Would the World be Better or Worse if WW2 Never Happened?

[Cutlass]

I think he meant the Japanese underestimating the U.S.'s ability to stick an army in their (Japan's) way.

No. I was referring to an apparent belief that the the Soviets could not stick a strong army in their way. And that is not to say that the Red Army was weak, but rather that it's a huge logistical effort to deploy a major army across Siberia and keep it supplied. And for what gain? The land wasn't of much value to the USSR, so would they fight for it? The Japanese may have made the same mistake they later made with the US and assume the answer to be no.

 

[Gen.Mannerheim]

No. I was referring to an apparent belief that the the Soviets could not stick a strong army in their way. And that is not to say that the Red Army was weak, but rather that it's a huge logistical effort to deploy a major army across Siberia and keep it supplied. And for what gain? The land wasn't of much value to the USSR, so would they fight for it? The Japanese may have made the same mistake they later made with the US and assume the answer to be no.

I'm not sure that all the Japanese military were thinking this way. While for the U.S., the Philippines and Guam were a very low priority to some in the State Department, for others the prospect of a Japanese controlled Pacific with a powerful navy was unacceptable. To a few in the State Department before the war, a possible outcome to not caring about holding Pacific territory is to grant Philippine independence and Australian acquisition of other American and European holdings and both countries granting naval access to the U.S. with the idea being to prevent Japanese dominance in the Pacific.

 

[History_Buff]

I'm pretty sure we mean the same thing. We just need to stop using the word 'they'.

 

[thecivinator58]

So moving back to Europe, what would Mussolini have done? He only entered the war when it looked like Britain and France were finished. Would he have tried something without a big, strong Germany as an ally?

 

[Lord Baal]

So moving back to Europe, what would Mussolini have done? He only entered the war when it looked like Britain and France were finished. Would he have tried something without a big, strong Germany as an ally?

Not in Europe, no. He may possibly have pushed in the Mediterranean, but not to the point of actual war with Britain and France. And it was less having Germany as an ally and more a case of fearing German domination if he didn't establish an Italian sphere for himself. That was what the "parallel war" was meant to accomplish.

 

[Gen.Mannerheim]

Not in Europe, no. He may possibly have pushed in the Mediterranean, but not to the point of actual war with Britain and France. And it was less having Germany as an ally and more a case of fearing German domination if he didn't establish an Italian sphere for himself. That was what the "parallel war" was meant to accomplish.

It would be very hard for the Italians by the mid-30's to really do much in the Mediterranean independently. Italian North Africa and East Africa were completely surrounded by British and French holdings. The Balkans (Yugoslavia & Greece) were heavily involved with the French, thus making any power play in that region very hazardous. Due to Turkey's animosity towards both Greece and the U.S.S.R., a very tenuous opportunity might have been available to Italy there, as well as trying to throw a monkey wrench into British machinations in Arabia. Other than getting really cozy with Franco's Spain, there aren't very many opportunities for Italy do do anything solo.

 

[Lord Baal]

It would be very hard for the Italians by the mid-30's to really do much in the Mediterranean independently. Italian North Africa and East Africa were completely surrounded by British and French holdings. The Balkans (Yugoslavia & Greece) were heavily involved with the French, thus making any power play in that region very hazardous. Due to Turkey's animosity towards both Greece and the U.S.S.R., a very tenuous opportunity might have been available to Italy there, as well as trying to throw a monkey wrench into British machinations in Arabia. Other than getting really cozy with Franco's Spain, there aren't very many opportunities for Italy do do anything solo.

Not really, no. But they might dick around a bit anyway, like they stupidly did with Korfu.

 

[Gen.Mannerheim]

Not really, no. But they might dick around a bit anyway, like they stupidly did with Korfu.

Though to the Italians credit, they did try to break Anglo-French cozyness. They played obnoxious monkey throwing poo in the face of anything the French did and kissed some major British ass. But the best they could get out of it was a British statement that in the event of a Italy/France war, they might maybe not support France, possibly.

However, the Italians kinda took the anti-French thing too far. They focused their navy on only the French navy, and especially so after the Washington Conference. They pretty much forgot to plan for the fact that the British had a rather powerful Mediterranean squadron backed up by the Home Fleet, so when war came their surface fleet got pwned hard.

 

[ParkCungHee]

The Italian Navy did consider the problem of the British Navy, very hard.

They decided there was no workable solutions and to focus on who they could compete with, which is relatively reasonable.

 

[Ajidica]

Didn't the Italian Navy have an almost irrational fear of the British Navy so they stayed in port for most of the war?

 

[Gen.Mannerheim]

The Italian Navy did consider the problem of the British Navy, very hard.

They decided there was no workable solutions and to focus on who they could compete with, which is relatively reasonable.

Not if you have imperial aspirations for the Mediterranean region.

Pre-39 Italian military/foreign policy was centered around trying to separate Britain from France, and then taking on France's position in North Africa, Corsica, and the Balkans. This is all well and good except you still have to plan for the possibility of Britain entering a war on the French side or the British checking your influence in your target regions. This is like the U.S. tying to focus on the Monroe Doctrine in the Caribbean and gearing up to fight a strong Mexico but completely ignoring a more powerful Columbia.

Didn't the Italian Navy have an almost irrational fear of the British Navy so they stayed in port for most of the war?

They were completely unprepared to fight the British. Their navy was designed on trying to lure the French fleet into a position where Italian capitol ships can pin them down while Italian land based torpedo bombers, which were surprisingly quality, did serious damage. Their ships armor was designed against French guns while Italian guns were designed for super-high velocity rounds that could punch through French armor. The Italian submarine fleet (along with the land based torpedo planes) was designed to cut off shipping between Metropolitan France and French North Africa as well as hang off the coast of Spain/Portugal and harass French Atlantic shipping. This latter task they did pretty well during WWII.

But the British Navy didn't play these games. The British could rely on sea-based aircraft to swarm Italian ships and British guns had range enough in the Italians as they could hit well before the Italians could. The British enjoyed numerical superiority in almost all of their engagements with the Italians and pre-war Britain invested and trained in night fighting tech and tactics and would often just follow powerful Italian ships until nightfall and destroy them.

So yea, the Italians were afraid of the British fleet, at least a little.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Not if you have imperial aspirations for the Mediterranean region.

Pre-39 Italian military/foreign policy was centered around trying to separate Britain from France, and then taking on France's position in North Africa, Corsica, and the Balkans. This is all well and good except you still have to plan for the possibility of Britain entering a war on the French side or the British checking your influence in your target regions. This is like the U.S. tying to focus on the Monroe Doctrine in the Caribbean and gearing up to fight a strong Mexico but completely ignoring a more powerful Columbia.

But they were right in figuring they could not beat the British Navy under any circumstances. It was largely because of the Washington Naval Treaty that they were even able to compete with France.

I find it very strange that the Japanese are criticized for having plans for an unwinnable war, but the Italians are criticized for not having plans for an unwinnable war.

 

[Gen.Mannerheim]

But they were right in figuring they could not beat the British Navy under any circumstances. It was largely because of the Washington Naval Treaty that they were even able to compete with France.

I find it very strange that the Japanese are criticized for having plans for an unwinnable war, but the Italians are criticized for not having plans for an unwinnable war.

You're right about Italian inability to beat the British. However, you still need to have some idea on how you would respond to war with somebody playing in your pool. Especially an enemy you have really good odds of actually having to fight. When you don't have a gameplan, you wind up having to scramble around to find answers to issues, leading you to over respond to some and under respond to others. The Italian surface fleet had their greatest success in engaging the British fleet around Malta, supporting an operation that could not succeed without troops on the ground. Yet because they were still under orders to harass the British in the Eastern Mediterranean it didn't take long for the British to beef up their convoys enough to cause casualties on Italian ships that Italy couldn't afford to take. The Regia Aeronautica, instead of coordinating with the Italian fleet to combat British surface ships, wasted their time trying to pick off lone merchant ships. Not planing for an enemy leads to a confused response.

And Japan thought they could win if they could do it quickly. I find more fault with the rationale behind their war plans, not the plans themselves.

 

[Domen]

In some aspects it would be better while in some other aspects it would be worse.

First of all - we wouldn't be "smarter" after all the lessons of WW2 and its crimes.

But question is if we really are smarter and if we really learned anything.

 

[Virote_Considon]

Not if you have imperial aspirations for the Mediterranean region.

Pre-39 Italian military/foreign policy was centered around trying to separate Britain from France, and then taking on France's position in North Africa, Corsica, and the Balkans. This is all well and good except you still have to plan for the possibility of Britain entering a war on the French side or the British checking your influence in your target regions. This is like the U.S. tying to focus on the Monroe Doctrine in the Caribbean and gearing up to fight a strong Mexico but completely ignoring a more powerful Columbia.

Not really.

Italian logic with regards to the Med and Britain/France is pretty much exactly the same as their policy with Germany on the continent.

Both were centred around the notion that there was a state whom they could not defeat at any point in the future should circumstances remain unchanged (Germany in Europe, Britain in the Med), and that they should therefore work alongside that state against the weaker states to act as a counter to the state.

So in Europe, you had Italy working alongside the much more dominant Germany, invading Yugoslavia, Greece and a damaged France. Victories there would not only increase Italy's power, but they would prevent Germany being able to get that power increase.

In the Med, Italy worked to antagonise the French and and placate the British. Their plan was to take away France's Mediterranian holdings - increasing their own powerbase there in a way which Britain would not benefit.

In both cases, the Italian strategy was to buddy up with a state they cannot hope to beat to give them enough maneuverability to strike the ones they could beat and thus slowly claw themselves into having a more favourable outlook with regards to the balance of power.

 

[hobbsyoyo]

In some aspects it would be better while in some other aspects it would be worse.

First of all - we wouldn't be "smarter" after all the lessons of WW2 and its crimes.

But question is if we really are smarter and if we really learned anything.

I like this post. I think we have learned things. For the most part, the West doesn't turn a blind eye to autrocities or act to commit them as much as they used to. The West doesn't always prevent them, but they do sometimes and again they don't perpetrate them they way the used to.

The West also seems much more about cooperation and peace than before.

Of course, there is alwasy exceptions to this.