Why did it take the North so Long to Win?

BCLG100

Music Master
Joined
Apr 11, 2002
Messages
16,650
Location
Lahndan
Well im doing an essay about it right now, this isn't me getting you guys to write it for me, i already have my own ideas and have committed the majority of them to paper already.

But my question is, why did it take the North in the American Civil war so long to beat the South?

I've got my own opinions on this so far but just wondering if you guys thought anything about it. :)
 
Well, it's mostly due to the north having mostly poor generals and the south having great generals.
Wow. Other than Lee, name me some great generals on the Southern side.
 
Wow. Other than Lee, name me some great generals on the Southern side.

Stonewall but thats not the point, i dont think it comes down to the South having better generals. Was it McClellans fault that Lincoln had about as much faith in him as i do in a chocolate tea pot. He was obviously a very sound administrator shown by the potomac and the soldiers love of him, is it his fault he recieved wrong information from pinkerton? obviously he wasnt a good general but that is Lincoln & co's fault for not using his abilities correctly. Look at the number of political generals throughout the war, put there by Lincoln in an attempt to keep things working in the union- is it their fault that they were used as a bargaining chip?

Other than Lee and chums the South wasn't overabundant with decent generals in the same way the North wasn't, Grant wasn't that brilliant he just realised he had more men than the South.

Personally i dont think the North could have got it done much quicker, it took about a year for the North to take the whole thing serious enough to not watch the battles as they occured. Then it took another year for Washington to realise it had to step back and allow people to do their jobs, after that it was downhill for the South and it took 2 years to clean up as the area 'conquering' was so large.
 
The lack of major standing armies meant that the force needed to fight the war had to be created after the war had begun. There are limits on how fast that is possible.
 
Stonewall but thats not the point, i dont think it comes down to the South having better generals.
This being the same erratic Stonewall Jackson who could win a brilliant campaign in the Shenandoah and then subsequently not only perform poorly in the Seven Days' Battles (if he showed up at all he did it late) but also take a huge chance on dividing the army (by God! what an idiotic idea) at Chancellorsville and even order thousands of pikes for his men in the style of the Macedonian sarissa because he thought that bayonets and Stuff That Pokes Holes And Is Sharp were the mainstays of warfare. Frankly, he was too erratic to be a good commander.
BCLG100 said:
Was it McClellans fault that Lincoln had about as much faith in him as i do in a chocolate tea pot. He was obviously a very sound administrator shown by the potomac and the soldiers love of him, is it his fault he recieved wrong information from pinkerton? obviously he wasnt a good general but that is Lincoln & co's fault for not using his abilities correctly.
That is truly amazing. I have never heard anyone attempt to defend McClellan by saying that even though he wasn't a good general, Lincoln should have trusted him. McClellan's very promising stroke on the Peninsula was poorly executed and he failed to destroy the rebel army at Antietam despite having full knowledge of their plans. He also signally did not pursue a defeated enemy, something that most generals who win battles like to do. True, his army was partially mauled, but that was in large part because he kept a large number of troops out of the fighting and fed others in piecemeal, in a fashion in which they were sure to get slaughtered. A general who loses and/or fails to win when handed victory on a silver platter doesn't deserve my trust, and Lincoln clearly felt the same way. As to why the troops liked him: fighting in two campaigns in a year, with a grand total of perhaps three months of anything resembling hard fighting, would make me like my general too. He kept them out of the fight, so he got kudos from them. Making your troops like you doesn't mean that you will win the war, though, and clearly that wasn't enough to keep him in power. I'd also like to know how Lincoln could have "used his abilities properly" when the man didn't have the temperament to be a subordinate and didn't have the competence to be a commander.
BCLG100 said:
Other than Lee and chums the South wasn't overabundant with decent generals in the same way the North wasn't, Grant wasn't that brilliant he just realised he had more men than the South.
As to Grant's generalship, I would contend that he was a very well-rounded and skilled general; maybe not a genius, but certainly no fool and not even merely competent. His esoteric and brilliant solution to the Big Black River campaign smacked of Philip II and Turenne in its operational skill and his recovery of Tennessee from Donelson to Shiloh and Chattanooga show an excellent combination of an understanding of industrial warfare and excellent maneuver and dislocation. When he was back east, it is true that he did not often attempt the kind of maneuvering that he had done in the west, partly because the US Army in the east wasn't made for maneuver and genial operational art like the western one. The ratio of force to space and the preponderance of rivers practically forced him to do as he did, and the fact that he seemed to combine the objectives of Lee's army and Richmond - after each battle, like the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House and North Anna and Cold Harbor, he always attempted to outflank Lee to the east, and in this manner slowly got closer to Richmond, exerting multiple kinds of pressure on the Confederacy. He was far better than competent, and what he did throughout the war took a good deal more intelligence and artful generalship than realizing that he had more men. When he didn't have vastly more men, he won too, after all.
 
He was obviously a very sound administrator shown by the potomac and the soldiers love of him, is it his fault he recieved wrong information from pinkerton?

He got bad info from Pinkerton because he wanted bad info from Pinkerton, and he greatly inflated even Pinkerton's numbers when he was reporting to Lincoln.

--------

I think you're operating under a false premise here, that is, that the Union was inevitably going to win and should have won easily. It's worth noting that many intelligent, well informed people of the era thought exactly the opposite. Consider this quote from the Times's military analyst:

"No war of independence ever terminated unsuccessfully except where the disparity of force was far greater than it is in this case ... Just as England during the revolution had to give up conquering the colonies so the North will have to give up conquering the South."

Now history showed that he obviously wasn't right, and I'm sure we both can think of some ways in which the analogy between the Revolution and the Civil War doesn't hold, but the point is that the inevitability of Union victory is the product of biased hindsight and is something we should be careful accepting blindly.
 
Well, it's mostly due to the north having mostly poor generals and the south having great generals.

This was really only a problem for the first year or so... maybe 18 months. Experience is a great teacher.

McClellan was terrible, no way to spin that, as a field commander.

TBH, the war was about 3 years and 2 months. Given the scope of the fighting, the number of participants, etc... I don't think it was long at all.

@shortguy, yeah, at the time the conclusion was by no means foregone. People were wrong about just about everything regarding how the war would turn out.
 
This being the same erratic Stonewall Jackson who could win a brilliant campaign in the Shenandoah and then subsequently not only perform poorly in the Seven Days' Battles (if he showed up at all he did it late) but also take a huge chance on dividing the army (by God! what an idiotic idea) at Chancellorsville and even order thousands of pikes for his men in the style of the Macedonian sarissa because he thought that bayonets and Stuff That Pokes Holes And Is Sharp were the mainstays of warfare. Frankly, he was too erratic to be a good commander.

Did i say he was consistently brilliant? The morale boost he gave the troops around him was invaluable also

daschpmg said:
That is truly amazing. I have never heard anyone attempt to defend McClellan by saying that even though he wasn't a good general, Lincoln should have trusted him. McClellan's very promising stroke on the Peninsula was poorly executed and he failed to destroy the rebel army at Antietam despite having full knowledge of their plans. He also signally did not pursue a defeated enemy, something that most generals who win battles like to do. True, his army was partially mauled, but that was in large part because he kept a large number of troops out of the fighting and fed others in piecemeal, in a fashion in which they were sure to get slaughtered. A general who loses and/or fails to win when handed victory on a silver platter doesn't deserve my trust, and Lincoln clearly felt the same way. As to why the troops liked him: fighting in two campaigns in a year, with a grand total of perhaps three months of anything resembling hard fighting, would make me like my general too. He kept them out of the fight, so he got kudos from them. Making your troops like you doesn't mean that you will win the war, though, and clearly that wasn't enough to keep him in power. I'd also like to know how Lincoln could have "used his abilities properly" when the man didn't have the temperament to be a subordinate and didn't have the competence to be a commander.
Well thats a mystery to me as to why you havent seen it, What im saying is if Lincoln had appointed him Twice then he should have shown some faith in him rather than the constant barrage of being told what to do, look at every single Civil war Northern 'Hero' they were allowed time and practice in the west without the hassle of politicians. He could have quite easily used his abilities properly, say in the mobilisation area/ in Washington as an advisor etc Just because he didnt have the temperement to be a subordinate didn't mean he couldn't do his job properly.
I suppose that could be one of the reasons why the troops like him afterall he didnt win the election in 64 but i do think it is more than that.

As to Grant's generalship, I would contend that he was a very well-rounded and skilled general; maybe not a genius, but certainly no fool and not even merely competent. His esoteric and brilliant solution to the Big Black River campaign smacked of Philip II and Turenne in its operational skill and his recovery of Tennessee from Donelson to Shiloh and Chattanooga show an excellent combination of an understanding of industrial warfare and excellent maneuver and dislocation. When he was back east, it is true that he did not often attempt the kind of maneuvering that he had done in the west, partly because the US Army in the east wasn't made for maneuver and genial operational art like the western one. The ratio of force to space and the preponderance of rivers practically forced him to do as he did, and the fact that he seemed to combine the objectives of Lee's army and Richmond - after each battle, like the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House and North Anna and Cold Harbor, he always attempted to outflank Lee to the east, and in this manner slowly got closer to Richmond, exerting multiple kinds of pressure on the Confederacy. He was far better than competent, and what he did throughout the war took a good deal more intelligence and artful generalship than realizing that he had more men. When he didn't have vastly more men, he won too, after all.

Shiloh where 20,000 casulties were?
Or Chatanooga where he was fighting Bragg who was pretty much incompetent. I realise he is more than competant, what i said he wasn't brilliant as people make out.
He got bad info from Pinkerton because he wanted bad info from Pinkerton, and he greatly inflated even Pinkerton's numbers when he was reporting to Lincoln.

--------

I think you're operating under a false premise here, that is, that the Union was inevitably going to win and should have won easily. It's worth noting that many intelligent, well informed people of the era thought exactly the opposite. Consider this quote from the Times's military analyst:

"No war of independence ever terminated unsuccessfully except where the disparity of force was far greater than it is in this case ... Just as England during the revolution had to give up conquering the colonies so the North will have to give up conquering the South."

Now history showed that he obviously wasn't right, and I'm sure we both can think of some ways in which the analogy between the Revolution and the Civil War doesn't hold, but the point is that the inevitability of Union victory is the product of biased hindsight and is something we should be careful accepting blindly.

Oh indeed 'No people ever warred for independence with more relative advantages' Beauregard, irrc southerners often used the Revolution itself as a morale boost 'look what we did there, we can do it again!'
 
This was really only a problem for the first year or so... maybe 18 months. Experience is a great teacher.

McClellan was terrible, no way to spin that, as a field commander.

TBH, the war was about 3 years and 2 months. Given the scope of the fighting, the number of participants, etc... I don't think it was long at all.

@shortguy, yeah, at the time the conclusion was by no means foregone. People were wrong about just about everything regarding how the war would turn out.

If you were in Kentucky it could be argued you'd been at war for 11 years....
 
Jackson operated well under Lee most of the time but was all but impossible to get along with if you served under him. He'd have been a disaster if he'd ever received an army command, probably half the generals under him would either have resigned or been put under close arrest. He was capable enough to enjoy Lee's trust in independent operations but as has been said tended towards erratic behaviour. Suggesting that your army swim a freezing river naked to attack an enemy at night is not the suggestion of a normal sane general. That said his talents and ability to gain sucess on the field of battle outweigh his erratic nature in my opinion.

I would rate Longstreet, Jackson or Stuart good commanders, and formed with Lee an extremely effective team. Yes they all had their faults but they also had their own strengths which Lee exploited to achieve the sucesses he did. For the rest of the war Lee would struggle to replace Jackson, and later struggle to replace Longstreet when he was injured. His other corps commanders with the possible exception of Early (who I'm no big fan of) didn't even come close to filling the boots of those they replaced. The less said about the performances of AP Hill and Ewell in corps command the better if you ask me.

MacClellan received the wrong information from Pinkerton because Pinkerton for the most part gave him exactly what he wanted to hear. Mclellan was simply too cautious to be a field commander and too egotistical to accept an administrative role. He wanted to think the South was superior in numbers to him (plus some of his over-estimates predate the employment of Pinkerton), and looked for excuses to delay engaging them in battle. Besides which Lincoln showed immense patience with Mclellan, he removed him from command but he only did so after handing him every possible opportunity to prove he could finish the war, and he dissapointed every single time. I would suggest that retaining him in command would have been highly detrimental to the war effort. Whilst you have to respect MacCellans' talents for administration I'd rather have Hooker in charge of a campaign than Mclellan, at least Hooker knew how to make a decent plan to crush the enemy, even if he did have difficulty carrying it out.

However if we're on the subject of Lincoln not trusting McLellan you might like to remember that McLellan didn't like or trust Lincoln either. He would often refer to him in derogatory ways, didn't trust Lincoln or Scott not to divulge information to the press, and made no secret of his opposition to the abolitionists. You say that the Western commanders were free of politics, but McLellan dabbled in politics of his own accord rather than having it pushed on him. Besides Lincoln had good reason not to trust McLellan, he was slow, cautious and rarely gave Lincoln any serious details of his plans. Even when he did provide information he rarely seemed to follow them with any vigour. Its hardly a suprise that Lincoln was exasperated with him and resorted to prompting/ordering him into attacking the enemy. To Lincoln's eyes the thought was hardly likely to occur spontaneously after all.

McClellan said after the battle of Antietam that "I feel I have done all that can be asked in twice saving the country". This sums him up for me, he reacted to percieved disaster and did the bare minimum to avoid it. He did not pro-actively prevent any chance of disaster by doing his job.

As to to the OP I would suggest that the objectives of the North played a major part. It would not be enough to win one or two victories (unless they came really early and in an important theatre), or capture one or two states. The North had to utterly destroy the South's ability to wage war via occupying its land, preventing it from supplying its armies and defeating its armies in battle. This is not an easy or swift task, and one not easily resolved simply by having superior numbers and industry. It takes a lot of time to train volunteer soldiers and officers, and just as long to divert your industry to producing the weapons, ammunition, food and supplies to make use of that army. A naval blockade can be effective, but if you have a small pre-war navy it takes time to expand it both in terms of ships and trained crews. Lincoln often had to tread carefully to avoid the delicate balance between radical Republicans and Democrats in his own country, not to mention having to avoid provoking the Europeans into intervening. The Civil War was much harder for the North than most people give it credit for, and victory was by no means assured. Even in 1864 and 65 there were still many people in the south willing to believe the war was not lost.
 
I think Lincoln's 'Anaconda plan' was designed for a long term war was unneccessary given the North overwhelming superiority in men and industry.

Landings in New Orleans and wasting time with Vicksburg not needed. I think they should have just concentrated on the Eastern states; Nth and Sth Carolina, Georgia and Virginia. Without those 4 the south would have had nothing.

McClelland was not the man for the job though. Lincoln was far to patient with him.

The performance of the Southern soldiers and civilians were also a reason the war dragged on.
 
Consider this quote from the Times's military analyst:

"No war of independence ever terminated unsuccessfully except where the disparity of force was far greater than it is in this case ... Just as England during the revolution had to give up conquering the colonies so the North will have to give up conquering the South."

Now history showed that he obviously wasn't right, and I'm sure we both can think of some ways in which the analogy between the Revolution and the Civil War doesn't hold, but the point is that the inevitability of Union victory is the product of biased hindsight and is something we should be careful accepting blindly.

Yeah the south probably would had a better shot if they had only a 2:1 numerical disadvantage, a continent to hide in, and Europe's foremost military power (plus the powerful dutch and Spanish fleets) on their side, as opposed to their actual 5:1 disadvantage, a blockaded and divided heartland, and no friends at all :lol:.
 
I think Lincoln's 'Anaconda plan' was designed for a long term war was unneccessary given the North overwhelming superiority in men and industry.

Landings in New Orleans and wasting time with Vicksburg not needed. I think they should have just concentrated on the Eastern states; Nth and Sth Carolina, Georgia and Virginia. Without those 4 the south would have had nothing.

McClelland was not the man for the job though. Lincoln was far to patient with him.

The performance of the Southern soldiers and civilians were also a reason the war dragged on.

The Annaconda plan originated with Scott, not Lincoln. Lincoln was the one who ammended the plan to try a direct push in the east, something Scott was against. We all know how those attempts worked out.
 
Well im doing an essay about it right now, this isn't me getting you guys to write it for me, i already have my own ideas and have committed the majority of them to paper already.

But my question is, why did it take the North in the American Civil war so long to beat the South?

I've got my own opinions on this so far but just wondering if you guys thought anything about it. :)

The main cause: Robert E. Lee
 
Robert E. Lee can be considered one of the greater generals in history.

Also in general the south had a relatively large number of already trained and experienced military commanders.

McClellan, while a great administrator, was an absolutely atrocious battlefield commander, very similar to most of the other Army of the Potomac commanders.
 
Back
Top Bottom