This post is structured mainly as a reply to Sill. Nonetheless, I hope to address several concerns raised by other posters whilst elucidating my arguments and broad position. I hope to address four broad topics. I shall start by defending and explicating the argument from moral disagreement. I shall argue that this argument stands, and I shall explicate precisely why disagreement, and the general presuppositions of our moral discourse, constitute an argument for moral realism. I shall then criticize Sill’s version of subjectivism. I shall argue it does not provide an adequate account of morality because it makes morality fundamentally arbitrary. Moving on, I shall explicate my notion of what value is, and argue that to say that value ‘depends on preference’ is to beg the question again me. I shall argue that value must be non-arbitrary, and that it can be. Finally, I shall explain how I believe valuing things gives rise to morality and concurrently defend (and refine!) my argument that acting immorally is irrational.
For ease of reading, I put some less important comments in spoilers. These comments address points not central to my main arguments. I will often pick up a point and discuss it in these boxes alone I reference periodically throughout the post to quotes at the bottom. That is to say, I quote the posters to whom my comments apply especially at the bottom. This should give one an idea as to what it is I am replying. Because of the character limit, my post is split into two parts.
Defending the Argument from Moral Disagreement
As I have said, I shall begin with rationally argued moral disagreement (let it be understood that ‘rationally argued’ should be prefixed to my mentions of disagreement). Sill argues that we can have disagreement without concluding that there is a fact of the matter regarding the subject of disagreement
1 . That we disagree about, and argue rationally regarding, the relative merits of a film or fashion does not lead us to conclude that there is a truth of the matter regarding whether how good a film is. It does not commit us to objective standards of film-quality. More starkly, I can disagree with someone regarding how tasty a meal was. We can argue rationally about it; I can say that it was far too spicy, my interlocutor can retort that this failed to outweigh the delicious aftertaste. But surely in this case we do not think there is a fact of the matter! There are no facts of the matter regarding how tasty something is. And, perhaps, there are no facts of the matter regarding how good a film or work of art is. Taste-realism is certainly false, aesthetic realism probably so.
This argument is meant to undermine the prima facie argument regarding moral disagreement. We are meant to infer that the existence of disagreement, even rationally argued disagreement, does not entail that there is a fact of the matter –an objective fact- over which we are disagreeing. And
certainly we should accept this! The aforementioned disagreement doesn’t entail said objective facts, as the taste case shows clearly. But more fundamentally, Sill’s attack misses it mark. Or, at least, it fails to contradict anything I have maintained. I have not said that such disagreements entails that facts of the matter exist. I have said that they provide prima facie evidence of such facts. Prima facie evidence is the type of evidence that can be defeated. I’ll give an example; seeing a stick as bent is prima facie evidence that that stick is bent. It (surely!) provides for me evidence that said stick is bent. But this evidence is defeated if I see that the stick is half submerged in water. Because of what I know of the science of optics, this new facts defeats the prima facie evidence of my eyes.
I am maintaining that the existence of rationally argued moral disagreement, and by extension the other presuppositions of our moral discourse which require moral realism, provide prima facie evidence of moral realism. In the light of this, do the example of film and art and taste refute my claim?
They do not. I can surely maintain that rational disagreement over these issues is also prima facie evidence that there are objective facts in the fields of aesthetics and taste. Indeed, I do so maintain. The difference is that in the field of taste and aesthetics we have conclusive evidence that there are no objective facts (I am much less sure about this claim in aesthetics!). In taste, the existence of truly irresolvable disagreement believes the prima facie evidence for taste-realism. The fact that, when you and I disagree about whether strawberry ice cream is delicious or disgusting and our disagreement is utterly intractable defeats said evidence. In discussing film, that our disagreement is similiarly irresolvable (if it is) also belies the evidence for film-goodness realism. As I said in my opening post, if moral disagreement were irresolvable this would be strong evidence against moral realism. But I do not believe that we have any evidence that such disagreement is irresolvable. For a defence of my views here, I refer you to the last section of said OP.
That Moral Disagreement is Resolvable 2
I will recap that argument here, for conveniences sake. Succinctly, my argument is two pronged. Firstly, I contend that the presence of moral disagreement occurs against a much larger background of agreement. We agree in the vast majority of our moral judgements; we agree that killing our neighbour’s is wrong, supporting our friend’s right, betraying our children reprehensible and helping the needy commendable.
The second prong of this argument attempts to explain the lack of agreement. I contend that non-religious ethics is a remarkable young science. That disagreement still exists in ethics is only to be expected. The rational debate and discussion which I am contending can resolve such disagreement has only existed for, very generously, the last century. Even then it has occurred largely against a background in which authority – the word of God- was deemed sacrosanct. We can explain the current instances of moral disagreement, at least partially, be talking about these facts.
So the background of moral disagreement supports the conclusion that moral disagreements are rationally resolvable and the existence of outstanding moral disagreement does nothing to imperil this conclusion (it can be explained in other ways). That is the argument recapped. I should be at pains to explain this is an epistemic argument. From our current epistemic position –what we know about the current level of disagreement- we have no reason to believe moral disagreements irresolvable. But our epistemic position could change; if non-religious ethics were to persist for hundreds of years and all that occurred was the arrival of new, deep and unresolved disagreements we would have reason to conclude that realism was false.
What I am saying is that our current position is not as described; our current position supports realism. I shall later argue that a position like that just described is what obtains in tastes and, perhaps, aesthetics.
T
he Argument Thus Far
My claim so far is thus; rational disagreement in other fields does not entail realism in said fields. But it provides evidence for such realism. It provides a prima facie case for realism. This is all I claim it did in morality. The difference is that in these fields that evidence is defeated, in morality it is not.
So the argument from rationally argued disagreement still stands. Nonetheless, the argument Sill advances might shake our faith in the prima facie argument. Precisely, if we think that the disagreement in morality is not so different from that in taste or aesthetics we might think that the prima facie evidence such disagreement provides is not very much at all. After all, it didn’t prove objectivity in these other fields.
To an extent, this response is irrelevant in the ways I have already explained. The fact is this evidence is defeated in those other areas, but not in morality. But I shall go further than this. I shall say that the disagreements in these other fields work in quite different ways to morality. Precisely, I shall argue that once we accept that different people have different standards for taste or beauty our disagreements in these fields resolve with little trouble. We realise we weren’t disagreeing about anything, at least nothing objective. When we are involved in moral disagreement we are much more reluctant to make this claim. We think we are most definitely disagreeing about some objective matter of fact. I shall, however, save the exposition of this argument until the next section.
In the rest of this section I wish to explicate why the prima facie argument is an argument at all. In the specific case which I have been discussing, I wish to explicate why the existence of rationally argued disagreement about an issue is an argument that there is a fact of the matter as pertains to that issue.
Why the Prima Facie Argument is an Argument
The Prima Facie Argument which I have advanced rests on the idea that our moral discourse presupposes moral realism. The argument from rational disagreement works as follows:
We do not have rational disagreements about an issue unless we think there is a fact of the matter regarding said issue. We have rational disagreements about morality. Therefore, we think there is a fact of the matter about morality. This is prima facie evidence that there is a fact of the matter about morality.
The idea is that, if something seems to us to be the case or if we believe something to be the case then this is prima facie evidence that that is the case.
Several posters (both Sill and Brighteye)
3,4 have protested at this point. They have said that it can make no difference if we believe something to be the case as to whether we should accept that thing as being the case. That we believe X is not evidence for X! Many people believe in God, but that is not evidence that God exists! Similarly, (I assume) that it seems to some people that God exists is not evidence that God exists.
*I deny these claims. That something seems to us to be so-and so is evidence that it is so-and-so and that we believe such-and-such is evidence of such-and-such. *
This might seem absurd at first glance, so bear with me. I shall first note that it is prima facie evidence; it is evidence that can be defeated. If we can explain our beliefs fully and most simply in a way that does not commit us to the truth of the fact which our beliefs concern, that evidence is defeated. This means it has no weight. If our beliefs or ‘seemings’ can be explained perfectly be an explanadum unrelated to that which they concern, they provide no evidence. To take near death religious experience as an example; near death religious experience is evidence that God exists. But it is defeated (so I believe) by the numerous chemicals released in the brains of people near-death. These chemicals could easily cause religious experiences. This means that it seems to such people (those who experience NDREs) that God exists is not evidence God exists; that seeming can be explained through other means. This is why our beliefs or what seems to be the case do not always provide us with evidence of which we need to take account; sometimes the evidence is but prima facie and defeated.
But when it is not defeated, so I maintain, it must provide us with evidence. This is because if it did not we would have no route out of scepticism. Let me explain this. As I am sure those who have read so far, scepticism is the view that we can know nothing about the external world. If beliefs or ‘seemings’ do not provide us with evidence about said world, I believe this view is justified. That is because if there was no way in which our beliefs about the world provide justificatory evidence about the world, we could never justify any of our beliefs. It is, after all, only from beliefs we can justify other beliefs. But if we can never justify any of our beliefs, we can hardly be said to know them. Unjustified beliefs are not knowledge (so I maintain). So if our beliefs do not give us (prima facie) evidence we have no knowledge about the external world.
But this is false. We do know things about the external world. Famously, I know this is a hand (I am holding my hand out in front of my eyes). If this is true, our beliefs do provide evidence for the propositions which they concern. And if this is true, the fact that our moral discourse presupposes a belief in moral realism provides prima facie evidence for moral realism.
This is exactly what I intended to prove.
Sill’s Subjectivism
So the argument from disagreement still stands. Hopefully, I have done some useful work in explicating and defending this argument. Nonetheless, Sill offers another account of rationally argued moral disagreement
5 . His account is a kind of subjectivism. Sill believes that moral disagreement, and moral discourse is general, can be explained thus; all people have their own personal standards of morality (for simplicity, I shall refine my discussion to ‘goodness’
. There is no such thing as absolute goodness. There is only hyphenated-goodness; ‘Goodness-according-to X’. When I say ‘Generosity is Good’ I mean ‘Generosity is Good-According-to-Lovett’. When Sill says ‘ Slavery is not-good’ he means ‘Slavery is not-good-according-to-Sill’. With this framework, we can judge things like moral progress and moral disagreement by standards, but our own standards. We can incorporate this aspect of moral discourse.
So we can. Sill is right here. But I will argue that this is an unacceptable account of morality. It is so for two reasons. Firstly, it fails to capture the actual nature of moral disagreement. Discussing this will illuminate some previous passages. Secondly, it fails to account for the normative force of morality. This anticipates the next section. Because such an account of goodness makes goodness arbitrary, it robs it of normative force. But morality does have normative force. Hence, Sill’s subjectivism fails
as an account of morality.
The first problem is that of disagreement. My point here is simple; moral disagreement is
deep. We cannot resolve moral disagreement by accepting that there was not disagreement at all; that we were just using the term ‘good’ differently. But this is what Sill’s view implies is precisely what we can do; if I say ‘Protecting the innocent is good’ and an Aztec priest says ‘Sacrificing the innocent is good’ we can resolve this by seeing that we simply don’t disagree. The Aztec priest means ‘Good-according-to-an-Aztec-priest’ when he says ‘good’ whilst I mean ‘Good-according-to-Lovett’ when I say good’. Our disagreement is purely lexical, it is as if he said I can get money from the bank and I disagreed, thinking he meant
river banks.
But this isn’t what moral disagreement is. Suppose in the above scenario I am a missionary. I will not be satisfied with his fey explanation of our disagreement. I will, in fact, insist that I do not at all mean ‘Good-according-to-lovett-the-missionary’. I mean good /absolutely/, unqualifiedly. I am disagreeing with him, and won’t be fobbed off by this lexical manoeuvre. On Sill’s view our moral disagreement should regularly be, in principle, resolvable by such a lexical manoeuvre. We should simply realise that we are using ‘good’ to mean a different thing. We are not actually disagreeing about anything at all. But this isn’t how moral disagreement works. Even cross-culturally (the Aztec and the Missionary) where such a response is most plausible this is not how disagreement works. We do not just see that our disagreement was illusory. We stick by it, and insist it was real.
This is what I mean when I call it a deep disagreement. Sill’s account simply cannot capture this aspect of moral disagreement and this is unacceptable.
We can contrast this with the case of taste realism. In taste, we do quickly accept our disagreement is no disagreement at all. In fact, we very rarely contradict someone when they say ‘Mint ice cream is tasty’. We accept people’s personal tastes as an expression of something personal to them. If we do disagree about how good a meal was, saying ‘Well, Liked it at least’ is usually enough to quieten our disagreement. We do genuinely think ‘tasty’ means something like ‘tasty-according-to-X’. To an extent, the same is true is aesthetics. When I say ‘Plan 9 From Outer Space’ was a great film and my friend disagrees, we tend to resolve the debate by recognising our different standards of great. I mean ‘great for a bad film’ and he means ‘great for a well-made film’. There isn’t a lingering disagreement here. Simply, in these fields on which I have focused, we can and often do resolve disagreement by realising either there was nothing to disagree about or that we were using genuinely different stands (the subjectivist view). But the same is not true, as my example shows, in morality. Our disagreements in morality are deeper than those in taste or aesthetics. We do not resolve them by recognising we all ‘mean something different’ by the term ‘good’. Indeed, we specifically don’t resolve them this way; moral disagreement is deep. This means those disagreements ought be given more prima facie weight.
The prima facie argument is more effective in morality than it is in other field! Evidently, this makes the argument from moral disagreement more powerful.
That concludes my first point. The nature of moral disagreement is such that Sill’s account is unable to capture it and that the prima facie argument has special weight. But there is more. As I said, my second point anticipates the next section. Sill believes that morality depends on value and value depends ultimately on personal preference. But our personal preferences are largely arbitrary. It is arbitrary if we prefer strawberry or chocolate ice cream. It is arbitrary whether we prefer hard or soft beds, coke or pepsi so on and so forth. On Sill’s account, then, morality is an ultimately arbitrary set of rules by which we lead our lives.
6
I contend that this is a deeply unacceptable account of morality. That is because it robs morality of its essential normative force. The characteristic normative force of morality is thus; everyone should follow the commands of morality. Morality claims universal scope in giving normative reasons; commands people should follow. But fundamental arbitrariness undermines this claim.
Simply, if all I mean by ‘Good’ is ‘good-according-to-Lovett’ and all this rests on is a set of arbitrary preferences I have amassed there seems little reason for others to take account of my talk of goodness. What I see as good is arbitrary, based on arbitrary preferences. Why should others do as my morality commands? All my morality is some function of my personal preferences. Surely nobody would take my preferences as normative reasons. They hold no special status; I am not privileged in any way. They are fundamentally arbitrary; there is no reason for anyone else to follow the commands of my morality. This undercuts the universal scope which morality purports to have.
The problem ramifies further. If my morality is fundamentally arbitrary, why should even I do as it commands? I have said that I do not believe my preferences are special. It is arbitrary that I have the preferences I do. And nor do all my preferences give me reasons; that I want to drink the liquid in front of me gives me no reason to drink said liquid when it is poison, and I think it is water. Preferences aren’t necessarily reason-giving, and it is not clear why morality-as-a-function-of-preferences could suddenly become reason giving. It is not clear why, merely because I judge something to be good, I should do that thing on this view (I use both prudential and moral senses of ‘should’ here).
As I said, the problem is one of fundamental arbitrariness. The moral ‘should’ –the claim that we should all do as morality commands- is one that cannot be based on some arbitrary set of principles. We have no reason to accept an arbitrary set of principles. There isn’t a sense in which we should do as said principles demand. Arbitrariness is incompatible with normativity. I’ll give some examples. That someone was born into wealth does not mean they should live a better life than others. That someone was born handicapped does not mean they should be excluded from public life. The arbitrariness of accidents of birth precludes normative claims on their basis. If all of morality is based on arbitrary facts morality cannot make universal normative claims.
But that is precisely what morality does purport to do. Morality purports to have universal scope. The demands of morality are demands we should all follow. If this is the case, no acceptable account of morality can make morality arbitrary. Whatever such an account is of, it is not an account of morality. This is my argument;
Sill’s subjectivism makes morality arbitrary. Any acceptable account of morality must grant morality its characteristic normative force. But no account of morality-as-arbitrary can do this. Thus, Sill’s account in not an acceptable account of morality. Simply, it is not an account of morality as morality.
It’s worth noting that I am making a conceptual claim here; I am saying that anything that works as an account of morality must grant morality the universal scope and normative force I have claimed it has. We might conclude such an account is empty; there is nothing with such normative force. This is what my arguments above, about the resolvability of moral disagreement, is intended to refute. But even if this argument fails it does not touch my point. Any account of morality as morality must accept this conceptual claim. If it does not, it is not an account of morality. Sill’s account is not an account of morality. It fails to grant normative force to morality and fails to capture the distinctive nature of moral disagreement.
Interlude
I have so far defending the argument from moral disagreement. I have argued that disagreement in morality is more indicative of objective moral facts than disagreement elsewhere. I have explicated how the argument from rationally argued disagreement, and the prima facie argument in general work. I have defended the resolvability of these disagreements in morality. I have then assessed Sill’s subjectivism as an alternative account of these things. I have found it wanting in its ability to explain oral disagreement. More crucially, I have found it incapable of accounting for morality’s normative force, and thus failing as an account of morality. I shall now discuss value. In particular, I shall argue that Sill’s conception of value begs the question and is, anyway, quite wrong.
Value is not Arbitrary
Sill says that values are ‘nothing but preference’ and ‘irrational’
7 . As what I have written above should make clear, this makes value fundamentally arbitrary. I shall deal with this in the next paragraph. Right now, it should be quite clear that this position is question-begging. Precisely, in my OP I regarded value as that which we would prefer under conditions of full rationality. This is precisely to maintain that value isn’t irrational and that it is not based solely on the preferences we happen to have in normal conditions. Mere contradiction does not an argument make; it is to assume what one wants to prove. It is to beg the question.
Sill attempts to support his point in his final section. I shall discuss this, appropriately, in my final section. But first I wish to make a similar conceptual claim about value as I have made about morality. Value cannot be arbitrary. That something is valuable means it has similar normative force as morality; if something is valuable we should all desire it. Valuable means ‘worth being desired’. But, as we have seen, nothing based on something so arbitrary as my current preferences could maintain this normative force. Hence, value is not based on our preferences alone. Value is not arbitrary.