When is war justified?

War is justified whenever a government violates the democratic rights and freedoms of a group of people. Any nation is then justified in going to war with that government for the purpose of defending the rights and freedoms of those people.

That doesn't mean that every situation in which war is justified is also a situation in which war is prudent, so for the love of god, don't tell me that we should be going to war with, say, North Korea or the USA or something. There's a difference between an action that we should take and an action that we would be justified in taking.

And yes I'm also skirting around the issue of how bad the rights violation needs to be before we are really justified in going to war. You should take the above as a framework for analysis, which to me seems like a better framework than "self defense" or "other-defense". But I haven't given it that much thought, so feel free to poke holes that I already haven't.

Making your neighbors fight and die in a foreign land is justified if that government is violating the freedom of the people living there?

I'd be happy if the amoral globalists running this country would stop sending our food and energy to those thugs in NK.
 
First off, I'd like to say I haven't decided on everything and am still learning about everything, so please enlighten me at all times you can. Thanks for the critical response.
Humbleness is always a pleasure to see on the web.


Necessary evil is still evil, not good.
In itself, sure. But if it is "necessary", than that implies that committing this evil results in a net good. If that is so, wouldn't you say that the act is morally sound, morally good?
Suppose you hit someone in the face and break his nose. Evil, right? Suppose by doing so you happen to save the lives of 10 people. Breaking someone's nose is still evil, but the contextualized act is also evil? I don't think so. And that's the thing. To say x is evil is all good and well for the theoretical basis, for knowing what in principle is right and wrong. But in reality, the lines blur and you usually will be somehow evil, the question is just how. And if that is so, isn't minimizing such evil good?
The problem is, perhaps, that you think you need objective moral legimization or justification to do something. Technically, you don't. You are free to be pragmatical and be evil to some other moral system if you think it will ultimately result in good by your own. I'm not the kind of judge that imprisons you for behaving a wrong way; I merely point fingers and go "Bad SiLL. That's not a good thing to do." War, for example, has plenty of uses you might find good for the remaining, living world, but you still kill a lot in the process and perform plenty of pain.
I am not sure what you are trying to say here. That you only put limited importance in morality? Well, we all do. Or rather, either we do or we decide to deceit ourselves and tailer morality to our liking. If we discuss morality, it of course is not necessarily about what we actually would do. It is about what we would do under the assumption that we would try to be as moral as possible.
Please realize that my point might have been that it's impossible to be good if you want to be pragmatic and reasonable. Maybe good is too civilized for the immature human creature to reasonably work about.
Why would good equal unreasonable? I am not following.
And if that's the case perhaps I'm trying to suggest that you should justify things pragmatically rather than morally since practically all human attempts on morals I've stumbled upon are measurements - subjective metrics that act as if objective - to justify some sort of immature, complex, human action.
Yes, morality is subjective, but practicality isn't? Again, I am not really following and I think that your understanding of morality is somehow messed up.
Perhaps I'm saying it's not that bad to be evil?
Well, depends on your interest in being a good guy. If your are an antisocial psychopath, evil may be not be bad at all. It's still evil though. What to you does it even mean to be evil? On a very general, conceptional level I mean.
Because I find the whole idea of utilizing moral concepts that are inherently subjective as they are created and analyzed by humans as if they were objective to justify anything despicable and egocentric. ;) (Or sociocentric? Is that a word?)
Well, I agree that one shouldn't treat any moral concept as the universal truth. However, if I think something is evil. And you are not able to refute, but still insist on doing it, than you don't think I have good reason to stop you?

Didn't care to have a look at your moral system right now, but maybe later.
 
I don't recall using that word.

So you'll be asking your neighbors to go fight? You said any nation is justified, many of them make people fight. And I dont think its ethical to use people who volunteered to defend the nation.
 
So you'll be asking your neighbors to go fight? You said any nation is justified, many of them make people fight. And I dont think its ethical to use people who volunteered to defend the nation.
What the hell are you talking about? Are you deliberately being obnoxious?
 
Humbleness is always a pleasure to see on the web.



In itself, sure. But if it is "necessary", than that implies that committing this evil results in a net good. If that is so, wouldn't you say that the act is morally sound, morally good?
Suppose you hit someone in the face and break his nose. Evil, right? Suppose by doing so you happen to save the lives of 10 people. Breaking someone's nose is still evil, but the contextualized act is also evil? I don't think so. And that's the thing. To say x is evil is all good and well for the theoretical basis, for knowing what in principle is right and wrong. But in reality, the lines blur and you usually will be somehow evil, the question is just how. And if that is so, isn't minimizing such evil good?

I am not sure what you are trying to say here. That you only put limited importance in morality? Well, we all do. Or rather, either we do or we decide to deceit ourselves and tailer morality to our liking. If we discuss morality, it of course is not necessarily about what we actually would do. It is about what we would do under the assumption that we would try to be as moral as possible.

Why would good equal unreasonable? I am not following.

Yes, morality is subjective, but practicality isn't? Again, I am not really following and I think that your understanding of morality is somehow messed up.

Well, depends on your interest in being a good guy. If your are an antisocial psychopath, evil may be not be bad at all. It's still evil though. What to you does it even mean to be evil? On a very general, conceptional level I mean.

Well, I agree that one shouldn't treat any moral concept as the universal truth. However, if I think something is evil. And you are not able to refute, but still insist on doing it, than you don't think I have good reason to stop you?

Didn't care to have a look at your moral system right now, but maybe later.

You should read my moral system, it answers all of your questions.

I think good, while most probably existing somehow, is basically unattainable by mankind and not a realistic measurement for justification of anything.

Yes, breaking a guy's nose is a bad thing, because it's negative, hurtful action. Do you know Kant's axeman dilemma?
 
What the hell are you talking about? Are you deliberately being obnoxious?

You asked people to poke holes in your argument and you said any nation was justified invading a country on humanitarian grounds, would that include making people fight or would you ask for volunteers?

...do you not think we'd get a bit bored if the Government consigned the Army to permanent public-duties roles?

I hope so


Whats your excuse?
 
You asked people to poke holes in your argument and you said any nation was justified invading a country on humanitarian grounds, would that include making people fight or would you ask for volunteers?
I'm assuming a volunteer army, with those volunteers aware of the conditions under which a nation might go to war (i.e. they are aware when they volunteer that they might be expected to fight a foreign war for humanitarian reasons). But I'm not here to discuss conscription.
 
So only nations with volunteer forces would be justified invading another country? Would volunteers have the opportunity to opt out of such a war if they joined to defend the country rather than be used in such a manner?
 
So only nations with volunteer forces would be justified invading another country?
To cut a long story short, yes.
Would volunteers have the opportunity to opt out of such a war if they joined to defend the country rather than be used in such a manner?
If they only want to defend the country and are unwilling to fulfil their duties abroad then they should not join the army.

I'd defend my own country if it were ever invaded, but don't really want to go somewhere else and defend someone else's country, so I'd never join my army. It's not a particularly complicated choice, and most people I know who have joined the army have done so specifically because they want to fight abroad. My friends who joined the army specifically joined to fight to free Iraqis and Afghanistanis from their regimes; regardless of how ridiculous I think those wars are, they joined with the knowledge that that's where they'd end up fighting.
 
You should read my moral system, it answers all of your questions.
It actually just confused me :p
1. Objective good is when no evil exists; it is when you never act in any kind of hurtful way, if applied as a personal moral code. The problem with this ideal is that it's not applicable anywhere in our society, as in humanity, the ability and will to do evil exists.
Sorry but I see no sense in this statement. I think what you mean is "pure" good.
Also, I don't think I, a simple, immature human, could ever know an objective ideal for certain.
There are no objective ideals. Morality is inherently subjective. However, you can have a common aim, which serves as a objective criteria to check on your moral concept. For instance: Everyone in principle deserves the same level of well-being. One you have done that, everyone is able to reason how that would be best accomplished.
2. Subjective good lies in the ideal that some parts of humanity is evil and must be vanquished through force or will. This kind of good might be any kind of just war or trial of a criminal. However, this soon begins to pale as the same actions are inherently hurtful. Which becomes very, very problematic as no issues are black and white. Many people murder for a very valid personal reason. Genocides, that legitimize modern wars on paper, could be in retort to something even darker. The metric becomes inabsolute and egoistical. It's completely trashable as moral justification. So we move on.
Sorry but that just seem incoherent. I'd need you to clarify that.
3. There are no moral codes valid for judgment or justification of war or punishment. They're disposable to utilize as a judge. Rather, take morals for what they are - a social group's general consensus in their interest of what's the best way to act. "We think we should x" is just as legitimate as "It's the good thing to do x".

While I believe I have the capability to act good according to Kant and intelligence to act good according to Bentham, I also realize that it's all a big ego that my small mind has produced and tried to make universal. So I throw it all out the window and take my girlfriend out for ice cream while just being pleasant to people.
Again, I'd need you to clarify. Why are no moral codes "valid"? What does such validity determine? And of course morals fundamentally rest on what is thought to be "the best way to act", so?
I think good, while most probably existing somehow, is basically unattainable by mankind and not a realistic measurement for justification of anything.
Unattainable by mankind? We invented that stuff to begin with! But yeah, only the most lax moral systems will ever be followed without compromise, sure. Doesn't make morality any less important.
Do you know Kant's axeman dilemma?
Nope
 
If they only want to defend the country and are unwilling to fulfil their duties abroad then they should not join the army.

What if they're attacked and they dont know how to defend the country because they were excluded from service? I'm nitpicking here, I got a different problem with that.

I'd defend my own country if it were ever invaded, but don't really want to go somewhere else and defend someone else's country, so I'd never join my army. It's not a particularly complicated choice, and most people I know who have joined the army have done so specifically because they want to fight abroad. My friends who joined the army specifically joined to fight to free Iraqis and Afghanistanis from their regimes; regardless of how ridiculous I think those wars are, they joined with the knowledge that that's where they'd end up fighting.

Your friends volunteered to fight ongoing wars - they gave their consent, most people join to defend their country and they kinda get dragged into 'elective' wars essentially started by a few people and their partisans. But if people are allowed to join and then "vote" with their feet, that will limit the politicians hold on power a bit. If a war is unjustified soldiers may walk first and educate the rest of us as to why... They really should be the ones with ultimate veto power. And if a war is more or less justified ;) only a small number will walk and they'll be replaced by volunteers.
 
Well I don't see the voluntary nature of the army as a problem here. To me, they're separate things - a government justifying war and an individual justifying joining the army. If a free man doesn't want to fight, nobody can force him... And yes, I don't really have a problem with a scenario in which the army has severe trouble recruiting because the government goes to war too often.
 
It actually just confused me :p

Sorry but I see no sense in this statement. I think what you mean is "pure" good.

There are no objective ideals. Morality is inherently subjective. However, you can have a common aim, which serves as a objective criteria to check on your moral concept. For instance: Everyone in principle deserves the same level of well-being. One you have done that, everyone is able to reason how that would be best accomplished.

Sorry but that just seem incoherent. I'd need you to clarify that.

Again, I'd need you to clarify. Why are no moral codes "valid"? What does such validity determine? And of course morals fundamentally rest on what is thought to be "the best way to act", so?

Unattainable by mankind? We invented that stuff to begin with! But yeah, only the most lax moral systems will ever be followed without compromise, sure. Doesn't make morality any less important.

Nope

Uh, damnit. Over again. I don't think I was confusing myself, but then again, I'm inside my own head. Again, per my state of mind as of this post:

Kant's axeman is that he invented the categorical imperative, a law which stated a number of bases for how to act good. He believed good lied in the intentions of acts. And everything you do must be practical as universally used: One must, for example, never lie, because if everyone lied, things would in general be pretty meaningless. He was then confronted with this view by a dilemma: What if an axe murderer showed up and asked where your brother was, when you knew his intention was to kill him? Kant argued that you should tell the truth, because it's not you who's making an evil decision to begin with. Then you remain good. The result of your acts did not matter, as long as your intention was wholly good.

Points, again:

1. You can rationally recognize good and evil, where I think the essence of which refers to a constant state or row of actions or either good or evil. Since we're talking morality here, it's basically a pointer of how to act - either act good and good exists or act evil and evil exists.

2. The ideal is obviously for everyone to be good.

3. But they aren't in the real world, obviously.

4. Quick aside: As you and I both agree on, morality is a human construct. Humanity is the source of good and evil. Humans act evil sometimes.

5. How to combat this? Kant (The axeman guy) said that everything you do must be universally applicable. You're your own shepherd of the good of the world. The problem with that is that you're acting impractical. Bentham (Another guy) said that every good action had to be measured in regards to how good the consequence would happen to be - if your intention was to hurt someone and he got better, you are a good person. Both are hilariously inapplicable. The world is, as you say, too complex for rational good to ever prevail. I dispose of both of them as rational arguments.

6. This is my own point, which isn't supported by a philosopher I've read yet, not wholly that is, it's somewhat inspired by Kant's categorical imperative, a rational concept. The thing is, basically, if something =/= good, then it's not good. If something is just slightly bad, a gray, complex thing, then it's not the white we recognize as "good". Even if I act in action against something black evil with a white good intention, it ends up gray, and it's not good. Good is a easily recognizable pure concept of how one must act. If the concept doesn't chime with our complex world, it's not attained.

7. Then to legitimization of just war, what is basically punishment on some human body or a multitude thereof, so this goes for crime trials as well. I think you read my post in another thread where you answered that sure, I could just dump rational arguments overall, as long as I was prepared for retort, and I am. So you might already know what's coming to you. But the rational arguments, the rational legitimization of just war, the moral arguments, they're simply not applicable, ever.

8. That's why I think that all moral legitimization of war is invalid. "We want to make the world good." You don't, you play fire and burn houses. It's not good. "We want to make the world better." You play fire and burn down houses. You inject bad things. The result has bad blood on your hands.

9. But I'm not against punishment. There are still pragmatical legitimizations that people just don't forgive themselves for having, if you'd ever need a rational argument. It's perfectly reasonable to think people are better off without a dictator, and a pragmatic way of disposing of him can be to shower his palace in Agent Orange. And it doesn't have to be moral thing to want people to feel good. I don't see the necessity of morals for me to be pleasant towards anyone. I see the utilization of moral (the silly greater good concept) when a military division burns down a village that supplies the local factory with manpower, but it's not a good thing to do. Greater good is a meaningless term in that it's just not good. But I still think it's perfectly fine to follow your gut and bomb families to pieces when they are kinda not very nice people. Godwin's Law inbound, you know.

10. So...

Tomorrow I'm taking a train to Jutland, because I don't like the high per capita carbondioxide production from a car, to visit my girlfriend, because I like making her feel nice and like general niceties for myself too. Monday, I'm working for a horrible wage at an after school club because the children have developed relationships with me and I want to nurture them and help them grow in the right direction. I actively try helping my friends (Almost all my friends are batshit crazy, see things etc) when they feel bad because I want them to be better. I don't eat pork, not because my moralistic religion tells me not to, but because I like dogs, and I've heard too many times now that pigs are more sociable and even smarter than our furry family friends. I'm very productive within music and poetry.

I think I could be considered a good person according to some weird moral system, but I don't want it. I don't want my thoughts to be universalized either. I don't need a moral reason to act like I do, and there are even parts of me that act bad, and I have resulted in really bad things for a few people. I don't need moral legitimization to yell at someone if they make me feel bad or even inflict some pain for fun at times.

My thought # 10 is very strange, I guess. But I assume it's the result of me attempting to dispose of rational arguments or rational application when it's actually what arguments are, so I'm being rational while trying not to. Or am I? Lol, I don't know anymore.

I had problems with phrasing throughout the post because I am tired and interweave good and evil into good and bad sometimes. One of the things is what I ditch. Another of the things is what I try to utilize as it mostly refers to what I feel of something, I guess. If anything, I hope you understand what I'm trying to pull.
 
@lod_jaoakim
Thanks for taking the time for a second approach. I think I see clearer now.
Kant's axeman is that he invented the categorical imperative, a law which stated a number of bases for how to act good. He believed good lied in the intentions of acts. And everything you do must be practical as universally used: One must, for example, never lie, because if everyone lied, things would in general be pretty meaningless. He was then confronted with this view by a dilemma: What if an axe murderer showed up and asked where your brother was, when you knew his intention was to kill him? Kant argued that you should tell the truth, because it's not you who's making an evil decision to begin with. Then you remain good. The result of your acts did not matter, as long as your intention was wholly good.
Ah yes, I've heard of it. I'll have to disagree with Kant here. To codify morality in a way that it doesn't care about context may be useful to make people act moral, because it is comparatively easy to check on it and not as prone to abuse, just as with codified law, but also just as with codified law isn't a reflection of an ideal order let alone justice, this isn't actually a reflection of ideal morality. Ideal morality requires individual commitment and thought rather than just some abstract codification (while such is necessary to establish the fundamental aspects).
5. How to combat this? Kant (The axeman guy) said that everything you do must be universally applicable. You're your own shepherd of the good of the world. The problem with that is that you're acting impractical. Bentham (Another guy) said that every good action had to be measured in regards to how good the consequence would happen to be - if your intention was to hurt someone and he got better, you are a good person. Both are hilariously inapplicable. The world is, as you say, too complex for rational good to ever prevail. I dispose of both of them as rational arguments.
I agree with you that both approaches are stupid, (at least as you portray them, I am not that familiar with them myself). But I don't see how this gives validity to your conclusion to disregard rational morality all together. You don't think there are more viable approaches to morality than the two you discussed ? I surely do.
6. This is my own point, which isn't supported by a philosopher I've read yet, not wholly that is, it's somewhat inspired by Kant's categorical imperative, a rational concept. The thing is, basically, if something =/= good, then it's not good. If something is just slightly bad, a gray, complex thing, then it's not the white we recognize as "good". Even if I act in action against something black evil with a white good intention, it ends up gray, and it's not good. Good is a easily recognizable pure concept of how one must act. If the concept doesn't chime with our complex world, it's not attained.
I disagree with you that grey means that something is not "good". My perception is rather that grey is a conglomerate of good and bad which could be split up in single pure good and bad components, but quit likely only in theory. While in practice, you always got grey, always got some good and some bad components. Now the moral thing to do would be to choose the one with the least share of bad / biggest share of good which then would be a inherently, a purely good act because you would do the best you can. Which means, that it is very important to differentiate between how you morally value a chose taken in itself and in the context of all the chooses given. Because the latter will always allow you to act good, regardless how bad the range of choices is you are given.
Which means, that "impracticality of morality" does actually only in so far exist as that people don't want to make the morally superior choices, not in so far as that morality would simply not match reality.

So when you say that the moral argument for war is never applicable, I strongly disagree. Because as soon as the alternatives to war produces even worse outcomes than war itself, it becomes a morally good choice, even though in itself rather bad. The same goes for all punishments which may be bad in itself.

After you have read this, I would like to ask you if you still don't see the necessity of morals.

Having said that, most people don't put much serious thought into morality without being inherently evil, as you surely realize. One does not need to consider morality to be good, or rather, fairly good. I don't have my life determined by morality either. Rather, I openly allow myself to be bad to some extends, but like to be aware of when I am. Morality is for me personally most of all a tool of fulfilling my will, because knowing what you are actually doing is necessary to know what you actually want to do.
 
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