How did Poland hold out longer than France.

Let's cut the crap. The worst f*ckup in WW2 were the Russians.

*sigh* If the Russians were anything in World War Two, it was that thing that's the exact opposite of a "f*ckup."

Simple question with a even simpler answer, refer to my attachment.
Oh, thanks! I wish someone could have shown us that twenty pages ago, would've saved us a lot of time! :rolleyes:
 
^ Pannonius, it was a joke... We all know it's fake. It's not even supposed to be serious.
I think it is.

"In France, nothing kills as efficiently as ridicule." - Voltaire.

I know a lot of people think jokes are somehow not serious, that they don't really matter.

That's a bloody naive view.
 
First of all, somebody's going to have to explain to me how 01SEP - 06OCT is a larger amount of time than 10MAY - 22JUN, because right now I'm really just not getting the premise of this thread... other than the circus of personal attacks on which it seems to thrive.
 
Oh, is that fake google page still around? Tell you something, it's ANCIENT and it has NEVER BEEN FUNNY.
 
Map of German advances in France in 1940 - soon I will post a similar map for Poland:
 

Attachments

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    France 1940.png
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I'm endorsing Kan'Sharuminar's and Cheezy's posts!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

EDIT: nvmnd necro
 
I object to the phrase "Soviet advance." I prefer the more neutral term, "Soviet liberatory anti-fascist march."
 
Haha, that's really more objective. Good point. :lol:

But why this "liberatory march" consisted of killing Polish soldiers fighting against the Nazis.

As well as of suffering several thousands killed and wounded (most likely some 5,500 - 6,000) in combats against these Polish soldiers.

Polish units, despite overhelming numerical superiority of the Red Army, offered some resistance to the Soviets, sometimes it was very fierce.

All of this despite the fact that after the Soviet Invasion on 17.09.1939 most Polish units were instructed by Marschall Rydz-Smigly to avoid combats against Soviet troops and withdraw to Romania (Smigly himself also fled to Romania after the Soviet Invasion - on 18.09.1939 -, rescuing his ass from Bolsheviks instead of dying).

If not the Soviet intervention (as well as subsequent stupid decisions of the Polish HQ - for example about withdrawing to Romania in order not to be captured by quickly approaching the town of Kolomyja - where the Polish Gen. HQ was located - Red Army mechanized units) Poland would have managed to hold longer than France. Possibly Poland could hold even until the end of October of 1939 if not that "stab in the back".

If it comes to the Italian invasion of France there is no comparison between these two invasions and the impact they had on both campaigns.

The Italian army was a very poor quality army. The Italian invasion was very limited when it comes to space (they only attacked in two places against two transient passes across the Alps), due to very hard geographical conditions (The Alps along the entire border). The Italians used no armour (btw - armour in the Alps ??!!) while the Soviets invaded Poland on 17.09.1939 with 5,000+ tanks and armoured cars (while Germany invaded Poland "only" with 2,700 tanks and over 1,000 armoured cars). The Italians practically gave up after their first attack was repulsed and repulsing it in such unfavourable conditions for the attacker (high mountains + extreme temperatures + narrow mountain passes) was nothing hard. The Soviets attacked along the entire border, mostly without natural obstacles (only in the central part of the border there were strong natural obstacles such as the Pripet Marshlands as well as some strong fortifications).

The Italian invasion was faced by one French army composed of 6 divisions and smaller units; the Soviet invasion of Poland was faced by a miscellany of small (and usually improvised or just during the process of formation and concentration) units, since almost the entire Polish standing army was facing the Germans and even if it was located in eastern Poland, it was preparing their defensive lines against the attack from the west, not from the east.
 
Yes, dying would have really helped him serve his country. :p
 
Nobody wanted him to serve his country any more - he screwed up too much while commanding Polish defense against Germans.

He could preserve scraps of soldier's honour by dying with rifle in his hand. Or at least by trying to command as long as it was possible.

But he withdrew to Romania leaving his soldiers fighting without any High Command with zero-coordination of combats for the next 2 weeks.

He could have coordinated the Polish withdrawal and ordered some units to resist the Soviets in order to halt their advance for long enough for other units to withdraw. He also should have declared war on the Soviet Union instead of pretending that nothing bad happened on 17.09.1939.

We know from the Winter War that even small forces could halt large Soviet forces for some time if only being under good command. Also in the Polish Campaign the defence of Grodno (defended by weak improvised units for 3 days against overwhelming odds) proved that Poles were able to put more of a resistance to the Red Army if only being well commanded and motivated (instead of ordering them to "retreat but avoid combats against encountered Soviets").

===================================

Edit:

Soviet casualties in combats for Grodno:

1. Men losses (KIA, MIA without a trace, WIA) of Soviet units which participated in combats against the defenders of Grodno (20.09.1939 - 22.09.1939):

27th Tank Brigade - 20 KIA, 18 MIA, 26 WIA (64)
20th Motorized Brigade - 7 KIA, 22 WIA (29)
Mechanized Group of 6th Cavalry Corps - 25 KIA, 110 WIA (135)
Mechanized Group of 16th Rifle Corps - 6 KIA, 5 WIA (11)
119th Rifle Regiment from 5th Rifle Corps - unknown casualties so far ??? *
101st Rifle Regiment from 5th Rifle Corps - unknown casualties so far ??? *

In total 239 soldiers in armoured-mechanized units alone, without losses of both infantry regiments (!).

* I would estimate losses of both infantry Rgts. as at least ca. 100 dead and 300 wounded (or 50 and 100 on average per each Rgt.).

2. Armoured Fighting Vehicles (tanks + armoured cars):

27th Tank Brigade - 4 destroyed, 26 + 1 damaged (31)
20th Motorized Brigade - 2 + 1 destroyed (3)
Mechanized Group of 6th Cavalry Corps - 1 destroyed, 12 + 1 damaged (14) *
Mechanized Group of 16th Rifle Corps - 1 destroyed, 2 damaged

In total 8 + 1 destroyed, 40 + 2 damaged (51)

* Commander - komdiv Jeromienko - lost 3 tanks during the battle and all members of his crew were WIA (!).
Komdiv Jeromienko himself was WIA during the battle for Grodno too (when his third tank was knocked out).

If it comes to losses of infantry (119th & 101st Rgts.), especially losses of 119th must have been very heavy. While reading descriptions of combats of this Rgt. in Grodno, we can see, that it took heavy beating. It was almost completely disrupted during one of Polish counterattacks - only Soviet reinforcements rescued it.

101st Infantry Regiment lost 7 men on 22 September alone, when Soviet forces were just mopping up the city since most of defenders retreated towards Lithuanian border during the night from 21st to 22nd September (while on the previous two days - 20 and 21 September - combats were much heavier).

Before Soviet forces entered Grodno, also a battle of Skidel took place. During that battle Soviet forces - Mechanized Group of 16th Rifle Corps - supported by Soviet partisans fought against Polish group of cavalry of rtm. Wiszowaty (4 squadrons of cavalry and one battalion of dismounted artillery without guns - in total few hundreds men). Up to around 200 partisans were involved in that battle, of them only 26 survived and the remaining ones were probably killed. Soviets also lost 6 tanks during the battle as well as some regular soldiers. Polish losses according to report of rtm. Wiszowaty were 45 killed, including four officers (Lt. Krygier, Lt. Młynarski, Lt. Lisowski and Lt. Kazimierz Liszewski). This battle lasted for around 8 hours (on 20.09.1939).

Personal accounts and other stuff from the battle of Grodno:

Komdiv Andriej Jeriomienko (commander of 6th Cavalry Corps) about the battle of Grodno in 1939:

"Poles put up strong but completely purposeless resistance (...) For the first time I had an occasion to participate in a tank attack and to get to know about their combat value, to understand the sense of some tactical operations during an attack on big open spaces and in the developed area. This experience rather didn't belong to the category of pleasant experiences: during combats at the outskirts of Grodno the entire crew of [my] tank, which served as a mobile command post, were WIA, and all 3 tanks, from which I was in turn directing combats, were knocked out."

Source: Vladimir Beshanov, "Krasnyj Blickrig" ("The Red Blitzkrieg"), page 91

Ppor. Rafał Czyżewski - officer serving in surplus unit of 86 pp (pp = Inf.Rgt.) from the Spare Unit (OZ; Ośrodek Zapasowy) of 19 DP (Spare Unit of 19 DP numbered ca. 1000 men but only with rifles - without any MGs or other heavy weapons - under command of Ppłk. Izydor Blumski) about his combats at the outskirts of Grodno and later (when units of Ppłk. Blumski were pushed from their initial positions into Grodno) combats inside the city:

"The enemy struck towards the gardens at the outskirts of Grodno, but was defeated between the fences and is now withdrawing towards Stanislawowo. Simultaneously from the direction of Skidel enemy armour is attacking. Tanks ran over us, but enemy infantry was defeated and after losing several KIA and captured wounded it retreated towards Skidel. At 11:00 I received an order to withdraw, covered by machine guns, to the Sekret forest. [...] at 12:30 I was encircled by enemy armour and called by Soviet forces to surrender. With heavy casualties I broke through behind the marshland towards Grandicze. Soldiers were fighting excellently, despite the fact that 50% of my company were Belarusians. Casualties were 2 officers and 57 men. On 21 September in the afternoon we decided to leave the city, this decision was forced by lack of ammunition and enemy superiority. Our units broke away from the Soviets and across Stanislawowo marched towards the Lithuanian border, which was crossed by the Spare Unit of 19 Inf.Div. on 23 September in Kodzie. Soldiers were disarmed and interned, but most of them soon escaped and broke through to the West."

25 September 1939, Soviet propaganda newspaper "Pravda" reports:

"Combat against bands of bourgeois officers in Grodno:

X Grouping of the Red Army encounters heavy resistance of the enemy. Poles try they darndest to hold Grodno at any cost. They set the bridge on the Niemen connecting the two parts of the city on fire and they opened fire to our units from all possible ambushes, from windows and from attics.

Despite all of that our commander, comrade Petrov, ordered to capture the city. [...] Combat was extremely hard: there were 3,000 Polish officers and gendarmes in the city. Bands of officers barricaded themselves in the fort, in the cathedral and in the barracks. Enemies had got large number of MGs and in some houses they had got even up to 13 grenade launchers. Enemy was avoiding face-to-face combat. Bands of officers had chosen the rotten way of carrying out combat from ambushes. They put up the most fierce resistance in the cemetery and in the Poniemun property.

During the night our units broke through up to the cathedral, other units up to the barracks, where they encountered heavy resistance. At first we failed to capture some resistance nests. Before capturing them, resistance nests in the cathedral must have been captured, after that combined forces of infantry and tanks could strike them together.

Since the evening on 20 September until the noon of the next day our unit of howitzers and our artillery were firying at the cathedral, barracks, water plants and camp of officers. Our artillery crews were especially fiercely firying at the cathedral and at the castle. During street combats our officers were the chosen target of the enemy. Many outstanding commanders lost their lives during this battle. Especially commanders of tanks and their crews distinguished themselves during the battle of Grodno.

When our first and second battalions were attacking towards the city centre the enemy formed a storm group composed of officer bands in the forest at the right bank of the Niemen river and ordered it to attack our units. However, our right wing and our rears were so well protected by machine gun teams, that the enemy was forced to withdraw with considerable casualties.

The battle of Grodno once again revealed the high combat efficiency of our Red Army soldiers. Especially productive despite difficult conditions was the reconnaissance service of Major K. Wiedenskog from the Belarusian Front."
 
It depends on which stage of the war. The first stage was a disaster.

Depends on how you look at it. Given that the Soviet Army still existed and the industrial complex was still intact, I would say the contrary.
 
If this was the goal of Soviet army, you'd be right. But it wasn't. The goal was to defend the lands they were successively losing. And they did lose much of their most industrialised, most densely populated and most productive (when it comes to agriculture) land.

Saying that they were doing great in the early stage of the war because Germans didn't reach Siberia is silly, it's saying that they were doing well because they weren't completely destroyed and managed to win despite early defeats. In another words, it's judging every stage of the war by the final outcome of it, not by the goals and actual results of different stages. With the same right one might say that Poland was doing great in 1939, and France in 1940, because, after all, they were sort of victorious in 1945, and in 1939/40 Germans didn't reach London. That would be true when it comes to general outcome of the war, but when it comes to smaller chapters of it, wouldn't.
 
So what was the point of reviving this thread? More Polish nationalistic wang wagging?
 
Basically.
 
I ignore trolling, aelf and Dachs.

Depends on how you look at it. Given that the Soviet Army still existed and the industrial complex was still intact, I would say the contrary.

I would be careful with stating that the Soviet Army still existed after the first stage of Barbarossa. In fact what faced the German in late Autumn / early Winter of 1941 was hardly the same army which faced them in the Summer - Autumn of 1941. Industrial complex was partly destroyed but partly evacuated to Siberia.

The Cadre Red Army was practically all destroyed in a very short time and in a much more disastrous way (considering the strength and the numbers of divisions, tanks, aircrafts, artillery pieces, men, etc., that the Red Army represented in 1941) than Polish, Belgian, French or Greek armies before.

What stopped the Germans was the Reserve Red Army and fresh units formed & mobilized yet after the invasion. And the Russian Autumn - Winter of course.

The Soviets unlike Poland and France had this advantage that they had huge territory and huge reserves so they could recover even after catastrophic defeats.

Not mentioning that Soviet army of 1941 was many times stronger than the Polish army in 1939 and also a bit stronger than the French in 1940. Russian road system was also much worse than that in western Poland or in France. So Germans encountered huge problems with logistics, especially in the Autumn.

With the same right one might say that Poland was doing great in 1939, and France in 1940

Both France and Poland were doing good taking into account their abilities and quality of the enemy they were facing.

After all it cannot be argued that the German army was the best army of WW2.

The myth that French soldiers had in general poor morale is a very unjust myth invented probably by the British. The Dunkirk evacuation without fierce resistance of French soldiers at Lille wouldn't have been possible, for example (another British myth is that only them contributed to the Dunkirk evacuation and that only them counterattacked the Germans at Arras - not true, major role was played by French forces in both battles).

As I wrote many historians consider Poland and France doing much better than the USSR in the first stage of Barbarossa. The Red Army was the only army which had so huge numerical advantage over the attacking German army. Yet despite having over 24,000 tanks (for example), they lost almost entire frontline army in the 1st stage of Barbarossa. While Poland opposed Germany with 600 tanks, mostly obsolete tankettes.

When we compare Poland to for example Belgium, Greece or Yugoslavia, Poland also wins in this competition.

Belgium with an army numbering some 2/3 of the Polish army fell in 18 days fighting against a much smaller German force than Poland was facing in 1939 (for example only 800 - 900 German tanks invaded Belgium) and without being stabbed back by anyone, like Poland. Moreover considerable French and British forces helped the Belgians in defending their territory, so Germans in Belgium were not only facing the Belgian army. Greece performed very well against the Italians (like almost everyone in WW2 except maybe Ethiopia), but German attack from behind overran it quickly with small number of casualties for the Germans. Yugoslavian defeat was the most catastrophic out of all countries that fell to Germany in WW2.

In Poland in 1939 German army had considerable numerical advantage over the Polish army in every aspect and often also technological advantage.

In 1940 forces of both opposing armies were roughly similar, with Germans having more aircrafts while Allies having more tanks.

In 1941 in terms of numbers the defender was far superior in almost every aspect (except maybe men where numbers were similar at the beginning).

Yet despite having much more tanks, aircrafts and artillery, the Russians let them to get to the outskirts of Moscow, which should never happen.

Of course we know that apart from simple ratios of forces, there were also other - often important - factors which influenced performance of each of these armies. But these unfavourable for the Allies factors were present in each of these campaigns - especially in Poland and in Russia.

Poland for example had too long borders to be efficiently defended with such a small army. Plus the Polish army was almost entirely horse-drawn, with very few motorized vehicles available and only two fully motorized brigades. Facing the highly motorized Wehrmacht, which had 15 fully motorized divisions, so 25% of all divisions used in the invasion (of them 7 armoured, 4 light armoured and 4 motorized infantry).

German infantry divisions, although marching mainly on foot, had also some fully motorized units as well as motorized supply columns.

Distribution of vehicles within German infantry divisions in 1939:

3 x Inf.Rgt. - 219 trucks & cars, 141 motorcycles, 630 horse-drawn vehicles (ca. 1800 horses *)
Art.Rgt. - 156 trucks & cars, 57 motorcycles, 240 horse-drawn vehicles (ca. 2,200 horses *)
Pz.Abw.Abt. - 114 trucks & cars, 45 motorcycles
Pi.Btl. - 72 trucks & cars, 32 motorcycles, 28 horse-drawn vehicles (71 horses)
Nachr.Abt. - 103 trucks & cars, 32 motorcycles, 7 horse-drawn vehicles (52 horses)
Aufkl.Abt. - 49 trucks & cars, 50 motorcycles, 260 horses
Other divisional units - 296 trucks & cars, 170 motorcycles, 14 horse-drawn vehicles (and some horses)

In total - 1009 trucks & cars, 527 motorcycles (+ 201 trailers for them), 919 horse-drawn vehicles, 4842 horses.

* without Reitpferde

By comparison a Polish infantry division in 1939 had got in total only 76 trucks & cars and much more horse-drawn vehicles.

If it comes to fully motorized / mechanized German divisions during different stages of the war and different campaigns:

Poland - 25% of their divisions were fully motorized (15 divisions)
France - 12% of their divisions were fully motorized (16 divisions)
1941 - 22% of their divisions were fully motorized (33 divisions)
 
Poland held out longer than France because Poland is only the second crappiest country in the world.
 
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