Towards the Third Decade.
The following is a hopefully-concise narration of the yet-unmentioned events of the first two decades of the 18th Century, and a description of the state of the civilised world as of the year 1721.
We shall begin in Europe, where a whole new era begun - with the end of the Eleven Years War (itself a culmination of decades of conflict), the death of Louis XIV and the partitions of Spanish and Polish periphereal territories. The new situation was extremelly unstable, especially as it was complicated by dynastic issues in France and Britain, and the decay of Spain and Poland turning into outright crisis. The loss of the imperial title by the Austrian Habsburgs and its capture by Maximilian II Emanuel of Bavaria led towards a new imperial restructuring and reform, though it was immediately obvious that Bavaria had no hopes of imposing its will on the rising powers of Prussia and Hannover, let alone Austria. And lastly, Peter I recommenced his reform in Russia, while Carl XII reasserted his power in Sweden. It ofcourse also goes without saying that with Louis XIV's final victory, the Grand Alliance was no longer in existance, while Carl XII's abandonment of the French cause in a potentially-crucial moment pretty much ruined the prospects for a renewed Franco-Swedish alliance. Thus a diplomatic vacuum arose in Europe; it would not be officially remedied for nearly two decades. That is not to say that the diplomats were passive in this day; if anything, they were more active than ever before, but just about nobody was willing to make a significant and easily-noticeable move this soon after the economically-devastating and generally exhausting war.
Be all that as it may, it was only natural that domestic and colonial issues took precedent for much of this time period. And these were quite interesting in their own right...
Great Britain, for instance, was undergoing a severe political crisis. In spite of making gains, it still had wasted a lot of money to prevent French hegemony in Europe - and, at least in popular perception, failed. Tory propaganda capitalised on this, the Whigs being blamed both for the war and for the "defeat", and, more reasonably, for the high war taxes and major money-raising schemes employed. This coincided with the 1716 bursting of the South Sea Bubble, and the huge economic crisis that ensued in already-battered Britain afterwards. The Tory leaders - such as the Viscount Bolingbroke, Robert Harley and Jonathan Swift - soon took over the Parliament and as Queen Anne died later in the same year set about to thwart the succession of the Hannoverian Georg Ludwig, both out of principle (while Whigs didn't care about nationality but cared about religion, the Tories didn't care about religion but cared about nationality) and out of awareness that he was a strong ally of the Whigs. After some three-way negotiations between the Tories, the French and James Francis Edward Stuart, the latter one very grudgingly agreed to convert to the Church of England, though still promising to protect the rights of Catholics. With some of the finest political minds of the time working for him (the aforementioned Polignac and Robert Harley, sometimes called the inventor of public relations), the pretender managed to safely arrived in London early in 1717 and get crowned, in spite of a nearly-succesful assassination attempt. A brief civil war ensued; Georg Ludwig had already landed in Yorkshire with a Hannoverian army and in spite of his broken English he managed to get numerous garrisons to defect, but most of the British troops rallied remained loyal to London, and repulsed the Hannoverians in the Battle of Peterborough. Between the army and the Scottish Highlanders whom James III managed to rally to his cause, the Hannoverians were pushed out of Yorkshire as well, and forced to retreat back to Hannover, though Georg Ludwig refused to renounce his rights and Louis XV refused to do anything about it.
Apart this surprisingly easy victory, however, James III's early reign was fraught with complications. From the start he was forced to "delegate" numerous powers to the Parliament, and to abandon many of his reform plans. He still managed to remove some of the restrictions for the Catholics, but his clear Anglo-Catholic stance and attempts to reconcile the Church of England with Rome backfired on both ends, and numerous revolts occured (both amongst his disappointed supporters in Scotland and amongst his natural pro-Whig opposition in England). Still, however tenuously, James held on to the throne and the Tories held on the to the Parliament (in part because of many Whigs being compromised during the Hannoverian War). Meanwhile, an economic recovery occured. In foreign policy, Britain attempted to assemble an anti-Hannoverian coalition, without success, but mostly disengaged itself from Europe, instead speeding up the colonisation of North America (a destination for many of the Belgian and Rhenish Protestants fleeing French religious oppression) and setting up new trade outposts in Africa and India. To Melchior de Polignac's disappointment, the new British government wasn't particularily eager to ally with France (possibly out of fear that then opposition to it would increase further), but at least Britain was no longer hostile towards France (possibly for more or less the same reason).
Indeed, such was the French situation in Europe in general. While Melchior de Polignac made sure that France had no enemies left, the divided nature of the court and the vacillating character of Louis XV prevented it from making any allies neither, and the old ones drifted away quite swiftly. Louis XV died in 1718 and was succeeded by his son, Philippe VII. Though more focused on domestic reform, the new monrach did conduct a more vigorous foreign policy (mostly still under the lead of Polignac), signing an alliance with Bourbon Spain and helping Carlos III crack down on rebels, and supporting Ahmed III in his struggle against the Janissaries; that support proved crucial and secured a Franco-Ottoman alliance, as well as temporarily made the Ottoman Empire dependant on French expertise for the construction of a new, modern and professional Ottoman army. The rise of French influence - and interest - in the Mediterranean naturally alarmed the Habsburgs, however, and so Polignac's past achievement (an enemy-less Europe) was about to be undone...
On the domestic front, this too was a fairly uncertain period. Under Louis XV, corruption thrived, and Polignac barely survived the court intrigues of the age, especially those of the reactionary, feudalist devots. Nonetheless, survive he did, and under Philippe VII the institutions of absolute monarchy were defended and solidly reinforced, though some compromises were made, especially with the various Protestants (the Edict of Nantes was restored). The devots weren't particularily purged, but did mostly lose any real power or influence. The economy slowly recovered, as some minor reforms were enacted and a bank was set up late in 1720. The army was rebuilt, as was the navy; the city of Toulon received lots of attention, and its defenses were improved drastically to avoid a repeat of the embarrasing 1707 defeat. Indeed Philippe's naval policies were very much in line with his diplomacy, and whatever his plans were the Mediterranean definitely played a large part in them.
Portugal was in a poor shape even before the war, and strangely enough an expensive military defeat and subsequent devastation of the Portuguese countryside didn't make thing any better. Still, under Joao V (who formally came to power in 1705, but only claimed it fully later in the war) a steady recovery and reconstruction has begun. A fleet was built up and the African colonies were expanded. However, in spite of the grumbling and outrage of the Portuguese nobility and middle class, greater emphasis was being placed on Brazil, by then much more prosperous - not to mention much more secure - than its metropolis. In a gradual process, the Portuguese government and the royal court were being relocated to Salvador da Bahia, the new capital, although Portugal Proper obviously retained an important status as well. After some negotiation with the Pope, Joao was recognised as a legitimate sovereign, though now under the primary title of Emperor of Brazil. Actual transition of power was, as already mentioned, gradual; and it was nto finished by 1721, ofcourse.
Carlos III's reign in Spain was thus far quite disastrous. Attempted reforms aimed towards centralised absolute monarchy caused huge revolts, especially in the Basque and Catalan lands, and though with French assistance such revolts were crushed Carlos III was forced to respect the fueros, albeit still managing to create a somewhat more centralised and unified Spain. For now those reforms - and the struggles with rebels - took up all of the king's time, and the colonial empire, already shaken by the war, suffered and decayed in the meantime, with growing social tensions and occasional revolts.
Holland's revived late 17th century fortunes had mostly ran out. Though avoiding a French invasion for the moment, the Dutch lost most of their influence in England after the Jacobite Revolution, and with it also lost much of their prestige. The new stadholderless period (i.e. period of oligarchic rule) saw political and social stagnation and dissent rise. Still, at least economically the country was doing pretty well, with the VOC on the ascendant and establishing a stronger grip on Java. Also, in spite of the failure of the transfer of power to Hannover in England, an alliance with Hannover was confirmed and a British attempt to create an anti-Hannoverian coalition was thwarted, showing that Dutch diplomacy still wasn't completely powerless.
Denmark-Norway had come out from the Eleven Years War slightly victorious; although all attempts to reclaim Scania had failed, the Duchy of Holstein-Gottorp was succesfully annexed, meaning that one of the main war goals was reached and that Sweden was no longer able to attack Denmark from the south. Though still harbouring a desire to reclaim Scania, the Danes had decided to be content with the status quo for now, and instead concentrated on domestic affairs. Frederik IV sponsored arts and sciences, made some adjustments to the already finely-tuned legal system, integrated Holstein-Gottorp into Denmark and introduced social reforms, removing some forms of serfdom. Although the reforms and the king's scandalous private life somewhat alienated the nobility, no serious consequences followed.
Sweden was quite uncertain, both at home and abroad. Carl XII wasn't; as vigorous and determined as ever, he immediately begun reasserting control over Sweden, thwarting the parliamentary designs of his former lieutenant Arvid Bernhard Horn (who was soon forced to retire). Absolute monarchy was consolidated, and more rigid economic planning was instituted; trade with Germany picked up somewhat, and new manufactories were set up, especially in rapidly-developing Finland, the colonisation of which was also reintensified with state backing. The southeast Baltic provinces - including Courland - were put under tight control, and nobles were strapped of many of their freedoms and priveleges, although the German burghers were worked with quite fruitfully. New forts and Swedish military settlements were set up as well. Lastly, the navy was rebuilt, and control over the Baltic Sea was established; the communication and supply routes were strenghthened. Carl XII was determined not to give up a single piece of land from now on, and subordinated all of his policies to that philosophy. The alliance with France was, as already mentioned, dead, but Carl XII did not seek new ones, expressing hope for the complete self-sufficiency of the Swedish empire.
The Imperial crown was now in the hands of Maximilian II Emanuel, but not securely so. To get support for himself, his house and his vision of loose political and military cooperation within the Empire, he used some adroit diplomatic manipulation and simple appeasement of the vanities of the stronger German rulers, granting royal titles to King Georg Ludwig I of Hannover, King Friedrich Wilhelm I of Prussia, King Karl I of Austria and King himself of Bavaria. Notably the Austrian Habsburgs still persisted in using the title of "King of Hungary" as a primary one, with the royal court moved to Buda (which was more or less a central location, and well out of French reach). As for Augustus II of Saxony and Poland, he decided to stick with the Polish royal title solely.
Maximilian II Emanuel's efforts to improve coordination via the regularily-assembled Imperial Diet had bore some fruit at least, although the victories were mostly symbolical ones; no common course in foreign policy was really agreed upon, nor were any steps towards an unified military taken. Still, Bavaria's prestige was enhanced, and its position was now more or less secure; consequently, Maximilian II Emanuel was mostly content. Georg Ludwig of Hannover had, as described above, tried and failed to claim the British throne; after that defeat he devoted himself to building up a new northern coalition, winning friends and influencing people, especially in Holland and Denmark-Norway; also some nearby territories were acquired, and a fleet was built up. Meanwhile, the Prussians were having a fun time integrating their Polish gains; due to resistance by the local nobles, many of the new lands were redistributed between the local supporters and the assorted poorer Junkers, and German settlement was generally encouraged, especially as there already was a considerable German presence in the territories annexed. Also Prussia prospered greatly thanks to its control over such a great trade centre as Danzig; trade with Scandinavia and Russia picked up, while rump Poland became more and more economically dependant on Prussia, much to the Saxon ire. The Prussians were mostly peaceful at this time, although some military reforms were put into place after the Brandenburger army's somewhat poor performance in the Eleven Years War. The Saxons were doing all they could to maintain their grasp on Poland; reneging on his previous promises, Augustus II - assisted by the heavy Saxon and Hungarian garrisons in major Polish cities - forced through assorted reforms, making the Polish monarchy hereditary and, if not quite absolute, then at least meaningful. The Sejm remained in place, but shrunk considerably because of many of its members being implicated in various rebellions. Although extremelly unpopular, Augustus II did manage to impose some order in the cities, though the countryside remained in total chaos. Lastly, the Austrian Habsburgs were, as already implied, reorganising their empire in the wake of the recent developments. Having struck a deal with the Hungarian lords, they moved their centre to Buda, and stuck to their previous decentralised semi-feudal model of government (ruling through local nobility, though a bureaucracy was also expanded to maintain coordination and make sure everyone stays in line). Financial woes were a primary concern for much of this time period, but ultimately were dealt with thanks to an agreement with the Genoese bankers. The rise of French influence in the Mediterranean alarmed the Habsburgs considerably though, and they made sure to consolidate their position in Italy, while maintaining a good diplomatic presence in Moscow and propping up the Saxons in Poland in order to avoid a repeat of the Eleven Years War Swedish diversion that had cost the Austrians so dearly. German affairs were mostly neglected, howver. All in all things were going well though; the Habsburgs survived the coup of the fall of Vienna, reformed succesfully and maintained their position as one of the primary European players. Relations with the Hungarian nobility were mostly patched up, and the court was quite comfortable and safe in Buda.
Russia had undergone major changes during Tsar Peter I's comparatively short reign (1689-1717). For one thing, after a century of civil wars and succession crises, Russia's political situation was finally stabilised to some degree; administrative reforms have redivided the empire into smaller and more manageable provinces, themselves united into governorates, while central administration was also improved, with the prikazes altered considerably (many were removed altogether as superfluous or obsolete, others were modified and some new ones were added as well, in part to execute Peter's new reforms and deal with new complications) and their responsibilities outlined more clearly; but most importantly, Peter I had laid down a clear system of patrelineal succession, and left an undisputed male heir (who inherited Russia in 1717 as Tsar Alexius II). Other reforms were agricultural (well, not quite, but that was the sphere most impacted - intentionally so - by the introduction of the right of primogeniture devised to stop the constant fracturing of the feudal estates), financial (revised currency), legal (a new standardisation, plus the legal side of the implementation of the other reforms and a degree of legal simplification of the social stratas - i.e. most notably the boyars and the court nobles were now equivalent in their legal rights) and military (the abolition of the streltsy and the reformation of the military around the New Model and Guards Regiments, with the end result being a much more modern, professional and "European" army, though still somewhat backwards and unwieldy, especially due to its large size). These changes, as well as the high war taxes resulted in some social upsets and a few uprisings during the 1700s, but these were all crushed. A major economic development concerned the construction of many new manufactories, especially military-oriented ones; most manufactories were either state- or foreigner-ran, but a few enterprising and fortunate Russian merchants managed to set up their own as well. Trade was dominated by classical mercantilistic policies. The foreign policy was also fairly intense, particularily but not solely in the middle of the reign. Prior to the Eleven Years War, Peter also prosecuted the war with the Kalmyks, ultimately managing to defeat them conclusively by making good use of the Cossacks and the more loyal of the Bashkirs to counteract the typical steppe nomad tactics of the Kalmyks. As the Kalmyk settlements were overran and reprisals (as well as simple undisciplinned atrocities) were carried out, many of the Kalmyks took flight southwards (where they would play an ultimately neglected, but in reality very significant role), but others simply surrendered to the Russian rule, and indeed many of the tribal nobles that surrendered quickly enough were allowed to retain some degree of power, though now shared with appointed Russian officials. By annexing Kalmykia, Peter had increased the Russian presence in Central Asia considerably, though his later preoccupation with Eleven Years War and his various reforms prevented Russia from making major advances in that theatre for now. Back in Europe, in the aftermath of the Eleven Years War, great efforts were made to establish better contact with the key European nations; embassies were established in the key European capitals, and good relations fostered with London, Paris and Buda alike; trade with Britain and the Netherlands picked up further, and some dynastic marriages occured as well.
An important trait of the Petrine era - which did not fully disappear under the more conservative Alexius II - was the employment of foreigners as advisors, especially to help out with the military reforms and the foreign affairs. The advisors were diverse; some were sent by German princes or the Hungarian or even French kings, others were Germans, Scotts, Frenchmen and Dutchmen that resided in Russia for at least a generation, or moved there now, often attracted by this very opportunity. After the Eleven Years War - in fact, during its late years as well - many of the well-educated Lithuanians, as well as Lithuanian Germans, Poles and Russians from the newly-gained territories joined the court as well, or were given administrative positions in the new territories. These people provided important expertise for Peter, and also often possessed real ability, which ofcourse made them useful for the highly-active monarch. They and the Russian "new men" (most famously Alexander Danilovich Menshikov) attracted the ire of both the Russian populace and of the old nobility, however, and many of both did not physically outlive Peter himself by much (especially as they were also always intriguing against each other).
Alexius II was, as already said, more conservative than his father, but avoided removing the most important of Peter's reforms. He even carried out a reform of his own (kinda), intervenning to assemble a Holy Sobor to choose a new Patriarch (the position being empty since 1700), Stephen I (Stefan of Ryazan), and then assisting Stephen I in his numerous church reforms (a standard new standardisation of rites, hymns, pantheons and such, plus a reorganisation of the hierarchy and some measures to purge the said hierarchy of the corrupt; and many other things besides, to the purpose of eliminating the products of neglect and decline under the previous patriarchs and in the patriarch-less period, as well as to consolidate properly the gains of the previous reforms and of the territorial expansion that occured through missionary efforts in Siberia and through the subordination of the Kiev Metropolia). Still, many concessions to the conservative circles were made, as many boyars were elevated and many of the "new men" were purged to one extent or another; and the Boyar Duma was consulted on virtually all the issues of state. In foreign affairs, Alexius II was mostly quite inactive, but - in part because of his Danish wife, and in part because of the geopolitics - improved relations with Denmark, agreeing to help counter any further Swedish aggression. Also there were pretty good relations with Prussia, the military advisors of which helped reform the Russian army and put down a 1719 peasant uprising. Lastly, as the decade drew to a close, complications grew in the relations between Moscow and the autonomous Cossack Hetmanate of Ivan Mazepa (and later, Pylyp Orlyk), in part because of Peter I's and Alexius II's general centralising trends and in part because of the ongoing disputes over the status of western Ukrainean territories conquered from Poland during the Eleven Years War.
The Ottoman Empire was also in a period of reform, and of recovery from the horrible reverses of the late 17th century. Albeit no Peter the Great, Ahmed III had managed to restore some order after the instability early in the century (and late in the previous one), and with the assistance of reformist Turkish ministers, French advisors and Timarli sipahi (feudal cavalry that competed with the Janissaries, and was generally both easier to control and more loyal than the said Janissaries) managed to achieve two major victories - firstly, finally purging the increasingly undisciplinned and mutinous Janissaries (who had given way too many causes and provocations lately), replacing them with the Timarli sipahi and a new professional army, and secondly, defending the central government's grip on the semi-autonomous North African, Arabian, Danubean and Crimean dependencies (though still allowing the local rulers to retain much of their power; the Ottomans simply removed the openly-rebellious ones, and established military garrisons to keep an eye on the remainder and the new, ostensibly loyal, rulers). Although these, an upsurge in trade (mostly with France) and a cultural renaissance created a semblance of general revival, in truth the Ottoman Empire was still facing many problems, such as general decay, corrupt and/or disloyal administrators, court intrigue, rebellious provinces and such. The new Ottoman army's quality was also quite uncertain, and it was probably most fortunate that Ahmad III did not have to face any foreign threats whatsoever during his reign. That was mostly because Persia was in anarchy (allowing the Ottomans to occupy a few border towns and cities, though no serious intervention was yet attempted) and Hungary and Russia were more interested in internal reform during this time period; and as soon as one of those three powers would again begin actively seeking to expand at the Ottoman expense (and that was ofcourse a natural course of action in case of an expansionistic drive), the ability of the rebuilt Ottoman military would be put to a severe test.
It would probably make some snese at this point to briefly go over the American situation again, especially as it was not fully elaborated upon yet. It must be said that in the wake of the Eleven Years War (i.e. after near complete elimination of the French presence in the Americas, and the further destabilisation of Spain) the colonial were more or less neglected, with the exception of Brazil (to which, as already mentioned, the Braganzas had suddenly moved their capital). Morale and loyalty declined accordingly (and, also accordingly, grew immensely in Brazil). In spite of some local efforts, the lack of actual state attention - and a series of local revolts, which dominated the attention of the Spanish Viceroys - prevented major expansion on the behalf of the Spanish colonies; such apathy was poorly-timed, as French and Brazilian colonial competition increased noticeably in the late 1710s. Brazil was fairly obvious; greater royal (or, rather, imperial) attention and a favourable shift of priorities resulted in major, well-funded land-grabbing efforts along all borders, with the Spanish-"contested" region of Uruguay among the early gains (as it was much easier to reach than the jungle-filled interior). As for the French, they founded a new colony in Louisiana, and managed to increase its population by inviting refugees from British-conquered New France. Further expeditions occured, and trade outposts and forts begun to be set up further inland, especially along the Mississippi and Arkansas rivers. Last but not least we must mentioned the British North American colonies, which were back then at their vaguest and most uneven. After the acquisition of New France, the British colonial empire was, in name, quite extensive; but due to widespread disagreements with the natives, mutual hostility with the French colonists and the aforementioned neglect, many of the old French trade outposts far in the west were simply lost. Still, as control over New France was consolidated, the nearer trade outposts were secured. Although now virtually all the serious foreign threats were eliminated, relations with the Iroquois and other Amerinds soured quickly due to increasing British encroachment. Also, the more populated parts of New France saw numerous French revolts and British reprisals; ultimately many of the French colonists were expelled, often to Louisiana, while the British government took great care to "recolonise" the area; many pro-Hannoverian rebels were expelled there, for instance, and newly-conquered Protestants fleeing from French religious oppression were also directed there quite often. Major incentives were set up. The colonies to the south from New France were undergoing a boom of sorts, as they too received considerable immigration and generally grew richer and more developed; the comparative autonomy of local governments, as well as a generally lower level of social tensions prevented the same kind of decline that occured in Spanish colonies. What did occur was that the colonies grew increasingly apart from the homeland, especially as the rise of James III was not particularily well received there (though it still was recognised, ofcourse).
