Um... don't you mean Missouri and/or Kansas?
Why did it take the North so Long to Win?
- Thread starter BCLG100
- Start date
Um... don't you mean Missouri and/or Kansas?
No, you said he was a great general, and I disagreed on the grounds I already stated.
One doesn't normally defend someone by insulting him.BCLG100 said:
Hancock...Sedgwick...Buford...Reynolds...BCLG100 said:
....BCLG100 said:
Try a little bit more than half that. And going from a massive disadvantage due to a surprise attack to eliminating the best Confederate commander in the west and smashing the enemy army the next day seems to be an acceptable reason to suffer proportionately fewer casualties than the rebels did.BCLG100 said:
Using that criterion tends to take away from Lee's victories, doesn't it?BCLG100 said:
To be honest, I don't notice most people thinking that Grant was any good as a general. Most people tend to think he wasn't all that great because of the reasons you put forth: "all he did" was throw men at the problem. That's not strictly true. Hell, the Big Black River campaign alone would get him a place in the annals of history as one of the better generals of all time, for sheer unexpectedness, brilliant result, and being really freaking cool. Also, it contributed greatly towards winning the war.BCLG100 said:
Lee's main advantage lay in his ability to use subordinates effectively and to inspire great loyalty in his men. While those things are extremely important, to be honest I think it is the military result which matters most, and one's tactical and operational ability. There, Lee wasn't bad at all either (who the heck loses almost every battle in the Seven Days' campaign but saves the capital and wins the campaign?
) but he wasn't as brilliant as others int he war. He was a very solid commander, and he is pretty high up there, as high or maybe a little better than Grant, but he was not really on a par with some of the top few tiers.Yes, much tends to be made of the South's control over such places as VMI and the commanders that they stole from the Union army at the outbreak of hostilities. Twigg did after all defect with a quarter of the prewar Federal army in Texas in 1861.Chronic said:
Archbob
Ancient CFC Guardian
Lee was a sound commander but not on par with History's greats like Alexander or Ghenghis. I think he's often overrated as a general. Ordering Picket's charage against Longstreet's advice was pretty stupid if you ask me, especially since he knew what happened at Fredricksburg earlier.
Stapel
FIAT 850 coupé
Most of my info is based on McPherson's "Battle Cry of Freedom" and on "With Malice Toward None" (can;t get the author's name by head).
My opinion is that three main factors prevented an quicker northern win:
-General underestimation of such an operation
-McClellan's unlimited possibilities to overestimate the power of the Army of Virginia
-The fact that in any war of independence, defending is easier than attacking.
My opinion is that three main factors prevented an quicker northern win:
-General underestimation of such an operation
-McClellan's unlimited possibilities to overestimate the power of the Army of Virginia
-The fact that in any war of independence, defending is easier than attacking.
Archbob
Ancient CFC Guardian
I agree with the first two and partly with the third one. Although unlike the war for independence, this "perceived line" wasn't a 3000 mile Ocean, if was a hypothetical line draw on the map known as the mason-dixon line.
But the North had more than a 2:1 manpower advantage and eventually wore the south out.
Cheezy the Wiz
Socialist In A Hurry
Well im doing an essay about it right now, this isn't me getting you guys to write it for me, i already have my own ideas and have committed the majority of them to paper already.
But my question is, why did it take the North in the American Civil war so long to beat the South?
I've got my own opinions on this so far but just wondering if you guys thought anything about it.
Two words: incompitent leadership.
Stapel
FIAT 850 coupé
Just to throw in some aspects on why I think my 3rd factor does count.
When a part of a nation tries to find independence, it is not just easier to defend a line. There is more to it.
-During the civil war period, according to many historians, the traditional attacking advantage was changed for trench-warfare. From xxxxBC until 1850 AD attacking was easier, from 1860AD defending was easier. Mostly due to long distance rifles and trenches.
-When trying to find indepedence, a status quo will do. The party that tries to restore the union, must actually conquer all of the rebellious land and destroy all of its forces. Think of the American independence: George Washington didn't really win a war, he simply avoided destruction.
It's true that the operational advantage shifted from the attacker to the defender due to the decrease in mobility for advancing forces (railroads help the defender more than the attacker). However, these shifts occur a lot more often than one would think. During the later seventeenth century, for example, until the time of Friedrich der Große, the operational advantage was clearly with the defender due to the improvements in fortification geometry spearheaded by Vauban and others.
Cheezy the Wiz
Socialist In A Hurry
I thought I would expand on this a bit.
In many cases it is indeed incompitent leadership, but by incompitent I mean incapable or unwilling to achieve the objectives, not always failure as a leader. Indeed, McClellan often gets one of the worst raps for being an incompitent field commander; his failure to take Richmond or Petersburg during the Peninsular Campaign, and later to capitalize on the retreat of Lee after Antiedam resulted in his dismissal as General-in-Chief of the Union. However, it should be noted that his cautionary tactics were not without warrant: McClellan had served as a foreign observer during the Crimean War, and seen the terrible carnage that could be wrecked upon an overzealous attacker, especially against a dug-in defender, as he encountered during the Seven Days' Battles. Granted, he was very, very, good at managing logistics, but his skills there were more given to strategy, not tactics, where quick decision-making and risk-taking is not only to be expected, it is practically incumbent. The great generals of that war were skilled in quick decision-making, and posessed a keen understanding of battlefield tactics. Unfortunately for the Union, most of those men fought against them, not with them. And so, we have a case not so much of generals who are wholly incompitent, but rather several mediocre generals who were unfortunate enough to go up against generals who knew how to take make their oppositions' faults work to their own advantage. And, of course, a little bit of luck is required, too. I'm thinking specifically of the morning fog at Chancellorsville, but also of Seymour's misfortune of miscommunication, resulting in the disaster at Olustee.
You cover McClellan well. I would definitely attribute his failure primarily to a lack of agressiveness. Rosecrans while agressive was a horrible tactician, and a horrible choice to lead the Army of the Potomac ( or whatever it was called at the time )
I believe Hooker ultimately had the best chance to destroy the Army of Northern Virigna had he been agressive. In his case it seems that he simply lost his confidence when it came down to actual fighting.
@Dachspmg - At Chacellorsville it was Lee who split the army not once, but twice. granted Jackson may have been the one to suggest the flank attack on the Union, but it was Lee who actually gave the blessing for Jackson to go ahead with that attack. Then day after Jackson attacke Lee again split his forces to attack Sedgewick when Hooker had taken up defensive positions as U.S. Ford. ( Jackson was out of the picture at this point having been shot by his own men)
One other note is that I don't recall fog playing any part at the battle of Chancellosville at all.
Hooker could have destroyed Lees army or at worst forced him to retreat to Richmond, his main mistakes was halting the army at Chancellorsville insteads of pushing on to get out of the woods where his superior numbers & artillery would have given the confederate forces no chance to defeat him. The second mistake was not pushing forward back towards Chancellorsville when Sedgewick was advancing to Lee's rear as he was ordered to do by Hooker.
The Attack on Hookers flank was primarily a result of Howard not digging in as he was ordered to do by Hooker. Two cannons pointing down the road and relying on the forest being inpenetrable was not a really smart move on Howards part. This was after he was warned that an attack on his position was possible.
I believe Hooker ultimately had the best chance to destroy the Army of Northern Virigna had he been agressive. In his case it seems that he simply lost his confidence when it came down to actual fighting.
@Dachspmg - At Chacellorsville it was Lee who split the army not once, but twice. granted Jackson may have been the one to suggest the flank attack on the Union, but it was Lee who actually gave the blessing for Jackson to go ahead with that attack. Then day after Jackson attacke Lee again split his forces to attack Sedgewick when Hooker had taken up defensive positions as U.S. Ford. ( Jackson was out of the picture at this point having been shot by his own men)
One other note is that I don't recall fog playing any part at the battle of Chancellosville at all.
Hooker could have destroyed Lees army or at worst forced him to retreat to Richmond, his main mistakes was halting the army at Chancellorsville insteads of pushing on to get out of the woods where his superior numbers & artillery would have given the confederate forces no chance to defeat him. The second mistake was not pushing forward back towards Chancellorsville when Sedgewick was advancing to Lee's rear as he was ordered to do by Hooker.
The Attack on Hookers flank was primarily a result of Howard not digging in as he was ordered to do by Hooker. Two cannons pointing down the road and relying on the forest being inpenetrable was not a really smart move on Howards part. This was after he was warned that an attack on his position was possible.
I'm not arguing with what you say but wasn't Hooker somehow involved in the Gettysbury shenanigans? I'm not sure in what way just remember reading it somewhere.
edit-showing he had some value as a general himself, also helped out in chatanooga with grant i believe.
edit-showing he had some value as a general himself, also helped out in chatanooga with grant i believe.
Hooker was not directly involved with the actual battle of Gettysburg, he tendered his resignation a few days before the battle actually took place as the result of some sort of dispute about the defenses at Harpers Ferry. Not real sure on the details about that.
He was involved at the battle of Chatanooga, but I believe he was under the command of Grant at that time. So he was not actually acting on his own initiative, but under orders to attack.
It is entirely possible that his performance at Chancellorsville was a one time poor showing.
In my view the war was prolonged by a marked lack of agressiveness on the part of Union commanders. ( or incompetence in the case of Rosecrans )
He was involved at the battle of Chatanooga, but I believe he was under the command of Grant at that time. So he was not actually acting on his own initiative, but under orders to attack.
It is entirely possible that his performance at Chancellorsville was a one time poor showing.
In my view the war was prolonged by a marked lack of agressiveness on the part of Union commanders. ( or incompetence in the case of Rosecrans )
Cheezy the Wiz
Socialist In A Hurry
You mean Army of the Cumberland? I don't think he ever served in the Eastern theater.
When Lee split his forces at the start of the battle, and Early took command of the Eastern portion, heavy fog helped to mask their movements until Lee was nearly in position (this was before Jackson began his lengthy flanking manouver).
I stand corrected. I was thinking of Burnside not Rosecrans. So replace all my comments above about Rosecrans with Burnside. Rosecrans was actually a decent general with only the one major screw up at Chickamagua.
I hadn't really considered the move away from Fredericksburg. Sedgewick was across the river prior to Lee splitting his army ( Damn, he actually split his army 3 seprate times during the battle not 2 ). The intent was ultimately a feint so that Hooker could get behind Lee. I'm not entirely convinced that the fog ultimately played any significant part. I will need to read up on that portion of the campaign again.
rilnator
Emperor
Awesome book. What Rise and fall of the third riech is to WW2, this book is to the civil war.
MilesGregarius
Half-baked Renegade
I'm not sure I entirely buy "the Hooker lost his nerve" argument. I think part of this line of thinking comes from the incessant political sniping among the various factions of the Army of the Potomac combined with Hooker's temporary incapacitation and his failure to ensure that any of his subordinates had a clear enough picture of the overall battle plan due to his concerns about the horrendously lax operational security of the army when he took command.
If I recall correctly, Hooker was expecting Stoneman's cavalry to cut, or at least threaten to cut, Lee's lines of communication. Had Stoneman carried out, or even attempted to carry out, Hooker's orders, Hooker planned to fall upon Lee's army as it withdrew to counter Stoneman's cavalry.
Part of the failure to coordinate with Sedgewick was due to failed communications (telegraph failures). Also, Sedgewick, like McClellan, tended to overesteimated the forces he faced, thereby slowing down his initial move across the Rappahannock.
This, more than any other factor cost the Union the chance to at least achieve a bloody stalemate that, with the CSA's limited manpower, would have been a tactical victory and, following the debacle that was Burnsides' assault on Fredericksburg, a moral one as well.
In some ways, this battle sums up why the North took so long to defeat the South. Not only was Lee a master at getting the most out of his subordinates, he had solid subordinates to begin with. Assuming all other factors remained the same, imagine the out come of this battle had Stonewall Jackson commanded the Union XI corps and J.E.B. Stuart commanded Stoneman's cavalry sweep while Lee was saddled with O.O. Howard leading Second Corps' flank march and George Stoneman in charge of Confederate scouting and flank security.
This is quite possible, however when Meade's division made first contact with the confederates he was oreder to pull back to Chancellorsville by Hooker. This in itself was incosistent with Hookers prior behavior and his behavior after this battle. I will need to find the quote, but Hooker eventually admitted that he had lost faith in himself. The incapacitation occurred during or after the mauling of his flank, and when he turned over command to Meade it was clear from his orders that advancing on the enemy was not an option ( will need to look up the wording on this one as well.)
I think you are correct as to Stonemans orders, and he certainly was not very effective in carrying them out. However Hooker was already in Lees rear and was not relying on Stoneman to draw him off.
I wasn't aware of any communication problems. Cetainly not a good thing to have happen when Sedgewick didn't know Hookers full plan.
If you swapped the subordinates I believe the destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia would have been accomplished during this battle.
FriendlyFire
Codex WMDicanious
Thats because a high number of military graduates and mexican war veterans joined the confederate army in Marylands while the union which had about the same number of trainned officers and war veterans had spread there leadership rather thin distributing them all over there new armies.
That is one very important reason why Lees army was so effective.
Late in the war Union manpower and more officer graduates gave the union army a far greater pool of leadership and effectiveness of there army improved greatly.
FriendlyFire
Codex WMDicanious
Why did it take so long ?
1. Cause all the Confedrates had to do was stand on the defensive to win. (As in any insurgency the government must take action other wise the insurgents win by default.) The Union had to attack to win
2. Land mass involved, long lines of logistics of the Union which meant fighting against gureilla warfare, nominal control of cities and ground. Was overcome by the union employing scorched earth and attacking south economic smaller capabilities (shermans legions march to the sea)
3. Democracies and war weariness problems, Lincon had huge domestic problems and was quite a capable leader. Having to deal with democrates as well as desentors within hes own republican party. Poltical consideration greatly affected the war.
4. Scale of warfare was something unknown at the time, Lincons inital 75,000 volunteers for 3 years was a vast underestimation of the task at hand. Huge armies had to be raised and trainned to become effective in new forms of warfare.
5. Southern resilience and will power to continue the fighting.
Of course the south had advantages in vast terrain and being able to be on the defensive (earthworks were a huge advantage vs any attacking army as we were to see in ww1)
1. Cause all the Confedrates had to do was stand on the defensive to win. (As in any insurgency the government must take action other wise the insurgents win by default.) The Union had to attack to win
2. Land mass involved, long lines of logistics of the Union which meant fighting against gureilla warfare, nominal control of cities and ground. Was overcome by the union employing scorched earth and attacking south economic smaller capabilities (shermans legions march to the sea)
3. Democracies and war weariness problems, Lincon had huge domestic problems and was quite a capable leader. Having to deal with democrates as well as desentors within hes own republican party. Poltical consideration greatly affected the war.
4. Scale of warfare was something unknown at the time, Lincons inital 75,000 volunteers for 3 years was a vast underestimation of the task at hand. Huge armies had to be raised and trainned to become effective in new forms of warfare.
5. Southern resilience and will power to continue the fighting.
Of course the south had advantages in vast terrain and being able to be on the defensive (earthworks were a huge advantage vs any attacking army as we were to see in ww1)
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