ParkCungHee
Deity
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If we're going to follow this logic through, why did they offer Grant (and McClellan!) a superior position to Lee?
Grant or Lee?
- Thread starter TopGearFanatic
- Start date
The only part of this that's true is that Grant was, indeed, determined and unwilling to retreat. He outgeneraled Lee several times during the campaign in individual actions, especially by his turning movements; Lee (and sometimes his subordinates, although those were increasingly unreliable as the campaign went on due to attrition) usually managed to stave off disaster by improvisation. For example: in the march to the North Anna River, Grant successfully beat Lee across and managed to establish a solid bridgehead before the rebels could respond. However, with his plan of holding the river line in a shambles, Lee held a council of war at which he and his generals improvised a fresh defensive line that withstood Federal probes. Where Lee really shone compared to Grant was tactical improvisation, a strength he developed of necessity in 1864 (with most of his top lieutenants dead or out of action, and with an attenuated command that permitted the kind of tight control he needed to have).
Grant's objective in the campaign was clear: hold the Army of Northern Virginia down and batter it to pieces by any means possible. This he (mostly) successfully accomplished by mauling it in several bloody engagements and finally locking it up inside the Petersburg fortifications; only Early's brief foray marred the accomplishment. But Lee had an objective in the campaign as well, and it was not simply "not to lose": he had to defeat the Federals in some way and keep the Army of the Potomac north of the Rappahannock, whether by offensive action or successful defensive action. In this, Lee failed horribly.
Compare the Overland Campaign to the Seven Days' Battles, a campaign which Lee is usually said to have won by defeating McClellan and the Army of the Potomac. In almost every single engagement in the Seven Days' campaign, the rebels suffered horrible losses, were poorly coordinated, and the only reason they advanced at all was because McClellan was intent on retreating anyway. How is that different from the Federal performance in the Overland Campaign? (Oh, I know how: the Federals took fewer losses in 1862 than did the Confederates in 1864.) Lee gets his army battered but successfully maneuvers his enemy away: he's lauded as a war hero. Grant gets his army battered but gives his enemy a battering of his own and successfully maneuvers him into a corner: he's vilified as an uncaring butcher who only won because he had more bodies to throw into the meat grinder. The hell?
LightSpectra
me autem minui
Very well, though considering neither of them had very high ranks during the Mexican War, that's a difficult question to give any sort of substantial answer to. Interestingly enough, I'd say that the best American commander in the Mexican War that went on to become a significant Civil War commander was George Pickett, who was a downright badass flag runner. But that's neither here nor there.
Because of circumstances in which Lee happened to be at the right place at the right time. This has been talked about extensively in other threads about the American Civil War on CFF, so I'm not going to go very in-depth with this.
I'm saying your position was crafted by the Lost Causers, regardless if you are one yourself. The notion that Lee was a brilliant commander that could've won the Civil War if he weren't totally outgunned is a position invented for political reasons by postbellum southern Democrats.
Dachs sufficiently covered this.
Assigning blame over failure to occupy Culp's Hill on July 1 to Ewell is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, you have to account for the fact that Ewell's on-hand intelligence suggested that they would've been dangerously outflanked by the Union XII Corps; something that though alt-history scenarios where Jackson survived and aggressively assaulted the hill often don't account for. Secondly, you would have to demonstrate that Confederate control of Culp's Hill would've completely altered the dynamic of their offensives for the next two days, which perhaps seems obvious, but is doubted by several military historians. I don't have a citation on hand at the moment, but I distinctly remember a passage from McPherson which very conclusively suggested that Culp's Hill wasn't a tenable or advantageous position, and the Confederates just wasted their manpower trying to grab it on July 2.
The July 3 offensive had so little chance of succeeding that I can only praise Longstreet for consciously hesitating to order so many men to their deaths.
I certainly don't think Lee failed where all of his subordinates succeeded. But the critical point here is that Lee came up with a disastrous plan that ended disastrously, thus making my job in calling Lee's performance disastrous to be rather easy.
I don't really want to get bogged down in a debate about Gettysburg, since that wasn't the critical juncture in Lee's career. The July 3 attack might very well have been the worst decision he ever made, but that wasn't the single most consequential decision he made. That being said, with the intelligence and resources in Lee's hands during the Battle of Gettysburg, he should've known the assault was a terrible idea. He took the blame for it, rightly so because it was a bad plan; and the only vindication he's received is by Lost Causers dumping all of the failure onto Longstreet because Longstreet became a Republican after the war was over.
In doing so, Lee took a great deal of casualties. McClellan only turned around because he himself was an abysmal commander; so Lee's only success there was psychological, and since he didn't plan that, I attribute that to incalculably insane good luck.
Calling Antietam a draw makes me lol pretty hard.
Chancellorsville was the same thing as the Seven Days Battles: a statistical and logistic defeat that only ended up being a pyrrhic victory in hindsight because the opposing commander wasn't competent enough to do a proper follow-up. Lee could make the Union commanders turn around, but he could never really defeat them, even though it was well within his power to do so.
How is this an argument in favor of your side? Emphasizing all of the difficulties the Union faced, the only thing you've accomplished is demonstrate Grant's skill.
Well that seems a bit overdone to me. Not that I'm trying to praise Lee at Grant's expense; but you neglect to mention that Grant's losses in the Overland campaign exceed Lee's losses in the 1862 Seven Day's and 1864 Overland campaigns combined. I don't know who 'outgeneraled' who, but it was getting pretty desparate for Lee, so what part was untrue ?
LightSpectra
me autem minui
Measuring a general's skill by how many casualties he sustains is problematic, considering the skill, morale, supplies, and (most importantly) tactical positioning were vastly different for both sides. Given that it's impossibly to perfectly reverse the two generals' resources, we have to judge this -- perhaps insufficiently so, there's not much objectivity in the matter to begin with -- on what is in front of us. We know that the Confederate army was not hopelessly outmatched by its Union counter-part, and we know that at times, Lee was able to use his advantages in order to score a victory against Grant. But most of the time, the reverse was true; and in hindsight, we can observe more errors in judgment on behalf of Lee. So by this standard (the only one we really have), we have to say that Grant was the superior commander.
Well, its true that Grant and the union forces were coping with a preview of what the modern age would bring. Most of Lee's victories were defensive. I'm not sure what else he could have done in the end game, other than try and stalemate the Feds defending Petersburg and Richmond. He didn't want to wage a guerilla campaign; seems all he really cared about was Virginia in the first place.
He had a few opportunities for turning movements earlier in the campaign on the western flank of Grant's army, and attempted to seize them, to little effect. (At one juncture, a unit of USCT successfully repelled a combined arms attack on the Federal supply lines long enough for a Union flanking maneuver further south to precipitate a rebel withdrawal.) After Spotsylvania, the Confederacy more or less surrendered the initiative to the Federals, practically guaranteeing operational defeat.
Hornblower
Cry Havoc!
Years ago I recall that there was a trilogy of Civil War telemovies made with such actors as Martin Sheen, Jeff Bridges and the like in key roles. They all had unbelievable beards and from what I remember the production values were quite good. Lots of men, horses and smoke in large scale cinematic battles. What was the name of all three movies? I never actually saw all of them and would love to finally see them all in one hit. ???
Only two movies were made, and of those, only one - Gettysburg, based on the Michael Shaara book The Killer Angels - was any good. Gods and Generals, a much more recent production based on Jeff Shaara's book of the same name, suffers from many problems related to the Lost Cause, foremost of which is a near-deification of Stonewall Jackson.
Jeff Shaara wrote another book about the war in the East after the Battle of Gettysburg titled The Last Full Measure, but no movie's been made about it yet.
Jeff Shaara wrote another book about the war in the East after the Battle of Gettysburg titled The Last Full Measure, but no movie's been made about it yet.
Communisto
Condottiere
Gods and Generals is worth watching just for the hilarious scene where the black cook talks about how awesome the Confederacy is. In seriousness though, the visuals and battles are quite cool but as Dachs said the glorification of it all is glaring and the dialogue is just cringingly terrible.
LightSpectra
me autem minui
The best part of that scene is when Jackson promises him to give him freedom some day. Because it's not as if Jackson was a slavery enthusiast on account of believing black people to be cursed by God, mirite?
Communisto
Condottiere
Or the Confederate Irish at Fredericksburg, "Have they learned nothing at the hands of the British!?"
gold.
gold.
Still, overall I find it difficult to see how the Overland Campaign can be summed up as a Union victory. They had the offensive power, but sustained very heavy losses in the failure to crush Lee's army. Grant disengaged and tried a different approach against Petersburg which they failed to take initially; and given Lee's dwindling options he had to defend. It didn't stop him from mounting a diversionary offensive against Washington, and it took another ten months to break the back of Lee's army, during which mounting Federal losses and the whims of politics might have presented the last (admittedly remote) opportunity to negotiate a cease fire.
The point is that Lee's army sustained very heavy, irreplaceable losses, and was placed in a position from which it could not escape. The Federal army sustained very heavy, replaceable losses, and was placed in a position that permitted it to place immense pressure on the rebel government and military, constraining its options. Early's foray was little more than a diversion, and as it turned out, it provided the Federal armies with a golden opportunity to crush the separated corps, which Sheridan seized with both hands at Cedar Creek. (One of the few instances in military history when one can definitively say that one man won a battle. ****ing epic.) And that contributed materially to Lincoln's reelection.
What happens if the Overland Campaign isn't conducted? If the Federals pulled back after any of the bloodlettings, the propaganda defeat would be even worse than the one that happened anyway.
colonialfan
Warlord
Both Lee and Grant were brilliant commanders. Both had their unique challenges, both had great strengths and shortcomings as commanding generals. I'm not subscribing to the belief that if things were not stacked so high against Lee that he would of crushed the Union. As with all wars there are missed oportunities and mistakes made, and Lee did make some mistakes, as did Grant. However, I think you would have to agree that taken as a whole the circumstances and obsticles facing Lee were greater than those that Grant had to face. Given thoses circumstances Lee did a remarkable job.
I grant that Ewell's on-hand intelligence was sketchy, but it was his cautious nature that really hampered him in reference to taking Culp's Hill on July 1st. The fact that he made no attempt despite several of his divisional commanders wanting to carry out an attack speaks volumes. In regards to the importance of Culp's Hill, you fail to mention that it commanded the land around the Baltimore turnpike. This turnpike was the major thoroughfare for the Union's line of supply and coordination. If the Union lost Culp's Hill, their position would of been untenable. James McPherson himself stated this in a recent interview, (albeit in a history channel program, which are invariably somewhat below par). Thus trying to gain Culp's Hill was not a waste for the Confederates, and after Meade weakened his position there by shifting troop from Culp's Hill to bolster Sickles debacle, a tangible opportunity presented itself to take the hill.
But did it stand so little a chance of succeeding? Bad luck and miscommunitcation certainly played their parts in its failure. If the artillery barrage had been more successful, if Longstreet, Ewell and Stuart had managed to coordinate their attacks more effectively and hit the Union on three sides, then perhaps the result might of been more favorable for the Confederates. I'm not absolving Lee, the plan was risky, but then again all plans have an element of risk. What unfolded was not the plan Lee had envisioned.
See above comment.
I'm not a Longstreet basher. In fact I think he gets a bad rap that is not justified. Longstreet's service throughout the war is admirable, and I find him a highly competent general, his defensive tactics were arguably ahead of their time. The two events that seal his negative reputation after the war is to first, join the Repulican Party, and second, criticise Lee, after Lee has died and cannot offer any rebutal. Given the political and social climate in the South during reconstruction they were both two big lapses of judgment. But I digress. At the time Lee
Was it not good luck that Grant was reinforced in the nick of time at Shiloh, or that the gun boats turned up just as his back was against the wall? Without that luck he would never of been able to go on the offensive the next day. The same is attributable to Lee and some of his results, he was lucky too, A.P. Hill turning up at Antietam springs to mind. Luck is all part of the battle. To dismiss Lee's achievements as simply being lucky or that he faced an abysmal commander is somewhat misguided and shows a distinct lack of objectivity. Yes Lee may of taken heavy casualties during the Peninsula campaign but he checked, McClellan's advance and forced the army of the Potomac, a much larger and better equiped force to withdraw.
I'm glad I could bring some joy into your life. Granted, Antietam can be seen as a tactical victory for the Union in the sense that it prevented the ANV from moving further north, and Lincoln was very shrewd to use it as the basis for a moral victory. But when the dust settled the end result at Antietam was pretty much a stalemate, Lee had fought McClennan's army to a standstill.
So is this a case of Lee being a bad general or you chalking another Confederate victory up to either fortutious luck or another poor Union commander. Lee could certainly make the Union commanders turn around, but I disagree that he had the power to crush them. To do that would of required a pursuit of the opposing army. The Confederacy where possible wanted to fight a defensive campaign. They essentially lacked the resources to fight offensively take the war to the north, as is evidenced by Lee's two northern campaigns.
The point I demonstate is that I am willing to make fair and balanced observations on both generals, and acknowledge Lee and Grant's skills as commanders giving both due credit and criticism. However, your comments appear to indicate that you believe Lee had very little skill as a commander and that any success he had was either down to sheer luck or facing an incompetent commander.
We could continue this debate indefinately, arguing points and counterpoints, but I fear all we will accomplish is to bore other viewers with our dialogue. While I respect your opinions and certainly appreciate the time you have invested in them I think the most sensible course of action to take would be to suggest that we should agree to disagree. You think Grant is the better commander, whereas I think it is Lee. It is a subject I think that will be studied and debated for many years to come with perhaps no definative answer.
ParkCungHee
Deity
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You know, being "fair and balanced" does not rule out the possibility that one commander has very little skill.
aelf
Ashen One
When people say "fair and balanced" here these days, I immediately think BS anyway. Even if a position can't really be defended on the basis of being correct, it's at least fair and balanced!
Serutan
Eatibus Anythingibus
Not really. What Grant actually wanted to do was get on Lee's lines of supply/
communication and force Lee to attack under unfavorable circumstances. He
came within an ace of this at both Spotsylvania and Petersburg. At the former,
Lee was aided by a forest fire (See Catton, Grant Takes Command for details),
and at Petersburg, incompetence in the Army of the Potomac's command. He
eventually accomplished this by extending the Petersburg lines far enough west,
causing Lee's March 25, 1865 attack on Fort Stedman. He also was determined to
get to the James River, so although he kept attempting to get behind Lee, he was
force to batter his way to the James.
He certainly did succeed in mauling Lee's army. I have to disagree with your
assertion that 'Lee failed horribly' at his objective of 'not to lose'. In the summer
of 1864, this was working quite nicely, and Lincoln himself thought his re-election
chances were close to nil. That the situation turned was not due to any defeat
Lee suffered, but Sherman's capture of Atlanta assisted by Sheridan's victories in
the Shenendoah Valley.
Yup, that sums that part up quite nicely.
Re Shiloh : Yes, Grant did get surprised. BUT, he had stabilized the situation before
the reinforcements arrived. They made the counterattack possible.
And if Lew Wallace had managed to show up mid afternoon, he would likely have been
able to make a devastating flank attack on the Confederates.
Re Overland Campaign casualties:
I think it's important to keep in mind that most historians are of the opinion that
Grant and Lee suffered around the same percentage of casualties (due to sketchy
Confederate records, it's not possible to be definitive on this one way or the other).
Also, the Army of the Potomac lost thousands of men during this time due to expiration
of enlistments, and did not really have as much of a numbers advantage as most
people believe.
Re: Who They Faced:
One thing in which Lee and Grant were alike was that if an opponent made a mistake
in their front, immediate advantage would be taken of that mistake - Lee happily
taking gift victories from McClellan, Pope,and Hooker, and Grant taking gift
victories from Floyd/Pillow, Pemberton, and Bragg.
Re Sherman:
Sherman was not in the class of Lee or Grant (or Forrest, for that matter). He
was the most outspoken opponent of the plan which succeeded at Vicksburg,
because he couldn't see how it could succeed without a supply line.
He always preferred maneuver over trying to destroy an enemy army (he let
the garrison at Savannah escape, even though he could easily have trapped it,
something Grant would never have done).
And after all this blathering, I take Grant, because I think he was a
superior strategist. I would also take him over any other American general with the possible
exception of Bradley (Eisenhower's role IMO makes a comparison too difficult).
This was never a consistent goal of Grant's - more like a means to an end, the end being "beating the living crap out of Lee's army by any means necessary". Frontal attacks, flank attacks, or attempts to circle around Lee's defenses entirely - all were fair game.
Blaming Grant's subordinates on their failures to execute his flanking maneuvers is a little harsh. When that did happen - in the immediate aftermath of Spotsylvania, for instance - it was really more a problem of Grant's attempting to coax too much out of exhausted staffers and men, and creating plans that were simply too tight and relied on too many things going right to seize relatively fleeting opportunities. This was a natural problem for a commander unfamiliar with his army and with the weird command structure that the Army of the Potomac employed in '64; by the Petersburg campaign, Grant and Meade had ironed out the problems and the army worked nearly perfectly in the Appomattox campaign. Anyway, the Army of the Potomac staffing difficulties are pretty well understood. Gordon Rhea's Overland Campaign series spends a lot of time on them.
You misunderstand. I'm saying that Lee didn't have to just "not lose", he had to win, and win convincingly and in a way that would have grand-strategic impact. The danger of Lincoln losing the election wasn't as great as is sometimes claimed, and even if the Republicans had lost, even McClellan was aware that committing to a Copperhead position all-out was political suicide, and would almost certainly have been forced to continue prosecuting the war.Serutan said:
Uncle Anton
Lighthorseman
Grant had a much neater beard...
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