Assassination as a tool of war?

[LightSpectra]

There's also the alleged plot by Hitler to kidnap and/or kill the King of Italy and the Pope after Italy switched sides in WWII.

I hadn't heard of this before. It's quite astounding that the Axis hadn't figured out that Pius XII was hiding Jews and gypsies in the Vatican, and that Pius XII had already saved some 600,000 - 700,000 people from Hitler, and only took action when Italy had already been captured by the Allies.

Operation Foxley.

My question about this is how the Allies knew Hitler was a terrible strategist before the end of the war. Did they just figure as much given all the blunders the German High Command was making, or did they routinely overhear radio chatter/capture memos complaining about his micromanaging?

 

[Joecoolyo]

My question about this is how the Allies knew Hitler was a terrible strategist before the end of the war. Did they just figure as much given all the blunders the German High Command was making, or did they routinely overhear radio chatter/capture memos complaining about his micromanaging?

I think Dunkirk, the Battle for Britain, and Stalingrad sealed the deal.

 

[LightSpectra]

Dunkirk was a political error moreso than a strategic one, and the Battle of Britain was essentially a no-win scenario for the Axis. There were plenty of mistakes made at Stalingrad that weren't Hitler's fault.

 

[Lord Baal]

I hadn't heard of this before. It's quite astounding that the Axis hadn't figured out that Pius XII was hiding Jews and gypsies in the Vatican, and that Pius XII had already saved some 600,000 - 700,000 people from Hitler, and only took action when Italy had already been captured by the Allies.

I only heard of it a few weeks go myself, when I stumbled across it while researching the invasion of Italy by the Allies. It's amazing how they took so long to defeat the Nazis, because they had numerous opportunities to shorten the process.

Pius XII may have helped hide Jews, but there were several other prominent cardinals and bishops who openly supported the Nazis, the obvious ones being the few who assisted SS and ustache members in fleeing Europe after the war. So the Nazis were confident of at least some support in the Catholic hierarchy. Then there was the simple fact that due to Italian reluctance to persecute Jews - they were pretty much Mussolini's least-popular ordinances, and basically ignored - that they couldn't do much about any protection the Vatican was giving to Jews until after Italy switched sides and they began to treat it as occupied territory anyway. Even then, the Vatican was a powerful enough force to be worried about offending, which is one of the explanations for why Hitler didn't go through with this plan, if it ever existed. Another is that Canaris leaked the information about the raid to the Vatican, putting them on their guard and effectively guaranteeing it wouldn't work.

My question about this is how the Allies knew Hitler was a terrible strategist before the end of the war. Did they just figure as much given all the blunders the German High Command was making, or did they routinely overhear radio chatter/capture memos complaining about his micromanaging?

His poor strategic planning was pretty obvious from the Russian campaign. That Hitler had taken personal command on that front wasn't exactly a secret. Even if it was, it wouldn't have been difficult to figure out that when people like Heinz Guderian were being demoted or sacked that something was rotten at the OKW, and it wouldn't take much digging to find out that Hitler was it. Presumably the Abwehr had contacts in Spain who could have passed this info on to Britain as well., though I don't know if they ever did.

 

[Joecoolyo]

Dunkirk was a political error moreso than a strategic one, and the Battle of Britain was essentially a no-win scenario for the Axis. There were plenty of mistakes made at Stalingrad that weren't Hitler's fault.

I'll give you Dunkirk.

Though Britain was strategic as the strategy midway through changed from bombing military targets to bombing civilian ones (Hitler ordered this), which in turn was a really bad decision. As this of course led to the RAF being bale to rebuild and reorganize. They could easily tell his strategy was pretty bad.

And the thing with strategic error at Stalingrad was to keep fighting. Sure there were other mistakes, but Hitler's obsession with capturing this city was the strategic error. He could have easily shrugged off the city and moved on but he ordered his men to keep attacking it.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

A really interesting topic in and of itself. But Masada summed it up in one sentence pretty well and there is not much more to discuss. At least not much I could think of.

To call it "Gentlemen agreement" or "cowardice of our leaders" makes no difference in the end.
One could argue that this Pandora's box would only harm everyone in the end because the continuing murder of leaderships would make the job of leading more chaotic and less purposeful (though some libertarians could also be fond of that idea). It would also strengthen the influence of backers who stay in the dark.
And it could cause the leading class to be even more out of touch with the population due to more strict security measures.

So all in all this unspoken agreement may be unfair, but nevertheless sensible.

 

[LightSpectra]

Though Britain was strategic as the strategy midway through changed from bombing military targets to bombing civilian ones (Hitler ordered this), which in turn was a really bad decision. As this of course led to the RAF being bale to rebuild and reorganize. They could easily tell his strategy was pretty bad.

That wouldn't have accomplished much. The goal of the Battle of Britain was to pummel the RAF enough to allow for an invasion, which never would've worked; Unternehmen Seelöwe had no chance of success even if the RAF magically disappeared into the wind, and the Luftwaffe's defeat did Hitler a favor in preventing an utter catastrophe from befalling the army.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

That wouldn't have accomplished much. The goal of the Battle of Britain was to pummel the RAF enough to allow for an invasion, which never would've worked;

You are right of course saying that "Seelöwe" had no realistic chance at any given time. However, it is news to me that that was the goal. As far as I know Germany never seriously considered that operation and wanted to force UK into a surrender by naval forces (submarine warfare) and the air force only regarding the main land. And I also remember having read how at one point of the war a conditional surrender seemed like a sensible option to the UK.

 

[LightSpectra]

You are right of course saying that "Seelöwe" had no realistic chance at any given time. However, it is news to me that that was the goal. As far as I know Germany never seriously considered that operation and wanted to force UK into a surrender by naval forces (submarine warfare) and the air force only regarding the main land. And I also remember having read how at one point of the war a conditional surrender seemed like a sensible option to the UK.

Firstly, the Halifax faction in the British cabinet did advocate a negotiated surrender after the Fall of France; nevertheless I highly doubt that had Halifax been PM, he would've had the nerve to do so for a number of reasons. Secondly, you're incorrect in suggesting that Seelöwe was some sort of back-up plan if the U.K. hadn't surrendered by the end of the Battle of Britain. A significant amount of man-hours were put into concocting the plan, which when observed after-the-fact, literally would've been the most folly thing to happen to Germany in the war.

Our intuition usually has us believe that since Operation Overlord worked, Unternehmen Seelöwe could've also worked. I point out the following facts: D-Day was planned for two years, included significant aid from the French Resistance, air superiority, naval supremacy, a great deal more of necessary heavy equipment and supplies, a highly coordinated chain of command, a stroke of unbelievably good luck (Rommel was away from Normandy on June 6 because of weather conditions unfavorable to an amphibious landing, which cleared up and allowed Overlord to proceed), and a successful deception campaign that threw a wrench into German defensive operations. On the other hand, the OKW had none of the aforementioned.

 

[innonimatu]

You are right of course saying that "Seelöwe" had no realistic chance at any given time. However, it is news to me that that was the goal. As far as I know Germany never seriously considered that operation and wanted to force UK into a surrender by naval forces (submarine warfare) and the air force only regarding the main land. And I also remember having read how at one point of the war a conditional surrender seemed like a sensible option to the UK.

I still think that the germans could have successfully invaded britain if they had negotiated different armistice terms with Petain's France (hell, let them even keep the damn Alsace-Lorraine). The UK had a defeated army, no heavy material and no defenses to speak off immediately after Dunkirk, but the english channel. If the germans had gotten the french and the italians to join their navies in an attack on the UK, the RN would be unable to keep them off the channel. As for troop transports, the british managed to scrap together a fleet of common ships to evacuate their soldiers from Dunkirk, under bombardment, so why couldn't the germans do the same thing for an attack?

 

[say1988]

It takes more to land an organised force and supply it than to haphazardly evacuate troops. And the situation of attacking a defended beach is inherently different from evacuating under air attack. Though the French fleet could have given the Germans a force in the Channel, I doubt it could secure their supply lines. And then you have to get the French captains to willingly hand ove their major warships. Staying in port is one thing, giving them to the enemy is another.

 

[LightSpectra]

I still think that the germans could have successfully invaded britain if they had negotiated different armistice terms with Petain's France (hell, let them even keep the damn Alsace-Lorraine). The UK had a defeated army, no heavy material and no defenses to speak off immediately after Dunkirk, but the english channel. If the germans had gotten the french and the italians to join their navies in an attack on the UK, the RN would be unable to keep them off the channel. As for troop transports, the british managed to scrap together a fleet of common ships to evacuate their soldiers from Dunkirk, under bombardment, so why couldn't the germans do the same thing for an attack?

When the Allied divisions crossed the channel to land at Normandy, they had aerial superiority and total naval supremacy; the Germans had neither of these. At Dunkirk, the British merely had to load troops unto ships and then cross a safe channel to land at the shore (I remind you that the Germans intentionally chose not to annihilate the BEF when it was well within their possibility).

Proponents of Seelöwe's feasibility have to contend with the fact that the Germans had no sea control, disputed/no aerial control, no means in which to supply their troops, and a time frame more rigid than the Schlieffen Plan.

The Luftwaffe proved inadequate against surfaces ships at Dunkirk sinking only thirteen destroyers and damaging another nineteen in a confined area as they loaded troops. It proved equally incapable against the RAF during the Battle of Britain losing 1887 aircraft of all types in exchange for 1547 fighters. Clearly the Luftwaffe could not stop the RAF or the RN much less both.

The German invasion of Crete is instructive vis-à-vis Sea Lion.[20] Reinforcement and supply by sea proved impossible even though the Luftwaffe had absolute air superiority. The Royal Navy intercepted and utterly destroyed the first flotilla of small boats hazarding the crossing from Greece. No further attempts were made to reinforce by sea. Instead the 5th Mountain Division troops were flown in. Although they eventually prevailed German parachute and glider troops and the JU-52 transport arm of the Luftwaffe were decimated in the process. One can imagine the slaughter had the RN and RAF run through 1277 barges loaded with men and equipment during the proposed Sea Lion channel crossing.

Source

 

[Terxpahseyton]

Firstly, the Halifax faction in the British cabinet did advocate a negotiated surrender after the Fall of France; nevertheless I highly doubt that had Halifax been PM, he would've had the nerve to do so for a number of reasons. Secondly, you're incorrect in suggesting that Seelöwe was some sort of back-up plan if the U.K. hadn't surrendered by the end of the Battle of Britain. A significant amount of man-hours were put into concocting the plan, which when observed after-the-fact, literally would've been the most folly thing to happen to Germany in the war.

You missunderstand me. I am sure Hitler liked the idea of capturing the island never captured and ordered his gernerals to work out a glorious plan. Also most likely some generals were fond of that idea, too. That does not make those generals supid, however (Hitler was stupid, nothing can change that).
The fact remains that the German naval forces tried to cut off the British Islands through submarine warfare and that this plan worked very well for some time causing huge trouble for the UK. Just as the Battle of Britain did regarding the RA.
An UK contionusly lacking air as well as naval superitoty would have eventually been forced to declare peace, which had been very much hoped and realized by the military leadership. This strategy could have actually worked. Operation Seelöwe - probably not.
That is why I don't like a description of the Battle of Britain only as a preparation for Seelöwe while this battle took part in a much better strategy.

 

[Hehehe]

There are very limited gains to be had in assassinating people. First of all, the person in question has to be exceptionally important in the faction he is working for: if that person is simply replaced with an another person, the assassination is as good as nothing. Secondly, there are risks involved: obviously the assassin could fail and be captured and interrogated, which could lead to a severe political blow back. Assassinating a leader of a major power requires a huge amount of intel too: the assassin must know where the target is, how to get close to him, has to be able to smuggle his weapon of choice near him etc. These leaders are well guarded too, especially wartime. I have no qualms that politicians wouldn't authorize an assassination if there was gains to be had.

 

[LightSpectra]

You missunderstand me. I am sure Hitler liked the idea of capturing the island never captured and ordered his gernerals to work out a glorious plan. Also most likely some generals were fond of that idea, too. That does not make those generals supid, however (Hitler was stupid, nothing can change that).
The fact remains that the German naval forces tried to cut off the British Islands through submarine warfare and that this plan worked very well for some time causing huge trouble for the UK. Just as the Battle of Britain did regarding the RA.
An UK contionusly lacking air as well as naval superitoty would have eventually been forced to declare peace, which had been very much hoped and realized by the military leadership. This strategy could have actually worked. Operation Seelöwe - probably not.

And how, pray tell, does Germany develop naval superiority? They'd have to crash the U.K. economy and then spend ten years developing the ships necessary to acquire it.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

And how, pray tell, does Germany develop naval superiority? They'd have to crash the U.K. economy and then spend ten years developing the ships necessary to acquire it.

S U B M A R I N E S
The Brits depended on a steady flow of convoys from the US. The German submarines did a very good job in disrupting those convoyd using the so called "Wolfpack strategy". Only when the Brits managed to precisely detect those ships through intercepted radio messages (Enigma) and advanced sonar they were able to get things under control.

Okay given, the term naval superitoty is missleading, my bad. But I think you get the idea.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Even if the British had never cracked Enigma (unlikely in itself) the Germans were never even close to defeating the English Navy by means of Submarines.

 

[Masada]

Okay given, the term naval superitoty is missleading, my bad. But I think you get the idea.

If German subs could take on the Home Fleet and support the beaches against British counterattacks by air and sea then by all means. If not, then no. For the record German submarine operations were patchy at best against the Royal Navy, let alone the whole Home Fleet.

 

[holy king]

you sure that eagle shouldnt be black-white-red, sill?

 

[ParkCungHee]

But he was military, not government.

For Japan, the distinction was strictly theoretical.