Moral Scepticism and Why It is Wrong

[Souron]

That one is easy! You claim you can universally determine right and wrong, good and bad. That would involve for murder/killing/death as already mentioned justifiable, premeditated, accidental, and praise-worthy plus at least criminal neglect. But all these words are loose in the edges, because you haven't explained how you differentiate between them in practice.

It's true that people disagree on moral issued. But that does not contradict moral realism. Most people may simply be wrong.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

Okay, that is cool. Just assume I never posted in thread. Very well.

(Screw you!)

 

[Global Skeptic]

O.O
Freeze.
Reads again.

.
.
.
WAT?

Sorry, if I have misread you. I mean it. Sorry.

Are you a combination of moral realism, but as subjective and group/culture relative?

 

[Global Skeptic]

It's true that people disagree on moral issued. But that does not contradict moral realism. Most people may simply be wrong.

Yes, if it is so that people can be wrong.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

Also, in response to this

The grammer nazi in me requires me to point out that I said that saying "the nature of desire is to be natural", is the same as "natural desires", and not what you said. It is true that 'desire' as a general noun is not quite the same as 'desires,' and this would be a more legitimate nitpick. Yet 'desire' and 'desires' are close enough in meaning that what is said about one is implicitly true about the other.

There. My inner grammer nazi is sated.

I referred with

Well natural desires does not mean nature of desires, but whatever, alright

to your original statement I questioned, (where you talked of "natural desires" but later you renounced the existence of unnatural desires which hence makes the attribute natural superfluos and misleading in this context) not your response to my response to your original statement.

This was my inner thrive for mutual understanding (and not being wrong, well maybe only not being wrong ) which demanded to be satisfied.

Sorry, if I have misread you. I mean it. Sorry.

Are you a combination of moral realism, but as subjective and group/culture relative?

Dear Global Skeptic,

I wrote a freaking wall of text (which hubristic me likes to claim to be fairly awesome) about how and why I am not a moral realist at all and believe moral realism to be incoherent.

 

[Global Skeptic]

...

Dear Global Skeptic,

I wrote a freaking wall of text (which hubristic me likes to claim to be fairly awesome) about how and why I am not a moral realist at all and believe moral realism to be incoherent.

Yes, I admit I misread you. Where I misread you was here:

Note that does not mean that moral values were not subject to certain tendencies. Example: A large group of people who do not even know the vast majority of the members of their group (which is what “society” usually describes) are grossly restricted in what morality such a society as a whole could represent, for purely functional reasons already. Here morality must be something that A) can grow fairly natural (that means not according to conscious agendas – exceptions notwithstanding) and B) which is not in conflict with the functionality of a society. That for instance explains why murder is commonly taken as morally wrong. It conflicts with the functionality of societies.

In the bold part I got that to mean a form of naturalistic utilitarianism. Again sorry.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

I see. Well that happens I suppose...

 

[Global Skeptic]

It's true that people disagree on moral issued. But that does not contradict moral realism. Most people may simply be wrong.

On people being wrong. That would be something they are, like having a certain weight or height. I.e. they can be right or wrong, but in either case that is something they are, right???

 

[Souron]

On people being wrong. That would be something they are, like having a certain weight or height. I.e. they can be right or wrong, but in either case that is something they are, right???

It's like any other belief. Some beliefs are true, some are false, some are close to the truth. People disagree about the origin of life on earth. Nevertheless life had exaclty one process that caused it, and everyone who believes in a different process is wrong.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

"Like any other believe"
Some believe a movie is bad, other it is good. But there is exactly one correct evaluation and everyone who believes differently is wrong.

 

[Souron]

"Like any other believe"
Some believe a movie is bad, other it is good. But there is exactly one correct evaluation and everyone who believes differently is wrong.

Like any other belief about an objective fact then.

 

[Ayatollah So]

Let's forget morality for a second and think about it anthropologically. What is the worth of “courage, loyalty and honesty”? Why are they valued in people? The answer is simple: It makes people reliable and useful. Treachery, cowardice and duplicity make them unreliable and even harmful. So their common existence is very well explained without any objective moral sense of right and wrong.

Let's forget about ice for a second, and think about water thermodynamically. What happens when you cool water below 273 Kelvin? The attractions between adjacent molecules become much more stable. Because the molecules are less mobile, they are not so easily compacted into the same space as they occupy at 277 K, so any clump of water molecules that is below 273 will float on top of slightly warmer water. Also, the immobility of the molecules makes this water much harder to penetrate. So you can see, the existence of all those features can be very well explained without positing any objective entity called "ice".

Unless - maybe - just maybe - that's exactly what "ice" refers to.

And, maybe - just maybe - the rational agreement among members of society that certain human traits are to be sought-after, is exactly what "moral virtue" refers to. And you've just outlined some very excellent reasons why they would.

I am sure we agree that “rationality” knows itself no values, that it is just a way to think.

Rationality is chock-full of values. It values truth over falsehood. It values deduction and inference to the best explanation. It values explanatory power, clarity, simplicity, consistency. It leads us to a recognition of the severe limitations of solitary thought and the enormous cognitive benefits of free and open discussion.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

@Ayatollah So
The central point of my virtues-argument (which you apparently somehow missed) was to differentiate between matters of rational self-interest and moral matters. Your allegory only works, if those in deed were actually the same. But that is - really - just indefensible as I argued later on. That is, it is indefensible if you want this to constitute moral realism.

And, maybe - just maybe - the rational agreement among members of society that certain human traits are to be sought-after, is exactly what "moral virtue" refers to.

What about rational disagreement?

Rationality is chock-full of values. It values truth over falsehood. It values deduction and inference to the best explanation. It values explanatory power, clarity, simplicity, consistency. It leads us to a recognition of the severe limitations of solitary thought and the enormous cognitive benefits of free and open discussion.

That is like saying that a chair values to be suitable to be sit on.

 

[Global Skeptic]

Hi all
Hi SiLL, this has already been mentioned by you, but I thought I would have a go at it.

In a sense it is very simple, but then in another it is not.

One way to get a handle on it is to represent this way:
Someone: I know X is Y; therefore I act in the manner A.
Someone else: I know X is not Y, but rather Z; therefore I act in the manner A.

Notice something, namely this is also what is going on this thread:

Moral realist: True can only be that X is Y when it comes to morality and that is what I claim.
A moral skeptic: No, because despite that this is false/bad/wrong as I am claiming X is not Y; I am right here and now doing X is not Y. I.e. I am as the act of writing this doing so, which is to do that X is not Y.

The problem it raises is this:
X is Y is true/right/good.
X is not Y is false/wrong/bad, yet is true that I am doing it right now.
It is the difference between I can fly by flapping my arms versus I can act against any other humans in any manner as long as I can act as such. The first one is false as per natural fact, but for the second one neither of these are false in that I can help another human or harm it.

Both good/right and bad/wrong are natural facts because both are true as they happen in the natural world.

 

[Ayatollah So]

The central point of my virtues-argument (which you apparently somehow missed) was to differentiate between matters of rational self-interest and moral matters. Your allegory only works, if those in deed were actually the same.

But I'm not talking about self-interest. lovett might be, but he and I are not on the same page there. I'm talking about communal interest. People who reason together about what to value, converge on valuing courage, integrity, and so on.

What about rational disagreement?

Well find me someone who rationally seeks the company of dishonest backstabbing cowards, and then we can talk.

That is like saying that a chair values to be suitable to be sit on.

Talking about what rationality values is just shorthand for talking about what rational people, insofar as they are rational, value.

 

[Global Skeptic]

...
Talking about what rationality values is just shorthand for talking about what rational people, insofar as they are rational, value.

There appears to be a problem, rational is selfish or rather in the broad sense subjective. I.e. rational is a marker you can put on one kind of thinking/feeling versus other kinds, but that is something you do. In other words rational is a mental/cognitive word for which there is no external, outside and/or objective reference point. Rational is a quality, not a quantity and it has no mind/self/subjective independence.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

But I'm not talking about self-interest. lovett might be, but he and I are not on the same page there. I'm talking about communal interest. People who reason together about what to value, converge on valuing courage, integrity, and so on.

Okay okay. I just don't like it if people turn what I say on its head by depicting it in the wrong context. But enough with the sensiblities.
I think that "communal interest" is a more interesting case, so sure, let's think about that.

Well find me someone who rationally seeks the company of dishonest backstabbing cowards, and then we can talk.

So let me get this straight. You argue that morality rested on those virtues everyone rationally values in others (and which hence always constitute communal interest) and that hence meant that moral realism was correct.
Hm, dame that sounds frightening plausible I must admit ^^ I can think of animal rights as an counter-example. Some people (including me) believe that certain moral obligations apply to all living things with an emotional life - would that be hence wrong because "respecting the emotional world of animals" does not constitute such a virtue, nor can it be traced back to it? Hm, well we could trace it back to compassion. People want others to have compassion and compassion means in practice to be sensitive to the emotional needs of others. I suppose one could focus on emotional needs and leave the human part out. Yet many people - quit rationally as they don't depend on the goodwill of animals - would not want that. From that I conclude, that virtues can not establish an absolute unlimited moral truth as the exact understanding and weighting of virtues still matters. But it would still be a great leap towards moral realism. But what about utilitarianism? Utilitarianism chooses to view virtues not as an end in itself, but merely as an end to raise the quality. I.e. I don't want people to be honest because I find honesty so crazily aesthetically pleasing, but because it provides me in the end with increased quality of life. So can such virtues not be argued to be merely utilitarian vehicles, tools of use? Is that then what morality is about? Establishing a rational based on (under the assumption of full rationality) universally agreed on tools in the form of virtues? Why must that be so? Why can that not merely constitute what in practice is an efficient way to handle morality by a group of people? Why must it be about virtues?
Also, your concept requires the assumption, that good and bad depends on shared rational interest. How can we establish this notion as the absolute truth?
Hm not sure yet how to get that all into synch. At the end of this post, I am starting to lean towards anti-realism again.

Oh and what Global Skeptic said.

 

[Save_Ferris]

I haven't read all of the OP, or the other posts for that matter, but if a moral fact is indeed true, how do we know and agree that it is true?

 

[Terxpahseyton]

That depends on why (if) moral facts exist.

 

[Ayatollah So]

I.e. rational is a marker you can put on one kind of thinking/feeling versus other kinds, but that is something you do. In other words rational is a mental/cognitive word for which there is no external, outside and/or objective reference point. Rational is a quality, not a quantity and it has no mind/self/subjective independence.

Rational is a quality, yeah; so? That doesn't mean judgments of rationality aren't objectively true or false. Qualitative judgments can be objective. Actually, I think all quantitative judgments are based on qualitative ones: for example, the left end of the object is lined up with the left end of the meter-stick, and the right end of the object is to the right of the "12 cm" mark. Therefore the object is longer than 12 cm.

So let me get this straight. You argue that morality rested on those virtues everyone rationally values in others (and which hence always constitute communal interest) and that hence meant that moral realism was correct.
Hm, dame that sounds frightening plausible I must admit ^^ I can think of animal rights as an counter-example. Some people (including me) believe that certain moral obligations apply to all living things with an emotional life - would that be hence wrong because "respecting the emotional world of animals" does not constitute such a virtue, nor can it be traced back to it? Hm, well we could trace it back to compassion. People want others to have compassion and compassion means in practice to be sensitive to the emotional needs of others. I suppose one could focus on emotional needs and leave the human part out. Yet many people - quit rationally as they don't depend on the goodwill of animals - would not want that. From that I conclude, that virtues can not establish an absolute unlimited moral truth as the exact understanding and weighting of virtues still matters.

Compassion is important, but so are the rational desires of members of the community. Because so many members care about how animals are treated, and we can make rules that provide some basic protections to animals without seriously impinging on the freedom of those who don't care about animals, those laws are justifiable. Part of the justification is that the laws express the compassionate values of the society, and society needs those kind of values to flourish; but another part of the justification is that these concerns by animal-lovers are rationally stable, and society ought to promote the rational concerns of many individuals, provided it can do so without consistently disadvantaging other groups. "You win some policy battles, you lose some" is fair; "Let's all gang up on the Rastafarians and take their stuff" is not.

But it would still be a great leap towards moral realism. But what about utilitarianism? Utilitarianism chooses to view virtues not as an end in itself, but merely as an end to raise the quality.

Utilitarians can certainly endorse specific virtues, and also specific rules. If an act can be evaluated by its consequences, why not a virtue? Why not a moral rule?

Classical utilitarianism, though, cannot be vindicated on a meta-ethical view like mine, I think. The reason why, is that justification is distributed, not collective. That is, each member of society must be able to rationally accept the results of moral discussion. Of course, each individual recognizes that they cannot get their own way on everything, since others wouldn't rationally accept that. But they have to get some respect - and I don't think "having your utility counted in the calculus" counts as adequate respect. It's too risky, at least for some individuals.

Also, your concept requires the assumption, that good and bad depends on shared rational interest. How can we establish this notion as the absolute truth?

Not all good and bad, just moral good and bad. And maybe not all moral good and bad, either - just certain (very important) domains like justice. I don't think we need to establish that conception of "justice" as the absolute truth. Instead, like any other hypothesis, we try it on, and see if it seems to provide an elegant explanation of what we observe.