History Questions Not Worth Their Own Thread VI

[H4run]

Well then, let me rephrase, why does a Turkish keyboard put "ı" in the place of "i"?

that's a tough question! because maybe they see "ı" much more important than "i" that's why the replace "i" in such isolation? but I guess that also wrong. But be calm I mostly online with my laptop and using common qwerty keyboard.

 

[sydhe]

They're different letters in Turkish.

 

[r16]

considering they represent different sounds . As far my limited knowledge on the use of the former Alphabet allows me ; they were writing without the wovels or the their use was likewise limited . Leading to situations where people would be unable to read what they had written themselves , forgetting the context and what they were supposed to convey . On a Qwerty keyboard ı is between u and o and i is directly to the left of comma-semicolon button .

and of course the former Alphabet is still Turkish alphabet . Replaced not because it was Arabic / Persian but there could be a better way .

 

[H4run]

-nvm-
edit: I'm sorry I get it wrong, you were talking about the keyboard mapping not about the pronunciation.

 

[DaNuke]

How long the Mongol empire existed?

 

[Ajidica]

It depends, which one are you talking about and how would you define 'Mongol Empire'.
For example, this guy was a male-line descendent of Genghis Khan and ruled until 1920.

Spoiler :

(Was this also an excuse for me to use a Prokudin-Gorskii picture? Could be!)

 

[Dachs]

It depends, which one are you talking about and how would you define 'Mongol Empire'.
For example, this guy was a male-line descendent of Genghis Khan and ruled until 1920.

the bogd xaan ruled in urga until his death in 1924

 

[Domen]

Can someone tell me why many people claim that the Treaty of Versailles was harsh and that the rise of Nazism in Germany - and not for example in Turkey, or anywhere else - was the result of that harshness?

IMO the rise of Nazism in Germany was actually the result of not harsh enough punishment and of not executing even that relatively modest punishment consistently enough. After WW1, as a matter of fact, Germany suffered the least harsh punishment out of all major Central Powers.

Compare for example the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles with that of the Treaty of Sèvres:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Sèvres

It was de facto the partition of Turkey (nothing similar happened to Germany after WW1):

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partitioning_of_the_Ottoman_Empire

Of course in the end - due to Turkish resistance - the treaty of Sevres did not come into force.

But even the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 was still harsher than the Treaty of Versailles.

Territory of Turkey decreased from 1,800,000 km2 in 1914 to 763,000 km2 in 1930 - i.e. Turkey lost ca. 58% of its territory.

Had the Treaty of Sevres actually been implemented, Turkey would have lost even more - something like ca. 70% of its territory.

Austria-Hungary (especially the Hungarian part) was of course treated even more harshly than Turkey.

Russia - despite not being one of Central Powers - also suffered more as the result of WW1 than Germany.

Territory of the Soviet Union in 1930 was 21,176,000 km2.

Territory of Russia in 1914 was well over 21,800,000 km2.

This means that as the result of WW1 Russia lost ca. 650,000 km2.

Of course territorial losses of Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1917 were even bigger than that.

But as we know later the Soviet Union regained large part of territory lost by Russia in 1917 at Brest-Litovsk.

Turkish army according to the Treaty of Sevres was reduced to just 50,000 soldiers.

Germany in the Treaty of Versailles was allowed to have 100,000 regular soldiers strong army. Two times more.

Nobody allowed for plebiscites in territories taken from Austria-Hungary and from Turkey. Unlike in case of disputed areas of Germany.

In many other ways, Germany was also treated extremely softly and gently compared to other defeated Central Powers.

In the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary lost 72% of its territory from 1914, inhabited by 3,3 million ethnic Hungarians. What remained was 28% of its territory from 1914, inhabited by 7,3 million ethnic Hungarians. So over 31% of ethnic Hungarians were left outside of the new borders of Hungary. Not to mention other citizens of pre-WW1 Hungary, who were not ethnic Hungarians, but many of whom perhaps felt allegiance to Hungarian state.

No plebiscite was organized to let them show that allegiance.

 

[GamezRule]

For all practical and legal purposes, what was the difference between the Tsardom of Russia and the Russian Empire?

 

[Dachs]

For all practical and legal purposes, what was the difference between the Tsardom of Russia and the Russian Empire?

It was a rebrand intended to exhibit the appearance of dramatic change without, for the most part, the substance.

 

[Agent327]

Can someone tell me why many people claim that the Treaty of Versailles was harsh and that the rise of Nazism in Germany - and not for example in Turkey, or anywhere else - was the result of that harshness?

IMO the rise of Nazism in Germany was actually the result of not harsh enough punishment and of not executing even that relatively modest punishment consistently enough. After WW1, as a matter of fact, Germany suffered the least harsh punishment out of all major Central Powers.

Compare for example the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles with that of the Treaty of Sèvres:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_of_Sèvres

It was de facto the partition of Turkey (nothing similar happened to Germany after WW1):

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partitioning_of_the_Ottoman_Empire

Of course in the end - due to Turkish resistance - the treaty of Sevres did not come into force.

But even the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 was still harsher than the Treaty of Versailles.

Territory of Turkey decreased from 1,800,000 km2 in 1914 to 763,000 km2 in 1930 - i.e. Turkey lost ca. 58% of its territory.

Had the Treaty of Sevres actually been implemented, Turkey would have lost even more - something like ca. 70% of its territory.

Austria-Hungary (especially the Hungarian part) was of course treated even more harshly than Turkey.

Russia - despite not being one of Central Powers - also suffered more as the result of WW1 than Germany.

Territory of the Soviet Union in 1930 was 21,176,000 km2.

Territory of Russia in 1914 was well over 21,800,000 km2.

This means that as the result of WW1 Russia lost ca. 650,000 km2.

Of course territorial losses of Russia in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1917 were even bigger than that.

But as we know later the Soviet Union regained large part of territory lost by Russia in 1917 at Brest-Litovsk.

Turkish army according to the Treaty of Sevres was reduced to just 50,000 soldiers.

Germany in the Treaty of Versailles was allowed to have 100,000 regular soldiers strong army. Two times more.

Nobody allowed for plebiscites in territories taken from Austria-Hungary and from Turkey. Unlike in case of disputed areas of Germany.

Fascist and ultranationalist movements rose in both Austria and Hungary.

The treaty of Sèvres, as you mentioned yourself, never came into effect, due to a nationalist movement in the Turkish army corps.

I'm not quite sure what the mention of Russia has to do with anything. It dropped out of the war following the October Revolution.

In many other ways, Germany was also treated extremely softly and gently compared to other defeated Central Powers.

In the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary lost 72% of its territory from 1914, inhabited by 3,3 million ethnic Hungarians. What remained was 28% of its territory from 1914, inhabited by 7,3 million ethnic Hungarians. So over 31% of ethnic Hungarians were left outside of the new borders of Hungary. Not to mention other citizens of pre-WW1 Hungary, who were not ethnic Hungarians, but many of whom perhaps felt allegiance to Hungarian state.

No plebiscite was organized to let them show that allegiance.

It's interesting you forgot to mention the forced reparation payments put upon Germany, as it was considered the sole nation responsible for WW I.

Ofcourse the treaty of Versailles was imposed upon the republic of Germany, not the empire, whose commanders graciously stepped aside to let the republic take the blame for Germany's surrender (Dolchstosz legend, which subsequently played a part in Nazi and ultranationalist German propaganda).

For all practical and legal purposes, what was the difference between the Tsardom of Russia and the Russian Empire?

Well, as that wiki tells, the czardom of Russia was originally the czardom of Muscovy. With the extension of territory grew also the extension of its title. As Dachs mentions, it's not entirely clear what the name-change to 'Russian empire' actually entails: the Russian emperor was still known as czar when the last one abdicated in 1917. But Peter the Great was an admirer of Western Europe, where 'empire' and 'emperor' were more common. He did pursue certain reforms, but in essence the empire was still the same czardom.

 

[Domen]

It's interesting you forgot to mention the forced reparation payments put upon Germany

In reality - not really:

Since and including the Treaty of Versailles, war reparations have been contrary to US foreign policy. Even the reparations owed by Germany under the Treaty of Versailles to the allied powers (none were demanded by the US, an associated power) were paid by the United States by giving Germany loans in greater value than the reparations she paid, these loans were defaulted on in 1932 and never repaid.

 

[Agent327]

Interesting detail: the US did not ratify the treaty of Versailles.

France, however, which did, was very insistent about German reparations.

 

[Cheezy the Wiz]

For all practical and legal purposes, what was the difference between the Tsardom of Russia and the Russian Empire?

It was a rebrand intended to exhibit the appearance of dramatic change without, for the most part, the substance.

It was more of an official acceptance and codification of a long-recognized situation: that of a multi-national empire ruled by Russians.

 

[Tahuti]

From another thread

Maybe so, but it's also an historical discussion. Historians have to deal with issues of identity and cultural change in pretty much every period they study, and they don't really have the luxury of delegating the issue to philosophers.

Why not subordinate the field of history to philosophy? It would also give history a very direct utility.

 

[Traitorfish]

I don't know if that would be much use. They're dealing with largely different concerns, especially in the English-speaking world where analytical philosophy predominates.

 

[History_Buff]

Why not subordinate the field of history to philosophy? It would also give history a very direct utility.

Because philosophy is the worst thing ever, and the less of it I have to deal with the better?

 

[Tahuti]

Because philosophy is the worst thing ever, and the less of it I have to deal with the better?

@#&*@&

I don't know if that would be much use. They're dealing with largely different concerns, especially in the English-speaking world where analytical philosophy predominates.

Subordination doesn't mean it has to be used all the time. Analytical philosophy arguably deals with the kind of subject matter that doesn't rely need to rely on history, so that may be thee exception. It is a really big thing for Continental philosophy though.

That said, the Continental vs. Analytical distinction is extremely dated and you may want to kill it off: Plenty of recent philosophers like Alain de Botton arguably transcend the boundaries of analytical and continental philosophy. Philosophy is a way older discipline than history isn't it?

 

[Plotinus]

That said, the Continental vs. Analytical distinction is extremely dated and you may want to kill it off: Plenty of recent philosophers like Alain de Botton arguably transcend the boundaries of analytical and continental philosophy. Philosophy is a way older discipline than history isn't it?

I'm not sure I'd agree that Alain de Botton "transcends" any philosophical traditions - more that he doesn't reach their level to start with. He's more of a general essayist who uses philosophical ideas at a popular level, a bit like Voltaire - he hasn't, to my knowledge, made any contribution to philosophy at the professional level.

I know it's often said these days that the continental versus analytic dichotomy is dead or was never even alive to start with, but I don't really see any evidence for that. All of the continental philosophy I've encountered has been radically different from anything I'm familiar with.

Anyway, while I obviously think that any discipline would be improved by turning it over to (analytic) philosophers, history differs from philosophy in that there are well established methods for establishing the truth, or at least the probable truth, in history. That leaves no room for philosophical discussion. Of course history provides plenty of material for philosophical discussion, and the border between the two may sometimes be very blurred, as in the case of how to handle questions of identity; but they're still distinct disciplines.

 

[Tahuti]

I'm not sure I'd agree that Alain de Botton "transcends" any philosophical traditions - more that he doesn't reach their level to start with. He's more of a general essayist who uses philosophical ideas at a popular level, a bit like Voltaire - he hasn't, to my knowledge, made any contribution to philosophy at the professional level.

I actually wanted to put forward Nassim Nicholas Taleb as well. I think Alain de Botton, together with Nassim Taleb somehow represent a strain in philosophy distinct from both Continental and Analytical philosophy, yet influenced by both by a small degree. Both men are actually hostile to reductionism analytical philosophy is accused of, yet without embracing any of the traditional continental schools like postmodernism, structuralism, existentialism etc. Actually, Nassim is pretty hostile to Postmodernism as well.

I know it's often said these days that the continental versus analytic dichotomy is dead or was never even alive to start with, but I don't really see any evidence for that. All of the continental philosophy I've encountered has been radically different from anything I'm familiar with.

There was plenty of crossovering between (Analytical) Wittgenstein and (Continental) Nietzsche. So, it the distinction may indeed have been a false dichotomy for starters. Though Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore would arguably be the quintessential 'stereotypical' analytic philosophers. Pretty much all other so-called analytical philosophers are to some degree indebted to continental philosophers and vice versa.

Anyway, while I obviously think that any discipline would be improved by turning it over to (analytic) philosophers, history differs from philosophy in that there are well established methods for establishing the truth, or at least the probable truth, in history. That leaves no room for philosophical discussion. Of course history provides plenty of material for philosophical discussion, and the border between the two may sometimes be very blurred, as in the case of how to handle questions of identity; but they're still distinct disciplines.

Because history is able to provide certainty philosophy can't, wouldn't you say history would be an excellent tool for philosophy?