Britain is not vastly more powerful than france as the economci recover and her huge population gives the french empire a great deal of power.
When you are launching a cross-ocean war, seapower is the only power that matters. In that regard, Britain is vastly more powerful, and the continent is France's cage.
Why would people go North when they can still go West? Frozen coniferous forest and tundra isn't very attractive; there's a reason the United States got most of the immigrants and its population is over ten times as large as Canada's. It makes it more powerful by being an additional at all; greater sum of parts. But just because it's there doesn't mean people will want to live there.
That would depend entirely upon the President and Congress at the time, and I doubt either, unless being particularly incompetent, would sit idly by on the question of letting a third of the country willing leave. If it's sufficiently early that the Federalists still maintain any credibility at all, they
certainly won't.
Compliant isn't the same thing as "owned". The only thing it does is give them an alternative source; which they have anyway regardless of who wins or loses the war. Don't see how points 1 or 2 cause greater interest on the part of the French anyway; they cannot expand their dominion over the East Coast or Interior (America will just fight to the death most likely) and at most get Canada, which again is not worth all that much on its own, and worth nothing at all in terms of cash crops. They'd have as much luck trying to turn America against the British by supporting them against the South, particularly as they can't realistically expand claims in Quebec.
Without Texas, or the issue of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, or Dred Scott, or Lincoln's polarizing election, or all the other various factors that are eliminated by starting the war earlier,
and the lack of gains from the Mexican-American War, the South's potential pool of membership is dramatically smaller and weaker, as many "frontline" states are likely not to go along with secession, possibly out of fear, possibly out of lack of perceived need.
Quebec is a bad place to launch an attack from. See the battles on Lake Champlain during the Revolutionary War and War of 1812. The georgraphy of the region is not condusive to such actions and holds several bottlenecks, and getting to anything of value, like Boston, New York, Pittsburg, Philadelphia, or Chicago, would take rather some effort. For France to get much anything out of it, realistically, would require American loses to be so catastrophic as to practically lose the war. They know the terrain better and have fought the same battles before, particularly if Winfield Scott is still around and in fighting shape (which he would be if the war was fought earlier).
The idea of the Americans losing Washington--again (since there is no indication of the War of 1812 not having happened)--also seems sort of silly.
6)Eventually Britain, more out of opposition to France than anything else, allies with the Union and moves in to clear the east coast of french ships (before now american hostility had kept the royal navy out of this region - without canada why should they bother?) and enforces a blockade on the south.
Britain doesn't take the opportunity to immediately use France's distraction to snap up colonies elsewhere, leading to a common cause with the Americans to be realized later why? France doesn't exercise more caution at this very distinct possibility why?
7) War then ends as per usual with the Union eventually overpowering the south, perhaps with some British forces on the south coast.
As soon as British seapower enters the equation French seapower becomes irrelevent, because the two will immediately shift to focusing on one another and their colonies as they always do. Under such a circumstance this South has nothing to sustain it. The Union does not even particularly need overwhelming force because the one thing that countered that for the real South--tactical ingenuity--is no longer present. Commanders would be on a roughly equal plane, and the South would fold like a house of cards, particularly with Union
and British seapower. With reinforcements cut off I don't see how French Quebec (assuming here it stayed French and became independent later) could survive--or would be
allowed to survive in any ensuing engagements or concluding peace treaty. The Americans would likely demand its surrender, the British wouldn't care, not having possessions in North America, and France wouldn't have much option, having lost their ally and the position being totally cut off by Anglo-American naval dominance.
Again, I don't see this playing out badly for the Union unless you are assuming
gross incompetence and
terribly bad luck.
, would you be interested in playing by any chance?
