Having had a couple days discussion on the issue, here's my take:
Assuming a criminal defendant and assuming the trial has started, the lawyer should advise the client to tell the truth. Lawyers are explicitly obliged to counsel clients against perjury. If this is fruitless and the client still insists on perjuring herself, the lawyer should conduct the witness examination normally instead of utilizing a narrative defense, and should be free to make reference to the defendant's testimony in closing arguments and elsewhere.
I say this because it seems to be the only solution that does not prejudice the court against the client, properly aligns the attorney’s loyalty with the client rather than the court, and because it is ultimately the responsibility of the client to determine if she will testify and what she will say.
American lawyers cannot abandon their clients willy-nilly; there are specific circumstances where a lawyer can terminate representation. Moral repugnance is one of these conditions, and certainly perjury is a morally repugnant act. However, during a trial a lawyer may not unilaterally withdraw if doing so would prejudice the tribunal against the client. Withdrawal during a trial without truly extraordinary circumstances seems to be prejudicial as it obviously sends a signal both to the jury, the judge, and other actors that there is something very, very wrong with the client here. So withdrawal is out.
The narrative solution, as posited by Illiram and Jollyroger, also seems to be prejudicial. As JR pointed out, the judge is likely to grok that a narrative testimony by a defendant appears to indicate perjury. Now the jury may not pick up on this because the jury can’t be assumed to be legally sophisticated, so narrative testimony may not prejudice against judgement, but that’s not the only consideration. In a non-jury trial, the judge sits in for the jury, and the judge should differentiate between his role as fact finder (jury stand-in) and administer of the court. The problem is you can’t really assume the judge would be able to do that because judges are only human. Even in a jury trial, the judge still determines the ultimate sentence of the defendant and indications that a defendant perjured herself can prejudice sentencing. So because the narrative solution is ultimately prejudicial it should be avoided.
What’s left after we’ve disposed of the possibility of withdrawal and the narrative solution appears to be only representing the client as if nothing untoward is going on. People may suggest that doing so interferes with the lawyer’s duty as an officer of the court to be candid in his interactions with the court. It is certainly true that lawyers have a duty to be candid to the court; however they also have a duty to be loyal to their clients. For a criminal defense attorney, I would argue that the lawyer’s duty to the client should override the duty of candor to the court when those duties conflict. The alternative amounts to making the defense attorney a tool of the prosecution by binding the defense attorney to report on his client, a role that seems to be opposed to both the adversarial system under the common law and the traditional role of the lawyer as a zealous advocate for his client. Because a normative treatment of the client, rather than a withdrawal or narrative approach, best serves the interests of the client, it is appropriate for the lawyer to fulfill his duty of loyalty to the client by adopting a normative approach even if the client perjures herself.
There’s a defined split in the roles and responsibilities of lawyers and clients that supports client autonomy to perjure herself on the stand. The lawyer is responsible for planning and executing much of the representation of the client, but the client is the ultimate decider on whether or not she wants to take the stand, what she wants to plead, and whether to accept a plea bargain or settlement. So ultimately the lawyer cannot control whether or not his client takes the stand, and the lawyer certainly can’t force a client to say what the lawyer wants her to say on the stand. As such, the lawyer should not feel responsible for a client’s decision to perjure herself on the stand provided the lawyer appropriately advised the client not to perjure herself. Because the lawyer is not capable of controlling his client and because he is not responsible for the client’s decision to perjure herself, the lawyer should continue to present his defense as if nothing was amiss.
In light of the client’s autonomy in deciding whether or not to testify, it should be noted that a normative approach is the most appropriate when a client perjures herself without first consulting with the lawyer. A lawyer who is blindsided by the client’s surprise decision to perjure herself is best advised to continue with a normative approach of examination because he cannot easily change horses in the middle of testimony.
So because the lawyer must avoid prejudicing the tribunal against his client through his decisions, because the lawyer owes a duty to his client above the court, and because the lawyer cannot ultimately control his client, it seems to be appropriate that lawyers whose clients decide to perjure themselves should treat their clients in a normative manner on the stand.
If anyone has an alternative other than withdrawal or the narrative approach for this dilemma, I would be happy to hear it.
Also, my determination is informed by the fact that a normative approach to examining a perjuring client is permitted by my state’s bar association. Other states may change the calculus by stating that the lawyer’s first duty is to the court, rather than the client or through other means.