Can we Pass Moral Judgement on the Past?

[Glassfan]

Historians are a bit like journalists. We expect a certain level of objectivity and balance so that we can trust in their accurate reporting of events - so that we, the readers can judge things for ourselves.

When I encounter an obviously biased historian, I simply can't trust what they're saying. As has been mentioned in the "objectivity" thread in the Chamber, a bias or prejudice leads the researcher down predetermined pathways, and the whole truth never gets out.

Now, having said that, I would also point out that certain subjects have been researched to death (Hitler, the Spanish Inquisition, etc.), and that in such overwhelmingly documented cases, historical objectivity is no longer neccessary.

 

[Flying Pig]

Perhaps 'no longer possible' would be more accurate. Certainly, with certain subjects - for example, Augustus Caesar - all of the sources available are so heavily biased that objective scholarship is impossible.

 

[Glassfan]

Now, having said that, I would also point out that certain subjects have been researched to death (Hitler, the Spanish Inquisition, etc.), and that in such overwhelmingly documented cases, historical objectivity is no longer neccessary.

Perhaps 'no longer possible' would be more accurate. Certainly, with certain subjects - for example, Augustus Caesar - all of the sources available are so heavily biased that objective scholarship is impossible.

Great minds think alike.

 

[lovett]

The very term 'moral judgment' is a misunderstanding. Morality is not what ought to be, but what is. It is possible for individuals to have a personal view of right and wrong, but it is does not carry any objective true-false value all of society should heed to. Scientifically, a morality that is both true and exists independent of public morality (that which is commonly accepted, notwithstanding our opinions) is plainly false.

Plainly? I await with baited breath your publication in Philosophy and Public Affairs on this topic...

 

[Perfection]

Random thoughts:

Perhaps when it comes to historical figures virtue ethics can come to shine. We can look at the options before the figure and how he/she thought and acted upon it. What were the motivations behind this person? Was this person, hateful, loving, compassionate, sadistic, etc?

In the Mongol horde leaders example, to judge the leaders we need to figure out what was going on in their heads.

As for what we owe the victims of horrific acts. Perhaps we can condemn the acts as terrible without making group judgments of the perpetrators. The biggest thing we can do to honor the victims is to ensure that such horrors are not forgotten and ensure they do not happen again.

 

[Dachs]

Sure we can pass moral judgment, and to cover say, WWII or the Thirty Years' War without saying what the Nazis and Swedes did, respectively was abominable would be a gross oversight, but I don't think history should be a moralizing tool, mostly because I think the popularly held notion that "those who don't learn from the past are doomed to repeat it", is, for the most part, a load of bull[excrement].

Bringing up the Swedes' conduct in the Thirty Years' War without mentioning that of the Imperials is like talking about Red Stick atrocities without mentioning Andrew Jackson's. On the one side, you got Fort Mims; on the other, you got a freaking war of extermination.

 

[sophie]

Bringing up the Swedes' conduct in the Thirty Years' War without mentioning that of the Imperials is like talking about Red Stick atrocities without mentioning Andrew Jackson's. On the one side, you got Fort Mims; on the other, you got a freaking war of extermination.

Note I also omitted the atrocities of the Soviets, Americans, Japanese, and damned near everybody else involved in WWII too...but point taken.

 

[Dachs]

Note I also omitted the atrocities of the Soviets, Americans, Japanese, and damned near everybody else involved in WWII too...but point taken.

Yeah, but I mean, when people think of WWII, they think of the Holocaust. So focusing on the Nazis makes sense there. But when people think of the Thirty Years' War's atrocities, they think of the Rape of Magdeburg.

 

[ParkCungHee]

If people can't pass moral judgement on the past, what's the use of moral judgement?

It's physically impossible to pass judgement on the present, and fruitless to judge the future?

 

[Terxpahseyton]

There are always reasons why stuff happens. In the end, no one holds any responsibility has the world is a world of soulless reaction by any reliable accounts.

Due to that, I think contextual morality is nonsense. In the specific and complete context of any actions there is NO ROOM for conscious divergence. All contextual morality can rest on is to just at will define an area of factors a person is supposed to be responsible for and an area it isn't, based on nothing but the aforementioned will of the one drawing the line.

Now as to why people do so anyway: They confuse judgment in the service of deterrence and enforcement with judgment in the service of morality and finally judgment in the service of how likable I find someone.

Judgment in the service of morality is what has been label "absolute morality". It is not absolute but the only kind of morality, however.

Judgment in the service of deterrence and enforcement uses the idea of responsibility (even though responsibility doesn't actually exist) to assign unavoidable sanctions to undesirable actions. That is a useful thing to do, as such sanctions will become a factor in the equation with determines a person's actions. One may also go as far as to say that the idea of responsibility makes the enforcement of morality possible. Unless one finds that to be inherently immoral of course. So as you can see, the idea of responsibility is the prerequisite for a morality brought about force. It however, remaining not actually existent, can not serve to justify a moral compass in the first place.

Judgment in the service of how likable I find someone is about relating to someone else. About feeling common ground. This is still irrelevant for moral questions unless you want to embrace a totally ridiculous moral compass, but seems to embody a lot of the things talked about when it comes to judging historic people.

In conclusion: Kahn is immoral, but not responsible for being so, it would however been great if Kahn had been seen as responsible nevertheless so his menace could have been stopped and perhaps he was in spite of his gravely immoral actions a likable person given the context of his time (I doubt that though).

Final answer to the thread: Yes we can morally judge whomever whenever. Secondly, we can also create the myth of responsibility and in effect integrate historic actions in a wider code of sanctions. For instance, by condemning Hitler even though he just happened to be the monster he was we indirectly threaten future Hitler with sanctions and as a consequence make future Hitler less likely. Thirdly, we can have long debates about how likable someone was given the context of his or her time.

@Kaiserguard
I agree with you that there is no objective morality. However, I think your conclusion is all wrong. Because such a conclusion is not that morality is not about what ought to be, but that it is about what ought to be relative to whatever normative stipulation, so morality is about what is supposed to be ought to be. And that then can be rationally debated on the ground of mutual interest. And now, it is my opinion, that in an ideal society every individual member of this society has the same interests. I think so, because in my opinion the ideal state of ones individual well-being requires a sort of harmony with its social surroundings. Saying: In the best case possible, a synthesis of individual and group interests is not only possible, but necessary. And such a group interest then can serve as the common ground on which to rationally discuss morality.
Which is why IMO morality is the art of stipulating how the individual should behave so that if everyone did so the individual and by necessary extension the group would have the best life.
That means, morality is potentially arbitrary, but potentially also not at all. And the latter serves us potentially best.

 

[Gigaz]

Khan was obviously immoral. But why would that matter today? His frame of thinking has become irrelevant anyway. In that sense theres a big difference between Genghis Khan and Hitler.

 

[Plotinus]

In the end, no one holds any responsibility has the world is a world of soulless reaction by any reliable accounts.

That's pretty contentious, wouldn't you say?

 

[Tahuti]

I agree with you that there is no objective morality. However, I think your conclusion is all wrong. Because such a conclusion is not that morality is not about what ought to be, but that it is about what ought to be relative to whatever normative stipulation, so morality is about what is supposed to be ought to be. And that then can be rationally debated on the ground of mutual interest. And now, it is my opinion, that in an ideal society every individual member of this society has the same interests. I think so, because in my opinion the ideal state of ones individual well-being requires a sort of harmony with its social surroundings. Saying: In the best case possible, a synthesis of individual and group interests is not only possible, but necessary. And such a group interest then can serve as the common ground on which to rationally discuss morality.
Which is why IMO morality is the art of stipulating how the individual should behave so that if everyone did so the individual and by necessary extension the group would have the best life.
That means, morality is potentially arbitrary, but potentially also not at all. And the latter serves us potentially best.

The problem is, that everyone has varying definitions of the "best life". For some people, it would mean torturing and raping other people, for fun. If morality is about eliminating what economists call deadweight loss (negative outcomes that benefit no one), like you seem to imply, morality wouldn't have very broad horizons indeed.

Furthermore, most normative morality, like utilitarianism, are essentially collective hedonisms. However, hedonism in general is highly problematic for a certain degree of utter randomness and awareness of suffering is necessary to define joy. It may sound a bit Nietzschean (I won't have trouble admitting a liking to him), but joy does not equal meaningfulness. And suffering and joy are measured relatively to each other, meaning it isn't really possible to have just one and remove the other; If you listen to the same song over and over again, it won't have the glance it used to have. Likewise, you will get accustomed to annoyances if you have to face it oft enough. Normative morality basically works like "we should have a time machine", without realizing it is unlikely to say the least.

That isn't to say morality is useless. But it revolves around values and not around consequences. And it should be noted there is a tragically absurdist thing to it: Great artists, scientists, philosophers and leaders and countless of good people who never went down in history due to bad luck tend to have much stronger values than society at large, which they seek to impose on society, though they will almost certainly fail within their lifetimes. However, this arguably what gives life a semblance of meaning, despite the universe itself - and everything contained within - lacks that. To get back to the time machine, it's probably a lot more fun to be the scientist inventing the time machine, than having a time machine.

 

[Masada]

If morality is about eliminating what economists call deadweight loss (negative outcomes that benefit no one), like you seem to imply, morality wouldn't have very broad horizons indeed.

That's not what deadweight loss is.

 

[Tahuti]

That's not what deadweight loss is.

Spoiler :

Right... that yellow part is of benefit to the god of deadweight losses

 

[Masada]

Right... that yellow part is of benefit to the god of deadweight losses

Heh, where does that graph support the view that deadweight loss "benefits no-one?" Monopolists, for one, certainly benefit from people paying more for goods. Consumers might also benefit if a price ceiling is set below equilibrium. The issue is that the outcome - on the whole - is less than optimal and that society - on the whole - loses a little bit as a result. But there are winners and very often clear ones.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

That's pretty contentious, wouldn't you say?

No I wouldn't. There are related questions of a contentious nature. Is the universe deterministic? How can it be that I think?
But there is no source of contention whatsoever* regarding the POV that what we think is determined by things entirely beyond what we think. Hence will is not a matter of choice but of circumstances not chosen.

*No source other than "But wouldn't it be fun to assume so?". And if that is source enough, then absolutely everything is pretty contentious, wouldn't you say?

The problem is, that everyone has varying definitions of the "best life". For some people, it would mean torturing and raping other people, for fun. If morality is about eliminating what economists call deadweight loss (negative outcomes that benefit no one), like you seem to imply, morality wouldn't have very broad horizons indeed.

See I am not interested in what a given guy thinks is a good life. I am stipulating that there is an ideal life which rests on the same interests for everyone (unless you have some sort of psychic dysfunction). I thinks so, because IMO humans do not only have common basic desires, but IMO one of this basic desires is to live in harmony with ones social surroundings. But I am repeating myself.

And now, it is my opinion, that in an ideal society every individual member of this society has the same interests. I think so, because in my opinion the ideal state of ones individual well-being requires a sort of harmony with its social surroundings. Saying: In the best case possible, a synthesis of individual and group interests is not only possible, but necessary.

I am also uncomfortable with the dead weight-loss comparison. For one perhaps in a given scenario it is possible to minimize dead weight while at the same time decreasing total gain, making the dead-weight focus counterproductive. I suppose economics don't account for that because in economic models you lack the complex interdependencies of life. Another trouble I have with this is the math of it. I tend to think of emotional well-being in all-or-nothing-categories rather than sums of tiny well-being-quantities. Well all-or-nothing surely isn't correct either, but I think more so than some happiness math or what have you.
So yeah, it is about optimizing something. But I am not sure, economic models are a good approach to the optimizing morality should IMO be about.

Furthermore, most normative morality, like utilitarianism, are essentially collective hedonisms.

Not sure about that. If I for instance find to have the happiest life I can get by attending to the weak, overall by helping those around me - does that make me a hedonist? If yes, than I am hedonistic in that sense. I am however not hedonistic in the sense that I narrow myself to self-centered ways to be happy or something like that.

However, hedonism in general is highly problematic for a certain degree of utter randomness and awareness of suffering is necessary to define joy. It may sound a bit Nietzschean (I won't have trouble admitting a liking to him), but joy does not equal meaningfulness. And suffering and joy are measured relatively to each other, meaning it isn't really possible to have just one and remove the other; If you listen to the same song over and over again, it won't have the glance it used to have. Likewise, you will get accustomed to annoyances if you have to face it oft enough. Normative morality basically works like "we should have a time machine", without realizing it is unlikely to say the least.

Yes those are all important points. And when I speak of good lives or ideal societies and some such, those are all things I consider as well. And yes, how I think morality has to be understood is probably the most uncomfortable way to understand morality. Which is why that is often not how morality is understood. Yet, it - and I am convinced of that - is the only non-arbitrary-way to understand morality and further on I am convinced that other ways to understand morality come in the end down to ideas of how society should be organized for the benefit of all as well, they just aren't that open about it. Why? Because that is the only way to justify morality to begin with I dare to say. Which brings us back to my understanding of morality being the only understanding.

That isn't to say morality is useless. But it revolves around values and not around consequences.

This dichotomy must be one of the biggest misunderstandings ever it seems. Values always are about consequences. They merely embody the stipulation that we will yield the best consequences when we stop looking at consequences and instead look at values. I am a utilitarian and recognize the use of values. Others do the same, but without realizing it and then claim to not be utilitarians. From where I stand, to not be an utilitarian merely means to want to stop to ask questions and nothing more. The basic idea however is always the same, weather realized or not.

And it should be noted there is a tragically absurdist thing to it: Great artists, scientists, philosophers and leaders and countless of good people who never went down in history due to bad luck tend to have much stronger values than society at large, which they seek to impose on society, though they will almost certainly fail within their lifetimes. However, this arguably what gives life a semblance of meaning, despite the universe itself - and everything contained within - lacks that. To get back to the time machine, it's probably a lot more fun to be the scientist inventing the time machine, than having a time machine.

I am not sure I understand? Certainly one can say without values no meaning. At least that is something I would sign right away. But why do I need to want to change the world or something to have values which yield meaning to me? Why can it for instance not just be a community I love? A family which needs me? I tend to think that meaning only springs from socially relevant values and that values embodied by actual people I feel close to yield the best meaning of them all.

 

[Flying Pig]

Heh, where does that graph support the view that deadweight loss "benefits no-one?" Monopolists, for one, certainly benefit from people paying more for goods. Consumers might also benefit if a price ceiling is set below equilibrium. The issue is that the outcome - on the whole - is less than optimal and that society - on the whole - loses a little bit as a result. But there are winners and very often clear ones.

The definition of a deadweight loss is a lost opportunity to make everyone better off. Monopolists don't benefit because in most cases people choose not to buy their goods, that's why we have a deadweight loss. Monopolists making essential goods would do so, but then the very existance of monopolies is hugely damaging to the economic health of society as a whole.

 

[Terxpahseyton]

Monopolists don't benefit because in most cases people choose not to buy their goods, that's why we have a deadweight loss.

What a weird statement. Why would the monopolist not benefit? Because of too high prices? Well, then it would lower it, no? From what I have in the back of my head, the principal assumption is that the monopolist will benefit form having a monopoly and other than a stupid monopolist there is no reason he won't. Or what would that be please?
The actual reasoning is that the total amount of money an economic sector would make in an environment of competition is bigger than the total amount a monopolist would make, but the monopolist still makes more money than he would with competition.
In other words, less economic activity due to the monopolist, but a happy monopolist. That so because the monopolist makes his profit by having less customers pay more. The assumption then is that the bigger number of customers we have in an environment of competition and who pay less would in sum pay more than those who individually pay more in an environment of monopoly but then allegedly in sum would pay less due to being fewer. Hence the more but less paying customers trigger more economic activity for the producers.
Yes, this was the first time ever I feel like I could put my economic education to some sort of use.
Though I am not sure why such an assumption can be made other than because it is possible to make a kind of symmetric graph out of it. That is the devil with economists. They assume whatever the hell they want but then force you to do all that math demonstrating whatever the hell they felt like demonstrating. In sociology and political science they also assume what the devil they want but at least you do not have to calculate it!

 

[Flying Pig]

Sorry, I wasn't clear - a monopolist who earns x amount (being markup of goods * number of sales) will probably earn about the same amount if the economy changes to include a (almost certainly further on top of a pre-existing) deadweight loss, since the markup will increase but the number of sales decrease to yield pretty much the same result, assuming that people can afford not to buy what he sells.