What does "external" mean?

[yung.carl.jung]

In order to have a sense of self, we need to identify what is not self. It begins at the cellular level. Cells interact with what is outside of themselves. Mind, brain, consciousness is just a complex version of that. You are over complicating this. That is the goal of most philosophy isn't it? To make what is simple, complicated.

nothing is inherently simple or complicated, we just choose to represent certain issues as simple or complicated. often times in philosophy it might seem like something is "overcomplicated", but that is simply an avoidance of black and white viewpoints and a celebration of nuance.

your first sentence is on point, with the rest of your post I cannot really agree. your terminology is very muddy, "mind" and "consciousness" is not the same, "brain" and "consciousness" is definitely something entirely different. consciousness could very well exist free of the material world, our brain is contained to it.

 

[Hrothbern]

then how does it easily follow that a FULLY (or seemingly fully) internal ability and internal means and notions about only internal things, can lead to a notion of an external?

I think that on our own we would not be capable to distinguish between internal and external in case of the apple.

But there are at least two mechanisms that cause us to attribute "external".
One direct and one indirect.

For the first mechanism let's say we encounter not an apple but an insect.
That insect is not that easy to PREDICT by our projective imagination.
It has a kind of random behaviour and "all the time" it suddenly does something else as we "expect".
That is a real nuisance for our small solipsic internal world we created for ourselves.
So "bad predictable" is a kind of precessor of foreign/alien/external.
That on her own causes two things I think:
1. we accept de facto there are things happening outside our internal comfort zone with good predictability.
2. we try to correct this aberation by trying to understand what drives this insect, and find out some behaviour that increases predictability, perhaps to the degree that we can catch and eat it (from some internal instinct driver).
Still an internal process trying to overcome the external oddity.

But now we toss in our fellow homo sapiens for the second mechanism.
In first order like the insect unpredictable to some degree (after some learning)
The weird thing however is that if we now BOTH see that insect, and one of the humans make expressions communications about it, there is a good chance that the other human relates that to that same insect, that same oddity.
From there there comes a kind of recognised external reality into being.
There is a kind of predictability: if my fellow human utters a specific word for that insect (after all it is good food, that word belonging to insinct driven learning), I see that insect as well, and if I eat it, it is an insect.

So the combination of a fellow homo sapiens and a word (language) give me POWER over that oddity that is of a repeatable consistent nature and therefore predictable.
THAT is what will satisfy our internal process.

So our mind internal as it is, has now a whole list of events and objects that are "more" than just predictable internal... there are as such less predictable oddities that are still tangible and predictable and I can talk about it, describe it, share behaviour insight about it.

Strictly this is still (solipsistic) not 100% tight, but our brain is, I think, not interested in 100.00% predictability, but just a good enough predictability to avoid surprises and frustrations.
Good enough to drive our evolutionary development including culture.

And in our human development from internal animism to religion and other super structures (tribal chieftains etc) that impose external realities on the individual, we developed that language and later logic to such a degree that that external world became after a while (science) more reliable and able to predict many kinds of events and objects, than our "natural" internal brain.

But still not 100% tight seen from the solipsistic individual.
But "who cares" when "everything" is meanwhile ruled by group efforts and communication.
(except our small personal emotinal "I", that suffers to some degree from unnatural external society rules)

 

[Birdjaguar]

nothing is inherently simple or complicated, we just choose to represent certain issues as simple or complicated. often times in philosophy it might seem like something is "overcomplicated", but that is simply an avoidance of black and white viewpoints and a celebration of nuance.

your first sentence is on point, with the rest of your post I cannot really agree. your terminology is very muddy, "mind" and "consciousness" is not the same, "brain" and "consciousness" is definitely something entirely different. consciousness could very well exist free of the material world, our brain is contained to it.

Yes my words were imprecise, on purpose. I wanted to cover all the brain, mind consciousness variables in one fell swoop. And if one chooses to place consciousness outside or both inside and outside of the brain, it does make a difference. My point was that the notion of self, separation and individuality all have roots in single cells and are not just products of a higher consciousness or mind or big brain.

 

[Kyriakos]

I think that on our own we would not be capable to distinguish between internal and external in case of the apple.

But there are at least two mechanisms that cause us to attribute "external".
One direct and one indirect.

For the first mechanism let's say we encounter not an apple but an insect.
That insect is not that easy to PREDICT by our projective imagination.
It has a kind of random behaviour and "all the time" it suddenly does something else as we "expect".
That is a real nuisance for our small solipsic internal world we created for ourselves.
So "bad predictable" is a kind of precessor of foreign/alien/external.
That on her own causes two things I think:
1. we accept de facto there are things happening outside our internal comfort zone with good predictability.
2. we try to correct this aberation by trying to understand what drives this insect, and find out some behaviour that increases predictability, perhaps to the degree that we can catch and eat it (from some internal instinct driver).
Still an internal process trying to overcome the external oddity.

But now we toss in our fellow homo sapiens for the second mechanism.
In first order like the insect unpredictable to some degree (after some learning)
The weird thing however is that if we now BOTH see that insect, and one of the humans make expressions communications about it, there is a good chance that the other human relates that to that same insect, that same oddity.
From there there comes a kind of recognised external reality into being.
There is a kind of predictability: if my fellow human utters a specific word for that insect (after all it is good food, that word belonging to insinct driven learning), I see that insect as well, and if I eat it, it is an insect.

So the combination of a fellow homo sapiens and a word (language) give me POWER over that oddity that is of a repeatable consistent nature and therefore predictable.
THAT is what will satisfy our internal process.

So our mind internal as it is, has now a whole list of events and objects that are "more" than just predictable internal... there are as such less predictable oddities that are still tangible and predictable and I can talk about it, describe it, share behaviour insight about it.

Strictly this is still (solipsistic) not 100% tight, but our brain is, I think, not interested in 100.00% predictability, but just a good enough predictability to avoid surprises and frustrations.
Good enough to drive our evolutionary development including culture.

And in our human development from internal animism to religion and other super structures (tribal chieftains etc) that impose external realities on the individual, we developed that language and later logic to such a degree that that external world became after a while (science) more reliable and able to predict many kinds of events and objects, than our "natural" internal brain.

But still not 100% tight seen from the solipsistic individual.
But "who cares" when "everything" is meanwhile ruled by group efforts and communication.
(except our small personal emotinal "I", that suffers to some degree from unnatural external society rules)

I agree with you, yet isn't this again mostly accounting with some hypothesis (possibly correct, and more generally i think quite correct in principle) not of the HOW but of the WHY of the forming of a notion of an external? Ie it still would not be about how some notions or more complex (triggered by things like those you said) variations of notions and ties of notions all of which are about the internal, create a notion of an external. (we know for a fact they do, and can provide hypotheses as to why, but the question is about the how, and more specifically about whether this notion of an external is purely made by notions of the internal)
My own wonder is more about the implication of a notion of X (in this case 'internal' being the X) leading itself to a notion of a 'Not X' (external), but a Not X built seemingly entirely out of formations of X. It is a bit scary*, in my view

* as in it does seem to be about the very peculiar and not conscious way the mind is working.
Furthermore, i am reminded of Socrates, who claimed that philosophy owns its existence to the sense of awe (cause if you feel strongly about an idea, it means you can continue examining it and going deeper, regardless of the outcome)

 

[Lexicus]

Yes my words were imprecise, on purpose. I wanted to cover all the brain, mind consciousness variables in one fell swoop. And if one chooses to place consciousness outside or both inside and outside of the brain, it does make a difference. My point was that the notion of self, separation and individuality all have roots in single cells and are not just products of a higher consciousness or mind or big brain.

Someone should ask David Chalmers how complex an organism needs to be to experience qualia.

 

[warpus]

What it does NOT explain is HOW we had the ability to have a notion of an external in the first place, because i think it seems mostly evident that even if we had senses, and even if the chair was there, but had we not the ability to identify it as EXTERNAL

Isn't this related to the question of self-awareness? As soon as an entity becomes self-aware, it surely becomes immediately able to draw a boundary between "internal" and "external". Maybe even before that. I don't understand what's so mysterious about an ability to look at your body and say "me" and to look at a chair that's standing a couple metres away as "not me".

If we were unable to look at a chair and deduce that it is not a part of us, then we probably wouldn't have the mental faculties required to reason through simple problems like how to farm, etc. I can't imagine a sentient being which is able to reason through such problems and not be able to distinguish between the concepts of internal and external. So it seems with a certain level of intelligence, such ability is needed, and naturally arises.

--If one assumes that we NEED some notion of the external if we are to identify (automatically) the chair as external, and if one assumes that ANY notion is something which takes form (usually not consciously) in the mind and thus is something internal and tied to only internal other things (other notions etc), then how does it easily follow that a FULLY (or seemingly fully) internal ability and internal means and notions about only internal things, can lead to a notion of an external?

I am having a hard time parsing this, but are you asking how it's possible to go from a being that makes no distinction between internal and external and end up with a being that can?

 

[Kyriakos]

Isn't this related to the question of self-awareness? As soon as an entity becomes self-aware, it surely becomes immediately able to draw a boundary between "internal" and "external". Maybe even before that. I don't understand what's so mysterious about an ability to look at your body and say "me" and to look at a chair that's standing a couple metres away as "not me".

If we were unable to look at a chair and deduce that it is not a part of us, then we probably wouldn't have the mental faculties required to reason through simple problems like how to farm, etc. I can't imagine a sentient being which is able to reason through such problems and not be able to distinguish between the concepts of internal and external. So it seems with a certain level of intelligence, such ability is needed, and naturally arises.




I am having a hard time parsing this, but are you asking how it's possible to go from a being that makes no distinction between internal and external and end up with a being that can?

To your final question, somewhat yes, but not entirely so. Although - once again - i am not arguing that we do not have a notion of an external (we OBVIOUSLY do). What i am asking is if our notion of an external is (as it seems to me) consisting of notions of the internal, and thus seems to be itself a special type of notion of internal things.

Why should this matter, you might ask. Well... in dichotomies usually both ends are seen as of equal importance, or at least none of the two polar extremes is seen as being itself subordinate to the other. But if our notion of the external is a special type of notion of internal things, then this isn't a dichotomy of equals, but two types of internal things. Philosophically, this seems interesting to myself.

In dichotomies such as warm/cold, you cannot claim that one end is created by the other WHILE the other end cannot be (likewise) created by the analogous other.
There are different types of dichotomy, cause some have to do with material things while others are more purely notional, eg light/dark, old/young, even/odd etc etc. But in this case (internal/external) due to the special parameter of human thinking being internal (by definition; it is in us, it is not outside of us) this makes this particular dichotomy seem to not be one of equal polar extremes but one quality (notion of the internal) and one split of that quality which is still tied and subordinate to it (notion of the external as another type of the notion of the internal).

 

[warpus]

To your final question, somewhat yes, but not entirely so. Although - once again - i am not arguing that we do not have a notion of an external (we OBVIOUSLY do). What i am asking is if our notion of an external is (as it seems to me) consisting of notions of the internal, and thus seems to be itself a special type of notion of internal things.

But our notions of the external do not consist of notions of the internal. Sure, our own internal representation of the external has to be as such, but that's not the same thing. We seem to have a clear grasp on the external vs the internal - they are distinct concepts to us and we are able to distinguish between them and do not define one in terms of the other. Yeah, when we analyze something like an external object, it first has to be brought into our memory, so we can think about it. But I don't see what the big deal about that is. It's just a representation.

 

[Kyriakos]

But our notions of the external do not consist of notions of the internal. Sure, our own internal representation of the external has to be as such, but that's not the same thing. We seem to have a clear grasp on the external vs the internal - they are distinct concepts to us and we are able to distinguish between them and do not define one in terms of the other. Yeah, when we analyze something like an external object, it first has to be brought into our memory, so we can think about it. But I don't see what the big deal about that is. It's just a representation.

But here is the issue: aren't ALL concepts internal by definition? (they are formed in our mind, thus are internal, no?)

And if all concepts are internal by definition, then a sense of the external can only exist not dependent on internal things or concepts IF that external somehow is formed in our sense or understanding or grasp without needing a concept to allow it to form (which, imo, is not possible; what does it mean to have something in your grasp if you did not have a concept of it?)

 

[Birdjaguar]

Someone should ask David Chalmers how complex an organism needs to be to experience qualia.

Given that he thinks that computer chip mimicking the brain will reproduce brain qualia, I think he would say minimal complexity is required. ??

I think the lack of an accepted definition of qualia precludes it being very useful.

 

[Lexicus]

Given that he thinks that computer chip mimicking the brain will reproduce brain qualia,

Did he say this recently? I was sort of under the impression that he didn't believe we would ever solve the "hard problem" of consciousness because we would never be able to artificially recreate qualia.

I think the lack of an accepted definition of qualia precludes it being very useful.

Secretly, I agree with you, but I do find the concept interesting and it has helped me to think about the issues of consciousness etc.

 

[Birdjaguar]

Did he say this recently? I was sort of under the impression that he didn't believe we would ever solve the "hard problem" of consciousness because we would never be able to artificially recreate qualia.

Secretly, I agree with you, but I do find the concept interesting and it has helped me to think about the issues of consciousness etc.

My interpretation of wiki:

David Chalmers[edit]

David Chalmers
David Chalmers formulated the hard problem of consciousness, raising the issue of qualia to a new level of importance and acceptance in the field.[citation needed] In his paper "Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia", he also argued for what he called "the principle of organizational invariance". In this paper, he argues that if a system such as one of appropriately configured computer chips reproduces the functional organization of the brain, it will also reproduce the qualia associated with the brain.

 

[Kyriakos]

^I don't know of him, but he looks intelligent - as all look-alikes of D'Onofrio would

 

[warpus]

But here is the issue: aren't ALL concepts internal by definition? (they are formed in our mind, thus are internal, no?)

If it's in our head, it's internal. But an internal concept can easily symbolize an external concept. Isn't this what happens each time we look at the world? We use internal references to objects that are external, right? You look at a chair and in your mind forms a virtual reference to that chair. You can close your eyes and picture it, and that visualization is internal. The reference is internal - while the actual object is external.

It would be impossible for us to look at the world and understand it without first referencing it internally. So this is the way it's gotta be

Does that make sense?

 

[Lexicus]

My interpretation of wiki:

That is quite interesting. I can't claim to be particularly familiar with his work, but in my experience he has generally been brought up by people making arguments against the possibility of technologically reproducing human consciousness, along the lines of "robots with human intelligence wouldn't be able to experience qualia and so wouldn't really be 'conscious'."

I should probably just read some of his papers tho

 

[Kyriakos]

If it's in our head, it's internal. But an internal concept can easily symbolize an external concept. Isn't this what happens each time we look at the world? We use internal references to objects that are external, right? You look at a chair and in your mind forms a virtual reference to that chair. You can close your eyes and picture it, and that visualization is internal. The reference is internal - while the actual object is external.

It would be impossible for us to look at the world and understand it without first referencing it internally. So this is the way it's gotta be

Does that make sense?

I agree. But not about the part "an internal concept can symbolize an external concept"*, cause "concept" is not in tautology with "object". The external object is indeed referred to, but the concept cannot be itself external, no? A concept is a means to have something manifest as a thing. The something can be external, but the means can only be internal regardless if it refers to an external or internal object.
In other words: while all concepts are internal, some can refer to something external, but it seems that the actual concept through which the external object is grasped/referred to is again some variation or complicated form of some concept of an internal object.

*unless by 'symbolize' you mean that while the concept remains internal, it somewhat assumes a tone of something MEANING an external thing. Yes, but that much isn't in contention In fact this would follow from the concept of internal being the core concept, and the concept of the external being some variation of it - which is my point; they aren't equal extremes in a dichotomy, but two differing forms of one concept; the internal.

 

[warpus]

This is exactly the same as computer software scanning your face and importing the data so that it can be analyzed. It is scanning an external object and converting it to an internal approximation, so that it can be analyzed. That's what our brain does when you look at external stuff - it imports it into your brain and converts it into a corresponding internal approximation, so that you can think about it.

It's not a paradox because you have 2 objects here - one is external, and one is an internal approximation of it. We simply remember "oh yeah, this object is external even though in order to think about it, I am referencing an internal approximation"

 

[Hrothbern]

This is exactly the same as computer software scanning your face and importing the data so that it can be analyzed. It is scanning an external object and converting it to an internal approximation, so that it can be analyzed. That's what our brain does when you look at external stuff - it imports it into your brain and converts it into a corresponding internal approximation, so that you can think about it.

It's not a paradox because you have 2 objects here - one is external, and one is an internal approximation of it. We simply remember "oh yeah, this object is external even though in order to think about it, I am referencing an internal approximation"

That's flawed
strictly speakin

you position yourself in a third person position

but if you position yourself within the "computer"
you cannot know whether those data are really external or just made up by you
from that within posiotion you have to ASSUME that that data list as seen by internal does come from an external source
and strictly reasoning: you cannot know that.

Enough examples of people that make up whole stories of a past they never had
our brain is a master in making up stuff
including the most realistic details

 

[Kyriakos]

This is exactly the same as computer software scanning your face and importing the data so that it can be analyzed. It is scanning an external object and converting it to an internal approximation, so that it can be analyzed. That's what our brain does when you look at external stuff - it imports it into your brain and converts it into a corresponding internal approximation, so that you can think about it.

It's not a paradox because you have 2 objects here - one is external, and one is an internal approximation of it. We simply remember "oh yeah, this object is external even though in order to think about it, I am referencing an internal approximation"

I agree about -the general gist of*1- that (but that is not the level we are discussing about) What i am saying is NOT about the end-result, which is as you said (triggered by something external, we end up having a concept which refers to it). I am talking about the process which (non-consciously to us) allows us to form a concept of something external, while apparently ALL our means (concept-formation and concepts themselves) are by definition internal.
(and i will have to now read Hrothbern's post to see what is going on*2 )

edit
*1 & *2:
yes, bringing computers into this is going to make things a lot more problematic, cause computers have no consciousness, and thus do not have internal vs external dichotomy in reality; as Hroth said that requires a third-party looking at the data as input to a computer, thus external to it.
The issue is about human thinking requiring (because we have a point of view) internal means of identifying anything, both internal objects and external objects use those means. My guess is that:
At some point... the concept of the internal, while always remaining about something internal, gets to connote an external thing. But it is still an internal formation. We do not actually grasp the external thing itself, of course, but the core issue is that while only having concepts of the internal we somehow (our mind) can create distinct concepts of the internal which include a concept of an external. Concept of 'not x' becomes, in effect, concept of 'x' in some iteration, and in some not examined way. That interests me

 

[Hrothbern]

I agree about -the general gist of*1- that (but that is not the level we are discussing about) What i am saying is NOT about the end-result, which is as you said (triggered by something external, we end up having a concept which refers to it). I am talking about the process which (non-consciously to us) allows us to form a concept of something external, while apparently ALL our means (concept-formation and concepts themselves) are by definition internal.
(and i will have to now read Hrothbern's post to see what is going on*2 )

edit
*1 & *2:
yes, bringing computers into this is going to make things a lot more problematic, cause computers have no consciousness, and thus do not have internal vs external dichotomy in reality; as Hroth said that requires a third-party looking at the data as input to a computer, thus external to it.
The issue is about human thinking requiring (because we have a point of view) internal means of identifying anything, both internal objects and external objects use those means. My guess is that:
At some point... the concept of the internal, while always remaining about something internal, gets to connote an external thing. But it is still an internal formation. We do not actually grasp the external thing itself, of course, but the core issue is that while only having concepts of the internal we somehow (our mind) can create distinct concepts of the internal which include a concept of an external. Concept of 'not x' becomes, in effect, concept of 'x' in some iteration, and in some not examined way. That interests me

I think we run here in a typical example that logic has only limited use, or so to say limited stating power.

A bit comparible with the paradox of Xeno where the hare will never overtake the turtle
because following the sheer logic, both never reach the point in time or space where the hare and the turtle are at equal distance
because the logic is a limit formular.

If you box yourself in with the solipsistic logic and exclude external, you have to assume that your mind is able to make up a complete universum, including all laws of physics etc.
That is much more complex than the far more elegant and simple assumption that there is an external world.
(of which we see a distorted view because of our internalisation process)

so there is never proof, only likelyhood from a belief in elegance.

Introducing an external world is a matter of convenience for your internal world.