians feared that such a convention would actually tackle the problems in the Balkans that were being caused in part by A-H expansionism, so they instead opted for seizing the opportunity to act unilaterally, and were backed by the germans. The rest is history.

What really made the war a world affair was the German backing to Austria. A-H swallowed Bosnia when it was already unstable, thus becoming an impossible empire. The best action by an international congress to deal with the Balkans issue would have been to strip Bosnia out of Hungary. Hand it over to the serbs and let them deal with that mess! Austria would gain stability, while its uppity challenger in the Balkans would probably wreck itself trying to swallow Bosnia.

It was german paranoia over being isolated that ended up chaining the germans to an alliance with a hopeless empire, in a hopeless position. And making a world war seem attractive to them. Germany started the World War because its rulers believed they had backed themselves into a situation where they had no alternatives. They hadn't, France and Russia were in no position to actually start a war against Germany if the germans kept themselves on the defensive, giving no cause to start one.

Oh no, I'm not saying that 'the balance of power' wasn't an idea that had meaning and was important to how people thought about international relations. My point is that it's really a euphemism for a system that was not naturally and fairly balanced at all: it was actually hugely unequal and maintained by strenuous and occasionally violent effort from the powers who benefited most from it. Historians who talk about Germany wanting to 'upset the balance of power' tend to bring in (on or below the surface) ideas like Germany being greedy, or over-reaching, or wanting more than its 'rightful' place in the world. In reality there was nothing 'rightful' about the international situation as it existed in 1913, and Germany leaders could fairly complain that Germany was not being treated as its 'weight' in the world would have suggested.

I would suggest that putting all of the blame on any one party is misguided. Any explanation which doesn't allow for (for example) Russian assurances of support to Serbia, another 'blank cheque' which seems to generate much less attention - Nicholas II promised Serbia 'full military support' and 'any support which it needed'. You also need to account, somewhere, for Edward Grey's diplomacy, particularly his fatally misleading conversations with the German ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky. After the first, Lichnowski's report to Germany was that if Germany 'were not to attack France, England would remain neutral and would guarantee France's passivity', and made a good few overtures both to Berlin and to the French ambassador that Britain would not necessarily support France at all. Though often written up as a 'misunderstanding' - that Grey did not make clear that Britain would feel obliged to side with Russia as well as France - it has also been interpreted as a deliberate policy on Grey's part to keep France and Britain out of a war between Germany and Russia - and that was certainly how Lichnowsky thought, judging by his dispatches to Berlin, Grey had told him was going on. In other words, he left Berlin fairly sure of Britain's keenness to remain neutral (as Lichnowsky put it, 'England wants to keep its hands totally free'), when there was absolutely no doubt in the Cabinet that Britain would go to war to support either France or Belgium. When the Kaiser was famously shocked that Britain had gone to war over a 'scrap of paper' enshrining Belgian neutrality, Grey's diplomatic failures had made him entirely justified in being so. Had Germany been convinced of Britain's resolve (which undoubtedly existed) to intervene in a war involving either France or Russia, they almost certainly would not have gone to war at all. It's a great mistake to talk about the beginning of the Great War as if every country had a single mind and knew exactly what it was doing - often, the problem is that different people had different access to information, both between countries and within them, and that not everyone within a given country's government had the same interests or priorities.

These are only a couple of factors - the broad point is that the Great War has generated so much ink because it doesn't boil down to a simple root cause, or a single person or country to blame. The whole idea of finding one is doomed to over-simplify a process which isn't at all simple.

 

[Gen.Mannerheim]

What really made the war a world affair was the German backing to Austria. A-H swallowed Bosnia when it was already unstable, thus becoming an impossible empire. The best action by an international congress to deal with the Balkans issue would have been to strip Bosnia out of Hungary. Hand it over to the serbs and let them deal with that mess! Austria would gain stability, while its uppity challenger in the Balkans would probably wreck itself trying to swallow Bosnia.

People have made a lot of hay out of the dual contentions that a: Austria was an unruly state bursting at the seams, which was just destined to fail; & b: Austria annexing Bosnia was a more or less illegal act which exacerbated the already high levels of ethnic tension in the empire and began the march to July 1914.
I’ve come unable to fully accept both of these assertions. First, Austria had a legal basis for annexing Bosnia. Russia flipping out at this breach of the “balance of power” is what accelerated the crisis, despite the fact that Austria had occupied and controlled Bosnia for 30 years. Austria’s annexation was also in response to political upheavals within the Ottoman Empire herself, particularly the demands that Bosnia accepts the new Ottoman constitution and become integrated with the new Empire. This unilateral step itself was a breach of the Treaty of Berlin that rarely gets mentioned.

Secondly, it is easy to sit back with the lenses of hindsight and declare the usual epithets to the Austro-Hungarian Empire. After all, Austria was the last holdout of the era of states that weren’t based around a “nation”, and thus must have been oppressing those within her which wanted to enter the growing number of modern “nations”. However, recent scholarship has asserted that without the Great War, there’s no real reason that the Habsburg Empire shouldn’t have been able to sort their house out to meet the requirements of a new century.

Starting with Bosnia, while there was initial tension to the annexation, by the 1914 the situation had become different. Remember, the Archduke wasn’t killed by a Bosnian, but a Serb. The K.u.K. had little trouble recruiting in the region, and political unrest during the war wasn’t extraordinary. Indeed, a poll conducted in 2014 in Bosnia showed that among ethnic Bosnians, the memory of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was strongly positive. Bosnians remember the Austrians for building schools, infrastructure, and providing religious and political stability.

Among the other ethnicities, there were many who were willing to work with the state. Important leaders among the Czech populations were struggling, not for independence, but for greater representation in Vienna. Croats had long been loyal members of the military establishment. While getting the Hungarians in line would have been hard, without the war Austria might have had a chance.

 

[jjkrause84]

One funny thing that has been observable with historians: wait 20 years more and odds are that you'll find a somewhat different consensus about this or any other complex past political issue... it's almost as if these guys make a living from arguing over the details of this stuff and are not immune to the academia's modus operandi of presenting "new conclusions" as a way of advancing a career, isn't it?

I respect and usually admire the work of professional historians, but do not feel obliged to always follow whatever the current consensus is.

Well, you shouldn't feel obliged to follow the consensus on any topic (historical or otherwise), but extra care needs to be taken in doing so, I think. On the rare occasion we ever do reach a consensus about something it is usually for very good reasons.

Anyway, I can assure you (with a few exceptions) we historians are NOT in a conspiracy to argue with each other in order to somehow promote/preserve our own careers. It just doesn't work like that (and it hardly means that more jobs become available!). You have to understand that we do historical research because, above all else, we love it. The passion for the subject, without which you simply cannot do historical research, mitigates against dishonesty. Purposefully lying or exaggerating to try to further your own career means betraying the very reason you became a historian in the first place. Besides 'new conclusions' have to make it through peer review anyway, so making wild, spurious claims is not generally a good way to advance yourself (again, with one or two rare exceptions).

Still, I'm glad that people are interested in history out there in the 'real world'. It is very reassuring.

 

[innonimatu]

Sorry, I didn't mean to single out historians as some kind of unreliable men of science. It's actually a more general complaint I have (having observed the workings of academia for years) that institutions are biased towards publishing "new stuff", and push individuals to play that game. I do not mean to say that people are deliberately deceitful, only that they invest their time and their hopes so much in publishing new (or different, noteworthy) results that sometimes scientific rigor suffers under that pressure.

Going back on topic, I do blame Germany because that was the power that turned a regional conflict (such as had already happened over Crimea and between Austria and Prussia, and Germany and France) into a world conflict. They could have let Austria and Russia got at it alone, and worked together with France and Britain to contain russian ambitions in such a war. If that had been attempted my guess is that Russia would have made some gains, AH would go on existing, Britain would be alarmed and change alignment, and the "balance of power" game would continue...
I didn't knew those detains about the role played by Grey in July. Seems like the misunderstanding he cause may have contributed to prevent this scenario.

 

[r16]

ah , ı just love to say that Grey was played by the guy who plays Palpatine in some TV series ; and this is the biggest proof you will ever need to believe that it was Britain that closed every single bolt hole Continental Diplomacy could run into to avoid the war .

 

[Flying Pig]

Well, you shouldn't feel obliged to follow the consensus on any topic (historical or otherwise), but extra care needs to be taken in doing so, I think. On the rare occasion we ever do reach a consensus about something it is usually for very good reasons.

Anyway, I can assure you (with a few exceptions) we historians are NOT in a conspiracy to argue with each other in order to somehow promote/preserve our own careers. It just doesn't work like that (and it hardly means that more jobs become available!). You have to understand that we do historical research because, above all else, we love it. The passion for the subject, without which you simply cannot do historical research, mitigates against dishonesty. Purposefully lying or exaggerating to try to further your own career means betraying the very reason you became a historian in the first place. Besides 'new conclusions' have to make it through peer review anyway, so making wild, spurious claims is not generally a good way to advance yourself (again, with one or two rare exceptions).

Still, I'm glad that people are interested in history out there in the 'real world'. It is very reassuring.

I imagine that 'extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence' is as true in history as it is in science.

 

[Agent327]

As it does in any argument (unless your name is Donald Trump). By the way, history is a science, albeit not an exact science. Hence the need for - properly founded - argument.

 

[Gen.Mannerheim]

Argument and debate are ingrained in the fabric of academia, not so much because of a job saving/creating conspiracy, but due to the fact that historians are people not robots. It’s the same result when two doctors look at the same report and come to two different healthcare solutions.

If it were a conspiracy, the number of Ph.D.’s out there looking for academic posts and failing would indicate that it’s not working out too well.

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In Grad School, we had a mega discussion in historiography over if “history is a science” or not. The majority opinion reached a no answer. Mainly because History:
1) Isn’t actually able to make reliable predictions
2) Experimentation is not really possible
3) In many areas of study, the body of researchable evidence is either lacking or is so poor that it makes definitive declarations practically impossible
4) History generally doesn’t provide answers to single definitive problems

 

[Lexicus]

Argument and debate are ingrained in the fabric of academia, not so much because of a job saving/creating conspiracy, but due to the fact that historians are people not robots. It’s the same result when two doctors look at the same report and come to two different healthcare solutions.

If it were a conspiracy, the number of Ph.D.’s out there looking for academic posts and failing would indicate that it’s not working out too well.

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On Grad School, we had a mega discussion in historiography over if “history is a science” or not. The majority opinion reached a no answer. Mainly because History:
1) Isn’t actually able to make reliable predictions
2) Experimentation is not rally possible
3) In many areas of study, the body of researchable evidence is either lacking or is so poor that it makes definitive declarations practically impossible
4) History generally doesn’t provide answers to single definitive problems

Yeah, the notion that history is a science is at best a ludicrous oversimplification that obscures reality, at worst just plain ludicrous. History may make use of science, but it is not a science.

 

[JohannaK]

Perhaps we could settle this by saying that academia, either in the pure sciences or in the liberal arts, requires proof to support conclusions.

 

[REDY]

I blame Austria-Hungary, its government. They knew that it will lead to major war with Russia, which is quite enough to make it unworthy. I read somewhere that old Franz Joseph was worried about decision to send harsh ultimatum and aware that it should lead to war with Russia, but probably too old to oposse.

Serbian government was moderate and had to carefully manage to keep Serbia sovereign and nationalist enough to be not killed by Black Hand (mighty nationalist organisation). They knew that Serbia was exhausted from previous war, but couldnt afford lose face.

The conference would be way to go.

 

[Gen.Mannerheim]

I blame Austria-Hungary, its government. They knew that it will lead to major war with Russia, which is quite enough to make it unworthy. I read somewhere that old Franz Joseph was worried about decision to send harsh ultimatum and aware that it should lead to war with Russia, but probably too old to oposse.

Serbian government was moderate and had to carefully manage to keep Serbia sovereign and nationalist enough to be not killed by Black Hand (mighty nationalist organisation). They knew that Serbia was exhausted from previous war, but couldnt afford lose face.

The conference would be way to go.

I’m beginning to feel like an Austrian apologist on this thread
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While I can concede that Serbian wasn’t a rogue state (by modern definitions) like many recent commenters have alluded to, it can’t be said that they were blameless or innocent. A cabal of army officers, led by Dimitrijević (same bloke who ran the Black Hand and organized the assassination in 1914), assassinated the King and Queen of their country in 1903. The Serbian government responded by declaring him the “savior of the nation”. Serbia had their own imperialist goals for the South Slavs. Serbia had a lot to lose not only by Austria occupying in Bosnia, but particularly in Austria succeeding in Bosnia. And all indications were that the Austrians were succeeding.

For Austria’s part, while the situation in July 1914 was tense, it wasn’t territory they hadn’t been through before. During the Bosnian Crisis of 1908/09, Austria caused more than just a little angst by annexing Bosnia outright (though they legally could do it, and Russia had already secretly agreed to it, is a different thread topic). Similar to July 1914, Russia and France were none too happy about it, Serbia was absolutely livid, and Britain and Italy were pushing for a conference.

However in 1908/09, German diplomacy was able to resolve the situation without having to go to a conference. A conference would most certainly have been bad for Austria, as both Russia and her own “ally” Italy would have been in a prime position to demand land from her. Germany was able to amend the Treaty of Berlin in Britain’s favor and sent an ultimatum to Russia that got them to back down.

Austria had good reason to hope that the situation in 1914 would turn out similarly. However, there were some key difference between 1909 and 1914. Russia in 1909 was just a few years out of the embarrassing Russia-Japanese War, and their alliance with France had yet to become as strong or as aggressive. Russia in 1914 was much stronger, and was tired of their constant string of military and diplomatic “losses” since the Treaty of Berlin. Added with a more aggressive France willing & able to back Russia, you get the gas that would turn the brush fire of the “Third Balkan War” into the Great War.

 

[Flying Pig]

It should also be noted that Austria's response the last time Serbia's government got out of control - during the Second Balkan War - was to issue an ultimatum trying to rein them in, and it worked.

 

[innonimatu]

But in 1914 they delivered an ultimatum that they should have known the serbian government would have to reject. And they could have sent a less aggressive one and had it accepted.

 

[Flying Pig]

But in 1914 they delivered an ultimatum that they should have known the serbian government would have to reject. And they could have sent a less aggressive one and had it accepted.

Well, the Serbian government almost did accept it - it was only the promise of unconditional Russian support that gave them the confidence to reject it. Clark points out that the ultimatum was a lot less insulting and disrespectful of Serbian sovereignty than the one laid down by NATO in 1999. Given that offer of unconditional support, I'm not sure you can say with confidence that a less aggressive ultimatum would have been accepted - and you can certainly make the case that the state-sponsored (at least as it appeared) murder of the heir to the throne was such a serious act that a calm response was not really an option. There certainly were, as a point of fact, those in the Austrian cabinet when the ultimatum was being drafted who put it on record that only defeating Serbia in war would be sufficient 'humiliation' to repay the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, but I don't think we can necessarily extrapolate to say that this was the intent of everyone who had a hand in drafting it. It also bears repeating many, many times that an Austro-Serbian war and the world war that resulted are very different beasts.

EDIT: To be precise, the part of the ultimatum considered unacceptable was the stipulation that Austrian officials would be involved in the inquiry into the assassination, and involved in the prosecution of the culprits, once found. This was seen as disrespectful of Serbian sovereignty - but Clark's view is that the Austrians had a fair point. It was clearly important to get to the bottom of what had happened in Sarajevo, and they were entirely justified in putting no faith in the Serbian government to manage the inquiry properly, even though they had only a partial idea of how deeply the conspiracy and the Serbian state were interlinked. The 1999 ultimatum, by contrast, demanded the unconditional right of NATO troops to enter Serbia (well, Yugoslavia) and to move, bivouac, operate and make use of 'facilities' however they saw fit.

 

[r16]

ı hear the acceptance of the ultimatum was also somewhat based on the possibility of delaying the implemantation of the conditions . From some book ı have read upto one third .

 

[LouisPhilippe]

Starting in 1917 Emperor Charles I of Austria tried to make a separate peace treaty between Austria and the Allies.
To this end he sent his brothers-in-law, Prince Sixtus and Prince Xavier, on several occasions, to the governments of France and England.