Alternate History Thread V

I agree.

The Peak of Seleukid Power

Antiochos V’s long reign was not a particularly expansionist one, but it was far from peaceful all the same.

In the east, the Wusun became serious protagonists in the 90s BC, raiding widely in the Ferghana Valley and Sogdiane. At more or less the same time, the Taxila-based Buddhists of Gandhara and Kaspeireia collapsed in the face of a renewed Sunga military onslaught; in the confusion, a military adventurer from Baktria, one Eupator, seized power, employing the sizable population of Greek colonists and refugees from the collapse of the Euthydemid state. Eupator I Soter’s Indohellenic kingdom crushed the Sunga armies in a decisive battle on the Akasines River in 87 BC and vouchsafed the state’s independence. Seleukid eastern resources were simply too taxed to deal with the new Indohellenic threat.

Further west, Seleukid power in Anatolia came under serious threat from Pharnakes III, ruler of the Pontic kingdom on the Black Sea coast. In the late 90s, Pharnakes had the opportunity to intervene in a succession crisis in Pantikapaion, which gave him more or less direct control over the kingdom of the Bosporan Kimmerioi far to the north. Afraid of the threat of a Pontos with the resources of the Crimea and the Galatians at its disposal, Antiochos V’s (third) son Demetrios, in the position of epistrategos of Anatolia, chose to preempt the Pontic king by invading Galatia in 88. The move disastrously backfired; the Seleukids failed to inflict a mortal wound on the Galatian tribes, which, led by the Tolistobogioi, turned to Pontos for alliance and aid, creating the very monster that Demetrios had feared. Pharnakes launched an invasion of Seleukid Kappadokia to try to cut the Royal Road and besieged Mazaka in 87; the Seleukid prince marched to the city’s relief, but lost his life and his army in the ensuing battle.

But Pharnakes failed to reduce Mazaka all the same, and retreated back northwards upon the approach of further Seleukid armies. With the Galatians’ aid, he succeeded in destroying the kingdom of Bithynia, but quickly lost control of his erstwhile allies, who plundered widely in both Seleukid Phrygia and his own territories to the north. This distraction proved vital. By the time Pharnakes had gotten the Galatians under control with a series of costly military victories, Antiochos V had died of old age. His successor, Alexandros I Kallinikos (r. 82-69 BC), was significantly more energetic. After returning from his viceregal post in the East, Alexandros spent a year subduing the Galatians and then moved on to attack Pontos itself. At Komana, the Seleukid king crushed Pharnakes’ forces; the Pontic ruler was killed in the rout. Pontos’ brief era of glory petered out; it retained nominal independence, but the new king, Mithridates IV, was virtually powerless, and quickly lost control over the Greek cities of Pontos Paralios in the aftermath of the Battle of Komana.

Pharnakes’ brief military successes may not have brought the Seleukid rule in Anatolia to an end – far from it – but they had spawned a massive rebellion in Greece. The satrap of Makedonia was murdered in 83 BC and supplanted by a man claiming to be descended from the line of Antigonos, whose subordinates overran most of the Seleukid possessions west of the Hellespont. He resurrected the Hellenic League of Antigonos Doson, successfully convincing or coercing Sparta and the Aitolians to join him. At the same time, this “Philippos VI” raised a massive slave revolt in the Aegean littoral, proclaiming that he was the New Dionysos and promising an ill-defined Stoic paradise on Earth. The Seleukids retained little more than Athens, Akrokorinthos, and the aid of the Achaians, who were chiefly opposed to the Aitolians, Spartans, and Philippos’ quasi-Kleomenean attempts at social revolution.

Yet this Makedonian rebellion could do little against a real field army. Philippos VI turned out to be a cardboard general; when Alexandros I and his battle-hardened veterans landed in Attike in 79, the slave-bolstered Makedonian armies disintegrated. The – mostly mercenary – Spartan armies came to a sad end in 77 when they collapsed in the face of Alexandros’ veteran thorakitai and Galatian mercenaries at Pellana; Aitolian regulars and Makedonian rebels tried to rally at Elateia in Lokris, but they, too, were crushed. The long history of the Aitolian League ended in 76 with the (second) destruction of Thermon; Makedonia’s brief taste of independence ended not long thereafter.

Alexandros I rationalized the administration of Greece, dividing the territory into satrapies and eparchies and reducing the status of many hitherto independent poleis. This administrative work took up some years, during which he spent most of his time west of the Aegean. As such, he was in the perfect position to serve as a ‘neutral’ arbiter in the widening conflicts in the western Mediterranean. Beginning with a revolt of Qarthadast’s Brettian allies in 89, most of southern Italy had been engulfed in war to some extent or other, with Capua desperately attempting to rally some kind of reasonable defense against the vastly more powerful Qarthadast. Before 79, Qarthadastim diplomacy had kept the Samnites out of the struggle, but after the Campanian alliance lost control of Thourioi (again), the Samnites intervened. They, too, were militarily worsted by a Punic army in Lucania near Potentia.

As Qarthadastim armies overran much of southern Italy, Capua requested Seleukid military aid. Alexandros quickly responded, landing in Calabria in 72. Unsurprisingly, Seleukid armies spent much of their time establishing control over the country instead of fighting the Qarthadastim for several months. Only in 70 did Alexandros advance into Lucania, from where he had his pick of targets. One Bomilkar assembled an army to drive him out, but the Seleukids stole a march on the Qarthadastim and attacked the Punic concentrations at Pyxos. In a hard-fought fight, the battle was eventually decided when the Seleukid cavalry managed to pull off a double envelopment, after which the Punic army collapsed. The extent to which the Punic position in Italy collapsed after the Battle of Pyxos was not the result of battlefield defeat alone; political infighting in Africa played a part as well, as did sheer war exhaustion. In 69, the Qarthadastim sued for peace and retreated to Sicily. A few days after accepting the peace, Alexandros died in a hunting accident.

After Alexandros I Kallinikos, few Seleukid emperors felt secure enough to go off campaigning on one frontier or another; they preferred to remain in the imperial heartland and keep control of the territories that mattered most, while retaining the ability to monitor their satraps and generals. Antiochos VI Euergetes, who had been serving as something of a regent in Seleukeia while his father was off on campaign in the west, was easily able to slip into a leadership role. Instead, it became somewhat de rigueur for imperial princes to win their military laurels on the frontier while they were still waiting on the succession, then to return to the homeland once they were next in line. In times of internal stability and good interpersonal relations this worked quite well. Antiochos VI was perhaps the master of this particular skill, and it was during his extremely long reign (69-25 BC) that the Seleukid Empire reached its classical territorial height.

Antiochos VI’s sons pursued aggressive territorial expansion, but their dirty secret was that much of the work of fighting had already been done by their predecessor Alexandros I. Pontos was fully absorbed into the empire along with Lesser (Pokr) Hayasdan in the sixties after Mithridates V foolishly took Alexandros’ death as a catalyst for rebellion; after the Yervanduni kings of Greater Hayasdan supported the rebellion, their own ramshackle armies were crushed, although much of the work was done by Scythian raiding from the north, not Seleukid armies. The puppet Haikaikan kings were then replaced by a Greek satrap in 37 BC after Samus II died childless. While Seleukos, the firstborn son of Antiochos and satrap of Baktria (before his untimely death in 41 BC) failed to extend the empire to the Indos, he campaigned against the Eupatrid Indohellenic kingdom and forced Straton II, the king, to render tribute.

It has long been a trope that the Seleukid state reached a cultural height under Antiochos VI, whatever that’s supposed to mean. Certainly, the literary and artistic output of the period was impressive, in large part due to extensive imperial patronage. But much of what was produced was countercultural, in the case of the flowering of Cynic philosophy, or simply individual – for the cult of the individual had been gaining steam throughout the Hellenistic era, and with the ultimate triumph of the monolithic Seleukid state, many men chose to – literally – carve themselves a place in history. Many of these men were merchants, enriched by the wave of Seleukid conquests and the trade that came with it; others were generals or magistrates plundering the territories of their remit. But while the volume of statues of individuals for public display may have been greater than at any time before in Greek history, the colossal size of imperial constructions dwarfed everything else. The palace complex at Seleukeia, the temple of Olympian Zeus at Athens, the vast stoa at Hekatompylos, and the center for the pan-imperial games at Apameia in Syria – what defined these Seleukid constructions, more than anything else, was their colossal size. Wags then and later said that being big made up for their lack of intrinsic architectural merit – but size, of course, has a merit all its own.

In terms of literary output, perhaps the most famous piece, other than the histories of Aristonikos and Dioskourides Athenaios, was the Herakleiad, composed by Apollonios Ekbatanikos, which tied the stories of Herakles in Asia together into a coherent story, replete with pointed references to the Seleukid conquests in Iran and Central Asia. As a literary construct, it has its merits, and certainly has inspired its share of imitators and borrowers over the ages (the scene in which Herakles storms the Khyber Pass being the most evocative), but perhaps his most enduring legacy, though, was to enrage generations of classics students who confused him with Apollonios Rhodios, author of the Argonautika. After having been left somewhat by the wayside for a century, heroic poetry experienced a resurgence in the literary circles of Athens, Antiocheia, Alexandreia, and Seleukeia – though Anatolian and Median grandees were still quite fond of the idylls and pastoral poems that had always been popular amongst rural aristocracy.

In the wider world, ‘high’ Seleukid art and architecture had an interesting impact. Already by 100 BC, but even more stridently after it, Qarthadastim merchants and many Italian notables began to experience the artistic life of the Greek East and came away wanting much more; conveniently, around the same time, the technology for reproducing marble via something rather akin to the lost-wax process that permitted the widespread copying of bronzes came into being, so that the well to do of the Seleukid periphery could have their own versions of sculptures by the Old Masters, or whatever was currently in vogue in the oikoumene, in both bronze and the more prestigious marble. While a Punic aristocrat couldn’t get his hands on Pentelic marble or Egyptian granite (unless he were very, very lucky or very, very rich), even a slightly cheaper substitute for either would be a quite impressive way to one-up the neighbors. It was around the same time that mosaic art started to show up in Africa and Italy, although it was not as advanced as the stuff further east (for instance, employing roughly-cut stones instead of tesserae).

State and Religious Practice in the Greek Oikoumene

If the late first century saw the Seleukid Empire reach new territorial heights, as had not been seen since the time of Alexander, culturally it has been described as having been in something of a decadent malaise. Like most claims of decadence, this has both true and false elements to it. Indeed, the Hellenistic period was one which saw the emergence of several new religions and their popularization across the oikoumene.

Antiochos V’s declaration in 104 BC that he was a God Manifest, epiphanes, helped to throw the religious and philosophical contradictions of the Hellenistic age into sharp relief. He was not the first dynast to have declared himself a living god. Alexander had tried, but had been ridiculed for his trouble, and even he hadn’t taken his godhood particularly seriously. (When in India, he had been wounded, and a nearby soldier had quoted Homer, “Ichor, such as flows from the blessed gods”. The king had tartly cut him short, growling, “That’s not ichor – that’s blood.”)

In Egypt, the Ptolemaioi had also declared themselves gods manifest, not merely to the indigenous Egyptians but to their Greek subjects as well. Ptolemaios II Philadelphos had been the first to institute a Greek ruler-cult, which pulled some ceremonial from the pharaonic tradition, but was chiefly meant for the consumption of the Greek, Syrian, and Galatian colonists along the Nile. Yet the colonists themselves seem not to have particularly believed that the Ptolemaic kings were, in fact, deities – but pragmatically worshiped them all the same. In that way, the Ptolemaic ruler-cult was less religious than areligious; its supplications were directed at beings who actually could intervene regularly in one’s daily life, not the distant Olympians who were notoriously mercurial, if they showed up at all.

Many of the same elements showed up in the ruler cult that Antiochos established. It’s never been particularly clear whether Antiochos himself was megalomaniacal to believe that he actually was divine, but that was almost a red herring. Instead, what mattered most was that he was a patron deserving of supplication, like the gods of Olympos, but who seemed much more likely to actually respond to pleas for aid. The Seleukids had already experimented with this during the reign of Antiochos III, who had made his wife Laodike a goddess in parts of Asia Minor. Antiochos simply extended the idea.

The institution of the formal ruler-cult and its widespread acceptance did not mean that it was universal or even unopposed, far from it. Philosophically, the Cynics, as they were wont to do, opposed the Seleukid divine ruler-cult out of their simple affinity for counter-culture; because of this, several philosophical concepts were increasingly mixed with Olympian worship, with unclear results. But the Olympians found much support in Greece itself – provincial gods for a provincial land, no longer the heart of Mediterranean commerce and trade or the heartland of empires. While cities like Athens retained much of their traditional and cultural importance, politically and economically they were being passed by. Even though the Seleukid kings spent many talents in Greece for patronage – Seleukos IV had completed the great temple of Olympian Zeus at Athens (which had been started by the Peisistratids in the sixth century) and – they were nothing compared to the vast funds spent on the development of the Syrian coast, or the construction of the massive palace complex at Seleukeia on the Tigris.

Antiochos never pushed for exclusive worship of his ruler-cult, nor did he employ it as a flimsy justification for raiding and confiscating his subjects’ property. There were no pogroms or anything like it under his reign. Indeed, the Jews, famously disinterested in the Greek pantheon (if very interested in Greek philosophy, language, art, and medicine), continued to be crucial to Seleukid rule in Anatolia and Central Asia, where they made up a large proportion of colonists.

The worship of other famous Hellenistic cults also continued unabated, the most popular of which was that of Tyche, Fortune (usually Agathe Tyche, “Good Fortune”); Dionysos was also popular, especially in Anatolia, where his resurrection and savior aspects were played up. Apollon-worship remained popular within the Seleukid state, unsurprisingly, as Seleukos I had claimed to be descended from the sun god, and continued to be one of the chief coin-types employed by the kings. The worship of Sarapis and Isis continued to spread out of Egypt, where it had been encouraged by the late Ptolemaioi. In Areia and Baktria, the cults of Artemis-Anahita and Zeus-Ahura Mazda were widespread. All over the Seleukid Empire, one could find heroons, shrines to individual heroes, somewhat associated with the worship of Herakles. In short, the diverse pattern of worship that had obtained before the institution of the Seleukid ruler-cult largely continued…for the time being.

Eurasia During the Seleukid Apogee

Insofar as the Gallic groupings around the Aeduoi and Auernoi can be referred to as polities, they expanded their reach and intermittently warred with each other during this period; the Auernoi in particular achieved military success under the verrix Cadeyrn. The coalescence of groupings of Belgae (especially the Tongroi and Manapioi) and, across the Rhine, the Somnonoz, were also relevant, although neither group really made much difference to goings-on further south. Of particular interest was the development of basic professional soldiers throughout much of Celtic Gaul, as the monetary economy expanded and soldiers’ pay became viable; the expanding Massiliot economy may have had something to do with this, as the Massiliots were close partners with the Auernoi kings. Frequently cited in support of this is the growth of the cult of Dionysos-Cernunnos, a syncretic Celtohellenic deity worshiped primarily in Massilia and the growing oppidum of Gergovia.

Although the Qarthadastim spent three decades in an ultimately counterproductive war in south Italy, their efforts in Iberia were much more profitable. After the bloody conquest of Turdetania in the 90s and 80s, Punic diplomats negotiated agreements with several groups in Carpetania and Turdulia and brought more and more into their alliance. The perception of the Qarthadastim as relatively disinterested allies with light hands aided expansion, as many Iberian groups were fearful of the growing power of the Celtiberian tribal alliance headed by Numantia (which included many groups that were not Celtiberi, but that moniker is most convenient). Despite limited attention due to political squabbles back home, the Qarthadastim gave a good accounting of themselves in a dust-up with the Celtiberians in the 30s BC; after the creation of a provincial administration with wide-ranging extrademocratic remit in 33 BC, it appeared as though the Qarthadastim were going to renew the contest in earnest.

The jury-rigged coalition of Insubres didn’t last much longer, and soon broke apart, with the Veneti going their own way in the 60s BC. Even though Rome was dead, the Rasna leagues that replaced it in northern Italy could still outmobilize the Gauls of the Po Valley. Etruscan warlords in Umbria took advantage of the collapse of the Insubres’ hegemony in the 60s to retake and resettle Aemilia. At the same time, the loose Etruscan federation began to slowly metamorphose into something rather similar to the Greek Achaian League, spearheaded by the statesman Silius Vetulonius and spurred by a defeat in a naval war with the Qarthadastim over Alalia (which Qarthadast reclaimed in 47) and Capua’s protagonism in Latium, where it dismembered what was left of the local Rasna league. Under Vetulonius’ successor at the head of the Rasna federation, Numerius Pontidius, the Etruscans successfully established suzerainty over the Ligurians and fought a victorious war with the Insubres to retain their conquest.

Things in Central Asia changed little after the initially furious onslaught of the Wusun. By skillful diplomacy, the satrap of Baktria, the Seleukid prince Demetrios, detached the Haomavarga Saka from the Wusun confederacy in 44; shortly thereafter, he elected to conquer the buffer state of Chach, north of the Iaxartes. Chach, which was fairly urbanized, put up stiff military resistance but was conquered in 39 and inventively refounded as Demetrias. The Wusun responded by raiding widely both north and south of the Iaxartes, but to little effect.

Eupator I’s successful hijack of the Gandharan-Kaspeireian Buddhist state was remarkable, but it had been ensured by the large-scale migration of Baktrian Greeks (and Hellenized Baktrians) into India from the west. These men, who had found gainful employment as heavy infantry mercenaries with unequaled staying power, had, along with the guild-warriors common in western India, provided the bulk of the Gandharan professional infantry. Eupator introduced even more migratory Greeks into the country and refounded several cities after the Greek fashion, but continued to play Janus, representing himself as a savior to the native Indian population with Kharosthi-script coinage. Whether astute political calculation or genuine belief (or both), his adoption of Buddhism went a long way towards ensuring the domestic foundations of his regime.

The Eupatrid kings that followed Eupator I were perhaps less able than he; Straton II, in particular, was somewhat feckless and incompetent. They never had enough Greek manpower to seriously consider invading the Sunga Empire, and only cautiously established connections with the peoples of Abiria and the other territories further south on the Indos. That dynamic seemed ready to change as the 30s BC wound down, for the Sunga Empire itself was on its last legs, hemorrhaging manpower and territory after several defeats at the hands of the Satavahanas of Andhra. (Interestingly, state and society were increasingly decoupled in the late Sunga state. Magadhi culture underwent something of a flowering around this time period, with the collation of several literary epics and the emergence of new styles of art based partly on Indohellenic influences.)

The Han hit a low point in 91 BC when Xuandi, the successor to Chongdi, was murdered by his officials after attempting to make his own appointments; the minor rebellion that this kicked off saw the Yuezhi intervene and briefly (for one week) besiege Chang’an. It didn’t take, fortunately, and the reign of Zhaodi (91-76 BC) saw the Han get back a significant measure of their old power and prominence. The rebellions were suppressed, and the Han even launched an invasion of Minyue, which remarkably succeeded. Zhaodi’s generals, chief among them Zhu He, then successfully beat back the inevitable Yuezhi raids. The regime was immobilized by aristocratic intrigues surrounding the Xu and Huo families in Zhaodi’s later years, but such was the price of success.

Zhaodi’s great-grandson, Mingdi, rose to power in 46 BC after a peasant siege of Chang’an caused the assassination of his unfortunate father Aidi; he conciliated the rebels, and a few weeks later had them all killed (or so the story goes) by one of the frontier armies. The streak of ruthlessness served him well in crushing further dissent; he broke up another plot two years later by having the official Dong Jia boiled alive as a particularly esoteric and gruesome warning. It was under his reign that the conquest of the south was completed. In 40 BC, the emperor launched the invasion of the rebel state of Nanyue, which had been tottering on the brink of collapse for some time under the rulership of the ineffectual Zhao family. The conquest was swift and brutal; after only a few field battles and a successful siege of the capital, Panyu, the last Nanyue emperor was murdered and the state was effectively decapitated. Cleanup lasted significantly longer, as the native Yue population had been in revolt against the Chinese rulers and administrators for quite some time, and weren’t about to quiet down because a new set of foreigners was in the house. Han rule was still shaky in 25 BC, with several small armies detailed to search-and-destroy missions throughout Lingnan.

The End of the Seleukid Golden Age

In 24 BC, Antiochos VI died of old age. His eldest son, Demetrios, had command of the Baktrian field army and the substantial resources of the further East; he seemed a clear heir presumptive. Personal animosity, though, intervened. With Antiochos alive, the poor relations of the various brothers had been submerged, but with the issue of the succession out in the open, civil war was in the offing. Much of the Syrian and Babylonian government supported the satrap of Armenia, the fourth brother, Attalos. Further west, the youngest brother (of six), Seleukos, had turned Makedonia and Greece into a personal satrapal seat from Athens, and loathed Attalos; he was likely to play on Makedonian and Hellenic secessionism if Attalos were crowned.

Antiochos VI’s funeral games would spell the end of the Seleukid Empire’s hegemony.

Spoiler World Map 25 BC :
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Things that strike me are that the Greek cities of Italy and particularly Sicily (and maybe even the Epirots) are being very servile, uncharacteristically so in my view; I don't really see it as particularly likely that the Seleucids would be able to keep control so easily of southern Italy or for the Carthaginians to be able to keep control of Sicily. I think the Achaeans are being servile too; I would have thought they would have most likely rebelled and been crushed by now. The absence and inactivity of Odrysians and other Thracians irks me. So does the appointement of minor Seleucid princes as satraps, and, indeed, the very existence of a powerful satrapy which Seleucus can revolt from; I seriously doubt Antiochus V's wisdom in not splitting it up by putting separate satraps in Molossia, Lysimacheia, Pydna and Corinth (or something similar). Also, I am mildly surprised by the fact that no incidents have occurred between Massilia and Carthage.

Anyway, you wanted comments last time you posted, so there they are; it was excellent and a delight to read as always. :)
 
Things that strike me are that the Greek cities of Italy and particularly Sicily (and maybe even the Epirots) are being very servile, uncharacteristically so in my view; I don't really see it as particularly likely that the Seleucids would be able to keep control so easily of southern Italy or for the Carthaginians to be able to keep control of Sicily.
"So easily"? Who said any of this was easy? If it were easy, the Seleukids would've kept going. :p
spryllino said:
I think the Achaeans are being servile too; I would have thought they would have most likely rebelled and been crushed by now.
Why would you think that? Just because the historical Achaians were brain-dead doesn't mean these ones have to be.
spryllino said:
The absence and inactivity of Odrysians and other Thracians irks me.
Not inactivity; lack of state-forming. You may have noticed that I don't really discuss things that don't have to do with things I consider polities, and even then, I don't discuss everything. (This is kind of the point of attempting a quick-and-dirty outline.) Obviously the Thracians aren't "just sitting there", just like the various British groups aren't just immobile and twiddling their thumbs despite the fact that they're not on the map and they don't get mentioned in the "updates".
spryllino said:
So does the appointement of minor Seleucid princes as satraps, and, indeed, the very existence of a powerful satrapy which Seleucus can revolt from; I seriously doubt Antiochus V's wisdom in not splitting it up by putting separate satraps in Molossia, Lysimacheia, Pydna and Corinth (or something similar).
Weird names. (Also, why Pydna?) But those are called eparchies, not satrapies. The whole point of a satrapy is to be a larger-scale governing body with a magistrate that serves as an intermediary between the king and the eparchs. And, of course, there are only so many people one can entrust with a satrapy. I don't really think this is a legitimate complaint; what makes the Makedonian situation any worse than the position of epistrategos of Asia Mikra, or the satrapy of Baktria?
spryllino said:
Also, I am mildly surprised by the fact that no incidents have occurred between Massilia and Carthage.
No named incidents. The fact that they are loosely working together against Numantia, insofar as Massilia has a coherent Iberian policy at all, has helped to paper over any major problems. Again, the point of this is to provide a coherent narrative, which was lacking last time, but to do it quick and dirty so it actually gets done in a relatively timely fashion.
 
spryllino said:
I won't argue! I don't doubt you have plenty of justification.

Wrong tact to adopt bub; arguing is GOOD.
 
Wrong tact to adopt bub; arguing is GOOD.

Yeah but the thing is I just don't enjoy arguing much, not really being a very argumentative person anyway, and besides I know I'll lose or run out of arguing energy or both. Besides, my opinion is that what lies at the root of the matter is not stuff that can easily be resolved by internet debate, and in fact isn't really much more than a matter of educated guesswork anyway. Besides, I haven't got time to write long and well-researched answers and look things up in all my books first, and I haven't really got time to proof-read anything I write properly either, to be honest, which is unfortunate, because it's probably all complete crap. :p


but if you like, to Dachs's replies, in order:

By "so easily", I mean, why didn't the Italiots rebel with any success? I think that, for almost any empire of the period, to run southern Italy from Syria is untenable, and for the Italiots not to rebel in any way worth mentioning is not really very likely.

And why should these Achaeans be any less brain-dead, if you can call it that, which even Polybius, very much in the pro-Roman camp, doesn't; I incline towards thinking that annexation to Rome in the Achaean case after an armed struggle was preferable to the Achaeans to puppetry to Rome, because, in short, Greek city-states were often a bit like that. Besides, the existence of an independent Achaea is dangerous to the Seleucid state because it could potentially facilitate rebellions in Greece, or, more likely still, in Italy. All in all, I think, just on the basis of "if you leave someone long enough, they'll do something," it seems likely that Achaea would have been incorporated into the Seleucid state on some pretext or other. Indeed, why hasn't the satrap Seleucus, who has made a personal fiefdom, you say, out of Greece, invented some pretext to annex Achaea, or at least have some sort of conflict with Achaea?

So, what caused the collapse of all centralised and important Thracian polities in this althist? That seems unlikely to me given the historical longevity and organisation of the Odrysian kingdom. No reason has been given for its collapse; therefore surely it should still exist? Thrace is an important and civilised place, and leaving it blank strikes me as quite a cop-out as well as being althistorically and historically unjustified. Comparisons with Britain are not really applicable (although I wouldn't mind some kingdoms there too), because Thrace is a more advanced civilisation in this period with a more developed state organisation.

Pydna because IIRC it was the capital of Macedonia in Hellenistic times, having been moved from Pella by Cassander or someone like that (although my recollection is probably at fault here). Satrapies in Greece are a dumb idea for any monarch (and one that, I should add, an idea no-one actually carried out) because Greece is full of long-standing poleis and so has a very, very, highly developed and organised structure of government, making it far more powerful than any other satrapy. The symbolism of creating an important Macedonian-Greek power-bloc is also very potent, because it instantly lends its ruler a legitimacy tied to the location, and lends any war carried out against Asia a certain Alexandrine glamour. Also, Greece is ridiculously full of mountains and water, making the satrapy a unit rather unsuited to governing the place. Therefore a satrapy of Greece really is an absolutely terrible idea in my opinion.

And yes, I can see it's an improvement on last time. :)
 
Magna Graecian cities aren't idiotic; they can clearly remember what happened to those of their number that betrayed the ascendant power during the Punic Wars.

Like any pragmatic empire, the Seleukids probably employ local proxies and patronage in their ruling arrangements as well. You assume that the Italiots are entirely shut out of local governance, a legitimate reason to rebel; Dachs hasn't indicated that this is the case.

And it was pretty damn easy for the Romans to hold down Sicily after the Second Punic War. Why should it be any different for the Carthaginians? As long as they don't aggressively push to Punicize the island there's no reason to be suicidal.
 
Redacted because I seem to be pissing off #nes with my musings, which seem to be universally misunderstood as challenges to the plausibility of Dachs's timeline, which they really aren't. I accept that anything included therein is quite as valid, as a resolution of things, as any alternative resolution that Dachs did not come up with might be.
 
I was just saying that, in a historical context, Greek cities in Sicily or Magna Graecia tend to be rebellious when there is an opportunity for their success, like after Cannae. As of now the Seleukids are undefeated in Italy.

That doesn't rule out them rebelling in the future when Seleukid and Carthaginian power declines. If anything that's exactly what happened in the original DaNES II. :p
 
Redacted because I seem to be pissing off #nes with my musings, which seem to be universally misunderstood as challenges to the plausibility of Dachs's timeline, which they really aren't. I accept that anything included therein is quite as valid, as a resolution of things, as any alternative resolution that Dachs did not come up with might be.

Eh. Thlayli and fc aren't exactly the entirety of #nes, you know. :p I like that you're asking questions that examine the timeline in further depth to make Dachs give us a more precise look at what's going on, and I'm sure Dachs does too (or else why would he aggressively solicit comments like he does?), even if he doesn't always show it from his characteristically pointed way of responding. :3
 
By "so easily", I mean, why didn't the Italiots rebel with any success? I think that, for almost any empire of the period, to run southern Italy from Syria is untenable, and for the Italiots not to rebel in any way worth mentioning is not really very likely.
I think that, for almost any empire of the period, to run Syria from central Italy is untenable, and for the Syrians not to rebel in any way worth mentioning is not really very likely. :p

At any rate, this will not be the end of Italiot/Siceliot/Sabellian political/military protagonism.
spryllino said:
And why should these Achaeans be any less brain-dead, if you can call it that, which even Polybius, very much in the pro-Roman camp, doesn't; I incline towards thinking that annexation to Rome in the Achaean case after an armed struggle was preferable to the Achaeans to puppetry to Rome, because, in short, Greek city-states were often a bit like that. Besides, the existence of an independent Achaea is dangerous to the Seleucid state because it could potentially facilitate rebellions in Greece, or, more likely still, in Italy. All in all, I think, just on the basis of "if you leave someone long enough, they'll do something," it seems likely that Achaea would have been incorporated into the Seleucid state on some pretext or other. Indeed, why hasn't the satrap Seleucus, who has made a personal fiefdom, you say, out of Greece, invented some pretext to annex Achaea, or at least have some sort of conflict with Achaea?
Because he's had better things to do. Look, this last century is supposed to be very broadly analogous to the advance of Roman direct control in the East in OTL, with various puppet states giving way to direct control very gradually, and I don't think it'll be spoiling anything to say that the Achaian League does not have long for this world anyway. The fact that the installment stopped when it did is not supposed to be indicative of any sort of long term trends; the Achaians are not going to last significantly longer.
spryllino said:
So, what caused the collapse of all centralised and important Thracian polities in this althist? That seems unlikely to me given the historical longevity and organisation of the Odrysian kingdom. No reason has been given for its collapse; therefore surely it should still exist? Thrace is an important and civilised place, and leaving it blank strikes me as quite a cop-out as well as being althistorically and historically unjustified. Comparisons with Britain are not really applicable (although I wouldn't mind some kingdoms there too), because Thrace is a more advanced civilisation in this period with a more developed state organisation.
For such a centralized and important state, the Odrysai didn't actually end up doing a whole lot in the first century BC. Besides, your Eurocentric bias disgusts me; why aren't you complaining about the lack of attention given to the Caucasus, or to Sindh, or to the Pandyas, or to SEA, or to the various Numidian, Gaetulian, and Mauri? And why has virtually nothing been said about the affairs of the Kimmerian Bosporos? :p

I think it suffices to say that Thrace and the Danubian valley have served chiefly as a buffer zone between the Seleukids and the Getai, inhabited by several groups, none of which is particularly important on its own; to the extent that Thracians formed relevant polities before the 180s BC, they ceased to be relevant by the turn of the century, due to external action/lack of ability to sustain centralization/migratory action insofar as it happened.

You're making mountains out of molehills, and that's the last I'll say about it.
spryllino said:
Pydna because IIRC it was the capital of Macedonia in Hellenistic times, having been moved from Pella by Cassander or someone like that (although my recollection is probably at fault here). Satrapies in Greece are a dumb idea for any monarch (and one that, I should add, an idea no-one actually carried out) because Greece is full of long-standing poleis and so has a very, very, highly developed and organised structure of government, making it far more powerful than any other satrapy. The symbolism of creating an important Macedonian-Greek power-bloc is also very potent, because it instantly lends its ruler a legitimacy tied to the location, and lends any war carried out against Asia a certain Alexandrine glamour. Also, Greece is ridiculously full of mountains and water, making the satrapy a unit rather unsuited to governing the place. Therefore a satrapy of Greece really is an absolutely terrible idea in my opinion.
Nah, the only association between Kassandros and Pydna is that Olympias hid there for awhile before he besieged and captured the place and put her to death during the civil wars. Pella/Aigai/Thessalonike remained the center of Makedonian royal authority up to 168 historically.

I think the main reason nobody established a Makedonian satrapy historically is because no external foes conquered Makedonia except for the Romans (Seleukos I doesn't count because he never actually took possession before Keraunos assassinated him), not because it was an intrinsically bad idea. :p

You're probably confused by the situation of the poleis because you don't know how they historically operated in the Greek East; they vacillated between full independence (very rare, only for powerful ones like Rhodos) and varying degrees of subordination to the kings while retaining political autonomy, even for the poleis that were in the middle of a satrapy. Cities differentiated between being free (eleutheria) and being kingless (abasileutoi), and with very few exceptions, Hellenistic monarchs were willing to cater to the autonomous amour propre of local government. (Antigonos II and Kassandros being among those exceptions.) And in every meaningful respect, the poleis were more than willing to grovel and kowtow and provide the Hellenistic kings with whatever they wished - so long as taxes were not actually called that, but something like 'contributions', they were levied, and so long as there was not too gross a breach of protocol, the kings were more or less free to trample on juridical autonomy. So talking about a 'satrapy of Makedonia and Greece' doesn't preclude the tradition of the polis and self-government in any way, no more so than the Seleukid satrapies in Asia precluded the same thing.

I think you're overstating the importance of the symbolism of Makedonia and Greece, particularly since this is the first century BC and not the fourth - not that such symbolic importance is completely nonexistent, of course, and it will be relevant later on, but it wasn't judged to be a sufficiently dangerous thing to keep the government of the area split up. Ceremonially, the position was originally supposed to be something of a stepping stone to the Seleukid monarchy of sorts, like the positions in the East and Mikra Asia had been before, but that was submarined by the circumstances of Alexandros I's death. By this point, the Syrian-Babylonian heartland has a lot more symbolic pull than does Makedonia + Greece.

The geography is an unconvincing argument; one could apply the same to the position of epistrategos of Asia or to the Upper Satrapies.
Eh. Thlayli and fc aren't exactly the entirety of #nes, you know. :p I like that you're asking questions that examine the timeline in further depth to make Dachs give us a more precise look at what's going on, and I'm sure Dachs does too (or else why would he aggressively solicit comments like he does?), even if he doesn't always show it from his characteristically pointed way of responding. :3
Gold star. Although I frequently end up elucidating things I don't particularly care about to you people, and leaving out things that I would like to talk about more but can't, due to my desire to keep these things relatively short and to the point.
Well, this is entertaining, but we should be seeing the Teutons by now, yes?
Those are the Somnonoz, or Semnones; the extent to which they will retain any sort of political control over the surrounding tribes is unclear. You can't really say that anything approximating a state existed in what's now Germany in OTL before, oh, the later Merovingians, and since the only real impetus towards state-forming was Rome-driven in OTL - and since Rome no longer exists - I doubt we'll see much of anything worth mentioning up there for quite some time. Hell, even the Aeduoi and Auernoi are quite the stretch. The main reason I put colors up on the map for them in the first place is to forestall complaints about lack of breadth and "why didn't you mention theez guise!!!!1111" (didn't work).

The perils of writing an ATL, even a cardboard one, before the early modern period...
 
Wrong attitude, keep going! RAWR.
 
Mang, if dachs was talking about SEA I would be going bat-poo-poo KRAZY. But he's not :(
 
Made me chortle...

Spoiler :
noflashgames.jpg
 
Ever heard of a spoiler?

[spoiler][/spoiler]
 
Doesn't really have the same impact... but fine! :p
 
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