I've translated them to rough percentages above in the thread. Too lazy to translate the table itself, though I will do it if you or someone else requests it.
Ah, I found it. Thank you.
I meant "numbers of lost livestock", not hunger mortality of people.
As I noted in my own post, the number was closer to 1/4, and that I had misremembered. Two-thirds is a number of something, maybe it was destroyed farmland following the Civil War? Not sure. Anyway, it's quite possible that they did slaughter other cattle than their own, or that there are livestock that the Soviet statistics you cited do not take into account. At any rate, let's say that the top two tiers of your chart, which is 16% of farmers, slaughtered their cattle. That would be pretty close to 1/4 of total cattle head lost! Also, your percentages are average, obviously lower strata did not own .7 cows; proportionally, the upper strata did own the majority of cattle.
The phenomenon of peasants destroying food rather than allow it to be confiscated is not new: the French Republic encountered the same problems during the darker days of the Revolution/Civil War, and the revolt in the Vendee.
Uhm? There were similar famines "immediately before" the collectivization drive? Or do you mean the famine of 1921 that was not immediately before collectivization and which was the result of wartime economic collapse (WWI + civil war)?
Or so you also mean that while the harvests were similarly bad, they didn't result in famine?
Yes, the harvests in 1926 and 1927 put serious pressure on the Soviet government to do something different. It was their failure that convinced Stalin of the need to forcibly collectivize farming, since at the time the voluntarily collectivized farms were producing more food per farm than the still-private farming was. This collectivization was also believed to make the concordant mass-mechanization of farming much easier, since 50 farms brought into one large Kolkhoz or Sovkhoz would need less equipment than 50 individual farmers.
Also, do not underestimate the impact of famines and bad harvests many years previous. Not only do they affect grain reserves for many years after they happen, but they also take a serious physical toll upon their survivors. One might survive one famine by the skin of their teeth, only to be taken in a weakened state by the next.
So, who were the kulaks, then?
I have already explained this.
I am of course not denying that every label possible was used to remove or slander people Stalin deemed to be enemies: Trotskyist, Zinovievist, Imperialist Agent, Counter-revolutionary, Politically Liable Ethnicity, I'm sure Kulak was used as well. But that doesn't mean that dekulakization was general terror across the countryside, or that there was no definition of Kulak. We've already talked about how local authorities took the two concepts that we're talking about in this thread into their own hands at times.
Collectivization itself doesn't, but too much grain confiscation by the state in order to finance industrialization by selling that grain abroad (to which both you and me allude) does. The more food goes abroad, the less remains for the peasants and the cattle.
And if too much surplus grain collected by the peasantry is taken away and goes abroad - well, the peasants have no economic incentive to collect it.
Add to it undue haste, poor management, some over-optimistic Soviet estimation of mechanization (introducing of tractors to the kolkhozy) rates - and you have some problems on your hands.
I never said it was a perfect idea that was perfectly implemented. Merely that they believed they were doing what was necessary. What is necessary is never unwise. How can you say that it wasn't? Without that grain to sell, they don't industrialize as quickly, maybe they aren't ready in time for the Second Intervention that haunted every Russian communist's dreams (and which turned out to be very real and very worth the worry). Put yourself in their shoes (after all, it wasn't just Stalin who dreamed up these ideas one day, the CC had been tossing the idea around for years in private). Your harvests are sucking badly. People are hungry. Your economy is in ruins, you know that another invasion is coming, and that you have no industry capable of supporting that defense. What do you do?
The first sentence is true. I doubt that Stalin or some other Soviet bureaucrat was busy rending his heart over it, though.
You have no way of knowing. But I don't think leaders or their subalterns engage in policies they know are, or will, cause great pain to their people without some level of regret or remorse, knowing that such measures are necessary. I know that doesn't mesh well with the popular conception of Stalin as a heartless psychopathic butcher.
Except the USSR in 1932 and 1933 was still a net exporter of food, most notably grain.
I literally just said that. Lone Wolf and I have already gone over that.
Kochman said:
How many millions of people in the UK starved to death in the 20th century due to food exportation?
Between 1.5 and 4 million in the year 1943 alone. I won't bring up the Irish Famine, since you said 20th century, but the British government neglected to help the Irish at all, and exported foodstuffs in the same way that you condemn the Soviets for, except that the Soviets used the proceeds to help their country vitally, while the British allowed their businessmen to grow richer in their case.