Well, here it is lovett
I must add that I didn't refer to the argument of realism being the "simplest" explanation for the sake of focusing on if it can be a plausible explanation to begin with - though actually, I indirectly kind of did. Whatever. Enjoy (or not
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In the following response I will quit drastically mix up the chronicle order of your post. I will do so, because I believe it to be vastly more efficient to tailor my arguments to my thoughts about your post rather then to it itself.
I will also structure this response under various headings.
Why moral facts are not unique to moral realism
If there are no moral facts than there is no sense to moral progress. […] Moral comparison necessary for judgements of moral progress would not be possible if statements of moral facts were all false (or non-factual). Moral comparison in general requires moral realism.
A lot of your post is about establishing what is the frame of reference of morality. Most importantly, you assume this frame of reference to be universal, to be an objective entity. But the alternative is not only to have no frame of reference, but also to simply not assume to have a universal frame of reference. And then, you can still perfectly establish a sense to moral progress which is
relative to a
subjective frame of reference. And in light of that, I also disagree that to be anti-realist means one simply claims moral facts to be false. You can also claim them to be relative to said frame of reference. What is claimed to be false are universal moral facts, not relative moral facts. So all properties you attribute to moral realism by them requiring “facts” and by which you conclude moral realism was a necessity for such properties are in fact not unique to moral realism. Moral realism is merely unique in what it requires those facts to be – that is universal.
That is an very important distinction, from which also follows that
But everyone takes it to be a disagreement, and disagreement happens only if the issue is factual.
and
We would hardly have arguments about moral facts if we thought no such thing existed!
and
If we deny moral facts exists we are committed to ‘error theory’; all such judgements are wrong.
don't do anything to defend moral realism against skepticism.
„Moreover, we believe these judgements are judgements on issues of fact. [… ] We think there is a truth of the matter. We argue rationally about it.“
Here we see what happens when you neglect to account for relative facts. People also argue rationally about how good a movie is or what is the better dress or when people should loose their virginity. In short, people seems to be capable to argue rationally about any matter of opinion, so that is hardly a criteria which distinguishes attitude from the assumption of objective universal fact. However, rational argument does at least require a relative kind of fact, so far I am in agreement with you. If I argue for how good a movie is, my frame of reference consists of assumptions about what a good movie constitutes. Based on this assumptions I then can go on and rationally argue for its merits. Point being: The same may apply to morality. And this dual nature of facts is very important to keep in mind when we concern ourselves with how humans tend to relate to morality, which is what the next section will be about
The subjective dimension – or, empirical evidence for moral realism
If we are talking about how “we” handle and relate to morality, then I might as well bring forth that many also refer in terms of “believes” to morality. “I believe X is good”. “American believe in the moral value of individual freedom”. You wouldn't say “Americans have established individual freedom as a moral fact”. And if we now remember that rational argument does not require the assumption of universal objective facts, your prima facie case based on how we handle morality becomes IMO very shaky. To further demonstrate the role of believes as opposed to the assumption of facts:
The injustice of Apartheid caused these people [who had nothing to gain] to protest. And of course, that conclusion can be true only if moral realism is true. ‘Apartheid is SA was injust’ is a moral fact.
Because besides what I already said on “facts” - as long as you believe in something, you can act on it. It does not matter if this believe reflects some kind of universal truth or if you believe it to reflect some kind of universal truth. The existence of relative facts perfectly accounts for rational arguments, the existence of believes perfectly accounts for the strong convictions associated with moral views and ensuing actions on their behalf. Neither can defend realism against skepticism because skepticism – as I understand it at the very least – is not opposed to their existence.
So I think that takes care of the notion that how people handle morality conceptually required moral realism. But there is another argument that goes along with it. That how people relate to and view morality could carry some kind of natural truth about the very nature of morality. Which is troublesome, because obviously, people, even the vast majority of them, can be mistaken with how they view things.
The fact that the vast majority of people are committed to the existence of moral facts – the idea that some moral propositions are true- is prima facie evidence that these things are true.
“The fact that the vast majority of people are committed to the existence of deities is prima facie evidence that deities exist”. How does that sound to you? Since when is truth a matter of knee jerk-majority rule? You argue that universal moral truths were “as real as properties of scientific enquiry”. Well then I also expect the same standards of truth. Which is why I think we should rather focus on what morality is and how that compares to what universal moral truth requires and if that really matches. Not if people happen to assume one or the other.
That already to me casts significant doubt on any attempt to derive the true nature of morality from observations. Which makes this argument
But as it happens we have no reason to believe disagreements in ethics are irresolvable. In fact, they tend to be resolved exactly as we would expect; by rational discussion.
IMO very weak. It just is not the point of importance weather we can agree on ethics. I know we can and I personally have a history in making passionate pleas for certain moral opinions among my peers. Because just as it is true that
The mere existence of disagreement does nothing to show moral facts do not exist.
it is also that the mere existence of agreement does nothing to show moral facts do exist. It is the wrong angle altogether.
But for the sake of argument I'll comment on the only observational and tangible as well as encompassing argument you made for moral realism anyway.
There are a host of ‘thick’ moral concepts in our language. These are concepts like courage, loyalty and honesty which have both descriptive and normative content. Universally, we think those three to be good and treachery, cowardice and duplicity to be bad. In this case, agreement is so deeply rooted that it is evident in linguistic divisions. This, I think, largely saps the force from the objection. Moral disagreement exists, certainly, but it is against a background of agreement.
Let's forget morality for a second and think about it anthropologically. What is the worth of “courage, loyalty and honesty”? Why are they valued in people? The answer is simple: It makes people reliable and useful. Treachery, cowardice and duplicity make them unreliable and even harmful. So their
common existence is very well explained without any objective moral sense of right and wrong. They would be virtues weather one gives a dame about morality or not, because they are so exceedingly useful. Even two abhorrent disgusting creatures of a human being will want each other to be loyal to each other and will judge treachery very negatively. I can not deny that there is also a moral dimension to those virtues, but I deny that it has any implication regarding moral realism – because those virtues are as natural as people not constantly going on a killing spree. For reasons of rational self-interest. Maybe you want to comment on that by referring to the role of rationality you see in morality but know that I'll give that role further consideration in the next two sections
The logical dimension – or, the necessary assumptions of moral realism
You said yourself, that morality was about “maximizing value”. If you combine this with the view, that morality is about universally true facts (moral realism) and take the max-value-part as a necessary precondition of moral realism (and I think one in deed will have to do so at some point)*, we can establish what is by the logic of those two assumptions a necessity for moral realism to be true: universal values it is concerned with. Which of course raises the question: Do humans – in a moral context - all value the same things (under the same exterior conditions) the same way? We know they don't but there you argue to save the matter that it (A) was just a matter of irrationality when they don't or (B) a matter of incomplete understanding (they would value it all the same when fully rationally and knowledgeable)**. Well what are values in the end? What is “rational”? I am sure we agree that “rationality” knows itself no values, that it is just a way to think. A tool, preferring one way or the other as much as a hammer prefers to hit a nail or not. And values? Again I am sure we can agree, that values are in principle the opposite. They are nothing but preference. Hence, values are irrational, unless they serve higher values in a rational way. Unless values just function as a rational tool themselves in the pursuit of higher values (for instance the value of friendship could be argued to be a rational tool in the pursuit of the higher value of feeling loved and connected).
So with those higher values being the foundation on which the rational and moral choice rests, it is clear I hope that they need to be universal for moral “facts” to be universal. Otherwise people would – fully rationally - maximize different values and your whole argument falls apart. And that I say is the core question the whole issue spins around. Is there in the end a universal set of higher values (or preferences) to the human condition? I will explore this in the next section
*I think so because universal moral truth must IMO necessarily rest on some kind of coherent agenda. Because as morality lacks natural law as such to be coherent, only an agenda is left to accomplish that. And as morality is undoubtedly about values, the maximization of some kind of values seems to lend itself. What else would this agenda be after all?
**I added “full knowledge” as requirement because I saw it strongly implied by your argument. I hope that is okay.
My finale case: The difference between moral and personal values
Let's recapitulate what according to you morality is.
It is a description of what we would prefer under conditions of full rationality.
And preference is based on value.
First: I absolutely agree with this. I agree that morality is a counter-factual description, that it is about how to maximize value. We both understand morality as the same thing. That is a great start. And where do we essentially differ? As explained in the preceding section: The nature of the value that is supposed to be maximized. I think, that the “higher value” is in deed not universal. I think that what people value depends on the individual not just due to lack of knowledge or irrationality, but different higher values. And further on, I think that what higher values people hold is not synonymous to moral values.
I already established that high values are irrational. They just constitute what satisfies us while the way to gain satisfaction is subject to rationality. One thing which can accomplish such satisfaction is power. But to gain power may require deceit, manipulation and other malicious actions. And it requires to do so plan-fully, rationally. Meaning: A person which gains satisfaction through acquisition of power by malicious intend and actions is according to you a virtues moral individual.* Because it rationally maximizes its higher values. From this I follow, that higher values can call for actually (commonly assumed) immoral ways to maximize them – all in full rationality and that hence moral values need to be distinguished from personal values.
Moreover: Higher personal values can in deed differ. Just think of compassion. While compassion is in principle a universal feature of the human condition, different people have different kind and levels of compassion. And that not only differs from person to person, but even day to day. Reading novels tends to increase compassion. Reading about unpersonalized stuff tends to lower it. In general: People have varying emotional needs in relation to others and themselves. And from that follows higher values which are different in quality. And from that follows different - rational - takes at maximizing value.
In conclusion: Personal values, but also - which is the important thing here - higher values vary. They are not universal. There is no universal psychology. And they may defy any common sense of morality in their pursuit.
But if not personal values, what it supposed to constitute value? Where is this necessary set of universal higher values supposed to come from if not from those that actually do value – us? There is only one way out:
You just believe whatever set of higher values to be true moral values. You simply pick primary axioms and go from there and if you don't like them, you pick others. And what you like – irrationally or rationally – is founded on ultimately irrational values. So arbitrary.
Note that does not mean that moral values were not subject to certain tendencies. Example: A large group of people who do not even know the vast majority of the members of their group (which is what “society” usually describes) are grossly restricted in what morality such a society as a whole could represent, for purely functional reasons already. Here morality must be something that A) can grow fairly natural (that means not according to conscious agendas – exceptions notwithstanding) and B) which is not in conflict with the functionality of a society. That for instance explains why murder is commonly taken as morally wrong. It conflicts with the functionality of societies.
Also note that IMO moral skepticism doesn't take away the legitimacy of morality. I strongly object to any such conclusion. It merely establishes that legitimacy is no absolute.
edit: Okay I was s anxious to get this post finally out there that I didn't read all the responses of the thread. After doing some reading: So @lovett even if you think that the power-guy isn't actually acting in his own rational self interest you still have to account for the varying nature of higher values. But in general I think it in deed is a very bold claim one could have never a better life by being immoral. Sorry but that just is way too bold of a claim. I would like to even call it naive. Acting good can definitely screw you, my head is so full of possible illustrations that I don't even know where to begin. Here is one: You are drunk and run over a person and cripple him or her for life. If you stop and take of of her (which will soften the seriousness of the injuries a bit) you will get a lawsuit that with its financial burden will ruin your life. If you drive on you can try to forget about it.
Really, you basically equated individual rational self-interest with morality. Isn't it obvious how flawed that is?
edit edit: I think however that there is fairly solid case for morality reflecting collective rational self-interest. I in fact argued for it in another thread extensively. However, that of course poses a fairly big bias in its premise of a collective dimension and only applies when you refer to one big collective (@Winston Hughes, I am talking about our debate and as you can see I revised my stance a bit)
