Ecofarm
Deity
I'm trying to get a lil love for hate here. This isn't the history thread.
Ask a Philosopher!
- Thread starter Fifty
- Start date
Fifty
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
I think the extent to which hate is wrong depends on the object of the hate. I don't think there is such a thing as just general hatefulness to any meaningful extent.
So the question is what sort of things is it OK to hate, and what sort of things is it not OK to hate.
I think its ok to hate stuff like murder or rape or bigotry, but I do not think it is OK to hate murderers, rapists, or bigots. First because hatefulness towards persons breeds misanthropy, which is a vice. Second, because hatred can cloud our judgment and turn us towards a sort of wrath, which is another vice.
As far as an institutionalized hate, I think that even hypothetically I can't come up with a case where its clearly OK, and in practice it seems to be always wrong. The problem isn't just that hate is often based on ignorance, but that hate often causes ignorance.
I guess it partially depends on what you mean by "hate". I see it as involving a certain seething, wrathful quality. But if you are using it to mean something more like "moral contempt" then hate seems much more justifiable.
I haven't read much of him personally, but I think the general consensus is that he was 1) a gifted teacher, 2) *far* less earth-shattering or original than people outside of philosophy think he was, 3) far less influential in philosophy than those outside of philosophy think he was, 4) mainly wrongheaded in his metaphilosophical views. He apparently had some provocative (and not always in a bad way) readings of some continental figures, but I know nothing about them.
I think it is a true thesis. For those who don't know, Fallibilism is the view that, roughly, there always remains some doubt about the justification of some proposition. Its an epistemic thesis. I do NOT, of course, think it implies that skepticism is true. The idea that Fallibilism implies skepticism seems crazy to me, based on a completely untenable view of what it is for someone to know something. The idea that to know that P requires that we have no doubt whatsoever that P is a weird view of knowledge that we have no reason to believe. The skeptics trick is to try to sneak such a view of knowledge onto us without our stopping to think how crazy it is.
No Diogenes love?
Can you explain in more detail why you think skepticism is so crazy? It seems intuitively wrong to me, but I'm interested in hearing a full argument against it, if you have time.
Another question! (I'm just editing it into this post after the fact so you have fewer posts to deal with)
What do you think about the existence of actual infinities? (I've primarily been thinking about them as they relate to William Lane Craig's kalam cosmological argument, but I'm interested in your thoughts in general) It seems intuitively absurd idea to me, but I'm really very interested in arguments to the contrary.
Imperialmajesty
Emperor
Nice summation. Glad you think it is a true thesis, because so do I
Pertaining to skepticism, do you completely reject the philosophical skepticism?
Imperialmajesty
Emperor
Oh, and what do you think of Cornel West? Saw him on real time and he seemed like a moron.
EDIT: Also, what about Alasdair MacIntyre? He seems like an interesting enough fellow, and I personally like his work on Virtue Ethics.
EDIT: Also, what about Alasdair MacIntyre? He seems like an interesting enough fellow, and I personally like his work on Virtue Ethics.
Ecofarm
Deity
Thanks.
Fifty
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
No Diogenes love?
I didn't know much about him... surely he's a contender!
Skepticism is crazy because all the arguments for skepticism assume a completely untenable analysis of knowledge. The skeptic just asserts, but never argues, that knowledge requires complete certainty. Yet, every ordinary, common-sense instance of knowledge is not based on complete certainty. We have no reason, in absence of an argument, to think that knowledge requires complete certainty.
Don't really know anything about it, I'm afraid.
I'm not sure what you mean by "philosophical skepticism", but I think I do reject skepticism in the we-have-no-knowledge sense.
Never heard of him.
He's certainly an important philosopher. I think his virtue ethics drifts a bit too far towards relativism though, since he holds this weird view where rationality is the product of, among other things, social customs. And virtues are derived from rationality, so virtue its dependent on social customs.
I'll answr this question in detail shortly.
dwaxe
is not a fanatic
"I believe that the phenomenon which holds things together -- the energy force, the power of attachment -- is that which has been typified by human understanding as "divine." The Transcendentalists (Emerson and Thoreau, principally) called it the oversoul. Others have called it the "ground of being." It is the power of existence of which we are all a part...whether human, other animal or plant. It is the thing that unites us. It is what makes my life less if others in the world are starving."
1. What is this person saying (translate what he/she is saying to English)?
2. What is your opinion of transcendentalism?
1. What is this person saying (translate what he/she is saying to English)?
2. What is your opinion of transcendentalism?
ParkCungHee
Deity
- Joined
- Aug 13, 2006
- Messages
- 12,921
Heres one.
Why is Eastern Philosophy and Western Philosophy so thoroughly segregated in most philosophy departments/discussions.
I remember explaining my belief (at the time) in the philosophy of Adi Shankara to one of my professors, which, in the short end of things, is a radical monism in which all things cannot be meaningfully separated, including temporally.
He thought, halfway through the conversation that I was discussing a certain Greek philosopher with him, (who's name escapes me now, if you or Plontinus have any idea that would be wonderful) so much so that he was certain this was that exact philosophy, until I told him no, I took this from an Indian Philosopher. Now this (as I was a wet behind the ear freshman) surprised me, because Adi Shankara is a really big figure in Indian Philosophy, and I found it so odd at the time that a professor who knew so much more then me would have never heard of this.
Long anecdote aside, why is it you think that Philosophy has such a stark east-west division?
Why is Eastern Philosophy and Western Philosophy so thoroughly segregated in most philosophy departments/discussions.
I remember explaining my belief (at the time) in the philosophy of Adi Shankara to one of my professors, which, in the short end of things, is a radical monism in which all things cannot be meaningfully separated, including temporally.
He thought, halfway through the conversation that I was discussing a certain Greek philosopher with him, (who's name escapes me now, if you or Plontinus have any idea that would be wonderful) so much so that he was certain this was that exact philosophy, until I told him no, I took this from an Indian Philosopher. Now this (as I was a wet behind the ear freshman) surprised me, because Adi Shankara is a really big figure in Indian Philosophy, and I found it so odd at the time that a professor who knew so much more then me would have never heard of this.
Long anecdote aside, why is it you think that Philosophy has such a stark east-west division?
Just in case Fifty doesn't know, that was probably Parmenides.
The major historic divisions of philosophy (western/Indian/Chinese, and to a lesser extent, analytic/continental) do remain very distinct in philosophy departments. I think there are two main reasons for this. The first is that they have, historically, been completely distinct without much interaction between them. So someone who studies one in depth might well never encounter the others at all. The second is that they use such different methods and terminology that they can sometimes hardly seem like they're the same subject, let alone very relevant to each other (personally I'm still unconvinced that most Chinese philosophy really counts as philosophy at all...). The example you cite is a striking exception to this. Even so, I suspect that if you analyse the thought of Adi Shankara (and I must admit I've never heard of him either - I know pretty much nothing about Indian philosophy) and Parmenides in more depth you'd probably find that while they say very similar things, they have very different reasons for doing so.
The major historic divisions of philosophy (western/Indian/Chinese, and to a lesser extent, analytic/continental) do remain very distinct in philosophy departments. I think there are two main reasons for this. The first is that they have, historically, been completely distinct without much interaction between them. So someone who studies one in depth might well never encounter the others at all. The second is that they use such different methods and terminology that they can sometimes hardly seem like they're the same subject, let alone very relevant to each other (personally I'm still unconvinced that most Chinese philosophy really counts as philosophy at all...). The example you cite is a striking exception to this. Even so, I suspect that if you analyse the thought of Adi Shankara (and I must admit I've never heard of him either - I know pretty much nothing about Indian philosophy) and Parmenides in more depth you'd probably find that while they say very similar things, they have very different reasons for doing so.
I'm going to try to listen to a few of these. Do you see any people/topic combinations that stand out?
http://philosophybites.com/past_programmes.html
http://philosophybites.com/past_programmes.html
Fifty
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
I'll go back to the more substantive questions later, but yeah those are real good.
I've listened to a lot of them (do this during my planning period to help remind me that smart people do exist somewhere in the world), and my favorites so far are the ones with David Papineau, Raymond Geuss, Roger Crisp, Peter Singer, Timothy Williamson, and Simon Blackburn.
ParkCungHee
Deity
- Joined
- Aug 13, 2006
- Messages
- 12,921
Well the problem is that Most of Eastern Philosophy is very much like...well, theology. There's a bunch of very old books, The Analects, the Tao Te Ching mainly, and they're not very philosophical at all. But then you get an outpouring of literature using them as a basis for much more advanced philosophy, using logical argumentative method based on it.
Oh and thanks for the name.
I looked it up and oddly enough, they say the same thing for almost the exact same reasons. It's almost freaky.
The only key difference I can see between them is that Parmenides believes logic can still establish truth, but Shankara thought logic was based on senses and therefor ultimately invalid.
As I understand it (which is not at all), Indian philosophy is more like western philosophy, in its aims and methodology, than Chinese philosophy is. You are right that a lot of Chinese philosophy is more like theology; I think it is also rather like continental philosophy in some ways. It can be very hard to work out what any given author's arguments are for his position. The arguments are usually there if you look hard enough, but they are rarely clearly expressed in the way you get with western philosophy. That, at least, is how it seems in my very limited experience. I studied a bit of early medieval Chinese philosophy and the author who seemed most "philosophical" to me was Ji Kang, which was a little unexpected since he is not primarily thought of as a philosopher at all.
MagisterCultuum
Great Sage
What about American Indian Philosophy? The Aztecs apparently had philosophy that was roughly comparable to that of the ancient Greeks, and there are actually more surviving Aztec than Greek texts.
Gary Childress
Student for and of life
IIRC there's a lovely anecdote concerning a meeting between Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein where the two of them spent an evening looking for a rhinoceros (or something along those lines) in Russell's study. I think it started with something like Wittgenstein asking Russell how he could know for certain that there wasn't a rhinoceros in his study and Russell proceeded in attempting to prove that there wasn't.
I guess the bottom line is can Russell ever know for "certain" that there isn't a rhinoceros near by? By "certain" I mean without potential for doubt. If there exists even the most remote scenario where there could be a rhinoceros in his vicinity (Say he is actually laying asleep next to a rhinoceros on a savanna in Africa-dreaming that he is in his study) does that mean Russell does not really "know" that there is no rhinoceros near by? What does it mean to "know" something? Does it mean being 90% sure or better that something is true, for instance? Or does it mean knowing without a doubt whatsoever that something is true? What role should doubt play in philosophy?
Mise
isle of lucy
I have a question tangentially related to the above post. Sometimes philosophy attempts to reflect our intuitive understanding of words such as "knowledge" and "exists" (otherwise it would be considered silly and irrelevant), whilst other times it seems to run against our intuition (otherwise we wouldn't learn much from it). How much of this kind of line treading goes on? How do you tell when a counterintuitive conclusion is true when it's not clear that the assumptions are true? How many times in the history of philosophy has something we now know to be true been dismissed as "too counterintuitive" to be considered, and how many times has something blatantly false been considered true just because it reinforces preconceived notions of what something means? Does it happen often or is it an exception rather than a rule?
If you look at pages 117-118 of this book, Putnam takes issue with Quine in a pretty big way.
http://books.google.com/books?id=qhOXfAshDe4C&lpg=PA22&hl=es&pg=PA117#v=onepage&q=&f=false
Putnam calls Quine a physicalist and rejects Quine’s notion that there is a “true” physics out there which is complete, that “the world does have a true and ultimate description, on Quine’s view, even if it doesn’t have a true and ultimate ontology.” He says, “A theory may predict all the motions of John’s body without predicting that John is angry; and in what sense is such a theory complete?” Thus, Quine’s idea that physicalism is “all the facts there are” doesn't work for Putnam. Putnam goes on to say that “the metaphysical realist notion of truth cannot play any role in a theory of how we understand our various versions and languages…no actually psychological mechanism can play the required role of comparing our statements with unconceptualized reality.”
Isn't the ideal of some "complete coverage" physics basically the same thing as reaffirming that reality is reality? Whatever "reality" is already covers all of physics. So then, is it even useful to talk about a "complete physics" that we could actually use? "Fully approximate" is an oxymoron, as is to "fully model" reality, and it's unclear what it would entail to finally get the "true" physics. What are Quine's commitments here, and is he maybe saying a weaker version of the above in that we might never get the full physics but that the fact that it exists still allows us to objectively improve upon our theories? That seems to leave him at the mercy of Putnam.
Thoughts? I just skimmed this so I might be getting it wrong, but it seems pretty important.
http://books.google.com/books?id=qhOXfAshDe4C&lpg=PA22&hl=es&pg=PA117#v=onepage&q=&f=false
Putnam calls Quine a physicalist and rejects Quine’s notion that there is a “true” physics out there which is complete, that “the world does have a true and ultimate description, on Quine’s view, even if it doesn’t have a true and ultimate ontology.” He says, “A theory may predict all the motions of John’s body without predicting that John is angry; and in what sense is such a theory complete?” Thus, Quine’s idea that physicalism is “all the facts there are” doesn't work for Putnam. Putnam goes on to say that “the metaphysical realist notion of truth cannot play any role in a theory of how we understand our various versions and languages…no actually psychological mechanism can play the required role of comparing our statements with unconceptualized reality.”
Isn't the ideal of some "complete coverage" physics basically the same thing as reaffirming that reality is reality? Whatever "reality" is already covers all of physics. So then, is it even useful to talk about a "complete physics" that we could actually use? "Fully approximate" is an oxymoron, as is to "fully model" reality, and it's unclear what it would entail to finally get the "true" physics. What are Quine's commitments here, and is he maybe saying a weaker version of the above in that we might never get the full physics but that the fact that it exists still allows us to objectively improve upon our theories? That seems to leave him at the mercy of Putnam.
Thoughts? I just skimmed this so I might be getting it wrong, but it seems pretty important.
I have to say I don't agree with this assessment. I don't think that scepticism is committed to the notion that knowledge requires complete certainty. (And note, by the way, that the word "certainty" is dangerously ambiguous to start with.) It certainly isn't committed to the notion that we know nothing at all, something that only the very most extreme sceptics, such as Arcesilaus and perhaps Pyrrho, asserted. Scepticism merely says that there are some things that we think we know, which in fact we don't. That's not such a crazy claim. To make it, you don't have to set the standards for knowledge unattainably high - you just have to set them higher than some of our beliefs reach.
I must also point out that, historically speaking, scepticism has often been used not to argue that we know nothing (or even that we know relatively little) but to argue that our knowledge is not based upon reason. This was the basic approach of religious sceptics (by which I mean philosophers who used the arguments of scepticism in support of traditional religious faith) in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They thought that we know all sorts of things - but we know them by faith, not by reason, because the arguments of scepticism show that reason won't get you very far.
