What's wrong with the history books I read?

If that's the case then it's a tragedy that there are no history books that are somewhere between a first very rough introduction to the chronology of a period and contemporary, argumentative research. Or rather, so few as I personally have read a handful of books that do just that. That being a few hundred pages that describes the evolution of the culture/institution/people/mindset of an empire/country/region through the events that happened over a particular period.

I'm a scientist by trade, if someone asks me for reading material on my research (Quantum Computers) I'm not going to tell them "Go to these scientific journals and read what they have to say, if you can't be bothered to do that then you deserve nothing more than a 2 page summary in the middle of The Economist". That's essentially what people in this thread are telling casual amateur historians to do. I'm really hoping that's just the personal opinion of those who have posted above me rather than the attitude of the field as the whole, because I struggle to think of a more arrogant, dismissive, and ivory-tower approach to take than that.
I don't think anybody's recommended specialist texts so far. As I've been at some pains to try to make clear in each post so far, the notion of a yawning gulf between "two-page summary in the middle of The Economist" and "scientific journals" is as utterly false in history as it is in any field. Mouthwash has been exaggerating fairly dramatically.

Let's go back to the Halsall example. The book (Barbarian Migrations and the Roman West) is a relatively recent textbook, about ten years old. It is primarily based around a narrative of the last century of the Western Roman Empire, combined with segments on thematic history and overviews of the Way Stuff Worked Back Then to further explicate things. While it contains a brief and non-exhaustive overview of some recent historiography, and stakes a claim in a fairly complicated debate, it is undoubtedly not a specialist text. The reader does not need to know very much about late antiquity to be able to use it effectively. That's one of the reasons Halsall spends so much time describing stuff like how identity works, and it's why he even includes a narrative at all. Specialist academic history rarely contains narratives, and certainly does not contain a narrative of more than a century of history. Certainly nobody has pointed to complicated journal articles, or texts that engage even more directly with specific things. Fundamentally, if somebody wants narrative history, they are looking for a relatively general textbook, and that is what they are going to be offered.

Even authors who write "relatively general textbook"s in history, however, find themselves having to engage with other authors. That is, after all, what the field is. It includes a great deal of collaboration and also a great deal of disagreement over interpretation. I would say that, while it's important to avoid taking it too far, interpretation assumes a somewhat larger role in historical academia than it does in STEM fields. There is no one right answer about why something happened, although there are plenty of wrong answers; while the field is fundamentally based on facts, it is fundamentally not based on experimentation. It is about intersubjectivity and persuasion. You can't avoid having to talk about multiple historians' opinions on a given subject, unless you are trying to give the impression that a field is settled when it is not. I will agree that Barbarian Migrations spends rather more time on historiography than some other such narratives. I believe, however, that it is a relatively small price to pay for what I believe is the best and most accurate narrative of the relevant events, as such things go, and I also believe that the interested reader will be able to make it through without much difficulty. I do not believe it is a perfect text; there is certainly room to update it, and editorial decisions I might not have made. There are some competing recent texts, which Halsall actually references in the section that Mouthwash complains about. He and anyone else are welcome to try them, although I believe that they are all flawed in more serious ways.

The journal article comparison doesn't work for another reason. With relatively few exceptions, the sciences that most people know and are taught in school are more or less settled. Nobody is going to seriously question the theory of evolution, or say that hydrochloric acid doesn't actually exist, or declare that free-body diagrams aren't worth using. But the history that is taught in school is constantly reevaluated to the extent that what is taught in middle and high school is often wrong - not just "incomplete" or "not the whole story", but flat-out wrong. In history, there is rarely such a thing as a settled field. There are not only explanations that have been discarded by the academy (for example, Gibbon's explanation of the last millennium of Roman history has about as much persuasive power for modern academic historians as the theory of phlogiston has for modern chemists) but a multiplicity of competing, possibly-valid explanations that are current and have not been discarded. A historian cannot begin a discussion of the fall of Rome without having to account for all the people who believe that it happened because of Christianity, or because of Iran, or because of "the barbarians", or because of stirrups, or because of lead poisoning, or because of inflation. It makes a great deal of sense, then, for a good historian to spend at least a little time in her general narrative history discussing these things and why they are not actually Things. This discussion might take the form of referencing the work of specific other historians, and it might not, but its fundamental purpose is still the same. And it is still quite far away from the sort of hyperspecific, highly detailed, and deeply complicated exegesis that one might find in an academic journal. One might compare it to having brief discussions of the work of Ptolemy, Copernicus, Brahe, Kepler, and Galileo in an introductory text on astronomy.

This problem, that a field is not settled and that even basic questions remain matters of serious contention in some ways, is one of the sources of the problem. I have repeatedly alluded to the hospitalitas debate as one of the more complicated segments of the Halsall text. The debate is fundamental to the field, because it addresses the actual mechanism of settlement. Pretty much everybody agrees that, in the fifth century, a bunch of people moved around the Western Roman Empire, and some people who didn't originally live in the Empire moved into the Empire, and then the Empire stopped being an Empire (without assigning any particular amount of causation to any of those things). So figuring out how these people settled is a pretty important discussion to have. It gets back to Mouthwash's original thing: how did any of this stuff actually happen for real people, anyway? Did barbarian hordes swarm into the country, plundering and pillaging, destroying local government and putting up something new in its place? Were these people not even really barbarians, but the imperial government's own soldiers, quartered on local land in a time-honored Roman practice even after the Roman Empire stopped being a Thing? Was the whole thing a matter of transacting taxes, not land? Was it none of these things, or all of them to some degree? Historians clearly have a lot of opinions on the matter. However, due to the nature of the evidence, most of the discussion centers around legal codes devised by post-Roman rulers in a highly awkward form of Latin. (There are other forms of evidence, but the legal texts are decisive.) The debate is fraught, contentious, and almost opaque to all but about maybe two hundred people in the entire world. You can't entirely ignore it, especially not in a text that purports to be a summary of history, when it was one of the most important aspects of political and social changes in the fifth century. I think that, in this particular case, the author made the best of a bad situation and provided an adequate summary that takes a stance on the issue without going too far into the weeds. There are other books (e.g. Walter Goffart's Barbarian Tides) that discuss the debate in rather more detail and thus have a greater likelihood of getting the non-specialist reader lost.

But that might be providing too much detail. Mouthwash has already said that he thought the first dozen or so pages of the text were what turned him off of it. This is a bit surprising to me, because many of those pages are taken up by three brief example case studies of Interesting Stuff That Happened In The Fourth Century that most history books use to help introduce fourth-century Rome to new readers (except for the last, which is the same thing except for the sixth century); some of the following pages are a thumbnail sketch of historiography, but nothing in the sort of detail that I'd be worried about offering to anybody who is actually interested in the material capable of reading beyond a high school level. He can't not talk about it, because a big part of his thesis is that common ways of seeing "the barbarians", e.g. as a rampaging horde, or as the kernel of modern civilizations, are flawed. Again, this gets at how things actually worked for real people, but gives a brief sketch of opposing viewpoints.

Mouthwash is, of course, within his rights to regard the book as overly complicated or boring. I probably wouldn't recommend it to most readers not yet in undergraduate studies, and if he is one of those readers I apologize. But it undoubtedly has a great deal to do with his other interest - finding out about real stuff - and although it might be a bit easier to absorb, it could undoubtedly be much, much harder.
 
^this^

I just got out of a seminar in which one of the leading experts on Medieval Latin spent the better part of three hours ranting about how other leading academics in Medieval Latin (all of whom have spent the better part of 3+ decades doing nothing but reading, writing about, and analyzing Medieval Latin) have totally misread certain sections of an Einhard letter to a person named Vussein. There are very few things in history (or other Humanities-type things like Comp Lit, Classics and Art History) which are met with 100% consensus. More often than not you'll have 5 leading academic authorities with 5 different takes on what is true and what is not. To me, that discourse is one of the truly beautiful things about history.

I mean Christ, Einhard experts still can't even come to a broad consensus just on when Einhard wrote his Vita
 
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In all fairness, that's a fairly obscure topic that probably is best suited to a journal article rather than the general reader. But academics still argue ferociously over the fairly broad topic of "hey why did the Roman Empire stop being a thing, anyway"? That's the sort of thing that makes it tough to write a general history that treats the readers with a little bit of respect while simultaneously avoiding the weeds of any particularly complex subject.
 
In all fairness, that's a fairly obscure topic that probably is best suited to a journal article rather than the general reader. But academics still argue ferociously over the fairly broad topic of "hey why did the Roman Empire stop being a thing, anyway"? That's the sort of thing that makes it tough to write a general history that treats the readers with a little bit of respect while simultaneously avoiding the weeds of any particularly complex subject.

Yeah, but my point is more that people who specialize in studying the language, who devote their lives to reading and writing about the language can't even agree over basic meaning-content, let alone larger metatextual and extra-diegetic material or historical truth of what is being said. That's the kind of arena you're dealing with in academia. And that's not a bad thing. That just gives you an indication of the kind of complexity, nuance, and subtlety that you're dealing with, particularly in studies of pre-modern topics, especially especially in Medieval and Late Antique studies.
 
Even authors who write "relatively general textbook"s in history, however, find themselves having to engage with other authors. That is, after all, what the field is. It includes a great deal of collaboration and also a great deal of disagreement over interpretation. I would say that, while it's important to avoid taking it too far, interpretation assumes a somewhat larger role in historical academia than it does in STEM fields. There is no one right answer about why something happened, although there are plenty of wrong answers; while the field is fundamentally based on facts, it is fundamentally not based on experimentation. It is about intersubjectivity and persuasion.
I just got out of a seminar in which one of the leading experts on Medieval Latin spent the better part of three hours ranting about how other leading academics in Medieval Latin (all of whom have spent the better part of 3+ decades doing nothing but reading, writing about, and analyzing Medieval Latin) have totally misread certain sections of an Einhard letter to a person named Vussein. There are very few things in history (or other Humanities-type things like Comp Lit, Classics and Art History) which are met with 100% consensus. More often than not you'll have 5 leading academic authorities with 5 different takes on what is true and what is not. To me, that discourse is one of the truly beautiful things about history.

What makes it a respectable field, then? Narratives are the worst way to understand anything. I'm sure you can have great fun discussing them, but wouldn't you rather your beliefs meet a reasonable standard of correlation to reality?
 
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A reasonable standard of correlation to reality is pretty much the sole criterion of the discipline. As Dachs said above: there may well be no right answer, but there're tons of wrong ones.
 
What assurance is there that Halsall won't be viewed the same way as Gibbon a hundred years from now?
 
I've found that, if you're lacking a specific recommendation, one of the best things to do can be to find a specific series by a reputable publisher, preferably academic, and pick out the period that interests you. Fr'example, a while back I needed a general history of the early American Republic, so I grabbed Empire of Liberty, the second volume in the Oxford History of the United States. There's a series like that for most, well, "countries", for want of a better word, and probably a volume to cover most any period you might be interested in.

Even just find a decent publisher and see what they offer. Doesn't have to be an academic one- Penguin publishes a lot of accessible work by academics, written for either an undergraduate or general audience. It's not scholarly, but it's written by scholars, so it treats the author like a grownup, and typically spends enough time addressing the historiography that you can see the author is making a sincere argument. You can just try browsing through their history section and seeing what takes your interest.

Alternatively, do a history degree, over-specialise in one area, but fail to actually follow it up with postgraduate study, and you'll have a laundry list of books to chase up and the time to kinda-sorta do the chasing. It's worked for me.
 
What assurance is there that Halsall won't be viewed the same way as Gibbon a hundred years from now?
None whatsoever. But among the existing academic texts, I believe that his book is the one that takes the best account of the facts that are currently available with the most rigorously applied reasoning.

If you'd asked me for a book recommendation in 1800, I would have suggested Gibbon and the primary sources, because there was nothing superior to them at the time. (And because, if you were interested in the subject, you'd probably have had a grounding in Latin already.) Nowadays, it's different. A few decades from now, it'll probably be different again. If you wait to read any history book until somebody comes up with the final, unimpeachable Answer, you will be waiting forever, because that Answer does not exist.
 
None whatsoever. But among the existing academic texts, I believe that his book is the one that takes the best account of the facts that are currently available with the most rigorously applied reasoning.

If you'd asked me for a book recommendation in 1800, I would have suggested Gibbon and the primary sources, because there was nothing superior to them at the time. (And because, if you were interested in the subject, you'd probably have had a grounding in Latin already.) Nowadays, it's different. A few decades from now, it'll probably be different again

So it's essentially intellectual masturbation.
 
So it's essentially intellectual masturbation.

So the simple fact that it has the potential of being superceded someday makes it intellectual masturbation? Wouldn't that then apply to all the natural sciences too?
 
So the simple fact that it has the potential of being overturned someday makes it intellectual masturbation? Wouldn't that then apply to all the natural sciences too?

The natural sciences aim at truth. Any and all of it could still be refuted, but it's worth pursuing because the odds of that continually shrink. What Dachs seems to be saying that is that it's all like, interpretation, man. (This is probably built into the very nature of the discipline - there aren't any actual laws to build predictions around, so like all social science it goes by authority.)
 
The natural sciences aim at truth. Any and all of it could still be refuted, but it's worth pursuing because the odds of that continually shrink. What Dachs seems to be saying that is that it's all like, interpretation, man. (This is probably built into the very nature of the discipline - there aren't any actual laws to build predictions around, so like all social science it goes by authority.)

Blah. I had a longer thing written out, but I think the best thing to do would be to just quote in toto a particularly illuminating passage from G.R. Elton's The Practice of History (1987). Emphasis mine:

The Practice of History said:
[Reacting to an (admittedly strawman) argument leveled against contemporary historian E.H. Carr that things only become facts once a historian has written about them]

Mr Carr holds that there is a 'process by which a mere fact about the past is transformed into a fact of history'. He quotes the case of a man who was killed by a rioting mob in 1850 and says that this event, once no fact of history at all, is on the way to becoming one because it has been mentioned in one book. It will achieve full status when it gets into one or two more historical accounts. The difference between facts about the past and facts of history hangs upon 'the element of interpretation' which the historian adds to the former in order to create the latter, though general acceptance of the interpretation offered is required before the fact's new status is secure.

This is really an extraordinary way of looking at history; worse, it is an extraordinarily arrogant attitude both to the past and the the place of the historian in studying it. A man was kicked to death in 1850: that is a fact, an event, which took place and which nothing now can either make or unmake. It is quite immaterial whether the fact is known to an historian or used by him in analysing a problem. If the event were unknowable - if no evidence of it had survived at all - it would certainly be neither fact about the past nor historical fact - it would have ceased to exist and that piece of potential history would never have materialized - but it would still, of course, have occurred, independent of any historian. However, the event can be known, and that is all that is required to make it a 'fact of history'. Interpretation, or general acceptance of a thesis, has nothing whatsoever to do with its independent existence. The point matters so much because Mr Carr, and others who like him think that history is what historians write, not what happened, come dangerously close to suggesting either that it does not much matter what one says because (interpretation being everything) there are always several reasonably convincing interpretations of any given set of events, or that history is altogether unknowable, being merely what happens to be said by a given historian at a given moment.

Mr Carr links his invention of special 'facts of history' with the by now conventional attack on Acton's programme for the old Cambridge Modern History. Certainly Acton was too sanguine when he supposed that 'ultimate history' - universally accepted and finally proven accounts of anything - would soon be possible. Though over a large range of historical problems this ambition will indeed never be achieved, the notion behind it was nevertheless true, for ultimate history is what actually happened, even though we shall never be able to rediscover it in full or with total assurance. Acton inferred from his positivist view of history that bias can be eliminated by strict attention to the facts and their meaning, so that in his cooperative history he hoped it would be hard to tell where a bishop left off and an agnostic took over. This demand has also received much ridicule, and Mr Carr duly laughs at it. Yet any reading of the old C.M.H. quickly shows that the ambition was fulfilled only too frequently, with a great increase in dullness and loss of life, but also a great increase in precision compared with what had been written before. That historians are prejudiced, blind and wilful, like any men, is true enough, and one may also agree that history written by men not afraid to allow themselves to appear in their discourse is both livelier history and probably better history. But that men cannot ever eliminate themselves from the search for truth is nonsense, and pernicious nonsense at that, because it once again favours the purely relativist concept of history, the opinion that it is all simply in the historian's mind and becomes whatever he likes to make of it.

Mr Carr's own work, and his reaction to criticism of it, prove conclusively that he does not in fact hold so whimsical a view of his profession. Yet his curious distinction between facts of the past and facts of history betrays two common failings: a lack of humility in the face of the past, and a confusion between the event and the meaning it acquires in the reconstruction attempted by the historian. The historian need not be too humble towards his fellows (though in an age of mass-reviewing and of jockeying for academic positions that is the humility he is likely to practise), but if he asserts a sovereignty of his facts he is a traitor to his calling. To say it once again: those things we discover, analyse, talk about, did actually once happen. They happened to real people, people quite as alive as we are and quite as entitled to repsect for their humanity. They may not have known exactly what was happening, and historical interpretation and judgment are (as we shall see later) thoroughly legitimate activities: the historian is entitled to think about his discoveries and to find a significance in them which may well have been invisible at the time. But his doing so does not affect the independent reality of the event; the historian is not entitled to suppose that he alone, by choosing this fact and ignoring that, creates history. On the contrary, no investigator is more fimly bound by his material, less able to invent or construct the object of his study. This problem of the relationship between the genuine truth and the historical event and the discovery of that truth from the evidence left behind is the subject of this chapter.

Here's another bonus section from a few pages earlier on scientificity and history:

Idem said:
The problem of whether the past can be known at all - since it is not now here in the presence of the observer and cannot be brought back for study - arises from the attempt to make history seem a science, comparable in purpose and method to the natural sciences. The natural sciences have, it would seem, cirtually abandoned the concepts of truth and falsehood; phenomena once regarded as objectively true are no seen to be only a statistical abstraction from random variables, and the accusing finger of the uncertainty principle futher insists that, since observation alters a phenomenon, nothing is capable of being studied except after it is changed from the state in which it was meant to have been investigated. Practising scientists have therefore permitted the philosopher to remove the word true from their vocabulary and to substitute some such phrase as more probably, more accurately descriptive, more aesthetically or intellectually satisfying.

[...]

As a matter of fact, in a very real sense the study of history is concerned with a subject matter more objective and more independent than that of the natural sceinces. The common argument that, unlike the scientist, the historian cannot verify his reconstruction by repeating the experiment at will can be turned round to give him greater assurance of objectivity. Let is be granted that verifiability is the basis of the method employed by the natural sciences, and that in any acceptable sense it is clearly impossible for the historian. He can reconstruct in the mind, but he cannot re-enact. However, the fundamental reason for this disability ensures that his subject matter is to a remarkable extent quite independent of him. All scientific experiments are essentially constructs, and this applies to both the physical and biological sciences. The scientist poses his problem, designs his experiment, and - if successful - can repeat problem, experiment, and solution as often as he likes, just because he has himself determined the form which the experiment is cast.

[...]

Scientific experiments [...] are artificial; these things would not have happened but for a deliberate act of will on the part of the experimenter; the matter studied may be taken from nature, but before it is studied it is transformed for the purpose of the investigation.

[...]

The historian's case is very different. True, he may select his problems to suit himself. He may ask the questions he likes or believes capable of being answered; he may, and probably will include himself in the equation when he explains, interprets, even perhaps distorts. But he cannot invent his experiment: the subject of his investigation is outside his control When the problem of truth is under consideration, his essential difference from the natural scientist works in his favour. He cannot escape the first condition of his enterprise, which is that the matter he investigates has a dead reality independent of the enquiry. At some time, these things actually once happened, and it is now impossible to arrange them for the purposes of experiment.
 
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So it's essentially intellectual masturbation.
Architects now that their buildings will eventually collapse. Doctors know that their patients will eventually die. "Maturbation" seems to be the human condition.
 
The Practice of History said:
[Reacting to an (admittedly strawman) argument leveled against contemporary historian E.H. Carr that things only become facts once a historian has written about them]

Mr Carr holds that there is a 'process by which a mere fact about the past is transformed into a fact of history'. He quotes the case of a man who was killed by a rioting mob in 1850 and says that this event, once no fact of history at all, is on the way to becoming one because it has been mentioned in one book. It will achieve full status when it gets into one or two more historical accounts. The difference between facts about the past and facts of history hangs upon 'the element of interpretation' which the historian adds to the former in order to create the latter, though general acceptance of the interpretation offered is required before the fact's new status is secure.

This is really an extraordinary way of looking at history; worse, it is an extraordinarily arrogant attitude both to the past and the the place of the historian in studying it. A man was kicked to death in 1850: that is a fact, an event, which took place and which nothing now can either make or unmake. It is quite immaterial whether the fact is known to an historian or used by him in analysing a problem. If the event were unknowable - if no evidence of it had survived at all - it would certainly be neither fact about the past nor historical fact - it would have ceased to exist and that piece of potential history would never have materialized - but it would still, of course, have occurred, independent of any historian. However, the event can be known, and that is all that is required to make it a 'fact of history'. Interpretation, or general acceptance of a thesis, has nothing whatsoever to do with its independent existence. The point matters so much because Mr Carr, and others who like him think that history is what historians write, not what happened, come dangerously close to suggesting either that it does not much matter what one says because (interpretation being everything) there are always several reasonably convincing interpretations of any given set of events, or that history is altogether unknowable, being merely what happens to be said by a given historian at a given moment.

Mr Carr links his invention of special 'facts of history' with the by now conventional attack on Acton's programme for the old Cambridge Modern History. Certainly Acton was too sanguine when he supposed that 'ultimate history' - universally accepted and finally proven accounts of anything - would soon be possible. Though over a large range of historical problems this ambition will indeed never be achieved, the notion behind it was nevertheless true, for ultimate history is what actually happened, even though we shall never be able to rediscover it in full or with total assurance. Acton inferred from his positivist view of history that bias can be eliminated by strict attention to the facts and their meaning, so that in his cooperative history he hoped it would be hard to tell where a bishop left off and an agnostic took over. This demand has also received much ridicule, and Mr Carr duly laughs at it. Yet any reading of the old C.M.H. quickly shows that the ambition was fulfilled only too frequently, with a great increase in dullness and loss of life, but also a great increase in precision compared with what had been written before. That historians are prejudiced, blind and wilful, like any men, is true enough, and one may also agree that history written by men not afraid to allow themselves to appear in their discourse is both livelier history and probably better history. But that men cannot ever eliminate themselves from the search for truth is nonsense, and pernicious nonsense at that, because it once again favours the purely relativist concept of history, the opinion that it is all simply in the historian's mind and becomes whatever he likes to make of it.

Mr Carr's own work, and his reaction to criticism of it, prove conclusively that he does not in fact hold so whimsical a view of his profession. Yet his curious distinction between facts of the past and facts of history betrays two common failings: a lack of humility in the face of the past, and a confusion between the event and the meaning it acquires in the reconstruction attempted by the historian. The historian need not be too humble towards his fellows (though in an age of mass-reviewing and of jockeying for academic positions that is the humility he is likely to practise), but if he asserts a sovereignty of his facts he is a traitor to his calling. To say it once again: those things we discover, analyse, talk about, did actually once happen. They happened to real people, people quite as alive as we are and quite as entitled to repsect for their humanity. They may not have known exactly what was happening, and historical interpretation and judgment are (as we shall see later) thoroughly legitimate activities: the historian is entitled to think about his discoveries and to find a significance in them which may well have been invisible at the time. But his doing so does not affect the independent reality of the event; the historian is not entitled to suppose that he alone, by choosing this fact and ignoring that, creates history. On the contrary, no investigator is more fimly bound by his material, less able to invent or construct the object of his study. This problem of the relationship between the genuine truth and the historical event and the discovery of that truth from the evidence left behind is the subject of this chapter.

Their epistemology isn't good. That's the whole issue. I'm glad that you at least seem to advocate objective truth.

Idem said:
The problem of whether the past can be known at all - since it is not now here in the presence of the observer and cannot be brought back for study - arises from the attempt to make history seem a science, comparable in purpose and method to the natural sciences. The natural sciences have, it would seem, cirtually abandoned the concepts of truth and falsehood; phenomena once regarded as objectively true are no seen to be only a statistical abstraction from random variables, and the accusing finger of the uncertainty principle futher insists that, since observation alters a phenomenon, nothing is capable of being studied except after it is changed from the state in which it was meant to have been investigated. Practising scientists have therefore permitted the philosopher to remove the word true from their vocabulary and to substitute some such phrase as more probably, more accurately descriptive, more aesthetically or intellectually satisfying.

[...]

As a matter of fact, in a very real sense the study of history is concerned with a subject matter more objective and more independent than that of the natural sceinces. The common argument that, unlike the scientist, the historian cannot verify his reconstruction by repeating the experiment at will can be turned round to give him greater assurance of objectivity. Let is be granted that verifiability is the basis of the method employed by the natural sciences, and that in any acceptable sense it is clearly impossible for the historian. He can reconstruct in the mind, but he cannot re-enact. However, the fundamental reason for this disability ensures that his subject matter is to a remarkable extent quite independent of him. All scientific experiments are essentially constructs, and this applies to both the physical and biological sciences. The scientist poses his problem, designs his experiment, and - if successful - can repeat problem, experiment, and solution as often as he likes, just because he has himself determined the form which the experiment is cast.

[...]

Scientific experiments [...] are artificial; these things would not have happened but for a deliberate act of will on the part of the experimenter; the matter studied may be taken from nature, but before it is studied it is transformed for the purpose of the investigation.

[...]

The historian's case is very different. True, he may select his problems to suit himself. He may ask the questions he likes or believes capable of being answered; he may, and probably will include himself in the equation when he explains, interprets, even perhaps distorts. But he cannot invent his experiment: the subject of his investigation is outside his control When the problem of truth is under consideration, his essential difference from the natural scientist works in his favour. He cannot escape the first condition of his enterprise, which is that the matter he investigates has a dead reality independent of the enquiry. At some time, these things actually once happened, and it is now impossible to arrange them for the purposes of experiment.
This does not take into account that natural sciences have laws, while historians have narratives. Also, the argument is about human fallibility while my criticism is of history's inherent unreliability. There may have been a certain, objective way that battle of Waterloo transpired, but aside from the very broadest strokes that information is lost forever.

Architects now that their buildings will eventually collapse. Doctors know that their patients will eventually die. "Maturbation" seems to be the human condition.

Buildings and treatments have quantifiable, positive effects. If you're Edward Gibbon then perhaps you've revolutionized *how* history is written, but you've given little of value to our understanding of what actually happened.
 
Buildings and treatments have quantifiable, positive effects. If you're Edward Gibbon then perhaps you've revolutionized *how* history is written, but you've given little of value to our understanding of what happened.
Gibbons was wrong, but he was corrected by a subsequent generation who studied his work and brought out the flaws, shortcomings and contradictions, and were in turn corrected by the next generation who studied their work, and so and so on. A contemporary historian like Halsall didn't simply dive into the primary sources by himself, and come out with a fully-formed of idea of How It Happened, any more than future generations of historians will. Whatever the merits or failings of specific historians or specific texts, the discipline itself wouldn't be where it is now unless previous generations of historians had been there to get it wrong.

History is an ongoing process by which humanity interrogates itself and its past, it is necessarily a work in progress. So it might be worth considering: is the value of the history, for the culture at large, found in the destination, or the process of moving towards it?
 
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Gibbons was wrong, but he was corrected by a subsequent generation who studied his work and brought out the flaws, shortcomings and contradictions, and were in turn corrected by the next generation who studied their work, and so and so on. A contemporary historian like Halsall didn't simply dive into the primary sources by himself, and come out with a fully-formed of idea of How It Happened, any more than future generations of historians will. Whatever the merits or failings of specific historians or specific texts, the discipline itself wouldn't be where it is now unless previous generations of historians had been there to get it wrong.

So he popularized it and this drew attention from more rigorous scholars. I suppose there's value in that, but would you want Hippocrates to operate on you?

History is an ongoing process by which humanity interrogates itself and its past, it is necessarily a work in progress. So it might be worth considering: is the value of the history, for the culture at large, found in the destination, or the process of moving towards it?

If history isn't aiming at truth you might as well just replace it with mythology and call it a day.
 
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So he popularized it and this drew attention from more rigorous scholars. I suppose there's value in that, but would you want Hippocrates to operate on you?
That's really not what I said. Later generations of scholars needed Gibbons- or if it not Gibbons personally, then other scholars of his generation- to provide a platform for them to build off. Gibbons main argument was basically wrong, but he did produce original work, he brought in new evidenced and examine it in new ways, he advanced the field, and in doing so allowed his successors to advance it further. I won't say that any specific mistakes or misinterpretations where inevitable or necessary, but the process of trial and error, of debate and counter-debate, is how for any field advances- and I mean the sanctified halls of STEM as much as the humanities. Nobody would reasonably except us to get it right immediately, and this is the process by which we gradually get more-right.

You're really hung up on this concern that we're falling short of the whole and entire truth, but the "the truth" here is really just a device we use to measure our success in describing a particular period or event or process, it's not a realistic standard which we are failing to achieve, because it's not something which we can actually access directly, only something we can approximate more or less exactly, and the process by which we measure this proximity is the same process by which we arrive at. How would we know Gibbons was wrong if other scholars didn't go through the same process of holding up the argument against the evidence and trying to see how well they matched? Look at this thread: the reason you're fretting that historians can't guarantee that their work will not be overturned is because two historians have told you that historians can never guarantee their work will not be overturned. It's not some great epistemological crisis that nobody else has noticed, it's just how how the production of knowledge, any knowledge, works.

I mean, I'd rather Hippocrates operated on me than no medical training whatsoever- wouldn't you?
 
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