U.S. Gov't Orders Apple to Backdoor iPhone

[uppi]

It generates the AES key from the PIN in combination with a UID fused into the hardware (not the storage hardware, specific hardware location depends on iPhone version). It's impossible to read the UID directly from either hardware or software, only the result of the decryption operation after inputting the PIN. If you pull the storage, there's no way to use the UID.

You can see details in the iOS Security Guide. They're really quite clever.

TPM devices on PCs (and Windows Phones) do the same thing - if you pull the storage from a device with a TPM chip, you can't brute-force the password, you have to attack the AES (or other cipher) keyspace directly.

I see. As I understand it, the crypto processor is integrated into the main processor, so that you cannot separate these two and hook up a custom processor to brute force the crypto processor.

That leaves only attacks on the chip itself, like corrupting the boot ROM, or sensing currents on the crypto processor. In principle possible, but extremely difficult and risky.

As an aside: I kind of like that we are entering a world where private businesses are starting to become too big for governments to contain. With Apple being as large as they are, and the fact that they have more popular support right now than the government, there is a good chance they are going to win this fight and the government is going to be told to sit down and shut up. We need more of that in this world.

I do not like this at all. The government should be contained by the people and governments that overstep their bounds should be voted out of office. Sadly, voters have neglected that duty and the best we can hope for is big powerful corporations to play benevolent dictator. And God help us if a corporations that is too big for the government to contain gets malevolent leadership.

 

[Agent327]

Mr Trump disagrees with you. Mr Trump has expressed his opinion, calling for a boycot of Apple till they comply with the court order.

Meanwhile the Justice Dept has specified its demand to the effect that the required access code will remain under Apple's control and may be destroyed after use. It will be one time thing only.

Which leaves only the giant loophole of the code being copied prior to destruction. And the minor issue that one time only things are legal precedents.

What will happen next?

 

[Cheetah]

Which leaves only the giant loophole of the code being copied prior to destruction. And the minor issue that one time only things are legal precedents.

What will happen next?

China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Thailand, Russia and a host of other countries will have very little patience if Apple is to refuse their court orders to unlock phones in the name of the perpetual war on terrorism.

And all other companies will have to comply as well, of course.

And then somewhere, somehow, things gets leaked and criminals get a hold of it.

Of course, this special firmware will of course only work on one specific phone. There's absolutely no reason to think that crypto is superhard (It really, really is superhard!) and nobody will ever make a mistake and someone will never find a way to modify it to use on other phones...

 

[Zelig]

Of course, this special firmware will of course only work on one specific phone. There's absolutely no reason to think that crypto is superhard (It really, really is superhard!) and nobody will ever make a mistake and someone will never find a way to modify it to use on other phones...

I think this is really the weakest point in the pro-Apple argument.

Sure, the firmware could leak, but it's useless without the crypto keys to sign it, and then still needs to be modified to work on any phone. If the crypto keys are leaked, then the firmware is nearly irrelevant, I've no doubt that a stock firmware could be appropriately modified. Hell, it might even be easier to modify a stock firmware than to remove the single-device restrictions on Apple's low-security firmware.

 

[Cheetah]

I agree it is somewhat far-fetched, but still... How hard would it be to modify the phone so it will run the firmware though?

And my argument there isn't necessarily just about this, but a bit down the slippery slope, where other companies must make other compromises. If it becomes a rule that manufacturers can be expected to engineer special-purpose products to facilitate bypassing encryption, I can't see how it can end well.

 

[Zelig]

I agree it is somewhat far-fetched, but still... How hard would it be to modify the phone so it will run the firmware though?

Probably harder than creating the firmware without Apple's help in the first place.

 

[warpus]

I do not like this at all. The government should be contained by the people and governments that overstep their bounds should be voted out of office.

This doesn't work at all in America's 2 party system, voters don't really have a choice to vote bad parties out of office, since they only ever have 2 options. The best they can do is alternate between them.

I agree though that powerful corporations are not a good thing. Just because some governments are out of control and some American governmental institutions have 0 democratic oversight doesn't mean that the problem is going to be made any better with corporations out of control as well.

 

[uppi]

I think this is really the weakest point in the pro-Apple argument.

Sure, the firmware could leak, but it's useless without the crypto keys to sign it, and then still needs to be modified to work on any phone. If the crypto keys are leaked, then the firmware is nearly irrelevant, I've no doubt that a stock firmware could be appropriately modified. Hell, it might even be easier to modify a stock firmware than to remove the single-device restrictions on Apple's low-security firmware.

The question is, how securely Apple can implement the single-device restriction. I doubt that they have the security infrastructure in place on existing devices for single-device firmware. If I understood correctly the link you provided, the bootloader only checks whether the code was signed by Apple. That means that code than runs on one iPhone should run on any other iPhone of the same type.

The signed code could of course contain a section that checks whether this is a particular iPhone and abort execution if not. But this check cannot be secured by the usual cryptographic layer, because the code would not have access to it before unlocking. So if hey have no second layer to fall back to, the check might be insecure, or at least less secure then the usual procedure. That means the unmodified leaked firmware might already be a security risk.

In this single instance, they could try to patch every other iPhone to not accept this firmware, but that update might not land on every iPhone out there. Once the requests for such things start piling up (which we all know they will), this becomes an extremely cumbersome strategy.

In any case, at one point Apple has to draw a red line if they want to fight the impression that you cannot trust American companies. They chose to draw it here. How much of a security risk it would actually be is secondary, because what has to be decided here is whether the American government may order a company to weaken the security of its products. That is the fundamental question, and if it is answered positive, trust in American companies will decline even further.

 

[Zelig]

It doesn't really matter how it's implemented - any future change to the firmware invalidates its signature. If you're able to post-boot execute arbitrary code (to bypass device check), it's about the same level of difficulty to just do at least two of the three things the FBI is asking for in the first place. (No device wipe and no enforced delays - the third, allowing automated password input would be more difficult, but you could always just build a high-speed capacitive robot finger.)

And really, if you have "execute arbitrary code" privileges, you have the same power as just having the signing keys for the firmware in the first place, so devs are fairly well motivated to close up those exploits.

 

[Agent327]

I think this is really the weakest point in the pro-Apple argument.

Sure, the firmware could leak, but it's useless without the crypto keys to sign it, and then still needs to be modified to work on any phone. If the crypto keys are leaked, then the firmware is nearly irrelevant, I've no doubt that a stock firmware could be appropriately modified. Hell, it might even be easier to modify a stock firmware than to remove the single-device restrictions on Apple's low-security firmware.

It would be if that were Apple's argument. The problem, however, is that, no matter what the FBI promises, it sets a legal precedent.

Secondly, not necessarily an argument but simply logical, what's the point of Apple upgrading their security if they can simply be court ordered to remove that security? 'Temporarily', of course.

The basic argument is not about whether Apple should comply or not. Whatever the answer to that is, it sets a legal precedent.

The weakness of argument here is on the government side. As Apple rightly pointed out, this is a matter of principle. The fact that Justice promises this is 'a one time only thing' basically shows complete legal ignorance. In law, there are no 'one time only things'.

For this reason alone, Apple should never comply, as the court fails to recognize the legal precedence of this case.

 

[Zelig]

Yes, I'm aware of that, read my other posts. That one is discussing purely the technical side.

 

[Aea]

The DOJ is now trying to use the same tactic to have Apple unlock a dozen more phones. Story is barely a week old and that one-time one-exceptional event claim is already bogus:

http://www.wsj.com/articles/justice...t-data-from-about-12-other-iphones-1456202213

http://www.theverge.com/2016/2/23/11097044/us-forcing-apple-to-unlock-dozen-iphones-says-wsj

 

[Agent327]

I can't say I'm surprised. It looks like Apple should definitely resist the court order(s) and made the right decision the first time.

Yes, I'm aware of that, read my other posts. That one is discussing purely the technical side.

I did and they provide no legal argument.

 

[Zelig]

I did and they provide no legal argument.

What?

This is a quote from a post of mine:

The expert consensus is that the FBI could almost certainly do this on their own, they simply picked this case because homegrown terrorism makes good optics for them to establish legal precedence with.

One of any number of security experts I could link, Bruce Schneier: Why you should side with Apple, not the FBI, in the San Bernardino iPhone case

"There’s nothing preventing the FBI from writing that hacked software itself, aside from budget and manpower issues. There’s every reason to believe, in fact, that such hacked software has been written by intelligence organizations around the world."

Here's a post where I link and selectively quote a specific breakdown of how the technical issues are relevant to the legal case, which is the important thing.

Here's a post where I'm linking and selectively quoting support of Apple and the right of people to have security.

 

[Agent327]

You concluded that Apple's position 'has a weak spot'. That, in your book, may be a legal argument, but not a very good one. You see, the case is not about what technically could be done, but what is allowed to be done. Technically the FBI (or any other government agency) do not need a court order. Legally, however, they do. The mere fact that the FBI is requesting a court for a court order already should have told you that the technical possibilities are not the issue here. As Apple rightly argued, this is a matter of principle.

As I argued (but you did not respond to) the weak case here is the one backing the court order. And I explained why.

 

[Birdjaguar]

What might happen if Apple loses and still refuses to comply. what are the various "punishments" that could be imposed on the company or Tim cook?

 

[Zelig]

You concluded that Apple's position 'has a weak spot'.

No, people's poor interpretations of Apple's positions are weak, Apple's position is fine. That post was purely in response to the technical argument.

That, in your book, may be a legal argument, but not a very good one.

No, it has no legal relevance.

The mere fact that the FBI is requesting a court for a court order already should have told you that the technical possibilities are not the issue here.

Right. I already said pretty much this exact thing, if you read my posts.

 

[Timsup2nothin]

Right. I already said pretty much this exact thing, if you read my posts.

The "let me state the same thing you did while calling you wrong" move. If you figure out a way to respond to that, let me know. I've given up.

 

[Zelig]

What might happen if Apple loses and still refuses to comply. what are the various "punishments" that could be imposed on the company or Tim cook?

I'm not familiar enough with American law to speculate, but I think it's pretty unlikely. My guess is that most likely scenario is that Apple loses, and engineers future devices so that complying is impossible.

 

[Hygro]

The "let me state the same thing you did while calling you wrong" move. If you figure out a way to respond to that, let me know. I've given up.

I use indent tags