Can the two atomic bombs be justified?

[Borachio]

Especially given their own experience in Manchuria and China?

Victorious troops of all persuasions do tend to go on the rampage (no doubt very civilized ones do it only a little bit). War in general has a brutalizing effect. It is only to be expected, imo.

 

[red_elk]

It's not justified.
The reasons for bombings were to test new weapon in real combat conditions and to demonstrate it to possible rivals.
Bombing into submission was achievable with much cheaper conventional bombs.
Surrendering of Japan was inevitable after entering USSR into war, destruction of Kwantung army and facing threat of Soviet and American invasion of mainland.

And results of this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Manchurian_Strategic_Offensive_Operation
show that Japan was very unlikely able to inflict serious casualties to invading forces.

 

[Formaldehyde]

Errrr. Why? Do you think FDR okay'd the creation and support of the Manhattan Project to create the bomb....only to not use it when it finally was created?

As I made quite clear in the sections of my post you had to delete to quote mine this single sentence, because the war was obviously already over so they weren't needed?

That makes no sense what-so-ever.

The light bulb has to want to change.

Japan surrendered unconditionally. This was important; whatever plans the Americans had for Japan, they can't allow the old enemy - especially one as obviously inhumane and obviously beaten as Japan - to choose the terms of surrender. It'd be like negotiating with Hitler and allow the Nazis to remain in power, annex Poland and continue the Holocaust.

It's not "like" that at all. Japan was completely defeated, and they only wanted one thing which they ended up getting anyway. They were more than willing to accept any other conditions.

And yes, I think it was also a huge mistake not to let Germany surrender as well. It directly led to a divided Germany and much of the so-called Cold War. Did the German government that entered into WWI still stay in power under the same terms as before?

 

[hobbsyoyo]

I've heard that Japan was actually willing to surrender as long as they got to keep their Emperor. If that's the case, clearly unjustified.

You heard wrong. The Japanese were not willing to surrender in the sense that you think they were. They wanted to keep all of the non-European Colonial territories they could and would not accept unconditional surrender.

You also should note that even when the Emporer decided on peace, he had to go into hiding because elements of the Army launched a (failed) coup against him.

No, the Japanese and particularly the Japanese Army?Navy (which is all that matters given their control of the country) were not ready to surrender even after the bombings. They had to be forced into it by a public declaration by a living god.

Think about that.

They were detonated over the cities, not at ground level. This was to test how much the radiation would be lessened. Some say that there were less harmful radiation effects than if the US was going for total destruction. Perhaps if they had detonated higher, there still may have been the fear factor, but not as much destruction.

No, they were exploded above ground level to maximize the blast wave and thus destruction. Reducing radiation was not a concern, not even for scientific purposes. A big bomb that's detonated at ground level wastes much of it's energy on the ground.

Perhaps if the Japanese were allowed to have Korea, there would not be such a mess there today?

The hell? The following Korean uprising would have been a bloody mess and would have been like the Korean War + Japan.

At Okinawa, locals were told by the Japanese military that US soldiers would torture and kill their entire families, so women were seen jumping off cliffs, children in arm, to kill themselves rather than be taken by US soldiers. Mass suicide was chosen by civilians rather than face what the Japanese told them would happen.

why do people think an invasion of mainland Japan would have been any different? I dunno, but when I read stuff like that, I wonder how on earth could people think the Japanese would just up and surrender when they sure as hell hadnt up to that point, even in the face of sure defeat.

The Emporer actually encouraged the Okinawan civilians to kill themselves. They complied en masse.

 

[Formaldehyde]

Would you think it a lie if the soldiers truly believed that the Americans were going to go on a rampage of rape and pillaging? And would you think it possible for many Japanese soldiers, being subject to lots of propaganda, to truly believe that?

There was even reason to suspect wide-scale rape might have occurred:

Okinawan historian Oshiro Masayasu (former director of the Okinawa Prefectural Historical Archives) writes based on several years of research:

Soon after the U.S. Marines landed, all the women of a village on Motobu Peninsula fell into the hands of American soldiers. At the time, there were only women, children and old people in the village, as all the young men had been mobilized for the war. Soon after landing, the Marines "mopped up" the entire village, but found no signs of Japanese forces. Taking advantage of the situation, they started "hunting for women" in broad daylight and those who were hiding in the village or nearby air raid shelters were dragged out one after another.[81]

It even occurred on the Japanese mainland after Japan had surrendered:

There were 1,336 reported rapes during the first 10 days of the occupation of Kanagawa prefecture.[16] Tanaka relates that in Yokohama, the capital of the prefecture, there were 119 known rapes in September of 1945.[17]

Historians Eiji Takemae and Robert Ricketts state that "When US paratroopers landed in Sapporo, an orgy of looting, sexual violence and drunken brawling ensued. Gang rapes and other sex atrocities were not infrequent" and some of the rape victims committed suicide.[18]

In the one instance when the Japanese formed a self-help vigilante guard to protect women from off-duty GIs this was met by the US army using armored vehicles in battle formation, and the leaders received long prison terms.[18]:67

According to Dower, "more than a few incidents" of assault and rape were never reported to the police.[8]:211

Many American soldiers and civilians certainly believed the propaganda they were fed. They thought of Japanese as being subhumans who were capable of unspeakable atrocities during the war in much the same way. There were incessant war crimes committed by the US military as a direct result.

Allied soldiers in Pacific and Asian theatres sometimes killed Japanese soldiers who were attempting to surrender or after they had surrendered. A social historian of the Pacific War, John W. Dower, states that "by the final years of the war against Japan, a truly vicious cycle had developed in which the Japanese reluctance to surrender had meshed horrifically with Allied disinterest in taking prisoners."[54] Dower suggests that most Japanese personnel were told that they would be "killed or tortured" if they fell into Allied hands and, as a consequence, most of those faced with defeat on the battlefield fought to the death or committed suicide.[55] In addition, it was held to be shamefully disgraceful for a Japanese soldier to surrender, leading many to suicide or fight to the death regardless of beliefs concerning their possible treatment as POWs. In fact, the Japanese Field Service Code said that surrender was not permissible.[56]

And while it was "not official policy" for Allied personnel to take no prisoners, "over wide reaches of the Asian battleground it was everyday practice."[57]

On 4 March 1943, during the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, General George Kenney ordered Allied patrol boats and aircraft to attack Japanese rescue vessels, as well as the survivors from the sunken vessels on life rafts and swimming or floating in the sea. This was later justified on the grounds that rescued servicemen would have been rapidly landed at their military destination and promptly returned to active service.[58] These orders violated the Hague Convention of 1907, which banned the killing of shipwreck survivors under any circumstances.[59]

American soldiers in the Pacific often deliberately killed Japanese soldiers who had surrendered. According to Richard Aldrich, who has published a study of the diaries kept by United States and Australian soldiers, they sometimes massacred prisoners of war.[68] Dower states that in "many instances ... Japanese who did become prisoners were killed on the spot or en route to prison compounds."[57] According to Aldrich it was common practice for U.S. troops not to take prisoners.[69] This analysis is supported by British historian Niall Ferguson,[70] who also says that, in 1943, "a secret [U.S.] intelligence report noted that only the promise of ice cream and three days leave would ... induce American troops not to kill surrendering Japanese."[70]

Ferguson states such practices played a role in the ratio of Japanese prisoners to dead being 1:100 in late 1944. That same year, efforts were taken by Allied high commanders to suppress "take no prisoners" attitudes,[70] among their own personnel (as these were affecting intelligence gathering) and to encourage Japanese soldiers to surrender. Ferguson adds that measures by Allied commanders to improve the ratio of Japanese prisoners to Japanese dead, resulted in it reaching 1:7, by mid-1945. Nevertheless, taking no prisoners was still standard practice among U.S. troops at the Battle of Okinawa, in April–June 1945.[70]

Ulrich Straus, a U.S. Japanologist, suggests that frontline troops intensely hated Japanese military personnel and were "not easily persuaded" to take or protect prisoners, as they believed that Allied personnel who surrendered, got "no mercy" from the Japanese.[71] Allied soldiers believed that Japanese soldiers were inclined to feign surrender, in order to make surprise attacks.[71] Therefore, according to Straus, "Senior officers opposed the taking of prisoners on the grounds that it needlessly exposed American troops to risks..."[71] When prisoners nevertheless were taken at Gualdacanal, interrogator Army Captain Burden noted that many times these were shot during transport because "it was too much bother to take him in".[72]

Ferguson suggests that "it was not only the fear of disciplinary action or of dishonor that deterred German and Japanese soldiers from surrendering. More important for most soldiers was the perception that prisoners would be killed by the enemy anyway, and so one might as well fight on."[70]

U.S. historian James J. Weingartner attributes the very low number of Japanese in U.S. POW compounds to two important factors, a Japanese reluctance to surrender and a widespread American "conviction that the Japanese were "animals" or "subhuman'" and unworthy of the normal treatment accorded to POWs.[73] The latter reason is supported by Ferguson, who says that "Allied troops often saw the Japanese in the same way that Germans regarded Russians—as Untermenschen."[70]

Mutilation of Japanese war dead

Some Allied soldiers collected Japanese body parts. The incidence of this by American personnel occurred on "a scale large enough to concern the Allied military authorities throughout the conflict and was widely reported and commented on in the American and Japanese wartime press."[74]

The collection of Japanese body parts began quite early in the war, prompting a September 1942 order for disciplinary action against such souvenir taking.[74] Harrison concludes that, since this was the first real opportunity to take such items (the Battle of Guadalcanal), "[c]learly, the collection of body parts on a scale large enough to concern the military authorities had started as soon as the first living or dead Japanese bodies were encountered."[74]

When Japanese remains were repatriated from the Mariana Islands after the war, roughly 60 percent were missing their skulls.[74]

In a 13 June 1944 memorandum, the U.S. Army Judge Advocate General, (JAG) Major General Myron C. Cramer, asserted that "such atrocious and brutal policies," were both "repugnant to the sensibilities of all civilized people"[73] and also violations of the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, which stated that: "After each engagement, the belligerent who remains in possession of the field shall take measures to search for wounded and the dead and to protect them from robbery and ill treatment."[75] Cramer recommended the distribution to all commanders of a directive ordering them to prohibit the misuse of enemy body parts.[73]

These practices were in addition also in violation of the unwritten customary rules of land warfare and could lead to the death penalty.[73] The U.S. Navy JAG mirrored that opinion one week later, and also added that "the atrocious conduct of which some US personnel were guilty could lead to retaliation by the Japanese which would be justified under international law".[73]

And it wasn't just the US which did so:

Australia

According to Mark Johnston, "the killing of unarmed Japanese was common" and Australian command tried to put pressure on troops to actually take prisoners, but the troops proved reluctant.[65] When prisoners were indeed taken "it often proved difficult to prevent them from killing captured Japanese before they could be interrogated".[66] According to Johnston, as a consequence of this type of behavior; "Some Japanese soldiers were almost certainly deterred from surrendering to Australians".[66]

Major General Paul Cullen indicated that the killing of Japanese prisoners in the Kokoda Track Campaign was not uncommon. In one instance he recalled during the battle at Gorari that "the leading platoon captured five or seven Japanese and moved on to the next battle. The next platoon came along and bayoneted these Japanese."[67] He also stated that he found the killings understandable but that it had left him feeling guilty.

In regard to the OP:

In 1963, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the subject of a judicial review in Ryuichi Shimoda et al. v. The State.[76] The District Court of Tokyo declined to rule on the legality of nuclear weapons in general, but found that "the attacks upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki caused such severe and indiscriminate suffering that they did violate the most basic legal principles governing the conduct of war."[77] Francisco Gómez points out in an article published in the International Review of the Red Cross that, with respect to the "anti-city" or "blitz" strategy, that "in examining these events in the light of international humanitarian law, it should be borne in mind that during the Second World War there was no agreement, treaty, convention or any other instrument governing the protection of the civilian population or civilian property."[78] The possibility that attacks like the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings could be considered war crimes is one of the reasons given by John R. Bolton for the United States not agreeing to be bound by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court[79] while he was Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, although they would not be prosecutable due to their having occurred prior to the ratification of the treaty.

 

[Agent327]

The Emporer actually encouraged the Okinawan civilians to kill themselves. They complied en masse.

AFAIK there were no public declarations of the emperor prior to his declaration about ending the war. (Which by the way wasn't understood by common Japanese as he used an archaic language. Which makes the above statement dubious in the extreme, as well as incongruous with his declaration after the A-bomb droppings.)

 

[Patroklos]

The bombs gave them an opportunity, an excuse, so to speak, to surrender. It was a game changer in terms of the culture of Japan that was in place at the time. The importance of this hasn't really been perceived by the masses, of course, I am, luckily for those of you here, possessed with unusual perception.

So yes, that is sufficient justification.

THAT is where the novelty came into effect.

There is no question that continuing to bomb Japan at the time was justified, the question was if atomic bombing was justified. Given the effect of one is the same as the other (there specific atomic weapons) they are both indeed justified. The fact that their novelty contributed to overall surrender outside of the physical dame caused is just more justification.

 

[Thorgalaeg]

Some warning about the new weapon plus inconditional surrender exigence could have been given to Japan government some days before using the bomb. If accepted that is it, if rejected simply drop the bomb. Nothing to lose (well, only the chance of testing the bomb on real cities and human beings). I think some guys in the US government itself thought like me.

I can help but think there was an "scientifical" motivaion for using both bombs (which were very different designs BTW) one after other without giving Japan any chance to surrender even after the first blast.

 

[hobbsyoyo]

AFAIK there were no public declarations of the emperor prior to his declaration about ending the war. (Which by the way wasn't understood by common Japanese as he used an archaic language. Which makes the above statement dubious in the extreme, as well as incongruous with his declaration after the A-bomb droppings.)

IIRC he issued an edict through the military that told them of the dangers of barbaric American GI's and encouraged them to die rather than surrender.

It's not "like" that at all. Japan was completely defeated, and they only wanted one thing which they ended up getting anyway. They were more than willing to accept any other conditions.

Not true, they wanted a lot more than keeping the Emporer and IIRC even accepted the condition that he be deposed which was later reversed by McArthur in order to lift Japanese morale and make the occupation easier.

 

[Eukaryote]

Some thoughts:

1. Neither atomic bomb attack had the largest casualties of a bomb attack of the war.

2. Both atomic bomb attacks complied with the law of war as it stood at the time - that being, the targets were military industry cities guarded by military units. They were thus military and not civilian targets. In fact, there were 40,000 Japanese troops inside the city Hiroshima on the day of its bombing and both cities had air defense artillery batteries guarding them.

3. Months prior Japanese cities had been covered in dropped leaflets telling civilians to evacuate cities. While the record is unclear, survivors of Hiroshima recall leaflets being dropped on the city just days before the attack.

4. While there is a lot of debate on whether the bombs were needed to end the war, the people that truly mattered, Truman and Churchill, both were convinced that the bombs ultimately saved hundreds of thousands, if not millions of lives by removing the need for an invasion of the Japanese homeland. This premise was fueled by fierce Japanese resistence from Iwo Jima (99% Japanese casualties)and Okinawa (94%) where Japanese soldiers fought to the death rather than surrender. The idea was further fueled by Japanese war ministry orders to execute POWs if the POW camp came within the combat zone.

5. Emperor Hirohito himself stated in 1975: "It's very regrettable that nuclear bombs were dropped and I feel sorry for the citizens of Hiroshima but it couldn't be helped (Shikata ga nai) because that happened in wartime."

The actual debate on this will never end because people will never agree on if it were necessary for the Japanese mainland to have been invaded, or how hard it would have been defended if it had been. There are certainly big 'ifs' on all sides of the argument.

I, myself, believe an invasion would have been necessary and it would have been horribly bloody given the examples of Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

Mark me down as the bombs were justified by both the situation at the time, and from the law of war as it existed then.

News to me. I change my mind. Justified.

 

[Agent327]

IIRC he issued an edict through the military that told them of the dangers of barbaric American GI's and encouraged them to die rather than surrender.

That's another interesting statement. But do you have any sources for either? As I've never heard or read about any declarations (or edicts) from the emperor. An edict, by the way, would be an odd thing for the ceremonial function of the emperor; he had no official governmental duties or privileges beyond being head of state, AFAIK.

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

Sure, they can be justified. That doesn't mean everyone is obliged to agree with the justification, though.

 

[Crezth]

It's not "like" that at all. Japan was completely defeated, and they only wanted one thing which they ended up getting anyway. They were more than willing to accept any other conditions.

This is objectively untrue, and it's rather sad to see this myth continue to get peddled about. The Potsdam Declaration consisted of the peace terms the Japanese were eventually forced to accept, and it was rejected flatly and deliberately, without any retort until well after the bombings.http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surren...tion.2C_Allied_response.2C_and_Japanese_reply Even so, Japanese leadership was adamantly opposed to more than just losing the emperor: they also rejected "allied-imposed disarmament, Allied punishment of Japanese war criminals, and especially occupation and removal of the emperor," so it is little wonder that from that point forward the Allies practiced a policy of pursuing unconditional surrender (at Roosevelt's behest, no less).

Now I don't deny there wasn't a significant amount of racism employed against the Japanese and that the Allies had no shortage of war crimes on their end, but from their point of view to allow Japan's criminally evil government to prevail would be insufferable. I mean, we are talking about some seriously messed up stuff, and I actually like Japan.

And yes, I think it was also a huge mistake not to let Germany surrender as well. It directly led to a divided Germany and much of the so-called Cold War. Did the German government that entered into WWI still stay in power under the same terms as before?

An undivided Nazi Germany is unquestionably worse than a divided Germany of any stripe. Say what you will about the GDR but they didn't butcher millions in cold blood.

 

[Borachio]

3. Months prior Japanese cities had been covered in dropped leaflets telling civilians to evacuate cities. While the record is unclear, survivors of Hiroshima recall leaflets being dropped on the city just days before the attack.

This is news to me. Didn't do any good though. And I wouldn't have expected it to. If someone dropped a leaflet on your city telling you to evacuate, after 4 years of war, would you take it seriously? And if you did, is it likely the authorities would have let the entire population leave?

Wouldn't you have been more likely to see it as a propaganda exercise, simply designed to disrupt your nation's ability to continue fighting? Assuming you dared to even look at the leaflet?

 

[red_elk]

This is news to me.

What is news for me, is using the fact that the Japanese installed air defense around the city, as one of the reasons to justify its atomic bombing

 

[Thorgalaeg]

Indeed. It is nonsense. Imagine everybody in Japan leaving cities. Where could they go? Specially in Japan where most of the country are mountains and cliffs. It had been worse than any war. Maybe they could have gone to live at the sea, like in that chapter of the Simpson where dolphins take over the world...

 

[peter grimes]

Some thoughts:

1. Neither atomic bomb attack had the largest casualties of a bomb attack of the war.

2. Both atomic bomb attacks complied with the law of war as it stood at the time - that being, the targets were military industry cities guarded by military units. They were thus military and not civilian targets. In fact, there were 40,000 Japanese troops inside the city Hiroshima on the day of its bombing and both cities had air defense artillery batteries guarding them.

3. Months prior Japanese cities had been covered in dropped leaflets telling civilians to evacuate cities. While the record is unclear, survivors of Hiroshima recall leaflets being dropped on the city just days before the attack.

4. While there is a lot of debate on whether the bombs were needed to end the war, the people that truly mattered, Truman and Churchill, both were convinced that the bombs ultimately saved hundreds of thousands, if not millions of lives by removing the need for an invasion of the Japanese homeland. This premise was fueled by fierce Japanese resistence from Iwo Jima (99% Japanese casualties)and Okinawa (94%) where Japanese soldiers fought to the death rather than surrender. The idea was further fueled by Japanese war ministry orders to execute POWs if the POW camp came within the combat zone.

5. Emperor Hirohito himself stated in 1975: "It's very regrettable that nuclear bombs were dropped and I feel sorry for the citizens of Hiroshima but it couldn't be helped (Shikata ga nai) because that happened in wartime."

The actual debate on this will never end because people will never agree on if it were necessary for the Japanese mainland to have been invaded, or how hard it would have been defended if it had been. There are certainly big 'ifs' on all sides of the argument.

I, myself, believe an invasion would have been necessary and it would have been horribly bloody given the examples of Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

Mark me down as the bombs were justified by both the situation at the time, and from the law of war as it existed then.

Well said.

I voted "yes", by the way.

If anyone is interested in reading an excellent book on this, please consider Richard Rhodes' "The Making Of The Atomic Bomb". It's a thrilling read, exhaustively documented and researched.

 

[Tee Kay]

Would you think it a lie if the soldiers truly believed that the Americans were going to go on a rampage of rape and pillaging? And would you think it possible for many Japanese soldiers, being subject to lots of propaganda, to truly believe that?

The Imperial Japanese Army in particular (and the Navy to an arguably lesser extent) institutionalised brutality towards its own rank and file. Physical punishment was rampant in the Japanese military. Many Japanese soldiers went through the war thinking it was the norm for armies to act cruelly; the idea of an army that protects civilians, that doesn't beat its own soldiers, was alien to many of them.

It's not "like" that at all. Japan was completely defeated, and they only wanted one thing which they ended up getting anyway. They were more than willing to accept any other conditions.

And yes, I think it was also a huge mistake not to let Germany surrender as well. It directly led to a divided Germany and much of the so-called Cold War. Did the German government that entered into WWI still stay in power under the same terms as before?

Already addressed by Crezth, mostly. Also, the German government that signed Versailles was a revolutionary republican government, not the imperial government that went into the war. A comparable situation in the Second World War would be if the NSDAP was overthrown either by communists or the July 1944 coup (though given the scale of devastation wrought by Germany up until that point, it is unlikely that it would have received light terms, especially from the Soviets if the July Plot succeeded)

 

[warpus]

The atomic bombs' main purpose was to shock the Japanese into submission - or rather, to shock the Emperor enough that he'd intervene on the side of the peace party. The firebombings were much more devastating, but there's psychological value in obliterating a city with a single bomb.

That was the first bomb.

The second bomb was a message to the Russians.

First bomb was morally justified, IMO. Second one, not so much.

 

[Formaldehyde]

Not true, they wanted a lot more than keeping the Emporer and IIRC even accepted the condition that he be deposed which was later reversed by McArthur in order to lift Japanese morale and make the occupation easier.

Do you have any reliable source it is "not true" such as these below?

And that is what "unconditional surrender" means. There are no conditions whatsoever despite there being numerous ones specified in the Potsdam Declaration, as well as one which was missing entirely due to the opinions of the British in this regard.

The Potsdam Declaration

It was decided to issue a statement, the Potsdam Declaration, defining "Unconditional Surrender" and clarifying what it meant for the position of the emperor and for Hirohito personally. The American and British governments strongly disagreed on this point—United States wanted to abolish the position and possibly try him as a war criminal, while the British wanted to retain the position, perhaps with Hirohito still reigning. The Potsdam Declaration went through many drafts until a version acceptable to all was found.[70]

On July 26, the United States, Britain and China released the Potsdam Declaration announcing the terms for Japan's surrender, with the warning, "We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay." For Japan, the terms of the declaration specified:

the elimination "for all time [of] the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest"

the occupation of "points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies"

"Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshū, Hokkaidō, Kyūshū, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." As had been announced in the Cairo Declaration in 1943, Japan was to be reduced to her pre-1894 territory and stripped of her pre-war empire including Korea and Taiwan, as well as all her recent conquests.

"The Japanese military forces shall be completely disarmed"

"stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners"

On the other hand, the declaration stated that:

"We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, ... The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established."

"Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, ... Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted."

"The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

Contrary to popular belief[citation needed], the only use of the term "unconditional surrender" came at the end of the declaration:

"We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction."

Contrary to what had been intended at its conception, the Declaration made no mention of the emperor at all. Allied intentions on issues of utmost importance to the Japanese, including whether Hirohito was to be regarded as one of those who had "misled the people of Japan" or even a war criminal, or alternatively, whether the emperor might become part of a "peacefully inclined and responsible government" were thus left unstated.

The "prompt and utter destruction" clause has been interpreted as a veiled warning about American possession of the atomic bomb (which had been tested successfully on the first day of the conference).[71]

On July 30, Ambassador Satō wrote that Stalin was probably talking to Roosevelt and Churchill about his dealings with Japan, and he wrote: "There is no alternative but immediate unconditional surrender if we are to prevent Russia's participation in the war."[74] On August 2, Tōgō wrote to Satō: "it should not be difficult for you to realize that ... our time to proceed with arrangements of ending the war before the enemy lands on the Japanese mainland is limited, on the other hand it is difficult to decide on concrete peace conditions here at home all at once."[75]

As you can see, there were numerous qualifications to the "unconditional surrender". But the US deliberately did not include the one which was seen by many Japanese as being the most important one by far, despite the protestations of the British.

The Japanese were simply not given sufficient time to surrender:

Hiroshima: WHO DISAGREED WITH THE ATOMIC BOMBING?

~~~DWIGHT EISENHOWER

"...in [July] 1945... Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. ...the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent.

"During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude..."

- Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, pg. 380

In a Newsweek interview, Eisenhower again recalled the meeting with Stimson:

"...the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing."

- Ike on Ike, Newsweek, 11/11/63

~~~ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY

(Chief of Staff to Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman)
"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.

"The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children."

- William Leahy, I Was There, pg. 441.

~~~HERBERT HOOVER

On May 28, 1945, Hoover visited President Truman and suggested a way to end the Pacific war quickly: "I am convinced that if you, as President, will make a shortwave broadcast to the people of Japan - tell them they can have their Emperor if they surrender, that it will not mean unconditional surrender except for the militarists - you'll get a peace in Japan - you'll have both wars over."

Richard Norton Smith, An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover, pg. 347.

On August 8, 1945, after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Hoover wrote to Army and Navy Journal publisher Colonel John Callan O'Laughlin, "The use of the atomic bomb, with its indiscriminate killing of women and children, revolts my soul."

quoted from Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 635.

"...the Japanese were prepared to negotiate all the way from February 1945...up to and before the time the atomic bombs were dropped; ...if such leads had been followed up, there would have been no occasion to drop the [atomic] bombs."

- quoted by Barton Bernstein in Philip Nobile, ed., Judgment at the Smithsonian, pg. 142

Hoover biographer Richard Norton Smith has written: "Use of the bomb had besmirched America's reputation, he [Hoover] told friends. It ought to have been described in graphic terms before being flung out into the sky over Japan."

Richard Norton Smith, An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover, pg. 349-350.

In early May of 1946 Hoover met with General Douglas MacArthur. Hoover recorded in his diary, "I told MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria."

Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 350-351.

~~~GENERAL DOUGLAS MacARTHUR

MacArthur biographer William Manchester has described MacArthur's reaction to the issuance by the Allies of the Potsdam Proclamation to Japan: "...the Potsdam declaration in July, demand[ed] that Japan surrender unconditionally or face 'prompt and utter destruction.' MacArthur was appalled. He knew that the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it. Ironically, when the surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a continuation of the imperial reign. Had the General's advice been followed, the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary."

William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, pg. 512.

Norman Cousins was a consultant to General MacArthur during the American occupation of Japan. Cousins writes of his conversations with MacArthur, "MacArthur's views about the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were starkly different from what the general public supposed." He continues, "When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor."

Norman Cousins, The Pathology of Power, pg. 65, 70-71.

~~~JOHN McCLOY

(Assistant Sec. of War)

"I have always felt that if, in our ultimatum to the Japanese government issued from Potsdam [in July 1945], we had referred to the retention of the emperor as a constitutional monarch and had made some reference to the reasonable accessibility of raw materials to the future Japanese government, it would have been accepted. Indeed, I believe that even in the form it was delivered, there was some disposition on the part of the Japanese to give it favorable consideration. When the war was over I arrived at this conclusion after talking with a number of Japanese officials who had been closely associated with the decision of the then Japanese government, to reject the ultimatum, as it was presented. I believe we missed the opportunity of effecting a Japanese surrender, completely satisfactory to us, without the necessity of dropping the bombs."

McCloy quoted in James Reston, Deadline, pg. 500.

~~~RALPH BARD

(Under Sec. of the Navy)

On June 28, 1945, a memorandum written by Bard the previous day was given to Sec. of War Henry Stimson. It stated, in part:

"Following the three-power [July 1945 Potsdam] conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position [they were about to declare war on Japan] and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the [retention of the] Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.

"I don't see that we have anything in particular to lose in following such a program." He concluded the memorandum by noting, "The only way to find out is to try it out."

Memorandum on the Use of S-1 Bomb, Manhattan Engineer District Records, Harrison-Bundy files, folder # 77, National Archives (also contained in: Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed, 1987 edition, pg. 307-308).

Later Bard related, "...it definitely seemed to me that the Japanese were becoming weaker and weaker. They were surrounded by the Navy. They couldn't get any imports and they couldn't export anything. Naturally, as time went on and the war developed in our favor it was quite logical to hope and expect that with the proper kind of a warning the Japanese would then be in a position to make peace, which would have made it unnecessary for us to drop the bomb and have had to bring Russia in...".

quoted in Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed, The Decision To Drop the Bomb, pg. 144-145, 324.

Bard also asserted, "I think that the Japanese were ready for peace, and they already had approached the Russians and, I think, the Swiss. And that suggestion of [giving] a warning [of the atomic bomb] was a face-saving proposition for them, and one that they could have readily accepted." He continued, "In my opinion, the Japanese war was really won before we ever used the atom bomb. Thus, it wouldn't have been necessary for us to disclose our nuclear position and stimulate the Russians to develop the same thing much more rapidly than they would have if we had not dropped the bomb."

War Was Really Won Before We Used A-Bomb, U.S. News and World Report, 8/15/60, pg. 73-75.

~~~LEWIS STRAUSS

(Special Assistant to the Sec. of the Navy)

Strauss recalled a recommendation he gave to Sec. of the Navy James Forrestal before the atomic bombing of Hiroshima:

"I proposed to Secretary Forrestal that the weapon should be demonstrated before it was used. Primarily it was because it was clear to a number of people, myself among them, that the war was very nearly over. The Japanese were nearly ready to capitulate... My proposal to the Secretary was that the weapon should be demonstrated over some area accessible to Japanese observers and where its effects would be dramatic. I remember suggesting that a satisfactory place for such a demonstration would be a large forest of cryptomeria trees not far from Tokyo. The cryptomeria tree is the Japanese version of our redwood... I anticipated that a bomb detonated at a suitable height above such a forest... would lay the trees out in windrows from the center of the explosion in all directions as though they were matchsticks, and, of course, set them afire in the center. It seemed to me that a demonstration of this sort would prove to the Japanese that we could destroy any of their cities at will... Secretary Forrestal agreed wholeheartedly with the recommendation..."

Strauss added, "It seemed to me that such a weapon was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion, that once used it would find its way into the armaments of the world...".

quoted in Len Giovannitti and Fred Freed, The Decision To Drop the Bomb, pg. 145, 325.


~~~PAUL NITZE

(Vice Chairman, U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey)

In 1950 Nitze would recommend a massive military buildup, and in the 1980s he was an arms control negotiator in the Reagan administration. In July of 1945 he was assigned the task of writing a strategy for the air attack on Japan. Nitze later wrote:

"The plan I devised was essentially this: Japan was already isolated from the standpoint of ocean shipping. The only remaining means of transportation were the rail network and intercoastal shipping, though our submarines and mines were rapidly eliminating the latter as well. A concentrated air attack on the essential lines of transportation, including railroads and (through the use of the earliest accurately targetable glide bombs, then emerging from development) the Kammon tunnels which connected Honshu with Kyushu, would isolate the Japanese home islands from one another and fragment the enemy's base of operations. I believed that interdiction of the lines of transportation would be sufficiently effective so that additional bombing of urban industrial areas would not be necessary.

"While I was working on the new plan of air attack... concluded that even without the atomic bomb, Japan was likely to surrender in a matter of months. My own view was that Japan would capitulate by November 1945."

Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pg. 36-37 (my emphasis)

The U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey group, assigned by President Truman to study the air attacks on Japan, produced a report in July of 1946 that was primarily written by Nitze and reflected his reasoning:

"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

quoted in Barton Bernstein, The Atomic Bomb, pg. 52-56.

In his memoir, written in 1989, Nitze repeated,

"Even without the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it seemed highly unlikely, given what we found to have been the mood of the Japanese government, that a U.S. invasion of the islands [scheduled for November 1, 1945] would have been necessary."

Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pg. 44-45.


~~~ALBERT EINSTEIN

Einstein was not directly involved in the Manhattan Project (which developed the atomic bomb). In 1905, as part of his Special Theory of Relativity, he made the intriguing point that a relatively large amount of energy was contained in and could be released from a relatively small amount of matter. This became best known by the equation E=mc2. The atomic bomb was not based upon this theory but clearly illustrated it.

In 1939 Einstein signed a letter to President Roosevelt that was drafted by the scientist Leo Szilard. Received by FDR in October of that year, the letter from Einstein called for and sparked the beginning of U.S. government support for a program to build an atomic bomb, lest the Nazis build one first.

Einstein did not speak publicly on the atomic bombing of Japan until a year afterward. A short article on the front page of the New York Times contained his view:

"Prof. Albert Einstein... said that he was sure that President Roosevelt would have forbidden the atomic bombing of Hiroshima had he been alive and that it was probably carried out to end the Pacific war before Russia could participate."

Einstein Deplores Use of Atom Bomb, New York Times, 8/19/46, pg. 1.

Regarding the 1939 letter to Roosevelt, his biographer, Ronald Clark, has noted:

"As far as his own life was concerned, one thing seemed quite clear. 'I made one great mistake in my life,' he said to Linus Pauling, who spent an hour with him on the morning of November 11, 1954, '...when I signed the letter to President Roosevelt recommending that atom bombs be made; but there was some justification - the danger that the Germans would make them.'".

Ronald Clark, Einstein: The Life and Times, pg. 620.


~~~LEO SZILARD

(The first scientist to conceive of how an atomic bomb might be made - 1933)
For many scientists, one motivation for developing the atomic bomb was to make sure Germany, well known for its scientific capabilities, did not get it first. This was true for Szilard, a Manhattan Project scientist.

"In the spring of '45 it was clear that the war against Germany would soon end, and so I began to ask myself, 'What is the purpose of continuing the development of the bomb, and how would the bomb be used if the war with Japan has not ended by the time we have the first bombs?".

Szilard quoted in Spencer Weart and Gertrud Weiss Szilard, ed., Leo Szilard: His Version of the Facts, pg. 181.

After Germany surrendered, Szilard attempted to meet with President Truman. Instead, he was given an appointment with Truman's Sec. of State to be, James Byrnes. In that meeting of May 28, 1945, Szilard told Byrnes that the atomic bomb should not be used on Japan. Szilard recommended, instead, coming to an international agreement on the control of atomic weapons before shocking other nations by their use:

"I thought that it would be a mistake to disclose the existence of the bomb to the world before the government had made up its mind about how to handle the situation after the war. Using the bomb certainly would disclose that the bomb existed." According to Szilard, Byrnes was not interested in international control: "Byrnes... was concerned about Russia's postwar behavior. Russian troops had moved into Hungary and Rumania, and Byrnes thought it would be very difficult to persuade Russia to withdraw her troops from these countries, that Russia might be more manageable if impressed by American military might, and that a demonstration of the bomb might impress Russia." Szilard could see that he wasn't getting though to Byrnes; "I was concerned at this point that by demonstrating the bomb and using it in the war against Japan, we might start an atomic arms race between America and Russia which might end with the destruction of both countries.".

Szilard quoted in Spencer Weart and Gertrud Weiss Szilard, ed., Leo Szilard: His Version of the Facts, pg. 184.

Two days later, Szilard met with J. Robert Oppenheimer, the head scientist in the Manhattan Project. "I told Oppenheimer that I thought it would be a very serious mistake to use the bomb against the cities of Japan. Oppenheimer didn't share my view." "'Well, said Oppenheimer, 'don't you think that if we tell the Russians what we intend to do and then use the bomb in Japan, the Russians will understand it?'. 'They'll understand it only too well,' Szilard replied, no doubt with Byrnes's intentions in mind."

Szilard quoted in Spencer Weart and Gertrud Weiss Szilard, ed., Leo Szilard: His Version of the Facts, pg. 185; also William Lanouette, Genius In the Shadows: A Biography of Leo Szilard, pg. 266-267.

There are many more similar opinions in this article and others from prominent military and civilian leaders, such as this one:

Was Hiroshima Necessary? Why the Atomic Bombings Could Have Been Avoided

General Curtis LeMay, who had pioneered precision bombing of Germany and Japan (and who later headed the Strategic Air Command and served as Air Force chief of staff), put it most succinctly: "The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war."

So no, I don't think dropping of two atomic bombs on major Japanese cities can be justified now any more than they were justified back then. YMMV.