Which is worse: doing the right things for the wrong reasons, or the inverse?

[Cheezy the Wiz]

The inverse being "doing the wrong things for the right reasons."

So, what do you think? If someone does something wrong, but does it with the best of intentions, is that worse than doing something very good, but for the wrong reasons (which usually means selfish and personal reasons not at all associated with the fact that they've done something good)? To what end does intent play a role in deciding how "right" or "wrong" something or someone is?

 

[Fifty]

The right thing for the wrong reasons is preferable... this is pretty much an analytic truth if you consider the meaning of the words "right" and "wrong".

 

[LightFang]

I would say the right thing for the wrong reasons, because the next time something rolls around, the wrong thing might be done for the wrong reasons, whereas a person doing the wrong thing for the right reasons I think would be more likely to do the right thing for the right reasons.

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

The right thing for the wrong reasons is preferable... this is pretty much an analytic truth if you consider the meaning of the words "right" and "wrong".

I have a very strong feeling that such a debate will imminently ensue in this thread. It may be to our advantage for you to elucidate this, you're a word of authority on logic in this forum.

 

[potatokiosk]

Right thing for the wrong reasons is better. If someone can benefit society while fulfilling their selfish desires that's great.

Also I just realized I voted wrong.

 

[Japanrocks12]

I'd say that the wrong thing being done is always worse than the right thing being done, regardless of the motive.

 

[Japanrocks12]

I would say the right thing for the wrong reasons, because the next time something rolls around, the wrong thing might be done for the wrong reasons, whereas a person doing the wrong thing for the right reasons I think would be more likely to do the right thing for the right reasons.

But this assumes that there is a "next time," and is beyond the scope of this question.

 

[Dachs]

I would say the right thing for the wrong reasons, because the next time something rolls around, the wrong thing might be done for the wrong reasons, whereas a person doing the wrong thing for the right reasons I think would be more likely to do the right thing for the right reasons.

I don't understand it but I agree with it.

 

[Fugitive Sisyphus]

I respect more the man who does the wrong thing for the right reasons than the man who does the right thing for the wrong reasons. Yet it is 'better' if you look at a decision in isolation for one to do the right thing for the wrong reason.

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

I would say the right thing for the wrong reasons, because the next time something rolls around, the wrong thing might be done for the wrong reasons, whereas a person doing the wrong thing for the right reasons I think would be more likely to do the right thing for the right reasons.

So then wouldn't it be more desirable for people to do the wrong thing for the right reasons, their motives still remaining pure, which is the most important concern for you, especially given your consideration for precedent?

 

[GoodGame]

If 90% of CFC-OT votes for doing the right thing for the wrong reason, then I believe we all deserve a pizza party.

 

[Souron]

The inverse being "doing the wrong things for the right reasons."

So, what do you think? If someone does something wrong, but does it with the best of intentions, is that worse than doing something very good, but for the wrong reasons (which usually means selfish and personal reasons not at all associated with the fact that they've done something good)? To what end does intent play a role in deciding how "right" or "wrong" something or someone is?

For oneself, it is better to do what you later decide to be the wrong choice, with good intent, then to do right thing, but later repent on your motives.

For society, better that people do the right thing, whatever their reasons.

 

[Fifty]

I have a very strong feeling that such a debate will imminently ensue in this thread. It may be to our advantage for you to elucidate this, you're a word of authority on logic in this forum.

Either you think that reasons figure into the rightness of an action, or you don't.

If you think that reasons figure into the rightness of an action, either you think that they exhaustively determine the rightness of that action, or you think that they are at least a factor in determining the rightness of that action.

If you think that they exhaustively determine the rightness of an action, the phrases "right thing for the wrong reason", and "wrong thing for the right reasons" are nonsensical (i.e. they describe logical impossibilities).

If you think that they are at least a factor in determining the rightness of an action, then "right thing for the wrong reason" must be such a case where whatever figures into the rightness of the action that isn't reasons overrides the wrong reasons to make the action, all things considered, right. Similarly, "wrong thing for the right reasons" must be a case where whatever good reasons you act upon are overridden by the non-reasons wrong-making features of the action. Since a wrong action is by definition worse than a right action, then, "right thing for the wrong reasons" is better.

If you think reasons don't figure into the rightness of the action, then whether or not the action had certain reasons associated with it is irrelevant to whether it is the best action. In this case, then, we defer to the fact that a right action is by definition better than a wrong action, and again, we find that "right thing for the wrong reason" wins.

These options (the ones I lay out above) are logically exhaustive. Thus, anyone who doesn't think that the two options (the original two that you ask us about) describe literal impossibilities is forced to the position that "right thing for the wrong reasons" is better. And no matter what your view, you cannot say that "wrong thing for the right reasons" is better. At best, you can just call the question incoherent.

 

[Earthling]

Oh crud, I misvoted, haven't done that for a while... I agree with Japanrocks as a whole - if it's any serious scenario then "the right reasons" ought to include "being careful and cautious in making your decision." Tragic irony isn't all too common in real life - it's not common at all to do the wrong thing for the right reasons if you're not being just flat out reckless.

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

Either you think that reasons figure into the rightness of an action, or you don't.

If you think that reasons figure into the rightness of an action, either you think that they exhaustively determine the rightness of that action, or you think that they are at least a factor in determining the rightness of that action.

If you think that they exhaustively determine the rightness of an action, the phrases "right thing for the wrong reason", and "wrong thing for the right reasons" are nonsensical (i.e. they describe logical impossibilities).

If you think that they are at least a factor in determining the rightness of an action, then "right thing for the wrong reason" must be such a case where whatever figures into the rightness of the action that isn't reasons overrides the wrong reasons to make the action, all things considered, right. Similarly, "wrong thing for the right reasons" must be a case where whatever good reasons you act upon are overridden by the non-reasons wrong-making features of the action. Since a wrong action is by definition worse than a right action, then, "right thing for the wrong reasons" is better.

If you think reasons don't figure into the rightness of the action, then whether or not the action had certain reasons associated with it is irrelevant to whether it is the best action. In this case, then, we defer to the fact that a right action is by definition better than a wrong action, and again, we find that "right thing for the wrong reason" wins.

These options (the ones I lay out above) are logically exhaustive. Thus, anyone who doesn't think that the two options (the original two that you ask us about) describe literal impossibilities is forced to the position that "right thing for the wrong reasons" is better. And no matter what your view, you cannot say that "wrong thing for the right reasons" is better. At best, you can just call the question incoherent.

What if the person performing the action perceives their action to be good, but it is, in fact, bad? An example of this could be helping someone who is injured and perceived to be in immediate danger; while moving them might save their life, it might also injure them severely. This motive to do good becomes "wrong" when the person becomes injured because of your actions, and the perceived danger was in fact non-existent. Thus, you acted with the best of intentions, but in fact performed a "wrong" action.

Why does intent not figure into this equation?

 

[GoodGame]

Why does intent not figure into this equation?

I think the intent of an action is lumped into the reason for making the action. So doing the wrong thing for the right reason would vaguely cover someone trying to give medical attention to a wounded person but has the effect of worsening the patient's condition. As it might cover someone helping an old lady across the street, even if the intent is to win her trust to rob her.
EDIT: Meant the second example to cover doing the right thing for the wrong reason, btw just caught that on a reread.

Right and Wrong aren't defined in the OP, so we have to project our own synonyms into answering the question. E.g. Right could be interpreted to mean correct, proper, beneficial, but also moral. Wrong could be interpreted to mean incorrect, improper, malicious, and also immoral.

 

[Fifty]

What if the person performing the action perceives their action to be good, but it is, in fact, bad? An example of this could be helping someone who is injured and perceived to be in immediate danger; while moving them might save their life, it might also injure them severely. This motive to do good becomes "wrong" when the person becomes injured because of your actions, and the perceived danger was in fact non-existent. Thus, you acted with the best of intentions, but in fact performed a "wrong" action.

Why does intent not figure into this equation?

If someone acts rightly given their beliefs (i.e. if they act such that if their beliefs are true, they will be acting rightly) then they cannot be performing the wrong action. Here's why:

Consider some moral agent. Call him "X".

Either X's beliefs are true, or they are false.

If they are true, then X will be acting rightly given his beliefs (obviously... this falls out of my definition of what it is to act rightly given one's beliefs).

If they are false, than either X is blameworthy for the falsity of his beliefs (e.g. if he's a doctor who blatently fails to remember standard procedure that he should know qua his role as doctor), or he isn't.

If he is not blameworthy for the falsity of his beliefs, then the act cannot be a wrong act, because of the basic meta-ethical principle of ought implies can, that states that if it ought to be the case that you should do some act p, then you must be able to do p, where ability doesn't just mean physical ability but ability given your belief corpus (in laymans terms this principle is just meant to account for the fact that I'm not blameworthy for stuff I know absolutely nothing about (provided its not the case that I should know about them)).

If he is blameworthy for the falsity of his beliefs, then the act must be wrong, and cannot be "for the right reasons", since reasons are usually taken to include not just moral motives (e.g. the desire to do good) but also the belief corpus that is salient in causing X to commit the action.

So no matter what, there are no conditions under which one can commit the wrong act for the right reasons, even in cases of mistaken beliefs.

 

[potatokiosk]

Why does intent not figure into this equation?

Is your poll asking which action is worse, or are you asking what kind of person it is better to be?

 

[general_kill]

All things equal, of course doing the right thing trumps doing the wrong thing. We need to take the hypothetical for what it is and not deviate into the land of what ifs.

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

If someone acts rightly given their beliefs (i.e. if they act such that if their beliefs are true, they will be acting rightly) then they cannot be performing the wrong action. Here's why:

Consider some moral agent. Call him "X".

Either X's beliefs are true, or they are false.

If they are true, then X will be acting rightly given his beliefs (obviously... this falls out of my definition of what it is to act rightly given one's beliefs).

If they are false, than either X is blameworthy for the falsity of his beliefs (e.g. if he's a doctor who blatently fails to remember standard procedure that he should know qua his role as doctor), or he isn't.

If he is not blameworthy for the falsity of his beliefs, then the act cannot be a wrong act, because of the basic meta-ethical principle of ought implies can, that states that if it ought to be the case that you should do some act p, then you must be able to do p, where ability doesn't just mean physical ability but ability given your belief corpus (in laymans terms this principle is just meant to account for the fact that I'm not blameworthy for stuff I know absolutely nothing about (provided its not the case that I should know about them)).

If he is blameworthy for the falsity of his beliefs, then the act must be wrong, and cannot be "for the right reasons", since reasons are usually taken to include not just moral motives (e.g. the desire to do good) but also the belief corpus that is salient in causing X to commit the action.

So no matter what, there are no conditions under which one can commit the wrong act for the right reasons, even in cases of mistaken beliefs.

Should I assume then that you do not regard there to be a higher level of right and wrong than the personal morals of the person performing the act, then? And if you do, then what are they and how are they defined?