The Causes of the First World War

Yeah, so there's no way that is what the Germans were planning.

The Germans also predicted that the Italians would join the Entente side in 1914, hilariously before the actual Italian military knew.

The Anglo-Japanese alliance was also a known thing, thus preventing the idea of some kinda German-Japanese anti-Russia effort. Wrong war man.

Some extensive modern research has argued that the Germans were REALLY hoping to keep the Austro-Serbian conflict a regional one, which it should've been. The "Blank-Cheque" blew up in their face because they didn't have the kind of allied coordination which has become the norm in the modern world. Berlin was flabbergasted by how slow the Austrian political and military elements handled the situation.
 
The Anglo-Japanese alliance was also a known thing, thus preventing the idea of some kinda German-Japanese anti-Russia effort. Wrong war man.
I was under the impression that the UK wasn't sure they could count on Japan to honor the alliance, which was one of the reasons the Admiralty lost their [censored] over Spee's East Asia Squadron and let Japan name their terms -with the added bonus of grabbing Germany's pacific territories for their own Empire.
 
I was under the impression that the UK wasn't sure they could count on Japan to honor the alliance, which was one of the reasons the Admiralty lost their [censored] over Spee's East Asia Squadron and let Japan name their terms -with the added bonus of grabbing Germany's pacific territories for their own Empire.

The terms of the alliance were intended to protect Japanese and British interest in China and Korea in the event of aggression from some other third party power. *cough Russia cough* Also, when a signatory had "vital interest" they want to claim, the other would remain officially neutral.

Outside of that, the alliance was vague. For instance Japan was under no obligation to support Britain in India. The treaty was more of a formalizing of the industrial and political support that Britain had been providing to Japan in their modernizing process. The British freakout was out of their general over-reaction to the abilities of the German Navy. As 1914-1916 proved out, the Germans were not really the major threat to the colonies that London expected.
 
Pangur Bán;14428954 said:
Yes, that's the point. Germany was becoming the most powerful country, but the three established superpowers were allying with each other to maintain the old equilibrium.
Insofar as "the old equilibrium" meant "Britain, France, and Russia could make any aggressive actions they liked with very few diplomatic consequences" then I suppose that's not wrong.
The Kaiser was concerned that Great Britain would support the French, but the British
army was small, and the Germans calculated that Britain could not ship in enough troops
from India and conscript enough troops in time before the French were defeated.

The fact that it did not work out that way is quite another story.
Surprisingly, EnglishEdward, well-known proponent of Little English nationalism on these here boards, subscribes to the standard British propaganda myths about the Great War, and even extends them somewhat. The post as a whole is not good, and there's no particular reason to take it seriously. The quoted section also imbibes in the usual British mythmaking about their allegedly contemptible little army, but is particularly egregious because it inflates the military value of the BEF and repeats the claim that the German war plan relied on a speedy end to the war when there is in fact no evidence that this is true; the "forty days" and "six weeks" claims that are often repeated (although not in the quoted post) are pure invention.

All of the Entente armies in the West in 1914 indulged in some fairly epic mythmaking to explain their disastrous defeats in the initial battles of the war (just as the Germans later found scapegoats for their defeat at the Marne), and the British came up with the most ludicrous stories. The BEF was defeated very badly from 24 to 26 August 1914 in the battles of Mons and Le Cateau in ways that showed severe flaws in British training, doctrine, and troop leading. In order to erase these defeats, the British made up casualty numbers, created military myths like "rapid rifle fire" and mowing down blocks of German soldiers advancing in close order, and accused the Germans of not fighting fair.

The reality is that in 1914 the BEF was not ready for a continental war against a Great Power. Its soldiers were brave and in some ways they were reasonably well-trained, although generally not as well-trained as the Germans were. But despite the Haldane reforms they were largely unaware of how modern warfare worked and how to coordinate fire and movement to generate maneuver. Most of the army was comprised of troops that had been deployed for counterinsurgency operations in Ireland and had not trained in many months (and were therefore undeployable by modern standards) and of reservists who were not even marching fit. The BEF's commanders at the operational level ranged from barely competent to worthy of court martial. They were not the architects of victory on the Marne, regardless of patriotic myth. There is in fact every indication that the Germans took the British about as seriously as they deserved. German accounts of the fights against the BEF in the summer of 1914 were full of praise for the old colonial mercenaries who were crack shots and adept at using terrain to gain cover...but they were also critical of British combined-arms coordination and positioning, while simultaneously fully aware of how most German units were better at all these things than the BEF of 1914 was.

It took a long time for the BEF to develop into a well-trained and -equipped fighting force capable of engaging in modern warfare. In that, perhaps, the imaginary Germans in the quoted post were not wrong.
 
Dachs said:
Insofar as "the old equilibrium" meant "Britain, France, and Russia could make any aggressive actions they liked with very few diplomatic consequences" then I suppose that's not wrong.

That's more or less how I see it.
 
That is quite the pipedream.

I agree it was indeed a hawk pipedream.


Can you provide sources? Not cited, just the book or books you took that from.

Pipedreams are not normally written down.

Furthermore proclaiming it would have undermined the hawk lie line to the doves that
Germany had to attack France because they did not have a plan to go to war with
just the Russians and they could not improvise a plan because of railway timetables.


Yeah, so there's no way that is what the Germans were planning.

Stage 1: happened,

Stage 2: do you deny the existence of the Schieffen Plan for Stage 2?.

Stage 3 to 7: was subject to success with Stage 2 and required german and
austo-hungarian politicians and diplomats to deliver, and even then the timetable
of that pipedream was obviously not determinable; so it was necessarily
outside the scope german general staff planning until Stage 2 succeeded.


The Germans also predicted that the Italians would join the Entente side in 1914, hilariously before the actual Italian military knew.

The triple alliance between Germay Austia-Hungary and Italy was renewed
only two years earlier in 1912. The concept that Italy would join on the sides
of Germany and Austo-Hungary was not unreasonable. Why they did not
and why they joined the Entente side instead is a separate story.

https://www.britannica.com/event/Triple-Alliance-Europe-1882-1915


The Anglo-Japanese alliance was also a known thing, thus preventing the idea of some kinda German-Japanese anti-Russia effort. Wrong war man.

The German hawks probably hoped that Great Briatin would remain neutral or would sign a
ceasefire if France was defetaed, in whichg case the Anglo-Japanese alliance would not kick in.


Some extensive modern research has argued that the Germans were REALLY hoping to keep the Austro-Serbian conflict a regional one, which it should've been.

I am sure that the more sensible Germans did indeed hope to keep out.
My opinion is that the German leadership was divided and the hawks
lied to the doves to obtain a false consensus for initiating a major war.

The "Blank-Cheque" blew up in their face

I agree.

because they didn't have the kind of allied coordination which has become the norm in the modern world. Berlin was flabbergasted by how slow the Austrian political and military elements handled the situation.

I am not sure I understand you. Did the Hawks expect Austria-Hungary to have completed
the annexation of Serbia before the Tsar got out of bed?


Insofar as "the old equilibrium" meant "Britain, France, and Russia could make any aggressive actions they liked with very few diplomatic consequences" then I suppose that's not wrong.

Surprisingly, EnglishEdward, well-known proponent of Little English nationalism on these here boards, subscribes to the standard British propaganda myths about the Great War, and even extends them somewhat. The post as a whole is not good, and there's no particular reason to take it seriously. The quoted section also imbibes in the usual British mythmaking about their allegedly contemptible little army, but is particularly egregious because it inflates the military value of the BEF and repeats the claim that the German war plan relied on a speedy end to the war when there is in fact no evidence that this is true; the "forty days" and "six weeks" claims that are often repeated (although not in the quoted post) are pure invention.

All of the Entente armies in the West in 1914 indulged in some fairly epic mythmaking to explain their disastrous defeats in the initial battles of the war (just as the Germans later found scapegoats for their defeat at the Marne), and the British came up with the most ludicrous stories. The BEF was defeated very badly from 24 to 26 August 1914 in the battles of Mons and Le Cateau in ways that showed severe flaws in British training, doctrine, and troop leading. In order to erase these defeats, the British made up casualty numbers, created military myths like "rapid rifle fire" and mowing down blocks of German soldiers advancing in close order, and accused the Germans of not fighting fair.

The reality is that in 1914 the BEF was not ready for a continental war against a Great Power. Its soldiers were brave and in some ways they were reasonably well-trained, although generally not as well-trained as the Germans were. But despite the Haldane reforms they were largely unaware of how modern warfare worked and how to coordinate fire and movement to generate maneuver. Most of the army was comprised of troops that had been deployed for counterinsurgency operations in Ireland and had not trained in many months (and were therefore undeployable by modern standards) and of reservists who were not even marching fit. The BEF's commanders at the operational level ranged from barely competent to worthy of court martial. They were not the architects of victory on the Marne, regardless of patriotic myth. There is in fact every indication that the Germans took the British about as seriously as they deserved. German accounts of the fights against the BEF in the summer of 1914 were full of praise for the old colonial mercenaries who were crack shots and adept at using terrain to gain cover...but they were also critical of British combined-arms coordination and positioning, while simultaneously fully aware of how most German units were better at all these things than the BEF of 1914 was.

It took a long time for the BEF to develop into a well-trained and -equipped fighting force capable of engaging in modern warfare. In that, perhaps, the imaginary Germans in the quoted post were not wrong.


I did NOT mention the BEF in my post yesterday.

What actually happened is a separate story from
what was then imagined would happen.
 
So you are openly claiming that this is all your personal guess of the German war aims and plans prior to the war, based on no evidence whatsoever. That is ballsy.
 
Stage 1: happened,

Stage 2: do you deny the existence of the Schieffen Plan for Stage 2?.

Stage 3 to 7: was subject to success with Stage 2 and required german and
austo-hungarian politicians and diplomats to deliver, and even then the timetable
of that pipedream was obviously not determinable; so it was necessarily
outside the scope german general staff planning until Stage 2 succeeded.

Stage 1 didn’t happen. Serbia rebuffed the Austrian invasions. It was the coordinated attack of Austria, Germany, and Bulgaria in 1915 that took down Serbia.

Am I denying that Schlieffen did some war games, many exercising a case of war with France?

No, there is plenty of evidence for that.

Am I denying that the Germans were marching to the orders of the per-agreed upon “Schlieffen Plan” in 1914?

Kinda.

The German part of the Battle of the Frontiers looked rather different than what Schlieffen war gamed out. Also “attacking through Belgium” can’t be pegged down to one man’s masterpiece. It’s the obvious point of attack for the Germans.


The triple alliance between Germay Austia-Hungary and Italy was renewed
only two years earlier in 1912. The concept that Italy would join on the sides
of Germany and Austo-Hungary was not unreasonable. Why they did not
and why they joined the Entente side instead is a separate story.

https://www.britannica.com/event/Triple-Alliance-Europe-1882-1915

Paper is easy to sign.

Also, the Triple Alliance was (especially in Italy’s eyes) a defensive alliance. Germany knew that while Italian nationalists wanted land from both France and Austria, to Rome land from Austria was probably the easiest get. Austria was also the great enemy of Italian Unification. Berlin knew that the course of the July Crisis with Austria attacking Serbia, even in the case of reaction to terrorism, would provide enough of a pretext for Rome to renege on the Alliance.

I am sure that the more sensible Germans did indeed hope to keep out.
My opinion is that the German leadership was divided and the hawks
lied to the doves to obtain a false consensus for initiating a major war.

The German military was the losers of the great mobilization race in July 1914.

The German’s diplomatic corps was still hoping for this to remain a purely Balkans incident when they began to receive reports from diplomats in St. Petersburg about troop trains rolling about and from agents in Warsaw who actually took train and mobilization orders off the walls they were posted on.

Russia is perhaps most at fault for turning the Austro-Serbian war of 1914 into the Great War. (imo)



I am not sure I understand you. Did the Hawks expect Austria-Hungary to have completed
the annexation of Serbia before the Tsar got out of bed?

In a funny way, kinda.

While the political ramifications of Austria occupying Serbia would have to diplomatically be hammered out in a conference (Congress of Rome perhaps?), the actual act of invading and winning by the Austrians should have been a quick affair.
Belgrade was right on the Danube across the river from Austria-Hungary, and though their military was of a decent size they should’ve been no match for the full weight of K.u.K. forces swarming over the border.( on paper at least)

If Austria was able to take down Serbia before Russia could mobilize and intervene, then they would have accomplished a fait accompli. But again, the Germans and Austrians didn’t have the sort of alliance coordination expected from Post-WWII allies, so Berlin was as much of a spectator in this regard as London or Paris in July 1914.
 
So you are openly claiming that this is all your personal guess of the German war aims and plans prior to the war, based on no evidence whatsoever. That is ballsy.

Different Germans had different aspirations, and Yes that is my own
approximating summary of what I think the German war hawks dreamed.

Thing is people talk about countries aims as if a country has a single
mind and will. In general, there are a multitude of opinions, and it is
only occasionally that countries ever summarised their war objectives.

Going back to my main point yesterday, the actual line up that occurred
was not necessarily as the Germans had expected and therefore to back
conclude from the line up that occurrred that it made no sense for Germany
to start a war against a stronger line up, is not relevant to the events.
 
Different Germans had different aspirations, and Yes that is my own
approximating summary of what I think the German war hawks dreamed.

Thing is people talk about countries aims as if a country has a single
mind and will. In general, there are a multitude of opinions, and it is
only occasionally that countries ever summarised their war objectives.

Yes and no, even with institutional debate one side usually dominates the direction.

A funny example of what you’re talking about would be Britain in July 1914. The army, navy, parliament, cabinet, the king, and PM all had different ideas of who or if they would be fighting. Asquith kinda screwed over his own government by making agreements before the war he never had the authority to make.

Going back to my main point yesterday, the actual line up that occurred
was not necessarily as the Germans had expected and therefore to back
conclude from the line up that occurrred that it made no sense for Germany
to start a war against a stronger line up, is not relevant to the events.

The “lineup” after Germany, Austria, Russia, France & Britain didn’t affect the balance of power that much, until the U.S. entered the scene.

Also, the field of play was never set or expected. Turkey was really interested in joining the entente before Britain said lol nope. Germany always held out hope that Romania would join them, a dream they had since before the war. Greece joined the allies because Britain and France actively violated their neutrality and influenced events in Greece in their favor.
 
EnglishEdward knows the truth, because research and academia have no value at all.
 
EnglishEdward knows the truth, because research and academia have no value at all.

The common understanding here is that the First World War occurred because:

(a) Austria-Hungary decided to and invaded Serbia

(b) Germany decided to and invaded Belgium

I have yet to find any academic research that rebukes that.

The assassination was a provocation, but it could have been handled
diplomatically without going to war, and they chose not to do that.
 
The common understanding here is that the First World War occurred because:

(a) Austria-Hungary decided to and invaded Serbia

(b) Germany decided to and invaded Belgium

I have yet to find any academic research that rebukes that.

The assassination was a provocation, but it could have been handled
diplomatically without going to war, and they chose not to do that.

Then you haven't read academic research of the last 20 years, because that's not really the consensus anymore.
 
Insofar as "the old equilibrium" meant "Britain, France, and Russia could make any aggressive actions they liked with very few diplomatic consequences" then I suppose that's not wrong.

Indeed. The problem with the old phrase 'balance of power' is that it implies that 'balance' had anything to do with it.

Surprisingly, EnglishEdward, well-known proponent of Little English nationalism on these here boards, subscribes to the standard British propaganda myths about the Great War, and even extends them somewhat. The post as a whole is not good, and there's no particular reason to take it seriously. The quoted section also imbibes in the usual British mythmaking about their allegedly contemptible little army, but is particularly egregious because it inflates the military value of the BEF and repeats the claim that the German war plan relied on a speedy end to the war when there is in fact no evidence that this is true; the "forty days" and "six weeks" claims that are often repeated (although not in the quoted post) are pure invention.

All of the Entente armies in the West in 1914 indulged in some fairly epic mythmaking to explain their disastrous defeats in the initial battles of the war (just as the Germans later found scapegoats for their defeat at the Marne), and the British came up with the most ludicrous stories. The BEF was defeated very badly from 24 to 26 August 1914 in the battles of Mons and Le Cateau in ways that showed severe flaws in British training, doctrine, and troop leading. In order to erase these defeats, the British made up casualty numbers, created military myths like "rapid rifle fire" and mowing down blocks of German soldiers advancing in close order, and accused the Germans of not fighting fair.

The reality is that in 1914 the BEF was not ready for a continental war against a Great Power. Its soldiers were brave and in some ways they were reasonably well-trained, although generally not as well-trained as the Germans were. But despite the Haldane reforms they were largely unaware of how modern warfare worked and how to coordinate fire and movement to generate maneuver. Most of the army was comprised of troops that had been deployed for counterinsurgency operations in Ireland and had not trained in many months (and were therefore undeployable by modern standards) and of reservists who were not even marching fit. The BEF's commanders at the operational level ranged from barely competent to worthy of court martial. They were not the architects of victory on the Marne, regardless of patriotic myth. There is in fact every indication that the Germans took the British about as seriously as they deserved. German accounts of the fights against the BEF in the summer of 1914 were full of praise for the old colonial mercenaries who were crack shots and adept at using terrain to gain cover...but they were also critical of British combined-arms coordination and positioning, while simultaneously fully aware of how most German units were better at all these things than the BEF of 1914 was.

It took a long time for the BEF to develop into a well-trained and -equipped fighting force capable of engaging in modern warfare. In that, perhaps, the imaginary Germans in the quoted post were not wrong.

A a follow-up to this, there's a story that started going around the British Army a couple of years ago and is now required reading for all young officers, concerning the BEF of a slightly later age, but much the same mindset:

Lt (later Professor) Sir Michael Howard MC said:
As a platoon commander at Salerno I had to take part in a daylight attack on a strongly defended hill. I was fresh out of from England, where we had learned a very intelligent ‘battle drill’ which taught that in the attack a ‘point section’ should be sent ahead to draw enemy fire with the platoon commander following immediately behind. Once it came under fire the platoon commander had to decide whether to lead the rest of the platoon on a flanking attack, to attempt an encirclement, or to call down covering fire and withdraw. I had met my platoon only two days earlier: it consisted of Eighth Army veterans who had never heard of battle drill. When I gave the leading section its orders the sergeant in charge asked incredulously “Aren’t you going to lead us, sir?”. The look of amazed contempt that he gave me when I said that I was not is something that I shall never forget. The other platoon commanders did lead their platoons. All were killed or badly wounded.

The German Army was professional from top to bottom, and took war seriously. Officers were too valuable to get themselves killed unnecessarily. I would like to feel that we have caught up with them, but I doubt it.

Pangur Bán;14428954 said:
Not tier 1 v. tier 2, but established versus insurgent.

Even then, that seems weaker and weaker the further you move the focus away from seeing the Great War as Britain and France on one side and Germany on the other. I already mentioned the case of Russia, and how very little about Russian policy and actions in the Balkans, particularly towards Serbia - as strong a candidate as any to be the reason why we talk about a World War rather than a Balkan War - could be characterised as anything other than trying to overturn the status quo in Russian favour. It's similarly difficult to see the US as a conservative force in international relations - in fact, American intervention in Europe fundamentally and so far permanently changed how diplomacy between the Great Powers worked.

A more minor example would be Japan, which fought with the Entente, ostensibly to honour the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (first signed in 1902 and intended to be used against Russia), but more pragmatically as an opportunity to take German territory in the Far East (notably the naval base of Tsingtao in China and the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana islands, to which were added various South Pacific islands by Versailles) - and it's very easy to see a reasonably straight line between 1902 (when the Russian Pacific Fleet was attacked at anchor by the Japanese fleet at Port Arthur, without a formal declaration of war), the attacks on German warships and territory between 1914 and 1918 (which included the first ever use of an aircraft carrier in combat) and Pearl Harbour in 1941. The most important of all, though, is Austria-Hungary, an empire whose entire domestic and foreign policy was based on holding together an extremely fragile 'balance of power' within the Empire and Europe. As I see it, there isn't a particularly strong relationship between how 'insurgent' or 'conservative' a state's aims (or, to go onto safer ground, interests) were and the side that it took during the Great War.

EnglishEdward knows the truth, because research and academia have no value at all.

The great strength of WH is that we have discussions where hugely informed and often professional experts (we've even had the odd professor of history drop by) mingle with students, amateur historians, those with a passing interest in a particular point or question, and everyone in between. Those discussions aren't going to go well if people post considered, researched mini-articles which summarise data and scholarship in a way that most of us are lucky ever to come across, and are only met with 'no it isn't' in reply. However, I also think we should be careful of saying that whoever has the most degrees or access to the biggest library should automatically be heard without question. That sort of elitism will eventually turn the place into a very small echo chamber.
 
Please provide me URLs for the last 20 years' academic research disproving
that Austro-Hungary invaded Serbia and Germany invaded Belgium.

Except the contention is not whether the invasions took place. The contention is this:

The common understanding here is that the First World War occurred because:

The because. And if you want citations go look at damn near any post Dachs and Gen Mannerheim have made over the last 6 pages trying to explain this very point. Hell the OP is a lengthy essay about how this very sort of thinking (i.e. that Germany caused the whole mess by violating sacrosanct Belgian neutrality or whatever) has gone out of fashion over the course of the 90s, 00s, and 10s.¹ I mean Strachan devotes like a solid 150 pages in To Arms! explaining quite extensively why it was more than just Germany and AH to blame for the war, and that book's nearly 20 years old at this point.

But whatever. Rah rah England and all that. You do you bud.

¹Was thinking of a different thread
 
The great strength of WH is that we have discussions where hugely informed and often professional experts (we've even had the odd professor of history drop by) mingle with students, amateur historians, those with a passing interest in a particular point or question, and everyone in between. Those discussions aren't going to go well if people post considered, researched mini-articles which summarise data and scholarship in a way that most of us are lucky ever to come across, and are only met with 'no it isn't' in reply. However, I also think we should be careful of saying that whoever has the most degrees or access to the biggest library should automatically be heard without question. That sort of elitism will eventually turn the place into a very small echo chamber.

Certainly, I'm far from an expert on anything at all, I sometimes contribute, and I'm mostly grateful for the more informed people to post here and inform us all in turn. It is good for people to question a narrative, but I consider that Edward went too far in making unsubstantiated claims, hence my less than gentle reply.
 
Indeed. The problem with the old phrase 'balance of power' is that it implies that 'balance' had anything to do with it.

I believe it had. Say what you want of it now (and it seems to be unpopular with current historians?) , but for diplomats living and acting during that time, during the whole century of (near-constant) peace between the Great Powers in the period 1815 - 1914, the notion of "balance of power" between the Great Powers of Europe was present and weighted heavily in their actions. It want new to their era, of course, but the division of Europe between great powers and others, where the great powers could and should "intervene" to "keep order", presupposed the maintenance of a balance of power when these interventions were carried out, and diplomatic consultations to that purpose.

A-H overstepped the bounds of this system when it issued the ultimatum to Serbia. Previous crisis impacting on areas that affected several great powers were resolved through conferences. They could have convened a conference to deal with the issue. Among the other monarchs (and even republican France had a problem with assassination) the issue of the assassination of the heir could be addressed. But the austrians feared that such a convention would actually tackle the problems in the Balkans that were being caused in part by A-H expansionism, so they instead opted for seizing the opportunity to act unilaterally, and were backed by the germans. The rest is history.

What really made the war a world affair was the German backing to Austria. A-H swallowed Bosnia when it was already unstable, thus becoming an impossible empire. The best action by an international congress to deal with the Balkans issue would have been to strip Bosnia out of Hungary. Hand it over to the serbs and let them deal with that mess! Austria would gain stability, while its uppity challenger in the Balkans would probably wreck itself trying to swallow Bosnia.

It was german paranoia over being isolated that ended up chaining the germans to an alliance with a hopeless empire, in a hopeless position. And making a world war seem attractive to them. Germany started the World War because its rulers believed they had backed themselves into a situation where they had no alternatives. They hadn't, France and Russia were in no position to actually start a war against Germany if the germans kept themselves on the defensive, giving no cause to start one.
 
The because. And if you want citations go look at damn near any post Dachs and Gen Mannerheim have made over the last 6 pages trying to explain this very point. Hell the OP is a lengthy essay about how this very sort of thinking (i.e. that Germany caused the whole mess by violating sacrosanct Belgian neutrality or whatever) has gone out of fashion over the course of the 90s, 00s, and 10s.¹ I mean Strachan devotes like a solid 150 pages in To Arms! explaining quite extensively why it was more than just Germany and AH to blame for the war, and that book's nearly 20 years old at this point.

One funny thing that has been observable with historians: wait 20 years more and odds are that you'll find a somewhat different consensus about this or any other complex past political issue... it's almost as if these guys make a living from arguing over the details of this stuff and are not immune to the academia's modus operandi of presenting "new conclusions" as a way of advancing a career, isn't it?

I respect and usually admire the work of professional historians, but do not feel obliged to always follow whatever the current consensus is.
 
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