Basically, my opinion on this subject can be summed up in an earlier post in this very thread, which (you would think) people haven't been reading.
Dachspmg said:
What happens when the Aztecs attempt to storm a Spartan-controlled ridge?

You can make any tactical scenario you want to fit the particular advantages of both sides.
The Greeks, including the Spartans, were really polite about warfare. They fought set-piece battles, which meant that the commanders got together and agreed about where they were going to fight and what time hostilities should commence, so they would have time to wait for everyone to arrive, to line up their formations all nice and neat, and to execute things according to plan.
lolwut
Okay, this wasn't even true back during the Golden Age when Athenians and Spartans still were the cock of the walk in terms of Hellenic warfare. Demosthenes in Aitolia is perhaps the best known example of highly unconventional warfare, but it was also employed (albeit by the same commander) at Pylos-Sphakteria and then by Iphikrates during the Korinthian War. Set-piece battle has nothing to do whatsoever with 'commanders [getting] together and [agreeing]', the concept of "mutual consent to battle" doesn't imply the same kind of
kriegspiel that is usually attributed to, say, the condottieri. Given El Alamein's enshrined status as one of the last set-piece engagements, one might as well say that Monty and Rommel had tea beforehand and talked out how they wanted things to go.

Interference with the enemy dispositions and launching surprise attacks was part and parcel of how warfare worked in classical Greece, too. Take a look at the Battle of Plataia (479 BC(E)), where the allied coalition was attacked while on the march, or the end of the siege of Syrakousai (413 BC(E)), when the Athenians launched a risky night attack on the Epipolai that only narrowly failed. The nice thing about the classical phalanx (as compared with the Makedonian syntagma) was that it was relatively flexible, and frequently was able to engage light forces with some success. (The introduction of more effective light infantry units into Hellenic warfare during the later fifth and early fourth centuries forced the phalangial formations to improve even further, and develop other ways of engaging the Thraikian peltastai or other psiloi units.)
frekk said:
If they could deploy in formation succesfully, the Aztecs would have a tough time facing them head-on. But they'd probably just avoid direct engagement, and hit them on the move or in camp with a constant series of raids. The Greek system of warfare simply wasn't designed to cope with anything like this. It was a formalized affair that depended heavily on everyone following the rules. It worked well, when fighting the Persians or other Greeks, because they had similar ideas about how war should be conducted.
Cultural notions were just so different. For instance, if a Spartan commander stepped forward to parley, the Aztecs would probably assume he was a sacrificial offering and bundle him up and carry him off.
This betrays a relative lack of understanding about the Hellenic system of warfare, or at the very least a massive generalization?

(Also, I would be most interested in knowing if we are to talk about the Spartans of Leonidas, or those of Kleomenes III, following his extensive military reforms. Hell, even the army of Kleombrotos at Leuktra would be different, too.) Be interesting to see the Aztecs engage Spartan cavalry (which they
did have), for example. Spartans fighting on difficult terrain, as terrible as the movie
300 showed it, did occur with frequency; the Hot Gates aren't just a plain, there, it's a bloody mountain pass. It's folly to assume that such mountainous terrain as Greece has, which lends itself brilliantly to asymmetric warfare, didn't condition the development of light units focused on ambushes. And, by gum, it sure did. And the Spartans still had the ability to engage them with reasonable success, with the notable exception of the destruction of a whole mora by light infantry outside Korinthos during that city's eponymous war. (Which occurred solely because the Athenian commander, the aforementioned Iphikrates, noted the lack of the usual Spartan march security of cavalry and peltastai, and thus took advantage of it. This Battle of Lechaion was the exception, not the rule.)
That's not even talking about the tech advantage that the Spartans had. While it's possible to generate tactical scenarios in which the Spartans lose (not that there's anything wrong with that), on balance I think that the Greeks win.