History questions not worth their own thread V

[Wrymouth3]

I was... jesting, do you really think I actually worship Dachs? That would be quite a literal interpretation.

I'll take your word for it, I didn't mean to offend you. I was speaking in general, and used that post as a basis.

 

[Masada]

There is no History but Dachs and Kraznaya is the Prophet of Dachs.

 

[Lord Baal]

Is there any era of history you are actually clueless about?

Yep. Ask him about India.

 

[Mouthwash]

DAAAACHS, does the culture and interpretations of Islamic law in the Mughal empire reflect a primarily Indian or Mongol-persian identity? DAAAACHS, has Fabian socialism contributed to India's agricultural stagnation and water shortages? DAAAACHS, would Alexander have had his ass kicked had he continued?

 

[ReindeerThistle]

This is for History Questions NOT worth their own thread.

 

[Mouthwash]

This is for History Questions NOT worth their own thread.

Oh, right. I'd make them now, but I think that the joke would be lost.

 

[JohannaK]

Is it possible that it was Napoleon officials' fault that the Russian campaign went so bad? I mean, it would be rather uncharacteristic of the best general this world has seen to blunder as he happened to do there.

 

[Mouthwash]

Is it possible that it was Napoleon officials' fault that the Russian campaign went so bad? I mean, it would be rather uncharacteristic of the best general this world has seen to blunder as he happened to do there.

Not sure if joking, but if so I fail to see the point.

 

[Dachs]

Is it possible that it was Napoleon officials' fault that the Russian campaign went so bad? I mean, it would be rather uncharacteristic of the best general this world has seen to blunder as he happened to do there.

Napoleon's conduct of the Russian campaign went more or less in the same sort of paradigm in which he managed his previous ones. The problem was that he was finally up against opponents who recognized his bag of tricks and had countermeasures for them.

Defeat was hardly unusual for Napoleon. He lost the campaign of Acre quite embarrassingly in 1798-99 (an amusing coda to the Egyptian campaign, his victory in which is often credited to the decrepitude of the Ottoman military without recognizing that that military promptly knocked him on his ass several months later, something that no European military had done up to that point). He certainly did not win the Battle of Eylau in 1807, which was a tactical draw and an operational defeat. His participation in the Peninsular War, brief as it was, reflected no real credit on his abilities. The Austrian army beat him outright at Aspern-Essling in 1809. And then his forces were crushed in every single one of his campaigns from 1812 to 1815.

Napoleon, naturally, chose to blame virtually anybody but himself for his disasters, in typical self-serving fashion. His dispatch after his escape from Russia in 1812 placed the onus of the defeat on a) bad weather, b) bad luck, and c) the errors of his subordinates and allies, even to the point of outright betrayal. What is annoying is that this line became the traditional interpretation of Napoleon's generalship for the longest time. Exculpatory historians placed blame on the numbers of Napoleon's opponents, their refusal to "fight fair", the failures of his marshals to properly execute his orders, or really anything other than simply saying that he got beat. Which is what happened.

 

[Mouthwash]

Napoleon's conduct of the Russian campaign went more or less in the same sort of paradigm in which he managed his previous ones. The problem was that he was finally up against opponents who recognized his bag of tricks and had countermeasures for them.

Defeat was hardly unusual for Napoleon. He lost the campaign of Acre quite embarrassingly in 1798-99 (an amusing coda to the Egyptian campaign, his victory in which is often credited to the decrepitude of the Ottoman military without recognizing that that military promptly knocked him on his ass several months later, something that no European military had done up to that point). He certainly did not win the Battle of Eylau in 1807, which was a tactical draw and an operational defeat. His participation in the Peninsular War, brief as it was, reflected no real credit on his abilities. The Austrian army beat him outright at Aspern-Essling in 1809. And then his forces were crushed in every single one of his campaigns from 1812 to 1815.

Napoleon, naturally, chose to blame virtually anybody but himself for his disasters, in typical self-serving fashion. His dispatch after his escape from Russia in 1812 placed the onus of the defeat on a) bad weather, b) bad luck, and c) the errors of his subordinates and allies, even to the point of outright betrayal. What is annoying is that this line became the traditional interpretation of Napoleon's generalship for the longest time. Exculpatory historians placed blame on the numbers of Napoleon's opponents, their refusal to "fight fair", the failures of his marshals to properly execute his orders, or really anything other than simply saying that he got beat. Which is what happened.

So... was he sometimes a genius™ or not really ever?

 

[JohannaK]

Not sure if joking, but if so I fail to see the point.

It's a dachs bait. Talk in a positive light about Napoleon and say stuff about the schlieffen Plan and he will appear out of nothing to beat you to death with historical knowledge.

 

[Antilogic]

Napoleon's conduct of the Russian campaign went more or less in the same sort of paradigm in which he managed his previous ones. The problem was that he was finally up against opponents who recognized his bag of tricks and had countermeasures for them.

Defeat was hardly unusual for Napoleon. He lost the campaign of Acre quite embarrassingly in 1798-99 (an amusing coda to the Egyptian campaign, his victory in which is often credited to the decrepitude of the Ottoman military without recognizing that that military promptly knocked him on his ass several months later, something that no European military had done up to that point). He certainly did not win the Battle of Eylau in 1807, which was a tactical draw and an operational defeat. His participation in the Peninsular War, brief as it was, reflected no real credit on his abilities. The Austrian army beat him outright at Aspern-Essling in 1809. And then his forces were crushed in every single one of his campaigns from 1812 to 1815.

Napoleon, naturally, chose to blame virtually anybody but himself for his disasters, in typical self-serving fashion. His dispatch after his escape from Russia in 1812 placed the onus of the defeat on a) bad weather, b) bad luck, and c) the errors of his subordinates and allies, even to the point of outright betrayal. What is annoying is that this line became the traditional interpretation of Napoleon's generalship for the longest time. Exculpatory historians placed blame on the numbers of Napoleon's opponents, their refusal to "fight fair", the failures of his marshals to properly execute his orders, or really anything other than simply saying that he got beat. Which is what happened.

I've heard arguments that Napoleon was most skilled with smaller formations of troops (ex. the Italian Campaign). Once the formations got large enough proper coordination became difficult for the commanders, especially so for Napoleon and his quite-confusing directions to subordinates.

 

[Arakhor]

One of Napoleon's less-admired generals became King of Sweden and Norway, so Marshal Bernadotte didn't do too badly.

 

[sophie]

It's a dachs bait. Talk in a positive light about Napoleon and say stuff about the schlieffen Plan and he will appear out of nothing to beat you to death with historical knowledge.

So you're saying you intentionally asked a stupid question so Dachs could come in and provide you with an answer you already knew?

Do you see how this kinda exactly the sort of thing wrymouth was talking about?

 

[Flying Pig]

I've heard arguments that Napoleon was most skilled with smaller formations of troops (ex. the Italian Campaign). Once the formations got large enough proper coordination became difficult for the commanders, especially so for Napoleon and his quite-confusing directions to subordinates.

This is probably more of a comment on Napoleonic officers in general than Napoleon himself. The French Army of the time employed an absolute system of promotion by distinction in combat, essentially producing a hierarchy of courage. What this meant was that you had a lot of people with the ability to inspire soldiers immediately around them and encourage devotion and respect in their troops, but who didn't necessarily have the intellectual training or capacity to plan operations for or simply administer large formations.

 

[JohannaK]

So you're saying you intentionally asked a stupid question so Dachs could come in and provide you with an answer you already knew?

Do you see how this kinda exactly the sort of thing wrymouth was talking about?

Oh, no, not at all. I mean yes, but not entirely for the sole purpose of summoning dachs. I made it because it was a question I was positive Dachs would answer AND that it would give me at the very least bits of information I did not know.

 

[Dachs]

I've heard arguments that Napoleon was most skilled with smaller formations of troops (ex. the Italian Campaign). Once the formations got large enough proper coordination became difficult for the commanders, especially so for Napoleon and his quite-confusing directions to subordinates.

I don't really think so. Actually, Napoleon did better at coordinating large numbers of troops than most commanders in history. Look at the 1805 campaign: two vast coalitions with armies lumbering into play on a front that stretched from southern Italy clear to the Baltic coast. Napoleon kept a handle on more or less all of his troop masses and directed them competently, even in some cases brilliantly. His opponents...did not, and that was why they lost.

A point that's often brought up here in an effort to convert correlation into causation is Napoleon's ostensibly rudimentary staff system. The criticism has some legs - by 1813, Prussia, Russia, and Austria all had staffs that did between competent and stellar work - but the extent to which Napoleon's armies lacked a staff system is very much overblown. There are ridiculous stories about Napoleon and Berthier sitting around a campfire late into the night during the Waterloo campaign, planning out all the maneuvers and supply lines for the entire army. That's simply not creditable. France had an excellent commissariat, staffed with more than competent officers, dating back to the revolutionary period; it did not simply evaporate in June 1812. Napoleon's armies remained very well supplied and armed until the very end, and it's hard to come up with any examples of the Emperor simply losing track of any of his forces.

This is a man about whom two frankly bizarre criticisms are made simultaneously: that he failed to keep his armies cohesive and under firm control, and that he micromanaged his subordinates too much and did not permit them enough local initiative. I suppose these two things could be possible at the same time, but that doesn't seem particularly likely to me. Unfortunately, there's no possible statistic to measure Napoleon's effective control of large armies. But I would say that he did no worse than any of his contemporaries at it, and much better than most of them.

Simply put, I think that Napoleon was an excellent gambler who managed to stay ahead of the house for a long time, but eventually everything caught up with him. He simply ran too many risks to keep his operation going forever. Because of his conception of his role in the world and in international politics, he failed to conceive of a situation in which he stopped taking risks and simply settled down to consolidate a stable empire. And finally, although he was a very skilled general officer, he was not perfect, and made many poor decisions throughout his career. Until 1812, Napoleon was more or less capable of evading the consequences of those poor decisions. After that, though, the chickens came home to roost, as it were.

 

[Lord Baal]

So... was he sometimes a genius™ or not really ever?

I think it's somewhat irrefutable that Napoleon was among a wave of military innovators during his period. He attained a higher rank than other such innovators, and due to his broad experience over a fairly short period of time was able to become proficient in his new methodology fairly quickly. The problem is that he was hardly the only person developing new military techniques revolving around manoeuvre and firepower at the time - I have a headache, sue me for using sweeping generalities rather than thinking hard enough to find the words I know exist for this - and that he eventually started to run into more and more rival generals who had the new game figured out as well as he did.

Napoleon was an innovator, which we would probably term a "genius." He was only unique in his success, not his innovations. Look at like this; is Bill Gates any smarter than a dozen other tech-savvy guys in the early-'80s, or did he just have the luck and timing to strike it big when he did? Nappy is similar.

 

[Gucumatz]

I read somewhere on another forum that the Seven Years War was started by an ambush by George Washington. It got me thinking since I really don't know what started the Seven Years/French and Indian war. What exactly started it? The Prussians or something else?

 

[Louis XXIV]

Unlike the rest of the wars that Americans group as the French and Indian Wars where the American role is often overstated, the American theater of the Seven Years' War was actually really significant. I think the fighting in the colonies with Fort Necessity and all that predates the declaration of war and might not technically have been the cassus belli, but it was a major driving force.