Capto Iugulum Background Thread

[EQandcivfanatic]

The situation is deliberately unclear.

 

[Immaculate]

I guess another thing I don’t understand is that previously President Urbina counted on the police and his supporters to force a victory in the last elections. And popular support was decidedly against him; indeed there were riots and protests to demand free elections to oust him. Now (four years later), he has popular support, overwhelmingly so, and the military is against him? It seems like a considerable role reversal. I am curious as to how that happened.

Is that also purposefully vague?

 

[Luckymoose]

Urbina has always had Brazilian popular support.

EQ: What is your opinion on super buildings? I've always wanted to push Moralism down the road of ridiculously big, imposing buildings.

 

[Immaculate]

From 1937:

The attempt to intimidate the protests and restore order has fueled the dissent and organization against Urbina's regime, as people have begun to call for new, free elections to demonstration the true will of Nicaragua.

From 1939

ECONOMIC LOSS SPURS BACKLASH IN NICARAGUA. Managua, Nicaragua. Despite the military victory over Costa Rica, the fortunes of Nicaragua’s people overall do not seem to have improved. The economy continues to worsen and unemployment has begun to climb once more, threatening a rise of a new wave of instability. Several major protests have been held this year, claiming corruption and failure amid the government of President Urbina, which has done nothing to lessen the plight of the poor. The protests eventually spun out of control, turning into rioting and dissent, causing severe property damage and further difficulties for the people. The military has declared martial law throughout the larger towns and Managua, threatening the ultimate penalty for further civil disobedience. As elections are looming next year, so far the military has maintained control of the press and infrastructure, and many doubt that the 1940 elections will be truly free ones under current conditions. Some suspect though that the military will at last give President Urbina the boot, for his current failure to preserve order and control in Nicaragua.

So obviously, yes, he originally had the support of the people but he began to lose it in 1937 and had lost it in 1939.

So yeah, thats the source of my confusion. Beloved, then hated. Then loved again? First with the military then against... its all very confusing for me.

 

[EQandcivfanatic]

@luckymoose: LoE built a fabulously huge building with a giant statue on top to house the prole legislature. Admittedly, it may be under bombardment at the moment, but I've never been opposed to ridiculously large buildings.

 

[Luckymoose]

@luckymoose: LoE built a fabulously huge building with a giant statue on top to house the prole legislature. Admittedly, it may be under bombardment at the moment, but I've never been opposed to ridiculously large buildings.

Good, because I'm thinking about building a massive new governmental complex for congress that has giant weapon wielding statues of the past emperors around it. I WANT PILLARS THICK AS BATTLESHIPS!

 

[J.K. Stockholme]

Map of countries the Confederation has radically reduced trade restrictions (a free trade agreement), purple is the Confederation, blue is free trade:

 

[Jehoshua]

On Nicaragua

From the update it seems to me that Urbina basically has played off himself against the military in order to racquet up popular support amongst the people, being very savvy politically by going out amongst the people and giving the appearance of being personally concerned at the plight of the people. This, combined perhaps with a natural swing towards a desire for stability due to the outbreak of the latest general conflict likely is what saw him over the line when taken with his natural constituency and support base.

Catalan Query

There are a number of things though that confuse me in Catalonia. Namely, where did the sudden general outpouring of septembrist sentimentality come from? Catalonia has never been part of the confederation or the general "Frankish" milieu of states, and so there was it seems no pre-existing base for it (ergo, it would have to have been built painstakingly from nothing). Now I understand that the country was run by the social proletarists, who proceeded to fail dramatically in actually supporting the worker thus completely undermining their legitimacy, but one would suspect the natural response to this would be a swing not towards yet another social prole/liberal project, but towards the right. Most definitely it is quite bizarre that this mass septembrist sentiment has emerged seemingly overnight in the scale of politics to the point that the septembrist took government outright (as compared to say a coalition of proles and septembrists taking power)

On the latest DP binge

With the latest defensive pact being established between Vinland and the Confederation, the latest diplomatic paper signing spree in our capto world has made me wonder about whether this is all a reactionary response to the war made out of fear and undertaken without a deeper consideration of the potential of chain-gang conflict this could incite (if even one party is attacked by any other power) in order to hedge against the possibility in the disruption in the balance of power that has been established since the original Great War (the Russia, Britain, Germany triad).

Ergo, I wonder to what degree is this latest diplomatic détente being bandied about throughout western Europe and into the Americas (particularly via the confederacy) is a response to public and political fear produced reaction. After all the psychic trauma to Europe produced by the invasion, which has torn the stability of the European order to pieces is not insignificant, and as we can see from the national issues notes, the question of the war in states that have actually no direct involvement in it is a major one.

 

[Grandkhan]

I think the Confederates are worried that the Russians aren't going to stop at the German border. I assume the intent is deterrence.

How well-founded that fear is is another question entirely, but eh.

 

[Jehoshua]

That is probably the intent, my question though is more to what degree has that public mood informed the reaction, most particularly in other countries that don't face such an immediate theoretical threat. With regards to these nations there is a risk that through defensive pacts they could be dragged in to a war that does not technically involve it, if the government was rationally considering its options (rather than responding at the behest of general fear) with the intention of avoiding embroilment in conflict, one consideration could be to refrain from such pacts and precisely to avoid war in the instance that Russia say attacks the confederation (which would embroil say Sardinia or Vinland, where before they had no real likelihood of being involved).

With regards to the domestic Confederation scene however, we do know that there is a faction that is pushing towards supporting the allies. This may suggest that the governing faction of the Septembrist Coalition is hedging its domestic political bets by developing a network of support in the event of war so as to show the electorate that the governing faction running on the doctrine of neutrality is not sitting idly on its hands or ignoring the potential threat of Russia.

 

[Luckymoose]

Sardinia has a very real problem of being involved. If Russians invade the Confederation, the Italians will hit Sardinia as it is part of the Grenoble Pact anyway. It seems clear to me that all the pacts are there because otherwise the nations would be divided. It is deterrence, if nothing else, and the threat of a massive alliance is one hell of a deterrence to invasion or attack.

 

[Jehoshua]

It is a deterrence, but not so much in the absence of great power support.

That does bring the interesting observation though that of the four great powers, only one in the immediate term is actually doing well out of all this, and that is Japan, which is now richer than Britain in terms of income and looks set to surpass Russia over the next year or two as the economic disruption continues and as the Philippines are re-incorporated into the Empire. Russia of the other three has the best chance of recovery, seeing as it has yet to have large swathes of territory occupied, and is not dependant on a colonial network like Britain (which incidentally has suffered the fireworks war as well). That said Russia is still clearly losing a lot immediately from the conflict (great power war is expensive) which suggests that the deterrence would be effective in the short to medium term with regards to them equally as with Britain, as war fatigue (economic and in terms of casualties, occupation costs and domestic political concerns) makes attack unlikely short of the confederation and its associates actually picking sides.

That said, the power discrepancy between the great power blocs (the ones that are left or that emerge after the war) and the western European states as such, inevitably I think is conductive to the western European sphere aligning with a "great and powerful friend" seeing as the power differential is likely to increasingly make an independent line unsustainable as an effective defensive proposition.

There is of course the possibility of a member of the bloc becoming a great power [most likely Brazil, although Vinland, Argentina and the Confederation itself are possibilities albeit from a lower base], depending on numerous factors such as how long the war goes for, If the emerging great power can sustain mass economic growth, and if it can establish a credible military force to compete with the existing great powers. That said, a member of the milieu becoming a great power and turning the pre-existing defensive structure into a full blown bloc would not really change the consideration, since it would achieve the same ends as if another great power became the "Great and powerful friend" of western Europe

 

[Luckymoose]

A united South America is far more of a "great power" than Britain or Germany ever could be.

 

[Jehoshua]

Its not really united though (its a collection of states, many of which have historical gripes and tensions with each other) and although they might be prepared to fight against a common adversary should one party be attacked, in terms of actually representing an "active" great power collectively imposing a unitary agenda and policy.. not so much.

That's not to say that there isn't potential for it to become a bloc of substantial influence and power, but I don't think you can reasonably say South America is now one big happy family perfectly in lockstep behind each other. You may have the peace and the defence part down, those things are clearly in everyone's interest and so they were fairly easily achieved, but beyond that you're still divided.

 

[TheLastJacobite]

And who's to say that, if the worst happens and you all get dragged into the War in Europe, that all the South American nations will happily send troops to die in a nation that they are aligned with Because Brazil Said To? Who's to say one of them wouldn't see that kind of scenario as the perfect time to break free of Brazil's sway or finally take care of that decades/centuries long grudge with their neighbor?

 

[Luckymoose]

And who's to say that, if the worst happens and you all get dragged into the War in Europe, that all the South American nations will happily send troops to die in a nation that they are aligned with Because Brazil Said To? Who's to say one of them wouldn't see that kind of scenario as the perfect time to break free of Brazil's sway or finally take care of that decades/centuries long grudge with their neighbor?

Because Brazil didn't force anyone to sign anything? Argentina is already technically allied to Britain, and if they go to Europe that is because they agreed to do so long before any other agreement came about. You're all misunderstanding Brazil's role in this. It is a common misunderstanding to think Brazil is bullying people into agreements or treaties, when it is almost always other parties offering treaties to Brazil. In this case, Brazil was approached by Argentina and the Confederation jointly. Detente between South American states didn't go anywhere, it was just sidetracked by a weird expansionist goal Argentina had under British support that was quickly, and politely, smashed down by reason.

I never understood the conflict Argentina brought up with Brazil over the past decade. It isn't like there was a reason for it. I blame it more on ignorance and stupidity than anything else. Why would Argentina facilitate a war with Brazil when their entire economy depends on South America not being a warzone? The battlecry for dright was that Brazil had forced Moralism on Uruguay. Newsflash, Uruguay was Moralist before Brazil was. URUGUAY FORCED ITSELF ON ME. IT TOUCHED ME. And Brazil sure as hell ain't the one building maginot lines and funding electoral fraud in Paraguay and Uruguay up in here, yo.

The point is. There is no historical rivalry. Argentina and Brazil have not had a reason to quarrel, besides this short lived Uruguayan Crisis, since the 1830's. War serves absolutely no purpose as neither party can gain anything from a war in South America except for dead bodies and burned cities. Peru and Brazil had a rivalry though, yeah. But that has mostly been calmed down by a detente between the two nations in regards to stopping a war over Uruguay.

If you want to blame anyone for making Moralism look evil. Blame Jehoshua. The Pope is the worst mascot in the world for a pro-democracy, pro-liberation welfare state.

 

[Azale]

And who's to say that, if the worst happens and you all get dragged into the War in Europe, that all the South American nations will happily send troops to die in a nation that they are aligned with Because Brazil Said To? Who's to say one of them wouldn't see that kind of scenario as the perfect time to break free of Brazil's sway or finally take care of that decades/centuries long grudge with their neighbor?

This is a strange understanding of South American politics, but one I'm sure is super popular in the Moscow war room

The only nation with a long history of ambivalence or worse towards Brazil is Peru, iirc.

 

[spryllino]

I think Jehoshua on several levels doesn't understand what's going on here. Partly because he has no idea what's going on behind the scenes and who's pulling what strings (nor is there any reason why he would); and partly because he insists on using analysing everything in terms of sometimes almost meaningless great power politics and in terms of EP points, to the expense of the importance of powers that have less influence on paper, but might actually have more leverage in actual fact for one reason or another.

 

[Jehoshua]

If you want to blame anyone for making Moralism look evil. Blame Jehoshua. The Pope is the worst mascot in the world for a pro-democracy, pro-liberation welfare state.

Mostly because his current holiness isn't a moralist and is probably only vaguely sympathetic too it on the basis that it is actually religious. One has to remember that Paul VI, who was much more affable to you Luckymoose, was "moderate" (before the "religious" ideology was put in, since left-right politics doesn't work so well for religious leaders) and that Pius X if one trawls back for his background is more in the leonine model, and has in addition to that philosophical backing, character reasons for being less than happy with liberal democracy (being personally affected by Italian nationalism spawned by liberalism and not in a good way, whereas Paul Vi was from the Franco-Burgundian Confederation where liberalism manifested in a much less traumatic way). I just play according to character rather than acting despite the set up as if the Pope is a blank canvas for me to fashion as I would .

That said democracy isn't condemned by the current pope, he sees it as a legitimate method of choosing a government. He just doesn't treat it as a moral value. Thinking about it, the events in Uruguay and now Paraguay have probably made him even more suspicious of the advocates of "democracy" as these events probably lead him to conclude that the process is inherently flawed and prone to producing social corruption, and inclined to the view that the advocacy of democracy is a tool of factions that are of questionable intent towards the Church.

He opposes welfare statism on a religious foundation (2 Thessalonian 3:10) although he supports reforming workplace laws to establish a family wage for working husbands to support themselves and their families, and a minimum wage that allows single workers to provide for their basic needs, and giving workers a stake in the companies they work for. He also supports healthcare particularly if its in co-operation with the Church (like in Uruguay), but opposes the pension (seeing care for the elderly as part of filial piety for peoples kids, and generally supporting the idea that people should be financially prudent instead of relying on handouts of other peoples money by the state). He also likely sees state attempts at welfare as usurping the role of personal charity, and thus making charity "soulless" without a personal dimension (seeing as charity to the Church is a personal moral duty). He obviously does not think the needy should be left to their own devices as such, but thinks that its the job of the community of Christians, as a community on an interpersonal level (be it at the parish level, simply two neighbours helping each other, or through Church run charity) to look after those people until they can get back on their feet through their own effort. He wants society to be rooted in relationships between people, in the virtue of religion and in community solidarity.

He flatly opposes liberty in the liberal sense of personal autonomy, since he sees people as being bound to community as part of ones responsibility to neighbour, to the laws of God and so forth. People have moral obligations to each other and too God. He believes that one should be at liberty to pursue that which is good, but that evil and error have no inherent rights. Paul VI if we refer to him in this, was almost certainly more charitably inclined in his perception of liberalism lets say, whereas Pius X, influenced particularly in his views by latter day permutations such as Occitanian Humanism, Communism and Anarchism, and numerous revelations of anti-clericalism on the part of liberals and proles has taken a much firmer anti-liberal line than his predecessor.

-

With regards to rivalries in South America, I was thinking more between Venezuela and Colombia, Colombia and Brazil to a lesser degree, and between Peru and Brazil. I recognise that Argentina has no historical rivalry with Brazil (indeed you have been historical friends) although I do think there is possibility for an entrenched rivalry to develop if things go the wrong way, presumably due to the policies that Argentina has followed which has created problems in your relationship with them.

I think Jehoshua on several levels doesn't understand what's going on here. Partly because he has no idea what's going on behind the scenes and who's pulling what strings (nor is there any reason why he would); and partly because he insists on using analysing everything in terms of sometimes almost meaningless great power politics and in terms of EP points, to the expense of the importance of powers that have less influence on paper, but might actually have more leverage in actual fact for one reason or another.

I'm not talking about "whats going on here", which is to say the nitty gritty detail of the here and now, and of current affairs (which I'm almost always not privy too). But rather I am ruminating on how the international order on a macro-scale might develop, if we consider things contextually (the RP'ish background) after the war (and also on how the domestic sphere might have influenced the foreign affairs sphere, particularly considering NPCs and the social context of nations like the confederation). I'm perfectly aware of the fact (players being players) that there are things going on behind the scenes and that influence does not necessarily equate to raw power and versa I agree that even a power that has little hard power can be massively influential (Playing the Holy See here you know...). However with regards to the actual way the macro-order (as compared to the nitty gritty "what is happening") is developed, I think actual hard power is important, and that its the large and powerful states that form the locus around which the broader paradigm is formed (by association with and in response too them). For example the entire context of the great war is centred on the rivalry between Britain/Germany and Russia at its centre. Other powers like Scandinavia, might be very important players here in this order altering event yes, they might have a crucial role in the secret chit-chat that goes on between players, but they are not the central architects of the world order as a paradigmatic "thing". This is pretty clear I would think from the entire history of Capto Iugulum, where its always been the major players (in real power terms) that have been at the centre of shaping the order be it Holy Spain in the past or Russia in the present. lower tier powers, and players who run them almost certainly are the grease that keeps the wheels of the machine churning, but the order itself is not oriented around them.

 

[ork75]

This is a strange understanding of South American politics, but one I'm sure is super popular in the Moscow war room

The only nation with a long history of ambivalence or worse towards Brazil is Peru, iirc.

Argentina, at least while I've been Peru, has had a much more aggressive opposition to Brazil. SK might have been different though, and I'm not sure how far back Dright's policy would have stretched.