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History Questions Not Worth Their Own Thread VII

The follow-up question then becomes why it was continued for so long with such energy. Was it due to faulty intelligence (in other words, are we only able to make this judgement with the benefit of hindsight) or were there other benefits and vested interests involved?

1) Because the weapon was there, so it was used.

2) Because there were powerful, forceful characters in both the RAF and USAAF who were zealous for strategic bombing.

3) Because the training and production pipeline was so long. There were tens of thousands of bomber aircrew in training around the world. Reversing that inertia in 1944 and retraining all those men was virtually impossible before the end of the war.
 
The USAAF most certainly targeted strategic bottlenecks, especially fuel. Harris OTOH considered that a pointless diversion from the real job of levelling Germany's cities.

Perhaps the biggest side effect was the destruction of the Luftwaffe in the first 6 months of 1944
Harris considered anything that killed less than 10,000 civilians a waste of his time. I know the USAAF focused on I.G. Farben's facilities to cut off Germany's supply of buna, which helped cripple German supply columns; no tyres, no trucks delivering materiel. I had always assumed the synthetic fuel program, also an I. G. Farben initiative, just got caught up in that campaign.
 
Harris really was a barbarian.

And we made him a baron!

What a country.
 
The follow-up question then becomes why it was continued for so long with such energy. Was it due to faulty intelligence (in other words, are we only able to make this judgement with the benefit of hindsight) or were there other benefits and vested interests involved?

I know in the USAAF at least, institutional considerations were absolutely involved. The USAAF hated the idea of being operationally and organizationally dependent on the larger Army. They needed a way to win the war on their own.

I'm not convinced one kind of bombing could easily have translated into another. Yes, bombing of German cities almost certainly was motivated out of revenge rather than strategic goal, but the allies relied on that over tactical bombing for the same reason the Battle of Britain turned into the Blitz. It's a lower risk strategy that's more likely to achieve its objectives. If the allies had focused their bombing instead on strategic targets (particularly mobile targets like armored units during a battle) there likely would have been greater casualties as plains were shot down. Granted, in war, that makes sense, but I can see the reluctance to take that action.

That's why they might not have easily translated from one strategy to another even if the other would ultimately be more successful.
Until the advent of the V-Weapon program, there was no investment in the Blitz comparable to the strategic bombing campaign. The German through what bombers they had into the blitz.

The British and Americans didn't end up with a vast fleet of Strategic Bombers by accident that they just put to what purpose they could. They actively pursued this policy before and during the war at the expense of alternative programs perused by the Germans, Soviets and Japanese.

As for manpower, the campaign lost 160,000 airmen, a frankly astonishing number outstripping Americas losses in all service in the Pacific Theater.
 
To be fair, that huge fleet of strategic bombers proved really useful in the Pacific, where long-range bombers were almost a necessity. It doesn't excuse avoiding tactical development for twenty-plus years, of course.
 
The biggest effect of the strategic bombing campaign against Germany was to shift German fighter strength and antiaircraft units from the Russian front to protect Germany itself. The USSR was the stronger in the fight on the Eastern Front, but the Germans were better in the air. By shifting the air power which protected German ground forces, and attacked Soviet ground forces, Soviet air power could be much more effective in supporting Soviet ground forces.
 
The biggest effect of the strategic bombing campaign against Germany was to shift German fighter strength and antiaircraft units from the Russian front to protect Germany itself. The USSR was the stronger in the fight on the Eastern Front, but the Germans were better in the air. By shifting the air power which protected German ground forces, and attacked Soviet ground forces, Soviet air power could be much more effective in supporting Soviet ground forces.

It's a good point. By 1944 ~80% of all the 88's being produced were pointing to the skies in Germany. One of the reasons the Dresden raid was so devastating was that all the 88s defending the city were stripped to reinforce the front line against the advancing Soviets. The RAF only lost 6 bombers that night, and 2 of those were due to a mid air collision.
 
Does anyone know what justification was used to place Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz on trial at Nuremberg? The man wrote official complaints about the Einsatzgruppen to Hitler, surrendered Southern France and the Netherlands with very little effort, and even tried to charge and execute Waffen-SS officers with war crimes for killing P.O.W.s in his jurisdiction. I have heard that it was because he was in the OKW, but he was on the record as denouncing Nazi war crimes as early as October 1939.
 
not any kind of historical authority on my part but possibly due to the willingness you report ; he might be also ready to talk about people the West would find useful in the coming struggle against Communism .
 
I don't think a trial would have been useful if the goal was just to keep him quiet.

How much did they know about what he did do that was favorable towards him?
 
not any kind of historical authority on my part but possibly due to the willingness you report ; he might be also ready to talk about people the West would find useful in the coming struggle against Communism .
He was from East Prussia originally, but I think he had settled in West Germany. It seems doubtful; the West was going through quite an orgy of prosecutions at the time, and most of the 'useful' Nazis, such as the Gestapo, had already been tried.

I don't think a trial would have been useful if the goal was just to keep him quiet.
If his suicide was really a murder, that might make a lot of sense. I don't think it was though; I think Blaskowitz was convinced that Goering had been right about "victor's justice," and expected to face a show-trial and a swift execution. He had some familiarity with such trials, having been under suspicion of involvement in the July 20 Plot (he wasn't) and having personally threatened Seyss-Inquart with one to force the latter's co-operation. Two of his fellow twelve generals on trial at the same time were acquitted, includng Hugo Sperrle, who most definitely committed war crimes, so he was wrong about that.

How much did they know about what he did do that was favorable towards him?
They didn't have all the information on Blaskowitz that we now have. We know now that he was probably the single most respectable and honourable general the Germans had, and his military skills are finally gaining recognition. Nobody could execute a retreat like Blaskowitz, which is likely the most under-rated quality a general can have. But the prosecutors certainly had enough information to see that he didn't commit war crimes.

His official complaints about SS actions in Poland were on record. I don't know if they were aware of his attempts to execute SS war criminals on his own authority. Probably not, given the SS's obsession with destroying evidence of their war crimes towards the end. His objections over atrocities in Poland survived because they were in Hitler's personal files; he hated Blaskowitz, and only retained him out of a grudging respect for his abilites.

Blaskowitz's actions in Southern France weren't well-known, but he basically commandeered the Netherlands from Seyss-Inquart in March 1945, and the Dutch resistance had reported on his willingness to look the other way when they launched food raids. He was also on record as negotiating to allow food drops to the Netherlands during the latter stages of the war. Seyss-Inquart wanted him to destroy the dykes and flood the Netherlands, but Blaskowitz conveniently lost contact with his entire corps of engineers - despite sleeping across the street from them - just long enough for the Flensburg government to order his surrender.

He was on good terms with the Canadians who he surrendered the Netherlands to, but I don't think the Americans liked him, even though he gave them most of Southern France without a fight; Blaskowitz was likely the best general in the world at the time when it came to successful retreats, and he basically extricated the entire German Army in Southern France from under the noses of the Americans. He also evaded larger French, British, and American forces in his successful retreat from Alsace-Lorraine to the Netherlands (not exactly an easy trip, and he technically took his troops behind the American front to evade Patton at one point, earning the latter's undying respect), and he only got stuck there because the Canadians stopped trying to chase him when he entered their zone. According to his adjutant, he'd already worked out a way to flee to Denmark if necessary, though even his talent for retreats would have ended there, with his back to the sea.

Sour grapes from the Big Three Western Allies about all that could have played a part, though it seems a little too petty. Maybe if FDR were still in charge. It just seems like there was no reason to try him. Other generals who were acquitted may have at least had a case to answer for, and needed to defend their actions - Sperrle cleverly brought up Dresden at his trial for the Blitz, causing the British to try to shut his trial down - but Blaskowitz was never even suspected of war crimes. Not even of helping plan the invasion of Poland; he was the military governor of Bohemia and Moravia at the time, and didn't show up in Poland until after the initial invasion.
 
there is rarely a final depth which people can scheme to fall in pursuit of strategic aims . Once again no authority in any real sense and it's indeed the first time that ı actually read anything about the General , but just as an example take this Gehlen guy . His enemies all suddenly became the enemies of the CIA , in just one night .
 
Does anyone know what justification was used to place Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz on trial at Nuremberg? The man wrote official complaints about the Einsatzgruppen to Hitler, surrendered Southern France and the Netherlands with very little effort, and even tried to charge and execute Waffen-SS officers with war crimes for killing P.O.W.s in his jurisdiction. I have heard that it was because he was in the OKW, but he was on the record as denouncing Nazi war crimes as early as October 1939.
He seems to have been placed on trial as part of the collective attempt to criminalize the general staff and high command of the German Army. The rationale is presented here, and it's surprisingly prescient in it's understanding of Nazi politics:

http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/chap15_part07.asp

It's likely Blaskowitz would have been acquitted or faced a minor sentence, but his membership in the organization, if you follow through the prosecutors argument, at least calls for a trial.
 
Yeah, it's worth emphasizing that the Nuremberg trials did acquit Nazis or reduce their charges. They weren't entirely show trials.
 
"So, as these documents make clear, the plan to invade Norway and Denmark was not conceived in Nazi Party circles or forced on the military leaders. On the contrary it was conceived in the naval part of the General Staff and High Command Group, and Hitler was persuaded to take up the idea. Treaties and neutrality meant just as little to the General Staff and High Command Group as to the Nazis. Launching aggressive war against inoffensive neighboring states gave the generals and admirals no qualms."

considering am so a big "fan" of Churchill ... Also considering ı have already put it somewhere that the Norwegians were so intent observing the Allied Navies coming in for the invasion that failed to notice the Germans in time . But then one can hardly argue against at least some kind of Nuremberg .
 
Yeah, it's worth emphasizing that the Nuremberg trials did acquit Nazis or reduce their charges. They weren't entirely show trials.

One might say that doing so was necessary to giving the actual show-trials a veneer of legitimacy. People could always point to the (minor) figures given 'not guilty' or the figures given a reduced sentence - that is, one reduced from an arbitrary level draw up by the victors - to 'prove' that those who were hanged deserved it.
 
Possibly. That's certainly what happened in the Tokyo Trials, but the difference there was notable.
 
Possibly. That's certainly what happened in the Tokyo Trials, but the difference there was notable.
Could you elaborate or point to relevant articles? While I have a passing familiarity with the Nuremburg Trials, I know very little about the Tokyo Trials.
 
Hanging a few notorious (eg Tojo), ambiguously notorious (eg Matsui) and not-even-really-notorious (eg Hirota) war criminals, and shooting a few thousand IJA commanders and other personnel, but letting many, many, many war criminals off scot-free, like future prime minister Kishi, Unit 731 boss Ishii, and the entire Imperial Family.
 
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