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Recovering from partisan disaster

The previous institutions of power are going to be causal in how they're eventually altered. Not in a 1:1 ratio, obviously, but it will be a confounding variable.
I guess we could discuss the various collapses caused by wingnuts and whether they recovered. You'd think there'd be some insight into which wingnuts were more capable of building something that had a base that allowed recovery.
 
You'll find that cultural diversity is a large contributing factor of when a society collapses rather than primarily partisan voting. The more diverse a country becomes the less social cohesion there is that keeps a country or society intact, the tribalism that ensues is counter-productive within the country and any enemies/adversaries of that country can take advantage of this instability.

What the christ are you on about?
 
You'll find that cultural diversity is a large contributing factor of when a society collapses rather than primarily partisan voting. The more diverse a country becomes the less social cohesion there is that keeps a country or society intact, the tribalism that ensues is counter-productive within the country and any enemies/adversaries of that country can take advantage of this instability.
Obviously every collapse hurts least, or even rewards those whose material ways are designed to do well when society sucks.

So at the bottom of the cycle there is homogeneity. But that does not mean it is the homogeneity keeps a society strong or the diversity during the peak that makes it fragile. It just means that those prepared for the bad times are alike. It would be foolish to assume decadence in diversity rather than assume there are cycles and different people flourish at different points.
 
I was mostly wondering if the underlying politics before the disaster was predictive.
I don’t know how that could be measured because we would also have to look at countries that didn’t have some disaster. Or in the more abstract sense, when is a disaster severe enough that it qualifies?
 
Obviously every collapse hurts least, or even rewards those whose material ways are designed to do well when society sucks.

So at the bottom of the cycle there is homogeneity. But that does not mean it is the homogeneity keeps a society strong or the diversity during the peak that makes it fragile. It just means that those prepared for the bad times are alike. It would be foolish to assume decadence in diversity rather than assume there are cycles and different people flourish at different points.
This is even assuming the narrative is true at all. The truth is by collapse we basically always mean Rome and do we know if Rome collapsed from diversity into homogeny? What if, relative to the numbers, it was a big mono culture and collapsed into a diversity of diversities?

Who would even know where to begin looking to answer this question?
 
The previous institutions of power are going to be causal in how they're eventually altered. Not in a 1:1 ratio, obviously, but it will be a confounding variable.
I guess we could discuss the various collapses caused by wingnuts and whether they recovered. You'd think there'd be some insight into which wingnuts were more capable of building something that had a base that allowed recovery.

Material conditions and institutional structures can't be controlled for in this fashion, and it's precisely why such analysis can't be done scientifically. Since we were using post WWII Germany and Japan as examples earlier let's continue to do so. What comparisons can be drawn between them and other circumstances of war-torn societies rebuilding? The fact that they were materially supported by a global military and economic hegemon has no historical parallel. As great as the British Empire was it did not possess nuclear weapons nor did it have the world's reserve currency. The fact that the United States was actually committed to their development instead of their maximal exploitation is another peculiar factor.

The explosive economic growth and development of China is another great example. What other upstart exporter has had the advantages of an underutilized labor force consisting of hundreds of millions of people? When else in history has the largest potential customer been in possession of a global reserve currency and a desire to reconfigure its own economy from being a net exporter to a net importer like the US did in the late 60s? Instead of being outright colonized China was able to exert enough leverage over negotiations that they were able to wring incredible concessions out of the United States like technology transfers and asymmetrical access to each other's markets.
 
The 11-Minute Harvard Speech That Rebuilt Postwar Europe
BY DAVID L. ROLL

Seventy-five years ago, on June 5, 1947, George C. Marshall delivered a historic speech at Harvard. According to the Harvard Crimson, a crowd of 15,000 turned up “not so much in expectation of seeing history made, as simply in awe of the man.”
Marshall was newly confirmed as President Harry Truman’s secretary of state and known by virtually every adult as the five-star army general who had guided the nation to victory in World War II. The speech he gave that day was just 11 minutes long. It called for the U.S. to rehabilitate Europe’s shattered postwar economy with an enormous, urgent infusion of financial and in-kind assistance.

What would soon be called “the Marshall Plan” was to be the most significant American diplomatic initiative since the Louisiana Purchase. “Our policy,” pro-c l a i m e d Marshall, “is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos.”

U.S. assistance to postwar Europe wasn’t just an act of incredible generosity but also one inspired by economic self-interest and national security. It helped lay the groundwork for a new order in Europe and arguably the world, wherein the U.S., by far the world’s most powerful nation, would export both its values and its brand of organized capitalism to protect and sustain itself at home.

Without mentioning the U.S.S.R. or communism by name, Marshall declared in the speech that while the U.S. would cooperate with any European government willing to assist with recovery, it would oppose any government or political party trying to block the recovery of other countries or otherwise perpetuating human misery. Those lines attracted sustained applause. Anyone paying attention knew which government and party he was referring to. In fact, the Soviets, who then occupied part of Germany, soon refused to participate in the Marshall Plan and blocked the Eastern European nations in their sphere of influence from doing so as well.

Marshall envisioned a reindustrialized Germany—with its capacity to produce coal, steel, fertilizer, food and machinery—as the key to Europe’s recovery. But he realized that it would be regarded as odious to elevate the living standards of the German people, who had gone along with Hitler. Talk of reconstructing Germany was enough to cause one to be hanged on the Ellipse in Washington, some quipped. Nonetheless, Germany was a bone of contention between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and Marshall understood that its revival as an American ally offered the best hope for containing communism and sustaining Western democracy.

Joseph Stalin may have understood this, too. At the time, the Soviet leader was demanding billions of dollars in reparations from Germany, the payment of which would cripple the country’s recovery. At a late-night meeting in the Kremlin just seven weeks before his Harvard speech, Marshall argued against this demand and for reindustrialization. Stalin responded with “seeming indifference,” recalled special assistant Chip Bohlen, content “to let matters drift” and suggested that this was only the first of many skirmishes concerning the fate of Germany. Marshall was alarmed. He believed that Stalin’s cynical goal was to allow Germany and the rest of Europe to slide further toward economic ruin and chaos, thus rendering the continent ripe for Soviet influence if not domination. He became all the more convinced that Germany’s revival was vital to Europe’s security. Robert Murphy, the U.S. ambassador to Germany, later recalled that it was the deadlock at the end of the meeting between Marshall and Stalin that divided Europe and “really rang down the Iron Curtain.”

On his flight back to the states, Marshall stopped at Tempelhof airport in Berlin to meet with Gen. Lucius Dubignon Clay, the U.S. military governor of Germany, who was an expert in reconstruction. Since assuming his responsibilities in 1945, Clay had railed against instructions from Washington that had barred him from strengthening, rehabilitating, or even maintaining the German economy. Now Marshall released him from those instructions and gave him new ones to strengthen the economy in the Anglo-American zone, making it “the bulwark of America’s policy of containment.”

All the way back to Washing-ton, wrote Bohlen, “Marshall talked of the importance of finding some initiative to prevent the complete breakdown of Western Europe.” That initiative, of course, would be the one officially called the European Recovery Program but popularly known as the Marshall Plan. When political adviser Clark Clifford recommended that it be called the Truman Plan, Truman scoffed. “If I send that plan up to the Hill,” he said, “it will quiver a couple of times, go belly up, and die. Even the worst Republican will vote for the plan if Marshall’s name is on it.” Months later, the broad strokes articulated in Marshall’s 11-minute speech became a fully developed plan, and within a year the plan passed through Congress and became law. Of the $13.2 billion appropriated, $1.4 billion ($16.8 billion in today’s dollars) was allocated to the western zones of Germany. As a condition for receiving the money, France would have to merge its occupation zone in Germany with the U.S. and U.K. zones. This unified area would soon become the West German state.

The first tranche of Marshall Plan funds helped West Germany reform its currency and jumpstart a surprisingly rapid economic and political revival. Integral to the Marshall Plan was the Truman administration’s elimination of German debt and reparations. As a result, real output increased by 18.5 percent in 1948 and leveled off at an average increase of 8 percent a year during the first half of the 1950s. As Dr. Manfred Knapp, professor of International Relations at the University of Frankfurt, concluded, “the economic recovery of Europe couldn't have been achieved without the reconstruction of the German economy.”

Today, with revisionist Russia waging war in Ukraine, a resurgent and unified Germany is again the key to the security of Europe. And again, Germany requires U.S. support, this time in reducing German dependence on Russian oil and gas. The Biden administration, in collaboration with the EU, has organized a task force to reduce European dependence on fossil fuels: Call it a “Marshall Plan for Energy Security.” Its principal focus will be on Germany, which is the largest importer of natural gas from Russia. By reducing Germany’s need for Russian fossil fuels, the U.S. can again help make Germany a bulwark against antidemocratic forces encroaching on the region.

Looking back, the evolution of America’s relationship with Germany since 1945 is nothing less than astonishing. With Marshall’s speech on his mind, President Truman wrote in his memoirs that “for the first time in the history of the world a victor was willing to restore the vanquished.” Truman and Marshall pivoted the U.S. from all-out war to offers of treasure and know-how, made to a foreign foe that had sought to destroy Europe and rule the world.






George Marshall, the man, may be fading from memory. His magnanimity and his vision, however, endure.

Mr. Roll is the author of “George Marshall: Defender of the Republic” and a trustee of the George C. Marshall Foundation.

It’s been 75 years since George Marshall outlined a bold plan to counter Soviet influence by revitalizing a foreign foe.

‘Even the worst Republican will vote for the plan if Marshall’s name is on it.’ HARRY TRUMAN

George Marshall, center, at Harvard’s commencement, June 5, 1947.

FROM TOP: HARVARD UNIVERSITY ARCHIVES; AFP/ GETTY IMAGES

Women cleaning bricks for rebuilding houses, Berlin, November 1945.
 
I think that article continues the long tradition to overstate the Marshall Plan in European recovery; in the German case, Ludwig Erhard went against the Anglo-American occupation authorities and abolished old Nazi-era wage and price controls, and introducing the Deutschmark, doing it on a Sunday when the occupation authorities had the day off. :lol:
 
Obviously every collapse hurts least, or even rewards those whose material ways are designed to do well when society sucks.

So at the bottom of the cycle there is homogeneity. But that does not mean it is the homogeneity keeps a society strong or the diversity during the peak that makes it fragile. It just means that those prepared for the bad times are alike. It would be foolish to assume decadence in diversity rather than assume there are cycles and different people flourish at different points.
What keeps a society strong is solidarity and unity, when people feels they are part of the same group and support each another.
Homogeneity is simply something that correlate rather strongly with solidarity, as people relate more easily to people who are like them. I'd say diversity can be either a boon or a detriment, depending on how it appears and is considered.
It can highlight unity when the underlying link is stronger (kind of "despite our differences, we share a common goal/identity/purpose that is stronger"), or it can undermine it (the "modern diversity" that tends to segment people into antagonist groups that are defined by their opposition to each other is kind of the latter).
 
What keeps a society strong is solidarity and unity, when people feels they are part of the same group and support each another.
Homogeneity is simply something that correlate rather strongly with solidarity, as people relate more easily to people who are like them. I'd say diversity can be either a boon or a detriment, depending on how it appears and is considered.
It can highlight unity when the underlying link is stronger (kind of "despite our differences, we share a common goal/identity/purpose that is stronger"), or it can undermine it (the "modern diversity" that tends to segment people into antagonist groups that are defined by their opposition to each other is kind of the latter).

There is no question that states willing to tolerate diversity in their populations have an enormous advantage over states that do not.
 
It's a semantic question what level of diversity "doesn't count". But to use your words Akka, adding "modern diversity" to a corporate board, for example, is known to be good business. It's no coincidence the biggest proponents of "modern diversity" is the incredibly singularly minded (profit seeking) corporate America.

We've known for no less time than since 2004 that diversity leads to increased crowd wisdom. Indeed, it is a prerequisite.
 
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What keeps a society strong is solidarity and unity, when people feels they are part of the same group and support each another.
Homogeneity is simply something that correlate rather strongly with solidarity, as people relate more easily to people who are like them. I'd say diversity can be either a boon or a detriment, depending on how it appears and is considered.
It can highlight unity when the underlying link is stronger (kind of "despite our differences, we share a common goal/identity/purpose that is stronger"), or it can undermine it (the "modern diversity" that tends to segment people into antagonist groups that are defined by their opposition to each other is kind of the latter).
Uniting around some core idea can be equally as strong in creating solidarity as homogeneity: sports teams, religion, race, nationality, gun ownership, civil rights, women's rights, Trump, abolition, NIMBY, etc. The more points of unity the stronger the solidarity.
 
There is no question that states willing to tolerate diversity in their populations have an enormous advantage over states that do not.
That's the dogma that is always presented as truth (as you said "there is no question"), but I've rarely seen an actual argument about it.
Uniting around some core idea can be equally as strong in creating solidarity as homogeneity: sports teams, religion, race, nationality, gun ownership, civil rights, women's rights, Trump, abolition, NIMBY, etc. The more points of unity the stronger the solidarity.
That's what I explicitely described in my post as the first case.
 
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There is no question that states willing to tolerate diversity in their populations have an enormous advantage over states that do not.

May not strictly be true. Democracy for example isn't as stable as Monarchy and looking at USA the diversity seems to be weakening it a'la Rome.
 
We can't run controlled experiments on human society. It's a big mistake, imo, to treat this stuff like science, and any attempt is a very reactionary frame because the idea that our relations are governed by immutable laws would mean that politics are actually pointless.
I disagree, but perhaps because I define science differently. To me science is the the process, involving things like open reporting of evidence and models, and the rejection of hypothesis on the basis of facts. To me it is the best way to try and establish truth. Any deviation from the scientific method results in a degradation in the power of the predictions made.

Controlled (and randomised and blinded where possible) are the gold standard in determining causality, but you cannot do them in cosmology or evolution, but these are still fields where the scientific method has had extraordinary results. I do not accept that there is any field where more powerful models/theories can be developed and tested using non-scientific methods than with scientific ones.

I am sure there are some who use pseudo-scientific language to be reactionary, but this does not mean that all attempts at really analytical analysis of human societies, economies and polities is a bad thing. That is what I think science is.
 
May not strictly be true. Democracy for example isn't as stable as Monarchy and looking at USA the diversity seems to be weakening it a'la Rome.

Diversity is strength. But a lack of ties that bind is still a weakness.
 
Diversity is strength. But a lack of ties that bind is still a weakness.

That's just rhetoric though. Some of the most stable and safest countries eg Japan and until recently Scandinavia don't have many immigrants.

USA at its height had a dominant culture. Objectively diversity by itself has no real benefit it seems. You just end up with a heap of people who don't really get along.
 
You need to define diversity, then. You just mean immigrants? It's practically one of our national identities. When the USA gets closed off and closed minded, it loses a key tie that binds, that of the melting pot of people that are American because they want to be. We've always had, and much worse tension frequently, black Americans, native Americans, all sorts of immigrants and natural born Americans. The decay of that idea along with siloing and the decay of inclusive moral institutions, like churches, might look like diversity isn't working, but that's not what has changed. What changed are people decided to be chunky or whatever and that they don't need to tie themselves to the fate of their neighbors. Like, "muh daughter will never date a Demoncrat/Repuglican." Those are the idiots that make diversity look weak... but it's not like they're the diverse ones. Those are the examples of toxic purity.
 
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