really is just a souped up 4th generation rehash economy job.
Because it's the oldest of these machines being discussed. They all start to age as soon as the design is fixed and you actually start building the damn things.
A bunch of the "souped up" features didn't even exist yet when the design process started in the 1970's. Whole chunks of technology had to be invented as they went along (and it hit a couple of bottlenecks the Swedish engineers eventually had to go to the Americans to sort out).
It is otoh cheap as dirt in relation to what it can still do.
It's not going to tie you over into... the 22nd century... which the F-22 might (yes, I'd say it's that expensive, and was designed for overkill to hopefully discourage competitors from even trying to match it). But since the cost of the "Gripen" is manageable even for small nations, that's not too much of a problem. Get some newer, relatively cheaper machine suitable for your needs in 10-20 years time.
I know you have this US military mindset where cost-effectiveness is a total non-issue of course. Others don't have the luxury of living in that kind of financial fantasy-land and tend to get what it needs, foregoing "massive overkill" as the default setting.
You also seem to have a US mindset which implicitly assumes your machines will always be taking off and landing in situations where you have local air-superiority. Even F-22s, and their bases, would be vulnerable on take-off and landing, if the enemy controls the skies.
Since the "Gripen" was designed to be operable fighting a surprise attack of the 3000 bombers, and supporting fighters in parity with them, of the Soviet Air Armies located in the Baltic region in the late 1980's, it is to be integrated in an air-defence system not enjoying such advantages. (Kiss all your airfields and bases goodbye in the first half hour of conflict for starters.)
The Swedish strategic assumption has always realistically been that: "If the Soviets/Russians deploy in force, we're toast, so lets force them to wager as much as possible, lose as late as possible, and cost them as much as possible." It's hardly the American way, but small nations must plan on losing wars, because that's the only realistic outcome if it gets jumped by a great power. How it loses matters. There's as little point in having a couple of F-22's bombed on the ground as any other type of machine.
I.e., while not directly integrated in the machine itself, it's a nifty feature for a small nation, hard up on cash for F-22 derivatives, expecting the next war it will be fighting to be one for national survival against an opponent superior in strength. Since you're going to lose the machines anyway, it might make sense not to put too much into each individual piece. The US doctrine is to try to build and fight in such a manner that no machines and no pilots are lost, which is nice if you can get it, but unrealistic for small nations. If you have to fight the Soviets, or the US, you will all die, that's a given. The trick is to make it difficult enough to make them think twice in the first place, and fight them as well as possible under the circumstances anyway if they come. (Otherwise the logical step is to have no airforce, but expect the US ally to fight for you which sovereign nations tend not to want, and neither does the US.)
It's of course not an issue for the US, but the observation that Greece, or anywhere else for that matter, isn't the US is mind-numbingly trivial in any case.
Is the expectation on Greece that it will be fighting an air-war against an inferior opponent (in which all these machines are fine, get something cheap), or that it will simply be sending their machines to a common NATO pool (go with the best integrated, most versatile one), or that it will be used in a desperate first line defense against a superior opponent, while possibly waiting for the US to fly those F-22s and stuff in to help out?
Different strokes for different folks, and the real question is: "What does Greece need at a pricetag it can afford?"

