Dreadnought said:
Well said Alder, well said. I admire your knowledge on these topics
I agree with the French soldiers revolting. The entire French army was about to mutiny.....you can guess the rest.
Not more so than they could still launch hugely successful offensives in 1918.
The French army almost went to pieces in 1917, only it didn't. And it failed to fall apart under the preassure if the German 1918 offensives. And it again spectacularily failed to fail when launching an offensive of its own in 1918, instead messing up the Germans badly and breaking through.
I know it flies in the face of conventional US/UK wisdom (received ideas), but that's about the size of it.
And German historians have recently pointed out that after four years of carnage the German armies were displaying the same signs of fatigue as the French army was.
Nivelle's 1917 spring offensive started with high hopes. When these were dashed you the reaction was dramatic, with entire units refusing to go back into the trenches. These had to be rotated out of combat and replaced with dependable troops. But there were still dependable troops around to take their place.
And with much less hoopla Ludendorff on the German side by 1917 also had to contend with problems of German troops no longer dependable in battle. The big difference was that Ludendorff was the virtual generalissimo of a not-quite-as-democratic Germany compared to France, which meant he could put a lid on things while the French generals had to deal with this stuff in the open. (Check out the relevant article in the anthology "Facing Armageddon" if you like.)
And turning to the German 1918 offensives, their failure produced reactions extremely similar to those of the French army in 1917.
So I'll certainly admit that the French army had a breaking point, and one more easily reached than either the German armies of the British by 1918. The up-side was of course that the French commanders were very much aware of how far they could push things.
Which is where one can bring up the major factor in favour of the French army by wars end French military industry was outproducing everyone else. France hade more guns, tanks and aircraft than anyone else. The French army in WWI had perhaps the steepest learning curve, starting with "offensive à outrance", to "war of attrition" to "war of materiel".
So even if French troops in general had to be handled with more care than German or British ones, France in the end was going to win not from "moral factors" by through firepower and mechanisation.
With a US out of the war and a Germany not pressured to force a decison the war would have dragged on, but the German material handicap would just have increased. The Royal Flying Corps by 1919 would have been sending fleets of bombers to Berlin in WWII-style strategic bombing raids increasing German trouble for instance.