Was Stalin a Communist?

[ReindeerThistle]

Perhaps. But Hitler also made decisions motivated by ideology that a) went against the recommendations of most of his generals and b) ended up being correct anyway. The ultimate, but by no means sole, example of this is his "stand fast" order after the Moscow campaign in 1941. Had Hitler followed along with the General Staff and let ideological concerns pass, at the very least the Wehrmacht would have yielded crucial territory for no reason and probably lost unnecessary casualties in a retreat. And it could very easily have gotten much worse, snowballing into a total Napoleonic disaster.

The focus on Hitler and Hitler's decisions is largely an artifact of German commanders' attempts to whitewash their own errors and the institutional errors of the German military after the war. Men like Manstein chose to blame Hitler for failing to allow the Wehrmacht to fulfill its true potential - and in so doing, they did their best to separate Army from Party, arguing that Germany's soldiers were largely disinterested servants of the state and the nation, not Hitler's stooges and not willing participants in the Holocaust. This portrayal is, to put it lightly, badly skewed and nauseatingly self-serving.

This isn't to say that Hitler didn't make military mistakes; of course he did. So did everybody else in the German military, in more or less equal measure. It's not unreasonable to argue that Hitler's strategic errors more or less balanced out with his successes.

And not to forget there are two sides in every battle (at least). The USSR moved the bulk of their production to the east of the Urals, out of reach of the Axis ground and air forces. Supply and ordinance have a lot to do with the Soviet success.

As for Stalin. He was a Communist. recommend Anna Louise Strong's The Stalin Era and Bruce Franklin's introduction to his Essential Stalin compilation for some basis for my view on him as a Communist.

Stalin as a son of the peasantry did not have the luxury of flowery erudition others, but he had two very important qualities: he cared and he worked.

His writings are geared toward a less "intellectual" crowd, and his lectures to the."Lenin Enrollment" are like Paul's Epistles from the Bible are Catholic study. They are a laymen's explanation of the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism.

Stalin's contributions to the Communist cause are significant. He was a maximalist, and in so being, was very heavy-handed in.use of overdetermination.

I will debate Cheezy's characterization of Stalin as not being a "good" Communist since this is WH and not the Tavern.

 

[Domen]

It also seems, that the material effort to organize the Nazi death machine cost more than the actual profits from extermination.

What profits were there in extermination? And please don't say "soap" or something disgusting like that.

Before entering camps or gas chambers, victims were being thoroughly robbed from all belongings and property. So were their houses and bank accounts.

All those things were reinforcing Nazi Germany's state treasury.

But - as I wrote above - that was probably worth much less than expenditures to build and run that "death machine".

 

[Mouthwash]

It would be nice to see Nazi Germany collapse far faster than in OTL. It might be unwise, however, to have the USSR penetrate Europe without having the US onboard to counterbalance it.

Would the US have been able to do so without dropping the atomic bombs on Japan?

 

[Lord Baal]

Would the US have been able to do so without dropping the atomic bombs on Japan?

Counterbalance the USSR? Absolutely. The existence of the bomb, combined with the USSR's own weakness at the end of WWII, is what held the USSR in check. It is incredibly unlikely that Germany's defeat stops US research into the bomb, though they probably won't compete it as quickly. A better question is whether it would matter in Europe.

Obviously if the USSR joins the allies in 1940 and Germany is crushed quickly, the US hasn't constructed the bomb, Japan probably doesn't incite a war in East Asia without the US and UK being distracted by Germany, and the US probably isn't involved at all. That seems to tip the scales in favour of Soviet hegemony in Europe, but a swift German defeat also leaves both the British and French Empires strong and intact, presumably with De Gaulle and Churchill at their heads. These two men wouldn't have fallen out over FDR's dogged insistence on dragging De Gaulle's name through the mud for no good reason, leaving Britain and France strongly allied.

This leaves us with a slightly stronger USSR than at the start of WWII and a slightly weaker Britain with a much weaker, but still stronger than in OTL, France. Germany will probably be rehabilitated rather than dismembered. Turkey would certainly jump very strongly into the Western camp out of fear of the USSR, or at worst be Finlandised. Most of the Balkan States won't have experenced German rule or influence. The situation in Europe changes greatly at this point, and it is doubtful that the Cold War as we know it eventuates at all. It is more likely that the interwar politicking and manoeuvring continues as normal.

 

[Mouthwash]

Counterbalance the USSR? Absolutely. The existence of the bomb, combined with the USSR's own weakness at the end of WWII, is what held the USSR in check. It is incredibly unlikely that Germany's defeat stops US research into the bomb, though they probably won't compete it as quickly. A better question is whether it would matter in Europe.

So it wouldn't matter to the USSR that America was involved in a huge, costly overseas invasion tying down millions of troops? They must have known that the US wouldn't be able to crank out enough bombs in time to deter them from marching into France or whatever. Couldn't they have offered help in taking down Japan in return for noninterference in Europe?

 

[ParkCungHee]

I'd also downplay the influence of De Gaul's and Churchill's personal falling out in Franco-British relations. The other source of weakness in the post WWII relationship was the fact that France was facing a fundamentally different situation after the war.

France had been invaded, saw a new government form, saw occupation, saw another invasion, another occupation and another new government form, not to mention the varied and often ambiguous ways it's colonies related to each of these events.

Comparatively, in this time line, France and Britain's interests are nearly perfectly in sync. Not to mention the idea that America needed the aftermath of WWII to "rouse it into action" against the Soviet Union is a farce, and so we can pretty well say that if the United States would not be actively supportive of Britain and France against the Soviet Union, they'd be a very friendly "neutral" party.

 

[Lord Baal]

So it wouldn't matter to the USSR that America was involved in a huge, costly overseas invasion tying down millions of troops? They must have known that the US wouldn't be able to crank out enough bombs in time to deter them from marching into France or whatever. Couldn't they have offered help in taking down Japan in return for noninterference in Europe?

Why would the US and Japan be at war in this scenario? If we posit an invasion of Turkey by the Nazis as opposed to Barbarossa, the swift German defeat is unlikely to provide Japan the necessary time to launch their Pacific assaults. Additionally, the US was always more concerned about the Soviets than the Japanese. The Japanese were seen as potential allies that had gone astray, whereas all but a handful - admittedly, this handful included FDR - of officials saw the Soviets as a menace. Moreso than Hitler, until events pushed him to the fore.

Even with several Asia-firsters among the high-ranking FDR Administration officials, it is extremely unlikely that Europe-firsters like General Marshall would allow any sort of arrangement with the USSR over Western Europe in exchange for an arrangement in Asia.

Also, the idea that the Soviets could march into France with ease is laughable. Even most of the Communist resistance movement recognised De Gaulle as their leader, not Stalin, and would have fought any Soviet invasion. Not that one was likely; France was an entirely different kettle of fish to Finland.

 

[Mouthwash]

Why would the US and Japan be at war in this scenario? If we posit an invasion of Turkey by the Nazis as opposed to Barbarossa, the swift German defeat is unlikely to provide Japan the necessary time to launch their Pacific assaults. Additionally, the US was always more concerned about the Soviets than the Japanese. The Japanese were seen as potential allies that had gone astray, whereas all but a handful - admittedly, this handful included FDR - of officials saw the Soviets as a menace. Moreso than Hitler, until events pushed him to the fore.

Even with several Asia-firsters among the high-ranking FDR Administration officials, it is extremely unlikely that Europe-firsters like General Marshall would allow any sort of arrangement with the USSR over Western Europe in exchange for an arrangement in Asia.

Also, the idea that the Soviets could march into France with ease is laughable. Even most of the Communist resistance movement recognised De Gaulle as their leader, not Stalin, and would have fought any Soviet invasion. Not that one was likely; France was an entirely different kettle of fish to Finland.

I'm not talking about your scenario (in fact, I can't remember why you made it in the first place). I'm simply asking what would happen if the US never used the bomb on Japan.

 

[Lord Baal]

I'm not talking about your scenario (in fact, I can't remember why you made it in the first place). I'm simply asking what would happen if the US never used the bomb on Japan.

Ah, my apologies. You quoted my post in response to a claim about Nazi Germany attacking Turkey, so I assumed you were continuing that scenario.

I think Operation: Downfall would have been more than enough to keep the Soviets on their toes, myself. There was also the small matter of the Soviet invasion of Manchuria. The US had the bomb, Stalin knew about the bomb, and the US successfully held the Soviets at bay for several decades despite relative parity in the numbers of bombs. I doubt the actual dropping of the bombs would have made much difference.

The old myth that Truman bombed Japan as a warning to the USSR is just that: a myth. While we cannot know Truman's private feelings, there is no indication that the though of a post-war conflict with the Soviets had even entered his mind by August.

 

[ReindeerThistle]

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The old myth that Truman bombed Japan as a warning to the USSR is just that: a myth. While we cannot know Truman's private feelings, there is no indication that the though of a post-war conflict with the Soviets had even entered his mind by August.

Read Meeting at Potsdam by Charles L Mee. Truman most certainly vociferated his intent to use the A-Bomb to curtail the USSR. As a side note, after hearing of the successful test at Alamogordo, Truman reportedly said "Wait until Stalin finds out we have the Bomb."

 

[ParkCungHee]

I think Operation: Downfall would have been more than enough to keep the Soviets on their toes, myself.

Honestly, I've always been doubtful of the actual difficulty of Operation: Downfall. Okinawa wasn't difficult because of any sort of psychological boost from fighting on their "home soil," but because Okinawa was a heavily fortified, easily defensible location and wide scale civilian resistance was impossible in a society that had already conscripted virtually every available body into the war effort.

We saw the same determination and planning for civilian resistance out of the Germans, and that just didn't last, never mind match the killing power of the Wehrmacht.

 

[Lord Baal]

Honestly, I've always been doubtful of the actual difficulty of Operation: Downfall. Okinawa wasn't difficult because of any sort of psychological boost from fighting on their "home soil," but because Okinawa was a heavily fortified, easily defensible location and wide scale civilian resistance was impossible in a society that had already conscripted virtually every available body into the war effort.

We saw the same determination and planning for civilian resistance out of the Germans, and that just didn't last, never mind match the killing power of the Wehrmacht.

If you look at the planning for Operation: Downfall, it seems painfully obvious that the Americans were going to slaughter the poor IJA. Especially in light of the IJA's stunning and swift defeat at the hands of the less-prepared - though admittedly very well-prepared - Soviets in Manchuria. US planning for Downfall was based on the worst possible outcomes, and rightfully so.

 

[r16]

Hitler's biggest missed chance was not invading Turkey, prior to the Soviet campaign and then immediately move on to conquer Soviet Azerbaijan and close the African theatre.

but then this was Hitler's trump card in the Maskirovska before the Barbarossa started . But the Corps that would travel on Soviet railroads wouldn't be strong enough to take the Caucaus or survive on its own . The road network in our Eastern parts were always utterly weak , meaning the bulk of German Army invading Istanbul and else wouldn't be able to arrive in theater for an immediate showdown . The deal Stalin and Adolf agreed was scaring us into submission , and have our army transferred South to fight the French and the British in a repeat of 1916-18 with limited German support . Limited as our logistics were terrible . As signed in 1939 when May 1940 was totally unforeseen . In 1941 Stalin had even less reason to suspect Germans could waste the opportunity they had in moving to Middle East .

 

[Tahuti]

Lolwut? How in the name of all that is holy is that supposed to have worked?

"Hey, Stalin, I'm invading Turkey and effectively encircling you by establishing my dominance in the Zone of the Straights! Just don't lift a finger to stop me until I establish effective control over a decent mid-range military power, thus giving me the ability to cut you off from the Mediterranean and launch strikes directly at your Caucasian territories, okay!"

Even if the USSR responded in kind, Germany would have been in advantage.

 

[Lord Baal]

Even if the USSR responded in kind, Germany would have been in advantage.

Yeah... No.

You expect us to believe that Germany could somehow manage to successfully invade Turkey, conquering enough of the country to pose an existential threat to the USSR's Caucasian oilfields and maintaining supply lines across the Balkans, Asia Minor and Southern Russia in spite of Soviet, British and Turkish resistance. Because the Nazis are magic.

Germany was forced to launch an auxiliary operation into Crete in order to protect their Romanian oilfields from British air raids before they could launch Operation: Barbarossa. If Germany launches an invasion of Turkey prior to the Italo-Greek War they get flanked by British forces from Greece, who would be there with or without Greek permission. If they launch said invasion after the occupation of Greece they have to deal with partisan assaults on their supply lines. The Germans then have to not only take European Turkey, which would be relatively easy - though Istanbul is no pushover - but have to cross the Dardanelles and push through northern Turkey in the face of Allied air raids from Iraq, a likely amphibious landing in southern Turkey leading to a flanking attack on the troops moving to the Caucasus and the Free French seizure of the Levant and reinforcement of Turkey's southeastern provinces.

This is on the off chance that Stalin suffers a debilitating head injury and wakes up believing himself to be a fish, whose flopping and gasping for air leaves the Soviet apparatus confused, preparing for some sort of gas attack, since Stalin is spending all his time gasping for air and eating his own poop. Because that's the only way the Soviets don't simultaneously support Turkey and launch a pre-emptive strike on German-occupied Europe.

All of this, of course, assumes Bulgarian support for an invasion of Turkey, which is extremely unlikely to be forthcoming. Bulgaria offered only token support for the invasions of Greece and Yugoslavia and actually came out of the war gaining territory, in no small part due to the Bulgarian government's obvious unwillingness to help the Nazis short of existential threats. If Germany coerces Bulgarian support through military force this gives the Brits and the Soviets plenty of time to position their forces in Turkey, which isn't exactly ruled by blind monkeys who spend all day masturbating and eating cheese while German troops position themselves for an invasion.

Please explain your reasoning for how the Germans could successfully subdue Turkey without any of these things stopping them, leaving them in an advantageous position to take the war to the USSR.

 

[ReindeerThistle]

Great discussion...

 

[Mouthwash]

Read Meeting at Potsdam by Charles L Mee. Truman most certainly vociferated his intent to use the A-Bomb to curtail the USSR. As a side note, after hearing of the successful test at Alamogordo, Truman reportedly said "Wait until Stalin finds out we have the Bomb."

Aren't there multiple versions of that meeting?

Also, (question for the crowd) did Turkey collaborate with the Nazis in any substantial manner? I think I remember Raul Hilberg mention that Turkey wasn't being criticized today for collaborating with the Nazis because of how important it currently is to the West (don't ask me for the link or quote- this is hearsay).

 

[ParkCungHee]

If you look at the planning for Operation: Downfall, it seems painfully obvious that the Americans were going to slaughter the poor IJA. Especially in light of the IJA's stunning and swift defeat at the hands of the less-prepared - though admittedly very well-prepared - Soviets in Manchuria. US planning for Downfall was based on the worst possible outcomes, and rightfully so.

Maybe so, but the problem is those worst case scenarios have, because of the atomic bomb debate, gone down as the accepted norm of what Downfall would have looked like, far out of proportion to the actually known facts.

The fact that racism, or at least cultural misunderstanding played a huge part in the thinking behind the worst estimates is also rarely brought up.

 

[Tahuti]

This is on the off chance that Stalin suffers a debilitating head injury and wakes up believing himself to be a fish, whose flopping and gasping for air leaves the Soviet apparatus confused, preparing for some sort of gas attack, since Stalin is spending all his time gasping for air and eating his own poop. Because that's the only way the Soviets don't simultaneously support Turkey and launch a pre-emptive strike on German-occupied Europe.

Then you missed my point, since I meant to say that Germany could withstand such a pre-emptive assault and end up better overall by invading Turkey, or even invade Turkey simultaneously with the USSR and still be better off. Especially considering the USSR would need to reroute troops to the Caucasus in such scenario.

However, even then, it might not be unimaginable that Stalin would have bought a German invasion of Turkey anyhow, and far from becoming hostile to Germany would instead be tempted to come to Germany's aid ala Poland, and take Turkish Armenia, which was something the USSR also considered doing after the war (though Turkish membership of the NATO prevented it).

All of this, of course, assumes Bulgarian support for an invasion of Turkey, which is extremely unlikely to be forthcoming.

All of this, of course, assumes Bulgarian support for an invasion of Turkey was necessary, which totally isn't the case. Bulgaria's support for the Axis in a military sense was completely negligible, and the Bulgarians were in because of political benefits for the Axis, and certainly not because of military ones.

 

[Tarquelne]

Honestly, I've always been doubtful of the actual difficulty of Operation: Downfall. Okinawa wasn't difficult because of any sort of psychological boost from fighting on their "home soil," but because Okinawa was a heavily fortified, easily defensible location and wide scale civilian resistance was impossible in a society that had already conscripted virtually every available body into the war effort.

We saw the same determination and planning for civilian resistance out of the Germans, and that just didn't last, never mind match the killing power of the Wehrmacht.

Look at Burma. The IJA defended a territory they (the soldiers) had very little personal connection to quite fanatically. And while there was a significant amount of defensive terrain the country wasn't a "natural fortress" like Ok... and the IJA wasn't even getting much benefit from the terrain by the time they were on the defensive. Except, perhaps, for the built-up areas - of which there are plenty to be found in Japan. In the end - after a lot of needless (even for WWII) bloodshed they did pull out. ... with the little they had left.

The Nazis were often big on talk and lacking in follow through. The Japanese, OTOH, when it came to fanaticism, tended to deliver. The idea that surrender was a terrible moral wrong was quite firmly believed by the military, perhaps even more-so by the leadership, and not uncommon among civilians.

The Japanese had correctly pegged the planned US attack locations, had reserved their best material (some actually rather decent armor and planes), and - back to Ok. - had better defensive terrain to fight in than Germany. Plus - Amphibious landings! In addition the Japanese gov had both less regard for the inevitable plight of civilians, and fewer resources to cope with the aftermath of an invasion.

It most likely would have been a frikin' bloodbath. Both during the initial landings, in the urban/mountain fighting afterward, and the following who-the-hell-knows-what period where famine and plague were likely.

And we've still the US and British casualties to consider. They couldn't count on the Russians taking the bulk of the fighting on themselves this time, and had much longer supply lines to deal with.

Assuming military action had to be taken - which, IMO, is where the real question is - at least one A-bomb was almost certainly the best choice. Even in hindsight, which can't change the information available at the time. Even granting they were racist.

You might even view the A-bombs as a repudiation of the European bombing campaigns. What the European campaigns were supposed to do, the A-bombs, arguably, did.

BTW: I'd say the take-away lesson from all this isn't "A-bombs aren't that bad!" Rather, it's "Even without A-bombs, war is horrible."