This is it.
A “quick war” was all they needed, and a fairly quick war – by the standards of the day – they got. For decades, the military theorists of Europe had known that a great clash was going to come; all that remained was to figure out how it would happen and how it would end. Though scant protests had been made about the quality of weapons and the siege technology that existed, that any war would degenerate into a bogged-down struggle of trench lines and fortresses, where the only real progress would be made in naval battles, both sides were driven by nationalistic spirit and fervor, and the inherent belief of the offensive’s superiority. Both sides’ governments had been largely co-opted by their militaries, which along with their citizens urged a clash with the enemy, not only to safeguard their interests, but (in one case) to protect an ally from the depredations of a vast multinational empire.
The First Punic War [1] had officially begun. (What, you thought I was talking about something else? Another “First” war, perhaps?)
It all started with the Mamertines, a bunch of brigands and mercenaries, who, after working for the Syracusans for a while to fight Carthage, took the city of Messana as their reward. For twenty years, the Syracusans had attempted to dislodge their erstwhile allies, but after initial victories could not force them out of the tiny bastion that they had managed to take with ease. With news of renewed Syracusan military buildup, the Romans, who didn’t want anyone to get too close to the Italian mainland, their purview, sent an army to assist the Mamertines and signed an alliance. 264 BC saw the initial clash of Roman and Sicel armies, which ended in some success for the Romans. Carthage and Syracuse, somewhat terrified of Rome’s growing power and disruption of the Sicilian balance of power, were forced into an alliance. More Roman success induced the Syracusans to switch sides. The war was on.
In 262, Rome began another critical operation. Carthage had seized the fortress of Agrigentum (Greek Acragas) on the southern shore of Sicily, and was supplying their thrust, obviously directed against the Syracusan allies, through the major base at Heraclea Minoa not far from the fort. The two Roman consuls with their four legions and allied troops – a contingent of 40,000 men – marched to besiege Agrigentum with the aim of preventing the Punic Army from advancing on their allies. Consul Lucius Postumius Megellus and his colleague, Quintus Mamilius Vitulus set up shop outside of the city and began a siege. A cry for help went out, and assistance quickly summoned in the form of an army under one Hanno, who came with 50,000 men, 6,000 cavalry, and 60 war elephants – a truly formidable force. The Romans were soon besieged themselves and erected walls of contravallation to keep their rears safe.
Megellus needed supplies from Syracuse, but they wouldn’t be able to get through Hanno’s blockade. He and his fellow consul drew up their troops and began to offer battle, but the Carthaginians declined until Hannibal Gisco, the commander of the Agrigentum garrison, sent word via smoke signals that the situation inside Agrigentum was growing desperate. Reluctantly, the Carthaginians accepted battle. Hanno drew his men up in the traditional two Punic lines and the Romans used their triplex acies formation of three lines. Most of the Carthaginian elephants were in the second line, and when the battle was joined, the missiles from the Roman troops drove them into a wild frenzy, stampeding throughout the Punic front, which was broken at several critical points. The Romans surged through and continued to attack the Carthaginians, who were hounded mercilessly as they fled the field. The defeat turned into a rout, and some 15,000 Carthaginian troops were slain, with about the same number of prisoners for the Romans, who also secured about 20 of the elephants. It was a major victory for the Romans, sullied only by the escape of Hannibal Gisco and his garrison. But without it, the fortress was open to the Romans, who entered and garrisoned Agrigentum.
The next years indeed were full of something of a slow advance by the Romans, who maintained a constant advance against the Carthaginians, who by 257 were confined to such fortresses as Eryx, Drepana, Lilybaeum, and Panormus on the western coast. When Panormus fell late that year, the Carthaginians, realizing that their control of even far western Sicily was in doubt, boosted the troop strength in Sicily to an aggregate 60,000 soldiers, including one field army, led by Hannibal Gisco. With this formidable force in their way, Rome couldn’t secure Sicily in its entirety. However, one bright spark, the consul Marcus Regulus, proposed a bold blow: he and an army of about 20,000 legionaries – his full consular army – would sail to Africa, land at Tunes, and besiege Carthage itself. When met with arguments that Carthage would be able to withstand 20,000 men, Regulus is said to have smiled and said, “Audentes fortuna iuvat.”
Fortune favored the bold indeed. With virtually the entire Punic army away in Sicily, Regulus, after a sharp fleet battle at Cape Ecnomus, landed at Tunes and advanced towards Carthage. Desperately, citizens of the city were conscripted, and even some of the poor were given armor and weapons and forced to serve in the army hastily cobbled together by Bostar to block Regulus’ path. The Carthaginians, knowing that they still had far fewer numbers than the Romans, encamped on a hilltop and waited out the night, ready for battle the next day. The Romans were not so patient. Early in the morning, Regulus’ men encircled the hilltop, then made the few enemy elephants stampede throughout the camp. In the confusion, the well-organized legionaries cut through the enemy camp. Only a few hundred Carthaginians escaped back to the city with the news.
In Carthage itself, panic reigned. Refugees began to flood into the city, fleeing from the victorious Roman army that soon made its camp beneath the Punic walls. Many Numidian slaves, seeing a chance for freedom, revolted and began to riot throughout the city; only with the few troops left to man the walls were they put down. Both Shofets were initially against surrendering to Rome and facing the consequences of that surrender, but eventually their populace made them turn around. With bated breath and much trepidation, an embassy was sent to Regulus.
The Romans, victorious, were inclined to be somewhat magnanimous. They had never faced a nation so large before, and the degree of Punic defeat was not enough to warrant a full and complete absorption into Rome itself. Regulus was initially on the side of being rather harsh on the Carthaginians, but, farsighted, he saw that they had been defeated and Rome’s supremacy had been shown. Carthage was still strong and capable of putting up a good fight yet, but there was no real need. After all, the war had lasted for eight years, and Rome had beaten Carthage on both land and sea, on Sicily and in front of the capital itself. Besides, Regulus reasoned, his chance to end the war would be fleeting. His consular term was almost up, and with that would go his power to end the war and gain glory. His terms were rather simple. Including peace and an alliance between Carthage and Rome, Carthage would relinquish its Sicilian cities and all claims thereto (it would become Rome’s first province, overseas or otherwise); Corsica and Sardinia would stay Punic. 100 war elephants would be given to Rome, and a relatively small indemnity would be paid. Considering what they had already lost, the consul reasoned, this would be like getting a reprieve.
Indeed, when the terms were shown to the Shofets, they were inclined to accept. Most people in the city were anxious to get home to their farms, and in the close quarters, plague was beginning to break out among the lower classes, like the Libyans. Despite a brief episode in which a Spartan mercenary, one Xanthippus, beseeched the Punic leaders to allow him to lead an army against Rome, the populace seemed dead set against continuing the war with so little success. Regulus was sent a message of agreement, and by the end of the year, Punic troops were back in Carthage and Carthaginian life was already getting back to normal. As for Regulus, a two-time consul, he was showered with glory. An invasion of Africa and an end to a heretofore slow war in only a few months, with both land and sea victories to go with it: he was hailed as one of the greatest generals in Roman history.
Rome, wishing to concentrate elsewhere to make more territorial gains, soon ran into a stumbling block. The Kingdom of Macedon, under its able ruler King Antigonus Gonatas, was beginning to extend control over Epirus and Illyria with armies fresh from victories in the Chremonidean War against Egypt, Sparta, and Athens. Sensing that Rome wanted Illyria for her own growing empire, Antigonus decided to get there first. It was presented in Rome by the orator and general Catulus as a blatant attempt to gain a base to strike at Italy itself. Macedon needed to be dealt with. Such minor, trivial things like the elimination of piracy in the Adriatic due to the loss of the pirates’ base to Antigonus, who on news of the deliberations in Rome stepped up his campaign, were unnoticed by the Roman populace, who were determined to use their newfound overseas power in humbling another opponent. Accordingly, a fleet and 20,000 legionaries – though only 500 cavalry and no elephants – were dispatched under one M. Aemilius Paullus in 253 to Salonae and Epidamnus (or Dyrrachium) to settle the Macedonians’ hash.
Antigonus, realizing that defeat here would bring about the large-scale revolt of his Hellenic domains (which Ptolemy II Philadelphus, his longtime enemy and rival, would doubtless use as an excuse to attack the Aegean again), took command of the field army personally. He led about 30,000 phalangites and 5,000 cavalry to Epidamnus, intent on a confrontation. Paullus’ two legions and alae landed at the city, ready for a blockade and siege, a practice with which they had long been familiar as a result of the Punic war. Antigonus’ army, which the King was loathe to risk on uneven ground, where the phalanx wouldn’t be as powerful, was drawn up along the Putamnus River, with one flank resting on the river to allow the King to concentrate his cavalry on his other – right – wing. His phalangite infantry were in a typical right-echeloned formation, to make maximum use of the phalanx’s right-wing superiority. Paullus did much the same with his cavalry, concentrating it on his left (he had only 500 of low quality compared with Antigonus’ excellent lancers), with his legionaries in the triplex acies formation of three lines that had proven so effective against the Carthaginians at the battle of Agrigentum.
The Battle of the Putamnus River opened with a Macedonian cavalry charge on their right flank, charging the Romans. Greek lancers came into contact with the Italian cavalry and easily drove the less experienced enemy off the field. Antigonus’ eager horsemen kept up the chase, forcing the equites to flee back to the fleet at Epidamnus. Meanwhile, the phalanx and legion came into contact. The frightful sight of the massed pikes and their sheer number at first put the Romans to pause, but eventually the skilled legionary infantry moved towards them with confidence, attempting to infiltrate the phalanx and cut it to pieces. That attempt was an abysmal failure. On a hillside or other broken ground, the Romans would be able to exploit the irregularities in the phalanx, the openings that would allow them to slip past the pikes and begin to cut the enemy apart. Here, on flat ground, the phalanx was packed tightly, letting nothing through. The weight of 30,000 phalangites and their irresistible advance began to drive the Roman legionaries to pieces. The hastati, the youngest and most energetic, were forced to retreat through the openings in the skilled principes – what was left of them, that is. Unable to penetrate the phalanx and drive it off the field, the Romans’ heretofore-unbeatable legions came to pieces and began to flee. The retreat of the first two lines and the velites, who had briefly engaged in a missile exchange with the Hellenic peltasts, was covered by the triarii, who prevented the entire thing from turning into a rout. Antigonus soon returned with the cavalry and pursued the Roman infantry as evening set in. The Romans lost 7,000 skilled veterans of the Punic Wars, and the rest crowded back to the fleet a few miles distant in Epidamnus, ready to flee.
A quick appraisal of the first major clash between Roman and Hellenistic armies since Pyrrhus of a few decades back will note the care with which Antigonus chose his ground. That, more than anything else, decided the issue. The phalanx, impossible to oppose on open ground, was able to make mincemeat of the Roman legions, which would have defeated it anywhere else. Roman cavalry was also shown to be deficient, as were much of the mounted units of the Mediterranean – at least in comparison to that of Macedon, Seleucia, and Egypt. This is a reflection more on the stupidity of the Roman commander than anything else. Antigonus had been on campaign with his legendary father, Demetrius Poliorcetes, and knew what to do and what not to do with a phalanx. Paullus, in contrast, believed that his legions were invincible after the battles of Agrigentum and Adys, and after the flight of Pyrrhus of Epirus.
Rome’s war, which had been called a “police action” by many at home in the res publica, had turned into an abysmal failure. An entire consular army had been defeated and forced back to their fleet. Antigonus, claiming the field, sent emissaries to Paullus, offering terms. The consul flatly refused these, which would have only entailed a surrender of claims to the Illyrian coastline and Epirus. Angered at his summary dismissal, the King led his army down to the shoreline and forced the Romans to complete their evacuation in ignominy. The Hellenes, who had been denounced by the Romans as “effeminate” and “weak”, now held the field victorious. Antigonus, expecting no trouble for at least the end of the campaigning season, returned to Pella to bask in his victory.
The Romans were incensed at this failure to impose their will. This obvious showing of Roman weakness would not exactly keep the Carthaginians on their side. Romans may not have liked to deal as the Hellenistic rulers did, but she did understand how the world worked. Imperium Puni would try to flex her muscles and perhaps break free of the humiliating alliance and pact with Rome. Already voices in Carthage were crying out for the restoration of Sicily and an invasion of Italy itself. Only with military force and mercenaries from Libya and Greece did the Shofets put down the angry crowds. Throughout Greece, the King was held in some respect, although Greek orators like Aratus of Sicyon (who had to flee that city because of a threat on his life by the ruler, Nicocles) declared that it was a victory over mere Italian provincials, descended from the Trojans, no less. Ptolemy Philadelphus, unable to get any advantage from this recent clash, sulked in Alexandria and continued to gather forces. On the other hand, Antiochus II Theos of the Seleucids, having some trouble with a rebel satrap named Diodotus in Bactria, came to Antigonus to reaffirm their alliance and to borrow some mercenaries, which Antigonus lent as a result of their perceived lack of necessity. With these troops, veterans of the Chremonidean war and the battle of the Putamnus, Diodotus was easily defeated and Bactria was returned, although seething, to Seleucid control.
Carthage, though, was persuaded to remain at Rome’s side as the Romans gathered another army for the 252 campaign and Paullus retired in shame to a Campanian villa. Antigonus, realizing that Rome would be sending even more troops, endeavored to prevent them from even getting there. A Macedonian fleet, under Navarchos Neoptolemos, numbering 200 vessels, including the King’s personal “eight” [2] and many “fives” and “fours”, set out from Thessalonika early that spring and gathered more ships from Athens and Corinth. By the time it took up station off Epidamnus, the fleet had grown to 270 ships, a formidable armada. Against this, the Romans had amassed a fleet, commanded by Regulus, victor of Cape Ecnomus and Adys, of 150 “fives”, a hundred “fours” and about fifty “threes”, on which was mounted an entire consular army of 20,000 men, 1,000 cavalry, and even 20 war elephants. Regulus’ colleague, G. Aurelius Cotta, had another 20,000 legionaries and a smaller fleet of 200 vessels, massing at Tarentum and Metapontum in the south of Italy. It was to be a terrific clash.
Indeed, the naval Battle of Nymphaeum, just north of Epidamnus, was a titanic bout between two highly skilled opponents. The Macedonians, since the time of Philip II, had had a long and glorious naval tradition in the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean, and a Macedonian – Nearchus – had even sailed in the Persian Gulf. Rome hadn’t had such a long naval tradition, but had defeated one of the two premier Mediterranean navies in the First Punic War, and was not yet off that naval high, if they ever would be. Regulus was a veteran admiral, having won the Battle of Cape Ecnomus against the Carthaginians in 256. He had the advantage of numbers on his side, too. The Romans, though, were not as practiced in the hallowed and still-effective Greek naval maneuvers, the diekplous and the periplous. Neoptolemus’ fleet was well trained in those skills, though.
Both sides formed into three units, two wings and a center each. The Romans closed with the Macedonians, who on the wings drove straight through the Roman formation and around, attacking towards the Roman rear. Regulus in the center, though, forced the Macedonians to engage in a struggle of marines. In this area, something of a land battle on water, the well practiced Roman marines easily crushed the Macedonian ones, in an engagement of gladius against sarissa where there was no phalanx to back up the phalangites who found themselves pitted against Roman legionaries. The center was largely lost to the Romans. Neoptolemus attempted to switch his main effort to the wings, but here too, the Romans turned what had been a battle of maneuver into a slog of marine versus marine, one that they could easily win. His fleet shattered, the Macedonian admiral limped south. Regulus continued to the beach, where his army was landed and he prepared to march on Epidamnus.
Antigonus had not been prepared for this rapid invasion and assault, expecting the navy to hold off Regulus for at least a few weeks more. As it was, his army was still massing in Macedonia and Thessaly, widely spread out and highly vulnerable. He sped up the process as best he, as the King, could, and with an army of decreased size – only 20,000 men and 5,000 cavalry – he set off into the Pindus mountains, intent on confining any Roman gains in his absence and ready to defeat each Roman army in detail separately. Upon his arrival at Kerax, not far from the Romans at Epidamnus, Antigonus received word that the city had fallen and that Cotta’s fleet was even now landing at Apollonia further down the coast. Deciding to take care of the weaker threat first, Antigonus and his men marched south to hit Cotta during his siege of Apollonia. With little intelligence on the King’s movements, Regulus unknowingly passed up an excellent opportunity for a pincer maneuver and marched inland, towards Pella, as soon as his supply line was firmly established.
Cotta, on word of Antigonus’ approach, broke the siege and marched to meet him. The two armies gathered on either side of the Apsus River at Antipatria, named after the former regent of the Alexandrine Empire. In a wily move, Antigonus snuck across the river under cover of darkness and was able to group his army south of Cotta’s by daybreak. In battle he would try to smash the Romans against the river. Deploying in his usual echeloned formation with cavalry on both wings, the Macedonian waited for the Romans to break camp before he struck. He had once again chosen his ground fairly well, putting himself in a situation to charge downhill and force the Romans into a bend in the river. As Cotta desperately tried to get his army to form up and march against the enemy in full formation, Antigonus launched his cavalry at the enemy, followed up closely by his phalanx. He caught the Romans in disarray, trying to deploy, and routed them with only his cavalry. Smashing them against the river, the Macedonians claimed 3,000 Roman dead in the initial charge and about 5,000 during the mop-up by the phalanx and cavalry. It was another crushing victory. Fortunately for himself, Cotta committed suicide after reaching the north bank of the river. The remnants of his army, numbering about 10,000 after prisoners and casualties, was regrouped under a tribune and marched north, reaching Regulus after a week of searching.
Antigonus was now in an unenviable position. He was still able to send reinforcements, and it was possible to cut Regulus off from his supply base, but Pella, his capital, was now virtually exposed, with only a token force of 15,000 there, commanded by his son, Demetrius II. If Regulus headed for his capital and occupied or destroyed it, he would stand to lose much of southern Greece to rebellions and revolts by the liberty-loving southerners. With a larger army from reinforcement, numbering about 35,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry, along with 10 war elephants he pilfered from Cotta’s supply base outside Apollonia, the Macedonian King marched inland to meet Regulus. He needn’t have worried. With 30,000 legionaries, 1,200 cavalry, and 20 elephants, Regulus moved back across the Pindus and reached Parthinia, not far from Epidamnus, at about the same time as King Antigonus.
Regulus, realizing that his deficiency in cavalry would probably be a problem, added a few maniples of legionaries to the cavalry, forcing the cav to travel more slowly but giving it more striking power. He decided that since the phalanx could not be defeat frontally, he’d have to hold them off by skirmishing and hope for success on the flanks. Antigonus continued his formulaic formation of the echeloned phalanx with peltasts deployed in a thin line in front, and cavalry on either wing, believing that the Romans, having failed to learn from the battle of the Putamnus, wouldn’t learn any lessons from Cotta’s defeat at Antipatria.
Initial skirmishing along the front was eventually broken off by Antigonus, who realized that his peltasts and psiloi [3] were outclassed by the Roman velites and heavy infantry, who also had spears, or pila. Unleashing his heavy cavalry in an attempt to seek decision on the flanks, he ran into Regulus’ specially augmented wing units. What had originally been expected to be a rout of the Roman cavalry to get round behind the center turned into a prolonged, slogging battle into which Antigonus decided to commit his elephants. Regulus reciprocated with his velites, who were able to kill several of the beasts and drive them back on Antigonus’ phalanx, which was still trying to catch the elusive Roman legions. Antigonus, refusing to accept failure, managed to eliminate most of his remaining elephants and committed more troops to the flank battle, until evening, when his tired phalanx was unable to continue in pursuit of the legionaries in the center and the flank action was tiring out even more of his men. Discouraged, the King ordered a withdrawal, which was uncontested by Regulus, who too had suffered high casualties in the battle.
The battle at Parthinia hadn’t really decided anything. By using the legions as they weren’t supposed to be used, Regulus had scored a tactical and strategic victory by forcing Antigonus to withdraw behind the Pindus. Epirus was now essentially under Roman control. However, the troops he had were not enough to hold the region effectively after his losses at Parthinia in what had basically been a deadly game of chicken with Antigonus on the flanks (fortunately for the Romans, the King had blinked before Regulus did), and his fleet was still weak after the naval battle at Nymphaeum. Realizing any further assault on his position in Epirus would probably succeed, Regulus sent envoys to Macedon, asking for peace and trying to bluff Antigonus into not attacking him. For Antigonus’ part, he, as a wily diplomat, skilled in manipulating the Greek ministates against each other, saw through the Romans’ transparent attempt to avoid a battle but also knew that peace or no peace, Ptolemy would be trying for southern Greece and the Aegean again at this sign of apparent weakness. In order to forestall this, he had to get south with an army and crush any signs of revolt and Egyptians. That, and he believed that Rome wouldn’t try to expand any further into Greece. It was just too untenable. Besides, the Greeks liked their liberty. He knew that all too well. The Romans didn’t seem able to hold areas effectively. The King agreed to peace with Rome controlling Epirus and Illyria and then moved south to forestall revolt.
After the critical years of the 260s and 250s, the Mediterranean world began to calm down a bit and settle into a repetitive pattern of events. Antigonus managed to fend off Ptolemy’s clumsy attempts at inciting rebellion in Greece, and on his death at age 82 in 237 was able to bequeath a powerful kingdom to his son, Demetrius II. Rome, for her part, began to campaign more and more against the Gauls in northern Italy, and had established several colonies on the Po, the chief one Placentia, by 220. Carthage, spearheaded by the Gisco family, expanded into first the east and Libya, taking advantage of Egyptian preoccupations in Syria and Greece to take over Cyrenaica. Eventually, the Giscos and another family, the Barcas, began to fight over the top spots in Punic government, causing a brief civil war, called the “Mercenary War” by some due to the heavy use of these mercs by the Giscos, who were defeated by Hamilcar Barca and his sons Hannibal, Hasdrubal, and Mago. Under Barcid rule in the 230s and 220s, Carthage began to aggressively expand into Iberia, subduing Celtic tribes and occupying Baetica and southern Lusitania, as well as much of what the Romans called “Tarraconensis”. Rome, meddling with northeastern Iberian politics, began to lock horns with Carthage in the neighborhood of the Ebro River, and by 220 both nations began to prepare for war, which seemed inevitable.
Seleucia managed several victories against the Attalid kings of Pergamum during this period, seizing much of the eastern Aegean coast as Macedon began to extend control over Thrace and Bithynia. The kingdom of Pontus stayed in control in northern Anatolia, but virtually all of the remainder was Seleucid. The Seleucids were defeated several times by the Egyptians in contests for Coele Syria and Palestine, but gave as good as they got, so by 220 Egypt controlled southern Phoenicia and the coastal regions of Palestine, as well as the south of that area including Jerusalem, and the Seleucids had…well, everything north of that. Seleucid control over Bactria was solidified during the late 250s but was weakened by the revolt of a Parthian prince named Arsaces. Seleucus II, on his ascension in 249, was forced to fight hard to retain control of Parthia. Throughout the 240s the Arsacids carried on a civil war, and during this time the Egyptians gained some land in Syria, but the Seleucids managed to bring the Parthians to battle and defeat them decisively at Harmosia. With the east briefly secured, Seleucus marched back into Syria and after initial defeats at the hands of Ptolemy III (in other words, he had his rear handed to him on a silver platter) around Damascus, the Seleucids began to exercise their superior resources and through sheer numbers defeated the Egyptians outside of Jerusalem, culminating in the surprise death of the Pharaoh Ptolemy III Euergetes in a nighttime cavalry skirmish. Seleucid troubles were magnified by the permanent loss of Bactria and constant low-level warfare with the Parthians in Persis. By 220 the Seleucid domains, though diminished since the time of Seleucus Nicator, were home to the most powerful single state in the eastern Mediterranean.
Ptolemaic Egypt went through a decline during this period, losing its territories in Asia Minor to the Seleucids and – after a brief revival during the 240s during the time of Seleucid problems and the reign of Ptolemy III – losing part of Syria and Palestine as well as Cyrenaica. A diminished Egypt under Ptolemy IV Philopator tried to maintain its shaky control over its territory, and after several revolts in the 230s and early 220s the Greek aristocracy and ruling class began to slowly identify itself more as “Egyptian”, although no actual ethnic Egyptians ascended to high civil or military office.