Would the World be Better or Worse if WW2 Never Happened?

[Gen.Mannerheim]

I wouldn't say WW2 wouldn't happen. Imperial Japan still exists even if Hitler dies, and a Japanese expansion war in the Pacific would drag in the Netherlands, France, the British Empire, the US, China and probably the Soviet Union too, so there's your World War. It'll just be more centered around Asia.

That said, I don't know how much of a factor German support was in the Japanese decision to war against Westerners. Maybe without Nazi Germany Imperial Japan would have avoided war for other, more subtle methods?

Japan needed a strong European ally to help shield them from the focused, collective might of the colonial powers. Without Germany, Japanese foreign policy needs a rethink on how they can expand without getting curbstomped.

 

[Dachs]

Japan gained almost zero advantages from Germany, and the decisions to expand the empire in China were taken without reference to German policy. Germany switched its support from the GMD to Japan because of Japanese success, not the other way around.

 

[Leifmk]

Japanese policy wasn't exactly controlled by cautious or even reality-oriented persons, as it was.

 

[Gen.Mannerheim]

Japan gained almost zero advantages from Germany, and the decisions to expand the empire in China were taken without reference to German policy. Germany switched its support from the GMD to Japan because of Japanese success, not the other way around.

I think the German monopolizing of British, French, and Dutch focus, manpower and resources was a great, nay "decisive" (to use the word of the day) advantage for Japan, especially early in the war.

 

[Lord Baal]

I think the German monopolizing of British, French, and Dutch focus, manpower and resources was a great, nay "decisive" (to use the word of the day) advantage for Japan, especially early in the war.

An advantage, yes, but it didn't really affect their planning much. Largely because they were batcrap insane, with no real strategy to speak of besides "let's attack this now."

 

[Dachs]

I think the German monopolizing of British, French, and Dutch focus, manpower and resources was a great, nay "decisive" (to use the word of the day) advantage for Japan, especially early in the war.

None of those countries seriously opposed Japanese expansion in the East, and subsequent Japanese policy merely took advantage of those situations, it did not rely on them.

 

[Racsoviale]

I always thought that the presence of the royal navy in Burma/India was what stopped japanese aggression in that part of Asia, as well as the thing that kept them from invading the dutch holdings. With the royal navy shiting it's focus towards Europe, the japanese could expand somewhat unchecked.

 

[Cutlass]

Possibly for a while. But as time went on the Japanese became increasingly overconfident batpoop crazy and just didn't care about things like that anymore. Certainly having the British and Dutch no longer active in the region made things easier for them. But recall that it wasn't long after that that they were willing to take on the US and Britain, and all the other powers of the region, at the same time. They talked themselves into believing that we would not fight back if they showed themselves aggressive enough right at the outset.

 

[privatehudson]

Well my world would certainly be a worse place, all of my published work is about aspects of WW2 crossed with my local history, so I might never have done that without WW2.

 

[Gen.Mannerheim]

I'm not so sure that the Japanese were "crazy" per se as much as desperate. They had "great nation" aspirations with almost third world resource development. Either lady luck threw them a bone soon or they were going to have to go out on a limb. But without the major European powers focused on something else, say panzers, than Japan couldn't confidently take all the resources they needed without fighting a major war.

Without Germany, could Japan have tried to buddy up with the U.S.S.R.? That might have been able to solve some of their problems.

 

[Cutlass]

Desperation assume they were backed in to a corner in some way. Or that they had something to lose by not acting as they did. That simply isn't true. It's more true to say they greed without limits. They convinced themselves that they had to have the empire to be the players on the world stage that they believed they deserved to be. It was all about what the place in the world that they decided they were entitled to.

 

[Dachs]

Without Germany, could Japan have tried to buddy up with the U.S.S.R.? That might have been able to solve some of their problems.

Most of the point behind Japanese military buildup was resource aggregation for the eventual struggle with the Soviet Union. Their actions in Manchuria were specifically designed to preempt Russian designs on the area. The extension of Japanese power in Inner Mongolia was aimed squarely at the Soviet puppet state in Urga. The conquest and repurposing of North Chinese industrial regions and raw materials was designed to provide a firmer foundation for the war machine that would eventually sweep into Siberia. And so on, and so forth.

Between 1939 and 1941, that ultimate goal got a little fuzzy. The IJA tested its strength against the Red Army at Changkufeng and Nomonhan and failed completely, reinforcing the notion that the Soviets were too powerful to fight at the moment. The Chinese war continued to drag on and the Army's strength continued to dissipate. The potential for Western intervention to throw the Japanese out of China combined with colonialism to justify new targets in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Commanders on the spot sped up that process even more. By late 1941, Siberia - the Northern Resource Area - was still the goal, but Japan's military capability to pursue that goal had gradually waned. The Kwantung Army was still Japan's largest and most powerful single field army group by the time the American war had started, but it was arrayed for defense, not offense, and there was scant prospect of that changing any time soon. The IJA still prioritized a Soviet defeat above everything else, but many officers had either come around to the Navy's view that the Americans and Commonwealth needed to be beaten first, or lacked the ability to change the policy.

In these circumstances, attempting to cooperate with the USSR would be ridiculous. It would have solved zero of Japan's policy goals and actively worked against a few of them. The Soviets weren't about to send a fleet or an army to help the Japanese conquer territories for the IJA to use as bases to attack Siberia. And the Japanese would assist Soviet goals not at all. The USSR would probably continue to be the patron of the GMD in such circumstances, keeping it afloat as a viable enemy and a drain on the IJA's fighting power to prevent the Japanese from having the capability to invade Siberia.

 

[Gen.Mannerheim]

Most of the point behind Japanese military buildup was resource aggregation for the eventual struggle with the Soviet Union. Their actions in Manchuria were specifically designed to preempt Russian designs on the area. The extension of Japanese power in Inner Mongolia was aimed squarely at the Soviet puppet state in Urga. The conquest and repurposing of North Chinese industrial regions and raw materials was designed to provide a firmer foundation for the war machine that would eventually sweep into Siberia. And so on, and so forth.

Between 1939 and 1941, that ultimate goal got a little fuzzy. The IJA tested its strength against the Red Army at Changkufeng and Nomonhan and failed completely, reinforcing the notion that the Soviets were too powerful to fight at the moment. The Chinese war continued to drag on and the Army's strength continued to dissipate. The potential for Western intervention to throw the Japanese out of China combined with colonialism to justify new targets in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Commanders on the spot sped up that process even more. By late 1941, Siberia - the Northern Resource Area - was still the goal, but Japan's military capability to pursue that goal had gradually waned. The Kwantung Army was still Japan's largest and most powerful single field army group by the time the American war had started, but it was arrayed for defense, not offense, and there was scant prospect of that changing any time soon. The IJA still prioritized a Soviet defeat above everything else, but many officers had either come around to the Navy's view that the Americans and Commonwealth needed to be beaten first, or lacked the ability to change the policy.

In these circumstances, attempting to cooperate with the USSR would be ridiculous. It would have solved zero of Japan's policy goals and actively worked against a few of them. The Soviets weren't about to send a fleet or an army to help the Japanese conquer territories for the IJA to use as bases to attack Siberia. And the Japanese would assist Soviet goals not at all. The USSR would probably continue to be the patron of the GMD in such circumstances, keeping it afloat as a viable enemy and a drain on the IJA's fighting power to prevent the Japanese from having the capability to invade Siberia.

Japan's goal in Siberia was oil correct? Wouldn't capturing the oil in the Dutch East Indies have met this need? I know there are large mineral deposits in Mongolia that the Japanese wanted (and still want actually) and the Soviets wouldn't just let them have, but wouldn't the defeats in 39 and the inability of the army to change capabilities have caused them to come to some agreement over China with the Soviets? I think that the Soviets would rather have a China dominated by a friendly Japan rather than hostile Western powers or a Nationalists government.

 

[History_Buff]

I didn't think there was much oil to be had from a 1940's Siberia.

 

[Phrossack]

I didn't think there was much oil to be had from a 1940's Siberia.

Me neither. Oil was found in Western Siberia, near the eastern slopes of the Urals, but there was no way the Japanese could ever get there. Unless the Japanese were interested in acquiring huskies and mosquitoes, there would've been little reason to take Eastern Siberia without oil.

 

[Cutlass]

I don't think that was known at the time. Japan is extremely resource poor. Siberia was the closest place that wasn't really well explored, or populated, at the time. The USSR at that point was a traditional enemy, heavily disrupted from the revolution and aftermath, had no navy to speak of, and their power base was 1000s of miles away across difficult and barely settled terrain. It looked ripe for the taking. Like with the US later on, they badly underestimated the Soviet's ability to put an army in their way and stop their plans.

Also recall that the Japanese army and navy were making plans (such as they were) independently, and both more or less independent of the actual Japanese government. These were not rational decisions. The Navy was not prepared to take on the Royal Navy before Britain was at war elsewhere. Later on of course that changed too. None of it was really rational decision making.

 

[Phrossack]

I don't think that was known at the time. Japan is extremely resource poor. Siberia was the closest place that wasn't really well explored, or populated, at the time. The USSR at that point was a traditional enemy, heavily disrupted from the revolution and aftermath, had no navy to speak of, and their power base was 1000s of miles away across difficult and barely settled terrain. It looked ripe for the taking. Like with the US later on, they badly underestimated the Soviet's ability to put an army in their way and stop their plans.

Also recall that the Japanese army and navy were making plans (such as they were) independently, and both more or less independent of the actual Japanese government. These were not rational decisions. The Navy was not prepared to take on the Royal Navy before Britain was at war elsewhere. Later on of course that changed too. None of it was really rational decision making.

Irrational though the armed forces were, didn't they at least know that Siberia was poor for farming, filled with giant mosquitoes, and unbelievably cold half the year? They wouldn't have been too able to settle there much.

 

[Gen.Mannerheim]

I don't think that was known at the time. Japan is extremely resource poor. Siberia was the closest place that wasn't really well explored, or populated, at the time. The USSR at that point was a traditional enemy, heavily disrupted from the revolution and aftermath, had no navy to speak of, and their power base was 1000s of miles away across difficult and barely settled terrain. It looked ripe for the taking. Like with the US later on, they badly underestimated the Soviet's ability to put an army in their way and stop their plans.

Also recall that the Japanese army and navy were making plans (such as they were) independently, and both more or less independent of the actual Japanese government. These were not rational decisions. The Navy was not prepared to take on the Royal Navy before Britain was at war elsewhere. Later on of course that changed too. None of it was really rational decision making.

When did we underestimate the Soviet army?

I agree about the navy. A lot of armchair historians love to make waaaaaaay too much of the sinking of the Prince of Wales. Despite the fact that they had the third best navy according to the Washington Naval Treaty, they would have a hell of a time against the full British +friends naval strength. Their carrier strength might have made victory over Europeans possible in homeish waters, but whatever navy Japan had after wouldn't stand a chance to the U.S.

 

[History_Buff]

When did we underestimate the Soviet army?

I think he meant the Japanese underestimating the U.S.'s ability to stick an army in their (Japan's) way.

 

[Dachs]

Japan's goal in Siberia was oil correct? Wouldn't capturing the oil in the Dutch East Indies have met this need? I know there are large mineral deposits in Mongolia that the Japanese wanted (and still want actually) and the Soviets wouldn't just let them have, but wouldn't the defeats in 39 and the inability of the army to change capabilities have caused them to come to some agreement over China with the Soviets? I think that the Soviets would rather have a China dominated by a friendly Japan rather than hostile Western powers or a Nationalists government.

Oil didn't really figure. During the Siberian Expedition, the Japanese had pushed as far as Buryatia, bringing with them over fifty thousand Japanese settlers. (A vaguely stated desire for living space was also part and parcel of this, along with a desire for large amounts of territory for its own sake.) The zaibatsu, especially Mitsubishi, Suzuki, and Mitsui, set up subsidiaries run by and staffed by these settlers to control local mines, forests, and fisheries. Mineral wealth in particular caught Japanese interest. During the short four years of the expedition, they managed to extract enormous quantities of gold and platinum especially. The region's oil was mostly exploited in northern Sakhalin at that point, and the Japanese did make a point to seize those rigs in 1920 in retaliation for Bolshevik atrocities in Nikolayevsk, along with the island's coal mines.

The Japanese obsession with Siberian resources should therefore be seen in that vein. Oil wasn't really relevant, but it was at least there; mineral resources, timber, and living space were seen as more important.

Japan's opposition to the Soviets should also be viewed through an ideological lens of fanatical anti-Communism and a conviction that a Soviet attack was inevitable and could only be met force-on-force, with the seizure of Siberia and Mongolia as buffer zones and imperial properties to follow.

As for the Soviets' part, in no way did it make sense to back a powerful, anti-Communist Japanese empire in China instead of the divided Guomindang. The Japanese were an imminent threat and were one of the few states seriously able to use the resources of a conquered China against the USSR; even the West, insofar as it could ever even theoretically dominate China - and by the 1920s and 1930s it really could not - would be preferable to the rule of a Japan that still played host to Kodo and the Kokuryukai.