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No, "Jesus" is normally used to refer to the human part, and "Christ" to the whole. Although that's perhaps a modern usage. The Nestorians didn't really have consistent terminology, which was really the root of the problem.

It's not about wills - they don't have names, as they are not persons, and they are not even natures, they are faculties of natures. The doctrine that Christ has two wills is also not Nestorian (or at least, not distinctively Nestorian), it is orthodoxy.
 
It's certainly a reference to baptism, just as John 8 is about the Eucharist. I have to say I've never heard of any other interpretation! To take "born of water" as a reference to natural birth seems very strained to me - what a peculiar way of referring to natural birth that would be.

Born of Water seems to me to simply be a reference of Natural Birth. I've never heard it explained as Baptism.

Early Christianity was an initiatory religion, similar to the mystery cults. Baptism was a really, really big thing. When you see references to water in early Christianity, they are generally references to baptism. When you see references to water in connection with salvation, new life, or initiation, they are definitely references to baptism.

How can you be "Born" by Baptism?






"Annihilates" is rather combative language, don't you think? Anyway, there are at least three obvious replies to that that I can think of off the top of my head. First, the thief couldn't be baptised since he was being crucified, and perhaps the intent to be baptised is enough in cases where actual baptism is impossible. Second, since the thief had faith, he could plausibly be seen as a martyr, and in the early church, martyrdom was considered a second baptism "of blood". In the Tertullian treatise to which I linked he says that martyrdom can take the place of baptism. Third, the people around Jesus during his lifetime, such as the apostles, may be considered special cases, which Tertullian also says in that treatise, in which case the fact that some of them weren't baptised shouldn't be taken as evidence that baptism is optional for other people.

I think the first two explanations could be plausible, however, the third one makes no sense to me. Why would the apostles not needed Baptism?







That's irrelevant, and a case of bad debating technique. Ajidica was saying that you seem to think it's OK to insult people from the past as long as you don't insult people from the present. He pointed out that insulting Jesus wouldn't be acceptable, so insulting other people would be equally unacceptable. Whether any of these people are God is completely irrelevant to that - unless you're now saying that it's OK to insult anyone who isn't God. Which isn't in line with the forum rules.

Well no but, he's also not here to hear the insult;)

I no longer remember why I gave that insult at all so.......................................................................... I don't remember.
 
Born of Water seems to me to simply be a reference of Natural Birth. I've never heard it explained as Baptism.

All right, maybe you've never heard of that interpretation, but the fact is that that is the standard interpretation and almost certainly the correct one.

To interpret it as a reference to natural birth is not only strained (who ever refers to birth in this way?) but pointless: why would Jesus specify that you have to be born naturally in order to be saved? Is he saying that people born by caesarean section cannot be saved? I don't see what is gained by interpreting it in this unusual way.

How can you be "Born" by Baptism?

It's a metaphor, of course, just like being "born" by faith. Baptism is an initiatory rite representing new life.

To illustrate, this is the introduction to the service of baptism in Common Worship, which is the standard service book for the Church of England:

Common Worship said:
Baptism marks the beginning of a journey with God which continues for the rest of our lives, the first step in response to God’s love. For all involved, particularly the candidates but also parents, godparents and sponsors, it is a joyful moment when we rejoice in what God has done for us in Christ, making serious promises and declaring the faith. The wider community of the local church and friends welcome the new Christian, promising support and prayer for the future. Hearing and doing these things provides an opportunity to remember our own baptism and reflect on the progress made on that journey, which is now to be shared with this new member of the Church.

The service paints many vivid pictures of what happens on the Christian way. There is the sign of the cross, the badge of faith in the Christian journey, which reminds us of Christ’s death for us. Our ‘drowning’ in the water of baptism, where we believe we die to sin and are raised to new life, unites us to Christ’s dying and rising, a picture that can be brought home vividly by the way the baptism is administered. Water is also a sign of new life, as we are born again by water and the Spirit. This reminds us of Jesus’ baptism. And as a sign of that new life, there may be a lighted candle, a picture of the light of Christ conquering the darkness of evil. Everyone who is baptized walks in that light for the rest of their lives.

The service begins like this:

Common Prayer said:
Our Lord Jesus Christ has told us
that to enter the kingdom of heaven
we must be born again of water and the Spirit,
and has given us baptism as the sign and seal of this new birth.
Here we are washed by the Holy Spirit and made clean.
Here we are clothed with Christ,
dying to sin that we may live his risen life.
As children of God, we have a new dignity
and God calls us to fullness of life.

You'll notice, again, the references to John 3:5 as a reference to baptism.

And part of the pre-baptismal prayer:

Common Prayer said:
We thank you, Father, for the water of baptism.
In it we are buried with Christ in his death.
By it we share in his resurrection.
Through it we are reborn by the Holy Spirit.
Therefore, in joyful obedience to your Son,
we baptize into his fellowship those who come to him in faith.

Now sanctify this water that, by the power of your Holy Spirit,
they may be cleansed from sin and born again.
Renewed in your image, may they walk by the light of faith
and continue for ever in the risen life of Jesus Christ our Lord;
to whom with you and the Holy Spirit
be all honour and glory, now and for ever.

So that is what being "born" by baptism is. I imagine that your church doesn't share this understanding, but that is the traditional, sacramental, understanding, and it is the understanding that the early Christians had of it.

I think the first two explanations could be plausible, however, the third one makes no sense to me. Why would the apostles not needed Baptism?

For the reasons Tertullian gives. If you don't agree with them, take it up with him, not me!
 
All right, maybe you've never heard of that interpretation, but the fact is that that is the standard interpretation and almost certainly the correct one.

To interpret it as a reference to natural birth is not only strained (who ever refers to birth in this way?) but pointless: why would Jesus specify that you have to be born naturally in order to be saved? Is he saying that people born by caesarean section cannot be saved? I don't see what is gained by interpreting it in this unusual way.

I have always thought that he was stressing that you must be born of water (Which simply means being born, essentially, everyone would have been born this way. I highly doubt it had anything to do with Caesarean section), and then stressing you must ALSO be born of the Spirit. So to interpret it in layman's terms, basically "You need to be born not only of water, but also of the Spirit" (With the stress on the Spirit.)

That said, I should probably look into it more now.

For the reasons Tertullian gives. If you don't agree with them, take it up with him, not me!

I was more asking what his reasons were (You just said he gave that as a reason, you never gave an explanation.)
 
I was more asking what his reasons were (You just said he gave that as a reason, you never gave an explanation.)

I gave the link to the entire treatise, though, so you can see for yourself what his own explanation is. I can't do better than that.
 
No, "Jesus" is normally used to refer to the human part, and "Christ" to the whole. Although that's perhaps a modern usage.

Is the idea of transubstantiation and similar beliefs that we eat Jesus or Christ? Are the communion breads supposed to transform into actual parts of his body, like one taken from his arm or leg? Or are they just generally ("metaphysically") parts of his body, so that it would be impossible even for the God himself to say which parts? Are they always meat, or can they be fat or bones or intestines too? Is transubstantiation supposed to have happen during the first communion when Jesus was present himself?

Then another, perhaps more relevant question: Are the rules of morality set by God or independent of him? From Christian point of view that is, of course.

That may sound stupid question, and perhaps it is, but here's something to justify it: Morals aren't usually though to be analytic truths, so they would be ones set by God. But then how would we know of any other morals except those told by God himself? On the other hand, if morals are just some arbitrary set of rules, what do they have to do what we call moral behaviour in everyday language?

The usual idea of morals, I think, is that we should be nice to each others. One could say then, that "punching someone isn't moral" is analytical truth, or almost, when the words "moral" and "nice" are explained. But how is it in religion? Could God have made world such that punching someone induces the pain and danger of injury and all that, but it's actually a nice thing to do? (Here I think it's essential, that the negative consequences aren't changed, because answers like "He could have made punching to induce pleasure" are similar to answers like "What if punching meant kissing?". They don't capture the problem. Even more of course the answers like "punching to save someone's life" aren't good, since they confuse the example with the question).

And moreover, if morals is something that we can think for ourselves, something independent of God, does the Bible or any other source have any authority on moral issues? Even from the Christian point of view, that is. Would it be even theory possible to argue that homosexuality or picking grain on Sunday are bad things because they are forbidden in the Bible?
 
Is the idea of transubstantiation and similar beliefs that we eat Jesus or Christ? Are the communion breads supposed to transform into actual parts of his body, like one taken from his arm or leg? Or are they just generally ("metaphysically") parts of his body, so that it would be impossible even for the God himself to say which parts? Are they always meat, or can they be fat or bones or intestines too? Is transubstantiation supposed to have happen during the first communion when Jesus was present himself?

In transubstantiation, the bread is supposed to become the entire body of Christ, not a part of it. So the whole of Christ's body is present in every part of every consecrated element. As for whether this is supposed to have happened at the Last Supper itself, that I'm not sure and can't seem to find any information on.

Then another, perhaps more relevant question: Are the rules of morality set by God or independent of him? From Christian point of view that is, of course.

That may sound stupid question, and perhaps it is, but here's something to justify it: Morals aren't usually though to be analytic truths, so they would be ones set by God. But then how would we know of any other morals except those told by God himself? On the other hand, if morals are just some arbitrary set of rules, what do they have to do what we call moral behaviour in everyday language?

The usual idea of morals, I think, is that we should be nice to each others. One could say then, that "punching someone isn't moral" is analytical truth, or almost, when the words "moral" and "nice" are explained. But how is it in religion? Could God have made world such that punching someone induces the pain and danger of injury and all that, but it's actually a nice thing to do? (Here I think it's essential, that the negative consequences aren't changed, because answers like "He could have made punching to induce pleasure" are similar to answers like "What if punching meant kissing?". They don't capture the problem. Even more of course the answers like "punching to save someone's life" aren't good, since they confuse the example with the question).

That's a question on which Christians, and indeed theists, disagree. Some think that moral truths are determined by God's commands (this is "divine command theory") and some do not. As you rightly point out, the problem for divine command theorists is that it makes morality arbitrary and makes it seem as if God could have specified that anything could be good or bad behaviour. Leibniz also pointed out that if whatever God does is good by definition, then there's no point thanking or praising him for what he has done, since he might as well have done the opposite and it would still have been good.

This is really just the Euthyphro problem - in his dialogue Euthyphro, Plato has Socrates argue that if the gods determine what counts as piety, then either they do so arbitrarily or they have a reason. But if they have a reason, then that's the real reason why certain acts are pious, and the fact that the gods endorse them doesn't really explain anything. It seems to me that this reasoning is quite correct. I think that divine command theory doesn't really work.

You say that moral truths aren't analytic, but it seems to me that a non-divine command theorist could argue that they are. Perhaps what makes punching someone in the face wrong is the fact that it causes pain, and it's an analytic truth that causing pain is wrong (Bentham, for example, seems to have thought this). Of course, in a different possible world, punching someone might not cause pain at all. But one might say that it's nevertheless an analytic truth that, given the physical laws which apply in the actual world, punching people is wrong. In which case the rightness or wrongness of acts could be an intrinsic feature of their nature which is not determined by God.

And moreover, if morals is something that we can think for ourselves, something independent of God, does the Bible or any other source have any authority on moral issues? Even from the Christian point of view, that is. Would it be even theory possible to argue that homosexuality or picking grain on Sunday are bad things because they are forbidden in the Bible?

Of course, because one can appeal to authority even when you don't think that authority is what makes the rules. If I'm ignorant of some period of history, I can ask a professional historian, and take what he says as trustworthy because I know he's an expert on the subject, even though of course he doesn't determine what's historically true. This even applies to necessary truths: I can ask a mathematician about some difficult mathematical reasoning, and even if I still don't understand it, I can take what he tells me to be authoritative. In the case of ethics and revelation, even if God doesn't determine what's right and wrong, he still has perfect understanding of right and wrong, because of his omniscience. In which case, if you think that the Bible is divine revelation, and that the Bible says that some action is wrong, then that would be a perfectly good reason for thinking that that action is wrong, even if you're not a divine command theorist.

So one could certainly argue that, because they're forbidden in the Bible, that tells us that they're wrong. Could one go further and say that the mere fact that they're forbidden in the Bible makes them wrong? One might, at least for some things. Perhaps God doesn't determine the nature of morality, but perhaps it's a moral law (independent of God) that it's wrong to disobey commands given by someone with the moral authority to issue them. Then, it could be the case that picking grain on the Sabbath is not wrong in itself; but perhaps because God tells us not to, we should refrain from doing it. An analogy: if a parent tells her child to do something, then it's reasonable to think that the child has an obligation to do it, even if the act in question is morally neutral.

By the way, the Bible doesn't say anything about Sundays.
 
By the way, the Bible doesn't say anything about Sundays.

At least the Old Testament doesn't; I think that several places in the New Testament (at least in Acts) talks about the early Christians keeping Sunday holy as that was the day Christ rose from the dead.
 
I don't think that's right. Acts mentions the act of breaking bread together on the first day of the week (e.g. Acts 20:7), but there's no suggestion that the day was kept especially holy or regarded in the same way as the Sabbath. As far as I know, the earliest indication of anything like that comes in Ignatius of Antioch's epistle to the Magnesians, ch. 9.
 
@Plotinus-

That's a question on which Christians, and indeed theists, disagree. Some think that moral truths are determined by God's commands (this is "divine command theory") and some do not. As you rightly point out, the problem for divine command theorists is that it makes morality arbitrary and makes it seem as if God could have specified that anything could be good or bad behaviour. Leibniz also pointed out that if whatever God does is good by definition, then there's no point thanking or praising him for what he has done, since he might as well have done the opposite and it would still have been good.

This is really just the Euthyphro problem - in his dialogue Euthyphro, Plato has Socrates argue that if the gods determine what counts as piety, then either they do so arbitrarily or they have a reason. But if they have a reason, then that's the real reason why certain acts are pious, and the fact that the gods endorse them doesn't really explain anything. It seems to me that this reasoning is quite correct. I think that divine command theory doesn't really work.

You say that moral truths aren't analytic, but it seems to me that a non-divine command theorist could argue that they are. Perhaps what makes punching someone in the face wrong is the fact that it causes pain, and it's an analytic truth that causing pain is wrong (Bentham, for example, seems to have thought this). Of course, in a different possible world, punching someone might not cause pain at all. But one might say that it's nevertheless an analytic truth that, given the physical laws which apply in the actual world, punching people is wrong. In which case the rightness or wrongness of acts could be an intrinsic feature of their nature which is not determined by God.

Isn't there kind of a difference between Polytheistic deities and a Monotheistic, Omnipotent deity though? I mean, a Polythestic pantheon of deities is usually basically superhumans with power and great age, but a Monotheistic deity literally creates the concept of morality and reason (Or it could be argued, God IS morality and reason, among other things, since those things are based on Him, and departure from God's morality or reason is considered wrong.)
 
Isn't there kind of a difference between Polytheistic deities and a Monotheistic, Omnipotent deity though? I mean, a Polythestic pantheon of deities is usually basically superhumans with power and great age, but a Monotheistic deity literally creates the concept of morality and reason (Or it could be argued, God IS morality and reason, among other things, since those things are based on Him, and departure from God's morality or reason is considered wrong.)

No, with both polytheism and monotheism, people may hold (and have held) either that God/the gods determine morality or that they don't.

With polytheism, the Euthyphro - the Platonic dialogue which began discussion of this topic - the subject is whether piety is determined by the gods. That is, is it the case that certain actions are pious because the gods do them, or is it the case that the gods do them because they're pious? The character Euthyphro thinks the former, but Socrates shows that this view is untenable. So there you have two polytheists disagreeing about this issue.

With monotheism, again, some people have thought that God is the source of morality, and others have thought that he isn't. As I said in the first paragraph of the post that you quoted, Leibniz argued that God is not the source of morality, and that's in the context of absolute monotheism. Whereas other theists, such as Aquinas, have thought differently. As I said, I don't think that divine command theory is really tenable; it seems to me that if God exists he must not determine morality, because if he does, that leads to very awkward consequences.

As for the idea that God creates the concept of reason, I don't really know what you mean by that. We've already argued at length about whether God determines the laws of logic, and as I said before, most theists have thought not. If he does, that leads to even more absurd consequences than if he determines the laws of morality.
 
As for the idea that God creates the concept of reason, I don't really know what you mean by that. We've already argued at length about whether God determines the laws of logic, and as I said before, most theists have thought not. If he does, that leads to even more absurd consequences than if he determines the laws of morality.

What then, is the role of God? Is he merely the instrument of some greater forces, wielding his powers to shape the world in accordance with Logic and Morality? And if God is perfect must he not shape the world in exactly the ways prescribed by Logic and Morality? What does God determine?

(Note: this may sound more argumentative than I mean it to. I'm genuinely curious what people who believe in the aforementioned beliefs think!)
 
With polytheism, the Euthyphro - the Platonic dialogue which began discussion of this topic - the subject is whether piety is determined by the gods. That is, is it the case that certain actions are pious because the gods do them, or is it the case that the gods do them because they're pious? The character Euthyphro thinks the former, but Socrates shows that this view is untenable. So there you have two polytheists disagreeing about this issue.

I thought Socrates was agnostic, not polytheist? In any case, what if one god does one thing and another god does differently? Which way is right?

With monotheism, again, some people have thought that God is the source of morality, and others have thought that he isn't. As I said in the first paragraph of the post that you quoted, Leibniz argued that God is not the source of morality, and that's in the context of absolute monotheism. Whereas other theists, such as Aquinas, have thought differently. As I said, I don't think that divine command theory is really tenable; it seems to me that if God exists he must not determine morality, because if he does, that leads to very awkward consequences.

Well, even if he didn't determine morality, wouldn't he still be morally perfect by nature?

As for the idea that God creates the concept of reason, I don't really know what you mean by that. We've already argued at length about whether God determines the laws of logic, and as I said before, most theists have thought not. If he does, that leads to even more absurd consequences than if he determines the laws of morality.

I didn't say logic, I said morality, and that wasn't what I meant. I meant that in theory God is by NATURE logically and morally correct.
 
I thought Socrates was agnostic, not polytheist? In any case, what if one god does one thing and another god does differently? Which way is right?

The idea of "right" and "wrong" as some kind of violation of a transcendent objective code is a very monotheistic conceit. "Gods can disagree" is not a refutation of paganism, but of a peculiarly Christian (and fundamentally vulgarized) understanding of paganism.

Well, even if he didn't determine morality, wouldn't he still be morally perfect by nature?

The two sides of the Euthyphro problem are (in Christian terms):

1. The good is good because God says so.
2. God says so because it's good.

I didn't say logic, I said morality, and that wasn't what I meant. I meant that in theory God is by NATURE logically and morally correct.

This doesn't solve the problem of in what way he is "by nature morally correct" (I'm not sure what "logically correct" means here); cf: Euthyphro.
 
What then, is the role of God? Is he merely the instrument of some greater forces, wielding his powers to shape the world in accordance with Logic and Morality? And if God is perfect must he not shape the world in exactly the ways prescribed by Logic and Morality? What does God determine?

(Note: this may sound more argumentative than I mean it to. I'm genuinely curious what people who believe in the aforementioned beliefs think!)

You're right that the more perfect one conceives of God, the less choice he seems to have. E.g. if God is really morally perfect, then he must always choose the best; in which case his actions seem to run on rails and he has no freedom. The answer to that, of course, is that being determined is not incompatible with being free. But that leaves the problem of what role God has. I would say that the obvious answer is that without God, nothing would actually exist. That is, it may be that (say) the actual world is the only world that God could have created, because he cannot do other than the best; so the fact that we have this world rather than another one is not down to God; however, the fact that we have a world at all is down to God. Without God, this world might still have been the best, but it wouldn't exist. So God certainly has a role - you could say that he is the explanation for the fact that things exist - even if he doesn't have a role in explaining why these things (rather than others) exist, beyond the fact that God is constrained to act in a certain way (by his own nature).

I thought Socrates was agnostic, not polytheist?

As far as we know, Socrates was a polytheist. That's how he's presented in Plato's dialogues anyway. One of the charges at Socrates' trial was of denying the gods, but it's not clear to what extent this was justified. At any rate, Socrates the character in Plato's dialogue is a polytheist, and that's all we're talking about, not the historical Socrates.

In any case, what if one god does one thing and another god does differently? Which way is right?

Very good - that is one of Socrates' arguments against the view that the god's behaviour determines what is right.

Well, even if he didn't determine morality, wouldn't he still be morally perfect by nature?

Yes, at least on classical theism. But that's quite a different thing. A morally perfect being is one that always does what is right; it doesn't follow that he determines what is right.

I didn't say logic, I said morality, and that wasn't what I meant. I meant that in theory God is by NATURE logically and morally correct.

Yes, that's the view of classical theism (although you're phrasing it rather oddly - I take it you mean that God always does what is right, and does not behave illogically).

The idea of "right" and "wrong" as some kind of violation of a transcendent objective code is a very monotheistic conceit. "Gods can disagree" is not a refutation of paganism, but of a peculiarly Christian (and fundamentally vulgarized) understanding of paganism.

And yet we find it in Plato! It's not meant to be a refutation of paganism, merely a refutation of divine command theory (or something like it) within a pagan context.
 
The idea of Greek gods setting the morality is kind of amusing when you think all the things they are told to have done...

I wonder whether they thought most of the stories as just stories, or did they really believe all of them. I've got the impression that Socrates &co didn't consider Zeus to be monomanic woman, cow, swan etc chaser of the stories. On the other hand, if they were just stories, why they had them about their gods? Most cultures seem to have specific characters for that kinds of fables.

You're right that the more perfect one conceives of God, the less choice he seems to have. E.g. if God is really morally perfect, then he must always choose the best; in which case his actions seem to run on rails and he has no freedom.

He could still choose between equally good options? Of course that wouldn't be very important job to do.
 
The idea of Greek gods setting the morality is kind of amusing when you think all the things they are told to have done...

I wonder whether they thought most of the stories as just stories, or did they really believe all of them. I've got the impression that Socrates &co didn't consider Zeus to be monomanic woman, cow, swan etc chaser of the stories. On the other hand, if they were just stories, why they had them about their gods? Most cultures seem to have specific characters for that kinds of fables.

I'm sure there was a wide range of attitudes to the myths. However, it's important to bear in mind that we know ancient pagan myths through literary sources, such as the poets. That is, what we know is what the poets thought worth writing - they are themselves literary creations. We can't assume that ordinary worshippers knew them in the same form or attached the same importance to them. Thinking of the Greek or Roman gods just in terms of the stories in Hesiod or Virgil is rather like thinking of the Christian God just in terms of Paradise Lost - it's a literary expression rather than the core of the religion as practised.

He could still choose between equally good options? Of course that wouldn't be very important job to do.

Yes, indeed, there might be neutral choices he could make. But as you say, that doesn't seem particularly exciting, since it would surely cover only a minority of cases.
 
Hey! I think this is amazing thread and very large indeed. I am hoping to find some time and come back to read some more of it. I have spend over an hour here and I am still not sure if it has been discused what I have heard that there is at least couple of years in Jesuss life which we know next to nothing about in which he possibly went to India?
 
Hey! I think this is amazing thread and very large indeed. I am hoping to find some time and come back to read some more of it. I have spend over an hour here and I am still not sure if it has been discused what I have heard that there is at least couple of years in Jesuss life which we know next to nothing about in which he possibly went to India?

Thanks!

We know very little about most of Jesus' life, but it's incredibly unlikely that he went to India, or England, or South America, or anywhere like that. There's no evidence to speak of that he ever undertook such a journey, and it would be highly unlikely for a lower-class artisan from Palestine to have done so.
 
Thank you very much. I see I am even going to improve my English. Thx again.
So I assume you dont know any source or who could possibly made such a statment. I just have may heard it from somebody years ago who possibly read it somewhere...:). What I remember being told he was supposed to go there and back with caravan and stay there for about a year or so which would take about a tree years of his life. I didnt discard that information (hypotesis) as it seems to me probable (not incredibly unlikely) that there existed such a trade conection between the twoo corners of the continent and partialy would explain the luck of our knowledge about his life before he become what we call Christ. Also he was a lower class but certainly no ordinary dude.
As for Jesus going to England and south America I agree of course:)

Also I wanted to ask if Jesus was suposed to make some coments on the Old Testament and which.
 
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