History questions not worth their own thread

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On the latter: really? I mean really?

Everyone thought of him as an absoluter buffoon with little grasp of reality and an ego the size of his gut.

Yes, that's the impression I got out of him until I started studying his character. In fact, the more I read of him, the more I get the feeling that he himself created that image in order to cause his opponents in Germany to underestimate him. At least until late 1941, when he realized the war was lost (back when many were predicting that the Soviets stood no chance) and started egging Hitler on with outrageous boasts about the Luftwaffe.

Regarding his intelligence; he predicted both that Britain and Barbarossa would fail. And even before that, the fact that he came to become Hitler's successor -- before Himmler and Goebbels, who were genuinely energetic about National Socialism -- seems to indicate a political wittiness. This is supported by some of his remarks at Nuremberg.
 
And even once he was Hitler's named successor, he managed to deflect threats on that position through reasonable skilful political manoeuvres.
 
Yes, that's the impression I got out of him until I started studying his character. In fact, the more I read of him, the more I get the feeling that he himself created that image in order to cause his opponents in Germany to underestimate him. At least until late 1941, when he realized the war was lost (back when many were predicting that the Soviets stood no chance) and started egging Hitler on with outrageous boasts about the Luftwaffe.

Regarding his intelligence; he predicted both that Britain and Barbarossa would fail. And even before that, the fact that he came to become Hitler's successor -- before Himmler and Goebbels, who were genuinely energetic about National Socialism -- seems to indicate a political wittiness. This is supported by some of his remarks at Nuremberg.

Goering was coherent and reasonably smart until the Beer Hall Putsch. His subsequent
morphine addiction destroyed him.

As for Barbarossa, it didn't fail; in fact it was quite successful. Hitler's meddling in the army groups destroyed the momentum.

By 1945, Goering was a regular sight in the Fuherebunker, sleeping with the high-command's maps draped over his face, snoring loudly.
 
As for Barbarossa, it didn't fail; in fact it was quite successful. Hitler's meddling in the army groups destroyed the momentum.

I've not read one work which said that it was a success in spite of the defeat at Moscow.

Hitler's named successor was Karl Doenitz, which is why he succeeded Hitler.

Correct me if I'm wrong: Karl Dönitz only became Hitler's successor in the last few days of the war, after a miscommunication resulted in it appearing that Göring was staging a coup.
 
LightSpectra said:
Correct me if I'm wrong: Karl Dönitz only became Hitler's successor in the last few days of the war, after a miscommunication resulted in it appearing that Göring was staging a coup.

... wasn't he trying to sell the allies Jews fresh from the camps in exchange for freedom?
 
Hitler's named successor was Karl Doenitz, which is why he succeeded Hitler.

Only after Göring was dismissed in the last days of Hitler's life. Dönitz was quite surprised to receive a message informing him that Hitler had died and he was now the Führer.

To quote wikipedia:
However, once Hitler decided on war, Göring supported him completely. On 1 September 1939, the first day of the war, Hitler spoke to the Reichstag at the Kroll Opera House. In this speech he designated Göring as his successor "if anything should befall me."
 
... wasn't he trying to sell the allies Jews fresh from the camps in exchange for freedom?

This is how Wikipedia puts the situation:

In 1945, Göring fled the Berlin area with trainloads of treasures for the Nazi alpine resort in Berchtesgaden. Soon afterward, the Luftwaffe's chief of staff, Karl Koller, arrived with unexpected news--Hitler, who had by this time conceded that Germany had lost, had suggested that Göring would be better suited to negotiate peace terms. To Koller, this seemed to indicate that Hitler wanted Göring to take over the leadership of the Reich.

Göring was initially unsure of what to do, largely because he didn't want to give Martin Bormann, who now controlled access to Hitler, a window to seize greater power. He thought that if he waited he'd be accused of dereliction of duty. On the other hand, he feared being accused of treason if he did try to assume power. He then pulled his copy of Hitler's secret decree of 1941 from a safe. It clearly stated that Göring was not only Hitler's designated successor, but was to act as his deputy if Hitler ever became incapacitated. Göring, Koller and Hans Lammers, the state secretary of the Reich Chancellery, all agreed that Hitler was incapacitated from governing and that Göring had a clear duty to assume power as Hitler's deputy.

On 23 April, as Soviet troops closed in around Berlin, Göring sent a radiogram to Hitler, asking Hitler to confirm that he was to take over the "total leadership of the Reich." He added that if he did not hear back from Hitler by 10 PM, he would assume Hitler was incapacitated, and would assume leadership of the Reich.

However, Bormann received the telegram before Hitler did. He portrayed it as an ultimatum to surrender power or face a coup d'état. On 25 April, Hitler issued a telegram to Göring telling him that he had committed "high treason" and gave him the option of resigning all of his offices in exchange for his life. However, not long after that, Bormann ordered the SS in Berchtesgaden to arrest Göring. In his last will and testament, Hitler dismissed Göring from all of his offices and expelled him from the Nazi Party.
 
It's rather astonishing just how naive the various Nazi party higher ups were towards the end of the war, fighting for power to the bitter end in a regime that was collapsing around them. Perhaps this is best summed up by Himmler pondering whether to shake Eisenhower's hand or give him the Nazi salute.

It probably never occurred to him that Ike wanted nothing to do with him (other than perhaps slinging him in a cell).
 
While on that subject, it always bothered me that the Battle of Berlin was fought by the Germans in order to prevent defeat by the Soviets; they'd rather wait for the Allies to invade Germany and then be defeated by them, since they would offer better peace conditions and occupation.

Did it ever occur to them to just surrender all of their forces west of Berlin?
 
Hitler's named successor was Karl Doenitz, which is why he succeeded Hitler.

Hitler had dozens of "successors" from the day he took power.

Hess, Goering, to a certain extent Himmler.

In fact,t he most likely successor of Hitler would have been Bormann, had Bormann not wanted to remain in the bunker right up until the Red Army was closing in on Pankow and even down Unter den Linden.

Doenitz kind of became a default after Hitler's empire was falling around him. Other possible choices might have been robbet Ritter von Greim.

I've not read one work which said that it was a success in spite of the defeat at Moscow.
The Wehrmacht and SS were on the outskirts of Moscow, and would easily have smashed in had Hitler not been so worried about the Caucauss oilfiends, and meddled with his comanders.
Stalin was ready to give Hitler all of the Ukraine and vast tracts of land (I beleive right up to Brest-Litovsk) to stop the Germans from advancing, so Barbarossa per se would have been a success had the OKH not been meddled with so much.
Had Moscow fallen, so would the Soviet Union.

While on that subject, it always bothered me that the Battle of Berlin was fought by the Germans in order to prevent defeat by the Soviets; they'd rather wait for the Allies to invade Germany and then be defeated by them, since they would offer better peace conditions and occupation.
Did it ever occur to them to just surrender all of their forces west of Berlin?
Because it was not in the spirit of the Landser to surrender, especially when fighting for his very Heimat.
The Americans and British noticed this markedly. As the Germans fought their fighting retreat through France and the Low countries, the Germans fought well, but somewhat half-heartedly. However, as soon as the Allies apprached the German border, and even crossed it, they were met with a ferocity of fighting that took them completely off guard.

The theory was also to provide a deadly blow to the Western Allies, to force them to come to a truce, which the Allies would agree to to smash the Red Menace, at which point the millions of German troops in the west could be whizzed straight over to the East, and crush the Red Army.

Furthermore, surrendering the Western troops would have been a direct repeat of the First World War, where the German army was never (decisively) defeated, and would have left a bitter resentment for National socialism.
 
The theory was also to provide a deadly blow to the Western Allies, to force them to come to a truce, which the Allies would agree to to smash the Red Menace, at which point the millions of German troops in the west could be whizzed straight over to the East, and crush the Red Army.

Alright, then. Better plan: evacuate everything west of Berlin, so that the Allies occupy Germany without it being a military defeat, and so they can continue their battles against the Soviets.
 
Part of the problem was that many of the Wehrmacht's higher ranking officers simply didn't understand that the Western Allies* saw Nazi Germany as a bigger problem than Soviet Russia. Many of them seemed genuinely upset after the war that the West hadn't simply betrayed the Soviets and gone into an alliance with Germany against the Soviets. This probably wasn't helped by the Cold War since it gave many of them the impression that all they did wrong was the timing.

This failure to grasp the way that American and British politicians viewed the war means that surrendering to the Western Allies would have shortened the war somewhat but the chances are that afterwards the post-war division of Germany would have remained largely the same anyway, with what territory the west did occupy after such a surrender just turned back over to the Soviets.

One side effect however (especially if such a surrender lead to the western allies taking Berlin which Stalin saw as Soviet by right) would have been to add more fuel to Stalin's already galloping paranoia since he already thought that the West were doing separate deals with the Germans.

*With the exception of some like Patton

Furthermore, surrendering the Western troops would have been a direct repeat of the First World War, where the German army was never (decisively) defeated, and would have left a bitter resentment for National socialism.

Not to mention the fact that many in the West were convinced that this scenario would merely lead to the equivalent of the Nazis coming along in 15 years time and claiming that they never lost WW2 either. Part of the incentive for the West to demand unconditional surrender was that there could be no argument about politicians stabbing the Wehrmacht in the back.
 
Alright, then. Better plan: evacuate everything west of Berlin, so that the Allies occupy Germany without it being a military defeat, and so they can continue their battles against the Soviets.

But then Berlin would have been occupied, and how could a German soldier fight when the very heart of the Reich had been taken from them?

The German army was based around ancient Purssian traditions which seem foreign to Americans, less so to the Brits and French, but still distant.

The SS's motto of "Mein Ehre Heisst Treue" didn't just hold true for them; their honour truly was their loyalty to the Reich, and worse, the blood oath every German had sworn to Hitler and uphold the Reich was a huge, huge mental and moral block to a large number of Germans, which partially explains their ability to keep fighting even when completely surrounded, outnumbers, and battered.

PrivateHudson said:
Not to mention the fact that many in the West were convinced that this scenario would merely lead to the equivalent of the Nazis coming along in 15 years time and claiming that they never lost WW2 either. Part of the incentive for the West to demand unconditional surrender was that there could be no argument about politicians stabbing the Wehrmacht in the back.
Aye, and I suppose the de jure separation between the Wehrmacht and the politicians would only have served to fuel this belief, especially amongst the Juker class.

BTW, it's been a while Hudson, good to see you again! Any articles in the works? :)
 
Not really, a couple of local history things in progress but nothing I could put up here. I do come by the forum quite often by the way, I just don't post as much now. good to see some of our old veterans are still posting though.
 
Not really, a couple of local history things in progress but nothing I could put up here. I do come by the forum quite often by the way, I just don't post as much now. good to see some of our old veterans are still posting though.

I'm actually in the middle of translating an essay I wrote about French responsibility for the Holocaust I wrote a few years back, I want to upload sometime.
 
Hitler had dozens of "successors" from the day he took power.

Hess, Goering, to a certain extent Himmler.

Although Göring was the one official successor. It didn't make him secure in the position, but he was, officially, it.

In fact,t he most likely successor of Hitler would have been Bormann, had Bormann not wanted to remain in the bunker right up until the Red Army was closing in on Pankow and even down Unter den Linden.

Doenitz kind of became a default after Hitler's empire was falling around him. Other possible choices might have been robbet Ritter von Greim.

I believe Dönitz was chosen because he was the next in the unoffiical line not in Berlin. (Save Speer, who had all but been executed for high treason).
 
Speer was still exceptionally close to Hitler (though Hitler was extremely disappointed with Speer for refusing his scorched earth policy, he was much more dissapointed than angry), and indeed along with Doenitz formed the Flensberg government, which operated for a month or so as the official succession to the Nazi government.

The "official" successor to Hitler was pretty much moot, considering Hitler's extreme fondness of playing divide and conquer with his cronies.
 
Speer was still exceptionally close to Hitler (though Hitler was extremely disappointed with Speer for refusing his scorched earth policy, he was much more dissapointed than angry)

...which is why he wasn't arrested and executed (he was Hitler's 'only friend'), but also why he wasn't chosen as the successor (he was a traitor).

indeed along with Doenitz formed the Flensberg government, which operated for a month or so as the official succession to the Nazi government.

If you can call it an operating government. Speer was in a situation that was (to quote Schmidt), "grotesque: From May 10 to May 25, a still officiating minister of the German Reich, 'at liberty', was divulging secrets of the German armaments industry to the enemy... Every afternoon, when Speer returned to Glücksburg Castle from the daily cabinet meeting, the interviewers, who then questioned him for hours, could be certain of hearing his opinion on the latest session of the Dönitz team." I would hardly call that an operating government, or one which would have held much authority from the Nazi's, had they still been functioning properly (or at least as much as they had been).

The "official" successor to Hitler was pretty much moot, considering Hitler's extreme fondness of playing divide and conquer with his cronies.

Although if something had happened to Hitler, the official successor, Göring, would have had much more of a chance of seizing power, due to his designated status. Sure, it was no guarantee, but Bormann would have to work pretty hard to undermine Göring's succession. Besides, IIRC, Bormann was on Göring's 'side', which was opposed by Speer, Goebbels and Himmler, attempting to undermine their influence. This was most likely an attempt to secure a favoured position when the inevitable happened- Hitler's death.
 
Just to remind you, this is "history questions not worth their own thread" ;-)

On another side: Why does WW2 interest people so much?

And: Are "living history"-tv shows the right thing to do? (background: We have one at the moment in Switzerland dealing with the "réduit", the alp bunkers to hide in when the Germans had overrun us in WW2 and from where you could easily attack the logistics crossing the alps, so the last line of defence that had given up 90% percent of population... It is glorified in Switzerland for unknown reasons to me, plus, the tv show is really really really bad made)
 
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